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Changing Climate and Energy Governance
1.1. INTRODUCTION
“Energy and climate are nearly synonymous”
“Nobody is investing because it’s such a long-term perspective, with high costs and uncertain 
prospects. […] So it is very important that governments continue planning and start sharing 
the risks. They need to take it seriously”
“We need a certain measure of central policy-making and planning. It is not enough to have 
the market decide everything”
“We have the Energieakkoord which speaks of CO2 reduction and the wish to implement CCS, 
but we do not have a vision”
“Typically Dutch is that we try to meet goals through minimum effort”1
One of humanity’s gravest problems in the 21st century is climate change and the threat 
it poses to the state of our planet and humankind. Governments, businesses, NGOs and 
experts across the globe are considering the problem and trying to find solutions to limit 
the earth’s temperature rise by finding and implementing ways to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (most notably CO2). So far, we have not been very successful as global 
emissions continue to rise and vulnerable nations (fe., island nations) are experiencing the 
woes of flooding and human disaster. Yet change is on the horizon. During 2015’s Paris 
1  Quotes are, in order, from: interview with someone from a knowledge centre, with a European Commission official, 
with a private sector representative, with someone working for an NGO, and with a Dutch government representative.
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Climate Conference (also called ‘COP-21’) leaders from over 170 countries ambitiously 
agreed to limit global warming to well below 2℃. This agreement entered into force in 
2016, yet does not guarantee success because it hinges on countries’ willingness to act. 
There is no strong enforcement mechanism. Recently, the United States have announced 
their exit from the COP-21 agreements.
Concerted efforts to limit CO2 emissions date from 1990 with the establishment of the 
United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since then, the lim-
ited progress that has been made has been subject of much scholarly study. The severity of 
the problem and the difficulty of reaching a solution make it a prime example of a (super) 
wicked problem (cf. Lazarus, 2009; Levin et al., 2012; Maréchal & Lazaric, 2010; Webster, 
2008) with four features and potentially catastrophic consequences:
“time is running out; those who cause the problem also seek to provide a solution; 
the central authority needed to address them is weak or non-existent; and irrational 
discounting occurs that pushes responses into the future. Together these features 
create a tragedy because our governance institutions, and the policies they generate 
(or fail to generate), largely respond to short-term time horizons even when the 
catastrophic implications of doing so are far greater than any real or perceived 
benefits of inaction” (Levin et al., 2012:124).
Lacking an easy test for a potential solution and a way of knowing precisely how our society 
will be affected by climate change, decision-makers are constrained by the choice they have 
to make between short-term gain (for example, economic gain) and the long-term gain of 
preventing climate change (Levin et al., 2012:126-128). 
The search for a logical solution begins with addressing emission sources: most notably the 
energy sector, industry, transport, and housing. The majority of global emissions is energy-
related, and even when emissions are not directly related to energy, they often stem from 
human practices that are ‘energetic’2 (Shaw, 2011:744). The energy sector alone was 
responsible for more than two-thirds of GHG emissions in 2010 (IEA, 2013:15). Energy 
being used in industry and transport furthermore accounts for almost 60% of the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU) final energy consumption in 2014 (European Commission, 2016:20)3. It 
therefore makes sense to seek concerted action by addressing climate change and energy 
(production and use) as two sides of the same coin. Processes of European governance 
2  Waste treatment is an example of a human practice that is energetic.
3  The EU publishes its statistical pocketbook for the energy sector each year at [https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/data-
analysis/energy-statistical-pocketbook].
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geared toward dealing with these challenges often result in a re-articulation of political 
space beyond the state. The result of such a re-articulation is a web of “complex relation-
ships of mutual interdependence among regions, organised interests, member states and 
the Union itself” (Hueglin, 1999:249). That makes them interesting to study. 
1.2. WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL?
The European Union’s import of raw materials is six times higher than its corresponding 
export4. As the world’s largest regional energy market, Europe’s challenges with respect to 
climate change, sustainable energy access and technological advancement are exemplary for 
the challenges faced worldwide. The European Union is trying to be a global climate leader by 
advocating stringent GHG emissions reductions and pursuing an ambitious internal climate 
policy. In reality it has to deal with 28 sovereign member states (MS); each has a different 
view of the problem and on the pathways available to solve it. Since the Lisbon Treaty 
(2009), the EU shares energy policy competences with its member states. The EU’s climate 
policies have followed global climate agreements and developed steadily since the 1990s.
Table 1.1 shows the three areas EU climate policies focus on: GHG reduction, adoption 
of renewable energy (RES) and improving energy efficiency (EEff). Though the three focus 
areas linked energy and climate from the onset, the EU had to wait until 2007 before both 
policy fields were mentioned in one and the same policy package. The Climate and Energy 
Package (third column in table 1.1), part of the Europe 2020 strategy, introduces binding 
goals on GHG emissions reductions and RES. Energy efficiency is left with indicative goals 
and voluntary implementation. Willingness to act is also embedded in the legally binding 
goals, since member states are free to reach them any way they want. The EU has only 
shared competence with member states in the area of energy policy; a nation’s energy mix 
is completely left to its sovereign decision making. At most, the EU can try to coordinate 
policies and policy results through soft coordination (benchmarks, peer pressure, common 
reports, and so on). Furthermore, the difficulty many member states have with reaching 
the Europe 2020 targets has led to their refusal to accept another batch of binding targets 
for the period after 2020. The Climate and Energy Framework for 2030 is altogether based 
on indicative goals.
The Netherlands is one of the EU’s few natural gas producers. The Slochteren gas bubble 
has given gas a big role in the Dutch energy mix and, due to its economic importance, 
the Netherlands has been unwilling to let the EU decide on matters pertaining to gas. The 
4  As stated by Commissioner Potoc ̌nik (DG Environment) at the EEAC Conference in October 2012.
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Netherlands is also home to Europe’s largest port in terms of size (Edelenbos, Gerrits & Van 
Gils, 2008:51) and market share (Port of Rotterdam, 2013): the Port of Rotterdam. After 
the 2004 corporatisation, the Rotterdam Port Authority (PoR) now has the status of a pub-
lic limited company5. It is furthermore a typical example of a landlord-type port. Somewhat 
a-typical about the port is the amount of industry located on port land. The port is by far 
the largest port in Europe, and also houses one of the world’s largest (petro)chemical port 
clusters (PoR, 2016a:12). Between 2010 and 2015, the port and port-related industries 
were responsible for about 3,5-4% of Dutch GDP (Van den Bosch, Hollen, Volberda & 
Baaij, 2011:ii; Van den Bossche, Kleingeld, Van Schijndel, Yagafarova, 2016:15). The port 
5  Owned by the Municipality of Rotterdam and the Dutch State.
Table 1.1. The rise of binding targets for EU climate & energy policy — 1990 to 2010
Pre-Kyoto
(1990 - 1997)
Aimed at 2000
European Climate Change 
Programme (ECCP) and 
additional legislation
(1998 - 2006)
Aimed at 2010
Climate and Energy 
Package and additional 
legislation
(2007 - 2010)
Aimed at 2020
Greenhouse 
Gases (GHGs)
No European policy 
(discussion on CO2 
tax, which was not 
adopted). 
Mainly national policies!
EU ETS (2003) EU ETS review (2008, 2009) 
with one EU-wide ETS target 
including aviation
Effort Sharing Decision 
(national non-ETS targets)
Fluorinated Gases Regulation Fluorinated Gases Regulation 
review
Mobile Air-Conditioning 
Systems Directive
Further implementation
Voluntary agreement with car 
manufacturers (1998/1999)
Mandatory standards for cars 
and vans
Renewable 
Energy (RES)
ALTENER
Renewable Electricity Directive 
(2001)
Biofuels Directive
Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED) & Fuel Quality Directive 
(FQD)
Energy 
Efficiency 
(EEff)
SAVE
Energy Services Directive
Energy Efficiency Directive 
(EED)Combined Heat and Power 
Directive
Ecodesign of Energy Using 
Products Directive
Further implementation
Energy Labeling Framework 
Directive
Energy Labeling Framework 
Directive review
Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive
Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive review
Source: adapted from Climate Policy Info Hub, 2017 [http://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/european-climate-policy-history-and-
state-play]. 
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area alone emits roughly 30 million tonnes CO2 per year (Wuppertal Institute, 2016:19), 
making it a prime target for GHG reduction efforts due to the potential scale and impact 
reduction efforts can have in the region. Compared to the Dutch national CO2 emissions, 
the port area is responsible for ±20% of the Dutch contribution to climate change. Con-
ventional energy sources such as oil, coal, and gas are supplemented by renewables and 
techniques to mitigate the negative climate effects of industry and shipping. Energy policy 
and sustainability thus co-exist inside the port, and can converge or clash. 
1.2.1. Rotterdam in the European economy
Due to its status as Europe’s largest port and important hub for European economy, there 
is a strong connection between the port of Rotterdam and the EU. The interconnectedness 
of energy markets within Europe and across the globe has had unsettling effects on the 
Dutch energy market. The German Energiewende, based on en masse investments into 
alternative energy sources (for example, solar power and wind) subsidised by the EU, is one 
such example. The large-scale production of shale gas in the United States is another. It 
has lowered coal prices and tipped the scales in favour of this — rather polluting — energy 
source; a development which stands in direct competition with the EU’s wish to decarbonise 
(European Commission, 2011a:2). The surplus energy that is flooding the Dutch market 
has had an unsettling effect on the price of energy and has created a trade-off in the 
Dutch market, because clean power plants (gas-powered) are being shut down in favour of 
coal-fired plants. An example of the latter is the Enecogen plant which has deconstructed 
and sold its turbine. Investments in clean energy and air in The Netherlands are also being 
mitigated by the lack of investments in sustainable energy elsewhere, such as Eastern Europe. 
Poland, for example, is one of the largest countries in the EU and still mainly runs on coal. 
The low carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) has made it unattractive for 
industry to invest heavily in sustainability (Sandbag, 2013); an effect which is strengthened 
by the coal surplus stemming from the USA.
Globally, nation states have committed themselves to a temperature rise ‘well below 2°C’. 
Progress is monitored by a UN body: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Yet this global goal cannot be enforced by any global judiciary. Binding agreements 
can, however, be found at EU-level. In the absence of an overarching port policy in the EU, 
many EU regulations from different DGs impact the port on a day-to-day basis. Climate and 
energy regulations are a good examples, and when one looks at how they are translated 
nationally, a complex picture arises.
1
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A cursory glance at the table above implies that the local ambitions are in line with 
European ambitions, and reason would state that there should therefore be no conflict 
between the two. However, the complex dynamics of the energy market also give rise to 
problems. Seemingly aligned goals may be conflicting due to other constraints, such as 
varying implementation of directives across the EU, political pressures within a country or 
economic interdependencies. Furthermore, the industry that is active in the port has its 
own preferences and operations, yet the port as a whole is seen as a big polluter. With 
the PoR being the landlord for the industry, the port authority can make demands to its 
‘renters’. An interesting question is how the PoR could steer the industry to meet PoR and 
policy goals so that the port ceases to be perceived as the largest polluter. Such steering 
becomes complex when considering the fact that many of the businesses present in the 
port are multinationals, and that business responds to global trends.
For the Port of Rotterdam, energy and sustainability are interconnected6. In its Energy 
Port magazine, the Port Authority argues that “energy efficiency measures and renewable 
energy (wind, biomass) will help a lot to cut emissions, but carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) will also be necessary to reach this ambitious goal” (Port of Rotterdam, 2010:4). In 
its yearly reports, the Port Authority — see figure 1.1 for a general map of the port area — 
outlines progress in the transition towards more sustainability. Cleaner energy production 
and use make up the largest parts of its sustainable ambitions7 to reduce CO2 emissions by 
50% in 2025 and increase the share of renewables to 30% (Port of Rotterdam, 2016:72). 
The Port of Rotterdam realises that in order to maintain its competitive position, a transi-
tion towards renewable energy, biomass, and a clean chemical industry is necessary. Given 
the high rate of energy imports and exports in Rotterdam, the port is of major importance 
to the European economy. Its strategic decisions regarding this energy hub function are 
summarised in its Energy Port concept. Rotterdam Energy Port is a “growth concept focus-
ing on infrastructure, transhipment, production and knowledge with regards to energy 
in the port of Rotterdam”8. The concept was coined to help combat external confusion 
surrounding the identity of the Port of Rotterdam and to provide a marketable concept. 
Developing the Energy Port is part of the policy and mandate of the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority, although it needs support from the wider Port Community to make it happen. 
The concept consists of five pillars and a backbone. The five pillars are the LNG hub, the 
coal and biomass hub, the CO2 hub, (sustainable) electricity generation, and energy ef-
6  And not only for the PoR. Policy documents of the Dutch government and the EU often explicitly mention energy and 
climate issues in one breath. Scholarly articles focusing on sustainability can hardly avoid mentioning energy (policy). 
7  See for example p. 83 of the 2010 report, p. 44 of the 2011 report, p. 35 of the 2012 report and p.30 of the 2013 
report at [https://www.portofrotterdam.com/nl/havenbedrijf/financiën/jaarverslagen]. 
8  Rotterdam Energy Port Marcom Plan, 2013. Author’s translation. Internal document.
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8 Chapter 1
fi ciency. The backbone covers all energy infrastructure necessary to make the pillars viable. 
In practice, this infrastructure amounts to pipelines for residue heat, CO2, utilities, and 
resource trade. The goals of the Energy Port concept are to solidify and ameliorate the 
investment climate in the Port of Rotterdam in order to continue its development into the 
‘sustainable power house’ of North-West Europe, and developing into a global hub for 
energy commodities such as LNG, coal, biomass and CO29.
The context in which the governance of the Rotterdam Energy Port is grounded needs to 
be analysed if we want to draw meaningful conclusions regarding EU climate and energy 
policy and how it plays out in Rotterdam. Figure 1.2 presents a highly simplifi ed view of 
the arena and relevant interests along the axes of competitiveness versus sustainability, and 
a concern for reaching the set EU policy goals for 2020 versus low concern for reaching 
these goals. While at face value the Port of Rotterdam Authority seems to strive for the 
same goals as the European Commission, their relationship is not clear-cut and is infl u-
enced by other actors. In other words, they are not the sole actors in Energy Port matters. 
The inclusion of the Dutch state, the municipality of Rotterdam, and the industry present 
on port land is an inclusion of necessity. With this addition to the picture that was sketched 
above, we are observing a dynamic context in which the Port of Rotterdam has to operate. 
Turning back to the illustrative case of this thesis, the above assertion allows us to draw 
9  See previous footnote.


Port  Community
 Figure 1.2. Major climate and energy stakeholders with differing interests
Source: author’s own composition based on conducted research. Highly simplifi ed.
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an important conclusion to further steer inquiry: the relationships between the Energy 
Port actors are embedded in a wider multi-level and multi-actor context which may have 
fundamental consequences for these relationships over time. Rotterdam Energy Port has 
a multi-level governance aspect due to the participation of actors such as governments, 
companies, NGOs, and even citizens, both national and international. However, whenever 
multiple actors are present, there will be multiple goals and strategies to achieve these 
goals as well. Sometimes these contradict and cause tension. 
Figure 1.2 lacks nuance10, though already shows that actors at multiple levels of gover-
nance have differing interests when it comes to climate and energy objectives. Interest-
ingly, the PoR sits at the middle of the figure which potentially gives it the means to relate 
to stakeholders on all sides of the spectrum. It also means the PoR can be drawn into the 
conflicting interests of others. The challenge is how to manage the major actors identified 
in the figure. Add to this picture the EU’s tendencies to Europeanise policies, either through 
soft or hard law, and the PoR is facing both an advocacy problem and a potential loss 
of sovereignty, putting pressure on the organisation. Not only is the context it operates 
in changing, but the way the PoR influences governance is changing as well. All things 
considered, this topic is definitely a big deal. That brings us to the research question this 
research project seeks to address.
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION AND AIM
In order to realise its long-term local strategies, the Port of Rotterdam Authority — responsible 
for port strategy and development — and the Port Community11 as a whole seek support from 
the EU. The EU, in turn, needs ports and industry to realise its energy and climate objectives. 
The ensuing relationship between the European Commission and the Port Community has 
its own complexity and struggles. The PoR feels that a certain degree of support from the 
10  More nuancing is added in chapters four, five and six of this dissertation.
11  The word ‘community’ implies that everyone part of it feels that they are part of a community, which does not 
necessarily have to be the case. In this respect he word ‘community’ reflects the eco-system of the port.
Table 1.2. Climate and energy policy goals aligned?
Rotterdam Netherlands European Union
CO2 reduction 50%* 20% 20%
Share of renewables in energy mix 20% 14% 20%
Energy savings 20% 1,5%** 20%
* = in 2025, ** = per year until 2020.
Sources: cited documents in this chapter and the RCI and Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs websites.
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European Union is necessary to achieve its Energy Port goals, which is why efforts are made 
to lobby at the European level. Successive Dutch governments have been staunch advocates 
of climate change mitigation and the Dutch academic community is very active. In terms of 
results, the country is lagging behind (chapter 4 discusses this in more detail). To successfully 
get through what has been dubbed the “energy transition”, radical change12 is considered 
necessary. Possibilities for GHG reductions in the Rotterdam port area are vast and, due to 
the region’s large contribution to Dutch emissions, efforts to decarbonise in the port play 
an important role in overall Dutch climate change mitigation efforts. Many expect the Port 
of Rotterdam to do everything possible to limit their GHG emissions. The two newly built 
coal-fired power plants have been subject of public discussion even before they opened. 
At the same time, even though reduction potential is high and the Dutch have committed 
themselves to EU climate and energy goals, the expectations are not met with satisfying 
results. Why not? That is the focus of this dissertation. It asks the following question: 
How do the European Union’s efforts to address climate and energy issues affect 
the Rotterdam port community, and what role can the Port of Rotterdam Authority 
play in its governance in order to reach climate and energy policy goals?
The aim of this dissertation is to explain how decisions made at EU level can impact the 
port area in Rotterdam13, and how relevant actors — in particular the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority due to its special status as a privatised landowner — operate within the black 
box of climate and energy governance. Chapter two will discuss the term ‘governance’ at 
length, but for now governance is defined as “the various institutionalized modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective 
goods” (Börzel & Risse, 2010:114). The special focus given to the PoR does not mean it is 
an all-powerful actor. The port authority is just one of many actors within a larger network 
in which actors are mutually interdependent. This dissertation zooms in on the PoR, without 
losing the whole picture, in an effort to give recommendations regarding how they can 
improve their public affairs. Understanding the impact of EU policies can help improve 
governance in order to deal with policies more effectively. Since governmental authorities at 
multiple hierarchical levels are involved and governance takes place at these different levels 
and including societal and business actors as well, the research question will be approached 
from the perspective of multi-level governance. As such, the national government can be 
12  Not necessarily meaning rapid change.
13  It should be noted that logistics, a very important activity in a port, is not the focus of this thesis. This study will 
only address issues concerning climate and energy as they come up in Rotterdam Energy Port (potentially applied 
to transport) but not, for example, containerisation. The Rotterdam port ‘area’ is defined as the formal tract of land 
that is part of the port of Rotterdam.
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viewed as a stakeholder in climate and energy governance, and is therefore identified as 
an important actor in this study. 
The dissertation also provides insight in how actors in the port can organise their public 
affairs to influence future policies to their benefit. It does not show in detail how EU 
climate and energy policy was made until now, but rather treats policy goals until 2020 as a 
given and shows what the consequences of current policies are for the Port of Rotterdam. 
What have these policies enabled and what have they thwarted? The results are interesting 
for public affairs scholars precisely because this study focuses on how governance actually 
works in an empirical case. Governance is a game of stakes and priorities, and developing 
an understanding of which buttons to press, or which tools to use, to get certain outcomes 
is of great value for public affairs. After all, every actor needs to find a working mode of 
governance for themselves and vis-à-vis other actors. 
The following sub-questions will structure the analysis:
I. Which EU climate and energy policies are relevant for Rotterdam Energy Port? (chapter 4)
 A. How do these policies affect the domestic level?
 B. Can national and supranational policy goals be aligned in practice and which 
constraints can be identified?
II. Which (multi-level) governance mechanisms are present in the implementation of these 
policies? (chapters 5, 6 and 7)
 A. What is the role and position of the Port of Rotterdam Authority?
 B. How are non-governmental actors involved in the process?
 C. To what extent is governance successful?
III. How can the governance of climate and energy in the Rotterdam port area be improved? 
(chapter 8)
IV. What are lessons the Port of Rotterdam Authority can learn for its public affairs manage-
ment of future rounds of climate and energy policy-making? (chapter 8)
This dissertation aims to provide an inside view into how climate and energy governance 
works between the EU and the port of Rotterdam. The illustrative case that has been 
chosen is the Energy Port, which is divided into two nested cases: the CO2 hub and the 
LNG hub. It is important to note that both nested cases provide potentially viable solutions 
on the medium term, yet perhaps not on the long term. Multi-level governance is used 
as a conceptual framework to guide data collection and analysis. MLG is interpreted as a 
hybrid model of governance in which both hierarchical and non-hierarchical mechanisms 
play an equally large role. As a consequence, power and influence — public affairs — are 
important concepts for the analysis. Insights from framing theory are therefore used to 
show how (political) narratives differ from action that is undertaken. Two narratives guide 
1
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the reader through this dissertation: a political (power-driven) narrative, and an industrial 
narrative. Politics and industry are presented as two different realities that are in close 
contact with each other, yet operate on a different logic. What is necessary problem 
framing in politics does not necessarily represent industrial reality and vice versa. These 
realities complicate governance processes in which all parties are vying to get their vision 
across. The dissertation culminates in one overarching conclusion: without vision and ac-
tive governmental steering, the governance of climate and energy will not bear fruit. The 
consequence for public affairs management is that insight is gained into what works and 
what does not work in climate and energy governance, which aids in the identification of 
valuable instruments to change governance and future policy-making.
1.3.1. Scientific Relevance
The scientific relevance of this dissertation is a strengthening of research, which thus far is very 
scarce in number, done on the interplay between the European Union and a port authority. It 
provides insight on how such a port authority — with ambitions focusing on (durable) energy 
that are compatible with EU ambitions — can be positioned within multi-level governance 
theory. Multi-level governance as a theory has been undergoing a reconceptualisation in the 
past few years to include mechanisms through which the participation of non-public sector 
actors can be studied. It is therefore not only possible to study the Rotterdam Energy Port 
case using this approach, but also desirable so that MLG as a theory can be further tested 
and improved. The results of this dissertation are also relevant for public affairs studies. 
The PoR’s ambition to be at the centre of an energy carrousel makes it very important to 
position it within a broader context consisting of many players such as the Dutch State, the 
European Union, private sector companies, NGOs, and even citizens. As each actor has their 
own priorities, agendas, and ways to frame problems and their solutions, uncovering how 
governance mechanisms work between the EU level and the port level helps further ideas 
about how to best organise interests in the area of climate and energy. Lastly, generated data 
from this thesis can also be used in similar studies to position other actors with a similar status, 
although question marks can be placed concerning the validity of such generalisations. It is 
not the aim of this dissertation to produce results that are generalisable across policy sectors. 
1.3.2. Practical Relevance
Ensuring the societal relevance of this dissertation has been done firstly through close 
cooperation with the port community, mainly with the Port of Rotterdam Authority. Given 
the complexity of the problem of climate change, the challenge for the Port Authority lies 
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in reducing its very large carbon footprint whilst maintaining competitiveness and remaining 
attractive for businesses to settle. This challenge can be viewed as a threat, but can also be 
framed as an opportunity to find new ways of capitalising on the strength of a cluster to 
reach a desired goal: a cleaner port. Secondly, the thesis is primarily focused on the interaction 
between the EU and the port area in the field of energy and climate policy. The study paints 
a clear picture of the governance of these policies and what that governance means for the 
port authority’s position vis-à-vis other actors, most notably governmental authorities. In 
essence, it adopts a reflexive attitude towards the consequences of governance processes 
and tries to act as a mirror for societal thinking about the role of governments and the 
private sector in solving the climate change problem. It will also provide the Rotterdam Port 
Authority with instruments to influence EU decision making and project funding based on 
an in-depth case study analysis and resulting recommendations. As such, this dissertation 
includes practical recommendations for the Port of Rotterdam Authority at the end. These 
recommendations will hopefully contribute to the orgware of the port — and not so much to 
the techware — and will seek to advance the Port of Rotterdam Authority’s efforts to achieve 
its goals at the EU level. It is also my hope that the findings of this dissertation will provide 
reasons to reflect on the Dutch national government’s climate and energy policy agenda.
1.3.3. Valorisation
Insights and lessons gained from this dissertation have been communicated with the Port of 
Rotterdam Authority along the way and aim to aid the PoR in improving its relationship with 
the European Commission. The end result will also be presented to the higher management 
of the Port Authority. Preliminary results and theoretical findings have also be presented at 
relevant academic conferences.
1.4. METHODOLOGICAL STATEMENT
This dissertation takes port authorities, with the Port of Rotterdam Authority as the studied 
case, as its unit of analysis within a larger context of port-related stakeholders, including the 
local and national governmental authorities and the European Commission. The research 
approach14 consists of an embedded single-case study to allow for a deep-dive into a 
practically and academically relevant case and generate in-depth knowledge regarding 
climate and energy governance mechanisms in the port of Rotterdam. Within the main case 
(Energy Port), two nested cases (LNG and CCS) have been chosen. The research approach 
14  Chapter 3 contains an extensive overview of the chosen methodology.
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can thus still benefit from cross-case analysis of the nested cases and ensure the required 
depth within the case. Data was collected during the period of 2013 through 2016. Because 
of the rapidly changing landscape of climate and energy governance, including events after 
2016 in the analysis was not doable. The analysis therefore reflects the status quo until 
December 201615.  Main methods of data collection were extensive desk research and 
interviews with experts from a wide variety of (public and private) stakeholders in the Energy 
Port. Observation and participative (action) research have also been employed due to the 
researcher’s stationing at the Rotterdam Port Authority for two days a week during the entire 
research period. Interview and observation data was analysed qualitatively using MAXQDA.
1.5. THESIS OUTLINE
This chapter can be read together with the concluding chapter (ch. 8) to give comprehensive 
insight in the studied problem and the most important findings; what does the climate and 
energy governance game look like and how does it work? For people who are interested 
in the theoretical part of this dissertation, chapter two provides an extensive overview of 
literature on (European) governance — including the chosen definition of governance — 
multi-level governance, and its theoretical expectations. These theoretical expectations 
have been used as conceptual lenses through which data has been collected. Chapter three 
continues with a treatise on the methodological part of this study. Scholars of climate and 
energy policy (sub question I) will want to read chapter four, which provides an overview of 
global, European and national efforts to set sustainable goals and progress that has been 
made in reaching them. The chapter also shows how closely energy and sustainability are 
tied together in discourse, providing insight into the political context and dynamics within 
which this case study operates. Chapters five and six dive into the case study and discuss CCS 
and LNG at length. These chapters provide a detailed analysis of how governance works in 
both nested cases, using rich descriptions and much of the data collected during the expert 
interviews. Chapter seven brings both nested cases together in an effort to compare them 
and draw conclusions for Energy Port and MLG at large. It discusses what MLG’s strengths 
and weaknesses are and ties the secondary findings into the theoretical framework. Chapter 
eight dives into the main conclusions of this dissertation, tying governance studies and 
public affairs together by showing how in-depth knowledge of governance mechanisms 
leads to insights regarding how to organise interests and influence governance processes. 
The chapter ends with empirical recommendations for the Port of Rotterdam Authority and 
governmental authorities, and suggestions for future research.
15  At the end of chapter 8 I have included a reflection on most recent developments (post-2016) and how they might 
impact the studied case.
2
European (Multi-level) Governance
2.1. INTRODUCTION
A lot of the literature focusing on the European Union mentions the term governance, imply-
ing that everyone seems to know and understand what that means. However, its definition 
is not straightforward, and neither are its implications. As Pierre and Peters (2000:7) have 
argued: “[t]he concept of governance is notoriously slippery; it is frequently used among 
both social scientists and practitioners without a definition all agree on”. Schmitter (2001:7) 
also argues that governance as a concept is fuzzy and vague, yet that there is consensus that 
it entails some sort of mechanism to resolve conflicts and solve problems. While the EU is 
often characterised as a multi-level polity, a concept such as multi-level governance remains 
elusive due to the focus on different elements pertaining to the multi-level and governance 
aspects of the concept (Eising, 2004:214). EU studies seem full of basic concepts that are 
vague and contestable, even though they share some basic views. Even so, a clarification of 
their use in this study is not impertinent. Using European governance literature as a starting 
point, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation will take governance as a 
leading concept and attempt to define and apply it to the studied topic of EU climate and 
energy policies and their consequences for the Rotterdam port region. In doing so, this 
chapter will especially discuss the value of MLG as a theoretical framework, presenting its core 
premises and strengths, but also its critiques. I will argue that MLG can be seen as a theory 
by contrasting it with other — similar — approaches and their theses if strengthened by a 
workable conceptualisation of power and the addition of attention for issue framing. This 
chapter serves to provide a comprehensive overview of relevant developments in scholarly 
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debates surrounding EU governance from the 1990s onwards, in an effort to identify the 
most appropriate theoretical approach for the dissertation.
2.1.1. Chapter Outline
This chapter will present and discuss the theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation 
and will focus on the academic literature on European governance. Starting with different 
definitions of governance, the next section (§2.2) will show the multiplicity of governance 
conceptions present in the EU. This variety will be further explored in a discussion of the 
emergence of European governance in academic research (§2.3), which will function as a 
broad literature overview in this field. Several streams of research on European governance 
will be identified, with specific attention for the up- and downsteam. For the remainder of 
the dissertation I will latch on to the ‘newer school’ combining both streams into a two-way 
stream of research on the EU. Specific attention will be paid to multi-level governance as the 
dominating view of how the European Union operates. This approach will be discussed at 
length (§2.4). A discussion comparing and contrasting multi-level governance and network 
governance will follow (§2.5), due to the fact that the approaches are at times used in 
concordance. This discussion will lead to the formulation of theoretical expectations that will 
guide empirical inquiry and structure the analysis (§2.6). The conclusions (§2.7) function as a 
bridge to the next chapter which focuses on the theoretical expectations of this dissertation 
and the chosen methodological approach and operationalisation.
2.2. THE MANY FACES OF GOVERNANCE
In very general terms, governance refers to “theories and issues of social coordination and 
the nature of all patterns of rule” (Bevir, 2011:1) and is distinctly different from government 
(Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006:28). In the public administration field, an accepted use by 
many is to define governance as a new way of governing society (Rhodes, 2007:1246), 
though a less vague but still all-encompassing definition is “the process of bringing about 
binding agreements” (Kohler-Koch, 1998:1), or “the process by which we collectively solve 
our problems and meet our society’s need” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993:24). According to 
Kohler-Koch, then, the essence of governing is about transforming “the plurality of individual 
preferences into collectively binding decisions” (Kohler-Koch, 1999:18). A bit more specific, 
governance can be defined as “the continuous political process of setting explicit goals for 
society and intervening in it in order to achieve these goals” (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 
2004:99). Here it becomes apparent that a body is needed to set goals and to intervene in 
society, implicitly drawing attention to public goals. This implication is made more explicit 
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by Hooghe & Marks (2008:2) who define governance as “binding decision making in the 
public sphere”, thereby also reiterating Kohler-Koch’s notion of binding agreements. In all 
of the above discussed definitions of governance, binding decision-making for society is 
key. Schmitter (2001:8) lets go of the explicit society-orientedness of governance and offers 
another process definition by arguing that governance 
“is a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems/conflicts 
in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by 
negotiating and deliberating with each other and cooperating in the implementation 
of these decisions”.
With the core of this definition essentially being about negotiations between many public and 
private actors (Prins, 2008:39), it comes very close to seeing governance as a network affair. 
Kooiman also stresses the importance of the network part of governance and states that 
“[no] single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to 
solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview 
to make the application of particular instruments effective; no single actor has 
sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model” 
(Kooiman, 1993:4). 
Consequently, governance encompasses more than just actions performed by the state 
(Jordan, 2001:199). In a co-edited book with Eising, Kohler-Koch (1999:20) offers a typology 
of modes of governance that deals with different characteristics of the polity and how 
political relations are organised. As such, this typology deals with the inclusion or exclusion 
of a specific focus on the public sphere when employing the governance concept.
Table 2.1. Typology of modes of governance
Organising principle of political relations
Majority rule Consociation
Constitutive logic of 
the polity
Common good Statism Corporatism
Individual interests Pluralism Network governance
Source: Kohler-Koch, 1999:20.
Statism refers to a focus on the common good and decision-making by majority rule, 
which essentially comprises basic decision-making procedures in national governments. 
Corporatism also has a common purpose but includes competing social interests that need 
to achieve some degree of consensus. The Netherlands is a country with a strong conso-
ciational tradition (cf. Lijphart, 1968) and is therefore illustrative for corporatism. Pluralism 
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is mostly focused on the pursuit of individual interests but with a majority rule. The last 
type, network governance, also pursues individual interests but by many different social 
actors and during negotiations. This typology helps understand definitions of governance 
focusing or abandoning a specific focus on societal problems as well as definitions that are 
mainly centred around networks and negotiations.
Bevir (2004:606) defines governance as “a politics that operates through disparate prac-
tices located partly within civil society, practices that often form loose networks based on 
dialogue and shared resources”. This definition is, although broad, very network-oriented 
and centres around relationships between actors, and less on the making of binding agree-
ments. In a similar light, Rhodes (2000:346) specifies his description of governance as a 
new way of governing society by adding that it is about self-organising, interorganisa-
tional networks. He attributes four key characteristics to governance: the interdependence 
between organisations, continuing interactions, game-like interactions, and a significant 
degree of autonomy from the state. Rhodes’ interactions are rooted in trust and structured 
by rules. In his view, networks can — but do not necessarily — work where markets and 
bureaucracies fail (ibid.:360) and can as such act as a source of legitimacy (Schmitter, 
2001:7). Risse, Green Cowles & Caporaso (2001:3) in their treatment of the Europeanisa-
tion concept indirectly define governance as political, legal, and social institutions associ-
ated with political problem solving that formalise interactions among the actors, and of 
policy networks specialising in the creation of rules. Here again the public and private 
participation in networks is underscored, and rules also come up as an important factor in 
governance.
Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden (2004:144-150) explore and define in their article nine ap-
proaches to governance as used by academia and in practice. The first, ‘good governance’ 
is a term that is used by, among others, the OECD and the EU, and refers to conscientious 
governing with an eye for legitimacy and the prevention of wasteful public spending. 
The second usage comes from international relations theory and refers to governance 
as governing without government. The third use refers to self-organisation “of societies 
and communities, beyond the market and short of the state” (ibid.:146). This approach 
is very bottom-up and reliant on informal factors such as trust and social control. In eco-
nomic sciences, governance is usually understood as being broader than ‘government’ 
and encompassing the (market) institutions societies create to facilitate exchanges. The 
fifth usage is called corporate governance and refers to how corporations are directed and 
controlled. Taking corporate governance to the public sector results in methods of New 
Public Management (NPM) and is therefore seen as the sixth approach. Finally, the last 
three approaches are variations of network governance, but at different levels. One can 
theorise that, in general, public institutions form networks to govern their environments 
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by exchanging information and resources in negotiation processes. This public networks 
approach is most akin to the classic interpretation of government. One can also focus 
on the shift from hierarchy to smaller, cooperative networks of organisations. This shift 
mainly occurs in the private sector. The third form of network governance is multi-level 
governance. It defines ‘governance’ as the power relations that result from the rules of 
international regimes and as the substance of the policies that emerge. The term ‘multi-
level’ shows that there are multiple governmental levels involved. Especially in the EU this 
is visible at the supranational level, the national level, the regional level and the local level. 
These different levels create policy networks across different policy areas. As becomes vis-
ible from Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden’s nine approaches to governance, all of these 
approaches focus on some form of network16. They assume a plethora of actors, with or 
without government involvement, operating together and with some goal. 
With all the different available conceptualisations of governance, the term remains vague 
and open to multiple variations of the general idea of Schmitter’s mechanism to resolve 
conflicts and solve problems. Specified even further, governance appears to always be 
about either resolving problems and solving problems for (1) society, or (2) in networks and 
negotiations, or both. Table 2.2 shows the alignment of authors concerning their definition 
of governance. 
16  In this chapter I will argue that MLG is a loose-standing concept — encompassing networks — but that it is not 
the same as network governance.
17  Some authors featured in the table were not discussed in this chapter. For Fritz Scharpf, see his 1991 article 
‘Games real actors play’. For Adrienne Héritier, see her 1999 book ‘Policy-making and diversity in Europe’ (1999a in 
bibliography). For James Rosenau, see his contribution in the 2000 book ‘Debating governance: authority, steering 
and democracy’ by Pierre & Peters.
Table 2.2. Definitions of governance: a matrix17
                                                               Focus on societal problems
Yes No
Focus on networks/
negotiations
Yes
Rhodes
Eising & Kohler-Koch
Risse, Green Cowles & Caporaso
Scharpf
Héritier
Schmitter
Rosenau
Kooiman
Jordan
Bevir
No
Osborne & Gaebler
Jachtenfuchs
Hooghe & Marks
-
Source: author’s own composition.
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Acknowledging the variation in the definitions of governance, it is imperative to define its 
use in this thesis. Here, governance will be defined — following Börzel and Risse’s work18 
— as “the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and imple-
ment collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods” (Börzel & Risse, 2010:114). 
This definition allows for recognition of the often institutionalised, interactive, multi-actor 
nature of EU governance, while leaving room for a strong societal focus on cooperation 
across and between levels with the goal of producing binding decisions. The definition 
also helps identify governance as encompassing both structure and process. The structure 
of governance relates to its institutions and actors, whereas the process of governance 
refers to the modes of social coordination (ibid.:114). This distinction is helpful because it 
sheds light on who engages in governance, in which settings, and how. Governance in this 
dissertation consists of:
s¬ INSTITUTIONALISED¬MODES¬OF¬COORDINATION¬IMPLY¬GOVERNANCE¬HAS¬A¬STRUCTURAL¬COMPONENT¬
and is not ad hoc;
s¬ SOCIAL¬COORDINATION¬IMPLIES¬THAT¬MORE¬THAN¬ONE¬ACTOR¬HAS¬A¬SAY¬IN¬MATTERS¬HEREBY¬INCLUDING¬
societal actors;
s¬ PRODUCING¬AND¬IMPLEMENTING¬IMPLIES¬GOVERNANCE¬CAN¬TAKE¬PLACE¬IN¬BOTH¬POLICYMAKING¬
and its implementation and is therefore a dynamic process;
s¬ COLLECTIVELY¬BINDING¬RULES¬IMPLY¬A¬CERTAIN¬DEGREE¬OF¬CODIlCATION¬THOUGH¬NOT¬NECESSARILY¬
through laws;
s¬ COLLECTIVE¬GOODS¬IMPLY¬GOVERNANCE¬BENElTS¬@THE¬GREATER¬GOOD¬SUCH¬AS¬IMPROVING¬THE¬
climate and securing energy supply.
Both the network approach and problem solving for society find their way into the defini-
tion. The focus on institutionalisation also keeps the definition close to Eising and Kohler-
Koch’s interpretation19 of governance as visible in the matrix (table 2.2). This definition of 
governance has as a consequence that this dissertation will not look for ad hoc networks, 
singular decision-making, informal rules of the game and private gain.
Another important feature of the governance concept is that it is dynamic. As such, shifts 
in governance may occur over time. While exploring the nine uses of governance, Van 
Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:152-155) identify five general shifts in governance 
that are present in how the concept is used. The first shift concerns an upwards move from 
the national to the supranational level, with the latter becoming more and more important 
for governance activities. However, there is also a downwards shift from the national 
18  Who, in turn, draw upon the work of Renate Mayntz.
19  Even though the typology as presented in table 2.1. (page 3) is credited as Beate Kohler-Koch’s, it features in the 
1999 book she co-edited with Rainer Eising: ‘The Transformation of Governance in the European Union’.
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and international level to the local and regional level. Therefore, governance is stretched 
out over multiple levels. A third shift is a horizontal shift from governance by executive 
and legislative powers to the judiciary. The fourth shift encompasses another horizontal 
change, yet now from public to semi-public — and at times even private — organisations. 
The plethora of corporatisation and privatisations in the last two decades are examples of 
this shift. The fifth, and final, shift is a mixed one; it entails the creation of complicated 
networks with multiple levels and with the participation of both public and private actors. 
Such policy networks are common in the European Union. The five shifts in governance not 
only show the dynamics of the concept but also signify that governance has many aspects 
which can be examined. In her treatise on multi-level governance as a theory, Simona 
Piattoni (2010) has also given attention to similar shifts, which she calls ‘pressures’. These 
form the basic theoretical searchlights guiding empirical inquiry in this dissertation and will 
be discussed later in the chapter. First, it is useful to present how the study of governance 
in the EU has changed over the years, which is the main focus of the next section.
2.3. OLD SCHOOL AND NEW SCHOOL APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN 
GOVERNANCE
This section will briefly cover the ‘governance turn’20 in EU studies and some of its critique. 
The focus on governance in European Union research is certainly not new, but has seen an 
explosion of articles following an increased focus on how EU policy-making works since the 
late 1980s (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006:27-32). Before that time, researchers were mainly 
interested in applying the grand theories of neofunctionalism (cf. Haas, 1964) and liberal 
intergovernmentalism (cf. Moravscik, 1993) to the European polity (Jachtenfuchs, 2001:246; 
Piattoni, 2009:165). When liberal intergovernmentalism seemed to take the upper hand, 
research shifted to studying one policy or one policy field, the public opinion, or the politics 
of the EU. In essence, grand theory gave way to middle-range theories (Jordan, 2001:194). 
The onset of the single market caused researchers to question the sovereignty of the member 
states and led them to study the impact of the EU on domestic affairs. Instead of taking 
the European polity as the dependent variable, the governance turn in EU studies sees the 
European polity as a given and rather places the focus on the “impact of the Euro-polity on 
national and European policies and politics” (Jachtenfuchs, 2001:246-250). 
European governance literature has bloomed over the past decades, and so have its defini-
tions and underlying concepts. As the EU changed over time, so has the research around 
20  The ‘governance turn’ is a term first used by Kohler-Koch and Rittberger in their influential 2006 article “The 
‘Governance Turn’ in EU Studies”.
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it. The older school focuses on a clear distinction between upstream and downstream 
research, whereas more recent work considers both streams inseparable. While the general 
consensus is — not surprisingly — that the European Union is the subject of European 
governance literature, the exact content of what to study regarding the EU or even how to 
study it varies. Areas of interest might be EU integration, decision-making, politics, sectoral 
policies, voter behaviour, knowledge dissemination, and so on. In her seminal work on EU 
governance, Schmidt distinguishes between Europeanisation and European integration and 
presents figure 2.1 below. 
European 
integration
EU decision-making
Member states' policies, practices, politics
Europeanization
Figure 2.1. Europeanisation versus European integration
Adapted from: Schmidt, 2002:896.
European integration is an upstream approach and is perceived as the process of EU con-
struction, or the way in which member states influence the EU. Important questions in this 
approach center around explaining how institutions of the EU came to be and how and why 
competencies are transferred to the EU level. By contrast, Europeanisation goes the other 
way (downstream) and studies how the EU changes the national level. Transposition and 
implementation of EU regulation is an important area of focus in this approach (Schmidt, 
2002:896). Olsen (2002:923-944) introduces a complementary view and identifies five uses 
of the concept of Europeanisation, one of which is akin to Schmidt’s European integration, 
and a second which shows her version of Europeanisation. His five uses center around 
what changes and why. The first use studies changes in the external boundaries of the EU, 
specifically paying attention to the territorial reach of the Union. The second use involves 
the development of institutions at the European level, increasing the degree of coordination 
and coherence and awarding the EU with decision-making capacities and means of enforcing 
binding decisions. This use is similar to what Schmidt calls ‘European integration’. The third 
use focuses on the central penetration of national systems of governance, looking at the 
division of power and responsibility on different levels and the way lower tiers adapt to 
the changing power balance brought upon them with European institution-building. This 
use is similar to Schmidt’s Europeanisation, the most widespread in academic literature, 
and — along with European integration — will be discussed in more detail below. The 
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fourth use is external and aims at change beyond EU territory, or how the EU finds its place 
among global fora. The fifth and final use is the political unification project and studies in 
how far the EU is becoming more unified and stronger as a political entity. Olsen calls this 
use the most interesting, but at the same time most challenging for researchers. The fifth 
use encompasses the previous four, but is not necessarily positively correlated with them. 
Accounting for complexities becomes difficult when studying the “mutual adaptation of 
co-evolving institutions” (ibid.:942). The network mode of governance is a crucial factor in 
this use of the concept. While the second and third use are akin to Schmidt’s approaches, 
the other three are distinctly different. They seem to fall under a different aspect of political 
science, with the first and second being oriented toward external relations and the fifth 
having a clear normative aspect and mostly being about state-building. Labelling them under 
Europeanisation is thus not wrong but can be confusing. For this reason, Schmidt’s distinction 
between Europeanisation and European integration will be adhered to from now on.
2.3.1. European Integration, or EU Upstream
During the early years of the (pre-)European Union researchers were interested in how the 
member states shape the constitution of a united Europe. Such upstream research (termed 
‘European integration’), or the way institutions are built at the supranational level (cf. Bulmer, 
1983; Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2008; Jeffery, 2000), has not been abandoned and continues 
to be a topic of interest to scholars. The EU is very much an ongoing project with dynamic 
institutions that are challenged each time a new member enters the Union. This analytical 
approach corresponds to Schmidt’s ‘European integration’ and to Olsen’s second use of 
the concept of Europeanisation. Hooghe and Marks explore in their 2008 article the extent 
to which national identity influences European integration. They find that where national 
identity contrasts the EU and when certain European issues become politicised, European 
integration may slow down or even invert. The referendums surrounding the Constitutional 
Treaty — particularly the French and Dutch ‘no’s — are an example of national influence 
on the European level (Hooghe & Marks, 2008:20). Yet bottom-up studies do not have to 
focus solely on the level of the nation state. With increased policy activism from subnational 
authorities, a more solid base for their involvement at the EU level has been created (Jeffery, 
2000:8). Many scholars also focus on the influence of interest groups and how they upload 
their preferences to the EU level (cf. Coen, 1998; Barron, 2011; Beyers & Braun, 2014; 
Van Schendelen, 2017). This short overview of upstream research is non-exhaustive out of 
necessity, but the research on topics like these continues to grow (Coen, 2007:341-342).
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2.3.2. Europeanisation, or EU Downstream
The introductory paragraph to this section has shown that Europeanisation can mean 
different things. This section will address Europeanisation as envisaged by Schmidt, and 
as described by Olsen as the third use of the concept of Europeanisation. However, even 
within this narrow perspective, the definition of Europeanisation is no straightforward issue. 
Graziano and Vink (2007:7) adopted the following definition of Europeanisation: “the 
domestic adaptation to European regional integration”. This definition is a very hierarchical 
approach to Europeanisation as it assumes that European regional integration precedes 
domestic adaptation. Any horizontal effects of European integration are seen as indirect 
effects (ibid.:8). Similar is the definition posed by Héritier et al. (2001:3): “the process of 
influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ policies and 
political and administrative structures”. Buller and Gamble (2002:17) are a bit less specific 
and argue that Europeanisation is “a situation where distinct modes of European gover-
nance have transformed aspects of domestic politics”. Börzel’s definition, which identifies 
Europeanisation as “a process by which domestic areas become increasingly subject to 
European policy-making” (1999:574) is criticised by Radaelli (2000:3) for being too general 
when a scholar is interested in the impact of the logic of European political behaviour on 
domestic policies. Instead, Radaelli is charmed by Ladrech’s more process-oriented definition21 
of Europeanisation, adapting it and ultimately suggesting that Europeanisation refers to: 
“[p]rocesses of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of 
EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies”.
While this definition seems very broad as well, it has a very specific EU focus in its way of placing 
EU decisions as something that happens prior to domestic adaptation (Flockhart, 2010:789), 
which is similar to the mechanism posed by Graziano and Vink. Furthermore, the definition 
includes both tangible (f.e., formal rules) and intangible (f.e., shared beliefs) aspects. Yet another 
definition focuses the attention on the development of distinct structures of governance (Risse, 
Green Cowles & Caporaso, 2001:3), thereby drawing away the attention so far given to the 
domestic impact of Europe and rather focusing on the growing policy competences of the 
EU (Bache, 2005:3). This definition ventures more into the realm of European integration. 
21  Ladrech’s definition of Europeanisation refers to the concept as an: “incremental process re-orienting the direction 
and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic 
of national politics and policy-making” (1994:69).
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But what can actually be Europeanised? The general consensus is that Europeanisation 
can affect policies, politics, and the polity of a member state (Börzel & Risse, 2003:61)22. 
Examples are instruments, policy narratives, processes of interest representation, judicial 
structures, public administration, collective identities, and so on. Europeanisation can thus 
have a fundamental effect on domestic structures through a process called download-
ing. Some scholars focus primarily on this top-down side of Europeanisation, looking at 
the influence of the EU on its member states and how European policies are translated 
and implemented in national systems (cf. Ladrech, 1994; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999, 2002; 
Radaelli, 2000; Schmidt, 2006). Knill & Lehmkuhl (1999:2, 2002:256) have studied 
Europeanisation of railway policies, environmental policy, and road haulage policies and 
identified in their article three mechanisms of Europeanisation: institutional compliance, 
changing domestic opportunity structures, and framing domestic beliefs and expectations. 
Institutional compliance hinges on the domestic adaptation to institutional requirements 
set by the EU. Such compliance is most often visible in areas such as environment policy or 
policies concerning health and safety at work and consumer protection (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 
2002:258), which are the so-called ‘positive integration’ policies (Taylor, 1983). Domestic 
opportunity structures might change due to European legislation influencing the domestic 
rules of the game. Power may shift between actors, leading to a change in domestic 
(institutional) structures. This mechanism of Europeanisation is often visible in market-type 
policies. When European policies trigger a shift in the beliefs and expectations of domestic 
actors, the way they frame their preferences might change. This change can ultimately lead 
to institutional change. This mechanism is mostly visible in contentious issues and policies 
that are intended to bring about a change in European integration (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 
2002:258-259). Adaptation of domestic structures can fuel policy entrepreneurship (Jef-
fery, 2000:14). The general idea behind this stream of Europeanisation research is clear: 
Europe affects its member states.
2.3.3. The ‘New School’: Two-Way Stream
But member states affect Europe as well. While Schmidt initially makes a divide between 
Europeanisation and European integration, a later article specifies that the divide is of an 
analytical nature, and that empirically the two streams are connected (Schmidt & Radaelli, 
2004:185). Börzel (2002) advocates a refined downstream model and argues that Europeani-
sation in itself is a two-way process. Scholarly work should thus focus on both downloading 
(transposing and implementing EU regulation) and uploading (advocating a State’s own 
22  Piattoni (2010) argues that multi-level governance affects the politics, policy and polity of not only the member 
states of the EU but also of the EU itself. Her argument will be discussed later in this chapter.
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preferences at the EU level). These activities are not sequential but rather run parallel to each 
other. Considering both the downloading and the uploading dimensions helps conceive “of 
the European level as an opportunity structure that domestic actors may, depending on their 
interests and resources, be able to exploit to further their own interests and, in turn, shape 
EU-level and national governance arrangements” (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006:38). In 
other words, Europeanisation not only shapes the domestic level but also gets shaped by 
it in turn (Laffan & Stubb, 2003:70). When done successfully, domestic actors may impose 
a — for them — favourable regulatory style to the larger European level (cf. Héritier, 1996; 
Bomberg & Peterson, 2000), which goes beyond ‘mere’ institution building but also touches 
upon the consequences for the policy dimension. They have an incentive to do so in order to 
minimise the costs associated with the implementation of European policies at the domestic 
level. After all, the higher the initial fit, the smaller the required changes are, and thus the 
lower the costs to implement them (Börzel, 2002:194-196). Drawing on evidence gathered 
from studying EU environmental policy, Börzel identifies three strategies of member state 
response to Europeanisation: pace-setting, foot-dragging, and fence-sitting. Pace-setting 
is “the active shaping of European policies according to domestic preferences (ibid.:197). 
It can be difficult to achieve the goal of uploading domestic policies to the European level, 
especially considering that there are many other member states that can have vastly different 
preferences. Successful pace-setting is made easier when the national executive operates in 
the right networks. Germany has been the pace-setter in environmental policy in the 1980s 
(Liefferink & Andersen, 1998:71), and is still very influential today where sustainable energy 
policy is concerned. Foot-dragging is the opposite of pace-setting and involves national 
executives trying to block others from uploading their domestic policies to the EU level. 
As with pace-setting, this strategy is neither always successful, leading member states to 
often opt for side-payments or package deals. In general, member states employing the 
foot-dragging strategy show poor levels of compliance with Community law. Fence-sitting 
involves neither advocating nor blocking a policy at the EU level, but rather employing 
a neutral strategy. This strategy makes fence-sitters attractive for both pace-setters and 
foot-draggers to build a coalition with. Fence-sitting may be caused by a simple lack of the 
required resources to be a pace-setter, the anticipation of low implementation costs, support 
of the pace-setters but lack of domestic support (rendering open advocacy unpopular), 
or calculating that the costs of non-implementation are lower than those associated with 
foot-dragging (Börzel, 2002:203-208).
Other uploading studies focus, for example, on agenda-setting in the EU and the role of 
lower-tier governments in the decision-making process. Eising (2004:236) has sought to 
link the multi-level governance system of the EU to interest group activity, and looked at 
the presence of interest groups at different levels of government. He found that multi-level 
interest representation is not (yet) widespread, but that there is evidence of some corporate 
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actors targeting multiple levels. A possible constraint is the amount of governance capacity 
needed to operate at different levels of the European polity. Coen (1998:97) has looked 
at large firm lobbying in the EU and found that national lobbying has started to decrease. 
However, no statistically significant evidence was found to indicate that this decline is 
connected to the supranational nature of the EU. Moving away from corporate lobbying 
toward member state lobbying, Haverland and Liefferink (2012:193) have investigated 
member state influence in the European Commission. Their case study on the Dutch 
activity in the drafting phase of the REACH directive demonstrated that the availability 
of high-level expert knowledge can prove invaluable to the EC, which is in need of such 
information. A high level of expertise can, though, turn into inflexibility when trying to sell 
very complex policies in Brussels. In that case the member state may lose influence. 
Reasoning from the supranational point of view of downloading, Kohler-Koch (1999:25-
26) identifies three ways of transmitting a governance mode from the European to the 
national level, thereby not excluding two-way interaction. The first method is the imposi-
tion of governance mechanisms by the EU on member states. The second method is the 
involvement of the national level through interaction in networks and based on institutional 
learning processes. The third method is the attraction of member states to European values 
by establishing and transmitting best practices. 
But what about non-governmental actors? What is their role in EU governance? The way 
EU governance operates is contingent upon the competences assigned to the suprana-
tional and domestic levels of government. Furthermore, in policy areas that rely heavily on 
information and support provided by non-governmental actors — such as expert informa-
tion needed for electricity grids regulation — the employed governance method can vary 
(Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004). At the policy-initiation stage, interest groups, the Council, 
the EP and the European Council supplement the activities of the EC, showcasing the 
involvement of multiple actors in policy-making (Hooghe & Marks, 2001:14). In fact, the 
EU is a big stimulator of private sector involvement in EU governance, which has steadily 
been increasing over the past years (Schmitter, 2001:9). The Commission does really seem 
to operate in a “system of multi-level governance involving competition and interdepen-
dence among it and the European Council, Council of Ministers and European Parliament” 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001:16).
2.4. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
The views on the two-way mode of Europeanisation assume that the mechanism of EU 
governance is inherently dynamic. The multi-level governance (MLG) approach seems to 
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fit well in this two-way stream, as it it also based on mutual interaction between multiple 
levels of government. Crosscutting Europeanisation and European integration, multi-level 
governance as a conceptual framework has taken flight in the mid-90s. This section intro-
duces MLG and its history, discusses its criticism and will conclude with a judgment of its 
value as a theoretical approach. Multi-level governance deserves to be given this special 
attention because of its importance to EU studies as a whole (Bache & Flinders, 2004) and 
to its persistence as an analytical approach; MLG has undergone several reconceptualisations 
since its introduction. 
2.4.1. From Grand Theory to Multi-Level Governance
As discussed in the previous section, European literature started with neofunctionalist and 
liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of how the EU evolved. When researchers shifted 
their attention from seeing the European polity as the dependent variable to using it as 
an independent variable, middle-range theories regarding EU policy-making took root. 
Wessels (1997:273) has contrasted governance as a view of how the EU develops with 
neofunctionalism and realism. He claims that whereas neofunctionalism perceives the 
EU’s development as linear growth and realism as decline, governance allows for a cyclical 
pattern of growth and decline. Wessels adds to these views a fourth: fusion. Fusion theory 
is a mixture of neofunctionalism and governance, perceiving EU development as structural 
growth in cycles. National governments are seen as actors capable of rational choice. 
Efficient and effective problem-solving in a system characterised by interdependency and 
joint problem-solving allow for growth, while sovereignty issues add the cyclical nature of 
EU development. Fusion is ultimately defined as 
“a ‘merger’ of public resources located at several ‘state’-levels for which the ‘outside 
world’ […] cannot trace the accountability, as responsibilities for specific policies are 
diffused” (Wessels, 1997:274), 
allowing for the involvement of multiple levels of government. In essence, this fusion reflects 
multi-level governance. Moving past the classic focus on how the EU integrates, scholars 
thus began to describe the EU as a system of governance (Marks, 1993; Hix, 1998:39; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004:121). Jachtenfuchs (1995:115) calls EU 
governance a system of governance ‘beyond the state’, though without claiming that the 
state itself has lost importance. If governance depends on negotiations, — as visible in some 
of its definitions — it is no longer “linked exclusively to the state” (ibid.:125). The need and 
ability to regulate the single market has been the main driving force behind the governance 
approach (Hix, 1998:40). As interest groups began to proliferate in the early 1990s, the 
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involvement of more than just state actors in policy-making became increasingly important. 
Furthermore, the emphasis placed on partnership and cooperation fostered linkages between 
and within levels and the importance attributed to the concept of subsidiarity at the time 
resulted in a wider inclusion of lower-tier governments (Stephenson, 2013:819). These 
developments have resulted in a system of European governance characterised by “a unique 
set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of state 
and non-state actors” (Hix, 1998:39), which Hooghe and Marks have dubbed ‘multi-level 
governance’. Originally defined as 
“a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers — supranational, national, regional, and local — as the result of a broad process 
of institutional creation and decisional reallocation” (Marks, 1993:392), 
MLG seemed a very hierarchically oriented form of governance. Since then, Marks23 has 
specified it further to include other types of actors as well. The original premise, however, 
still holds: (sub)national actors are incorporated into EU-level decision-making (Wessels, 
1997:281).
Another strand of research centred around Majone and the typology of the EU as a ‘regula-
tory state’ (cf. Majone, 1996). The assumption in this strand of research is that the EU 
has reached a degree of maturity in which it can act like any other state by developing 
regulation to deal with societal issues. The regulation developed to create and sustain 
the internal market — a situation of far-reaching fusion — is an example often used to 
illustrate the EU’s regulatory activities (Jachtenfuchs, 2001:252; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 
2006:35). However, the EU’s regulatory power is often also questioned. Scharpf (1988) 
mentioned the ‘joint-decision trap’ as being a feature present in the EU, — not a feature of 
the EU (Scharpf, 2006:847) — leading EU policy to present suboptimal outcomes because 
of the simultaneous presence of the representation of member states’ self-interests and 
the unanimity rule. These two features clash and can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes. 
Because of the EU’s obvious shortcomings as a regulatory state, I will only focus on the EU 
as a system of governance approach.
Hooghe & Marks (2001:2-3) assert that there are two ways to look at the EU. One ap-
proach is to assume that the EU works through state-centric governance, which effectively 
means that governments are in control and that EU policies thus show what the interests 
23  After criticism by other authors such as Jordan and Rosenau. The inclusion of non-state actors would later prove to 
be very popular, but would also lead to the dismissal of the label ‘multi-level governance’ by Kohler-Koch in favour 
of ‘network governance’.
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and power of national governments are. The state-centric governance model is an inter-
governmental model. The second model they present is that of multi-level governance, 
which is a supranational model. Their central hypothesis is that, because of the different 
actors and levels of hierarchy involved in policy making, national governments lose some 
of their autonomy. This loss of autonomy has a few causes. The first cause is the increased 
power of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative process of the EU. Over the years 
the competences of the EP have been broadened, making the EP a weighty player. The 
second cause is increased public scrutiny through, for example, electoral competition, 
public referenda and the involvement of domestic groups in European decision-making. 
The third and final cause is the limited control of national governments over supranational 
agents. This cause can also be termed a principal-agent problem. Because of the nature 
of European integration, there are multiple principals. In effect, each member state is a 
principal since no basic institutional change can be made without reaching unanimity on 
the subject. All these principals make it hard for national governments to rein in suprana-
tional institutions. Unanimity thus creates hurdles to change. Furthermore, a supranational 
institution such as the EC operates within a network of national governments, subnational 
governments and interest groups, which gives it a lead start on governments when it 
comes to information and knowledge. This information asymmetry ensures that the EC 
has wide influence on policy-making processes. European governance is also characterised 
by mutual distrust. To ensure adherence to the ambiguous treaties, member states have 
established a judicial system. However, they also allow the EC to create detailed regulations 
in order to be able to devise precise and binding policies. This competence, then, causes 
national governments to become less autonomous (ibid.:5-12). Following the logic of fu-
sion theory, Wessels argues that it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse this process of 
continuing loss of autonomy as member states consciously choose further fusion. As the 
other two options, more intergovernmentalism or more federalism, are not preferable; in-
tergovernmentalism erodes the effectiveness of common coordination whereas federalism 
threatens the constitutional setup of member states. More intensive participation at the 
EU level maintains a member state’s own sovereignty by making the EU not only the cause 
of the decline of state power, but also the answer to it (Wessels, 1997:287). The result 
is a relatively stable system with supranational actors influencing the “rational pursuit of 
national interests” (ibid.:274).
To specify multi-level governance even further, Hooghe & Marks (2003:236-239, 2004, 
2010:17-22) identify two types of jurisdictions within which multi-level governance in Eu-
rope can take place. They argue that dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions, 
instead of concentrating it within one large jurisdiction, increases its flexibility. Making this 
flexibility possible is an advantage of multi-level governance. The two types of multi-level 
governance that Hooghe & Marks propose are summarised in table 2.3.
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Table 2.3. Multi-level Governance type I and II
Type I Type II
General-purpose jurisdictions Task-specific jurisdictions
Non-intersecting memberships Intersecting memberships
Jurisdictions organised in a limited number of levels No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels
System-wide architecture Flexible design
Source: Hooghe & Marks, 2003:236.
Type I is founded in federalism, which focuses on a limited number of governments covering 
only a few levels. Power is shared throughout these levels, which do not intersect. An example 
is the relationship between a national government and a sub-national government. These 
type I jurisdictions mostly adhere to the trias politicas thought of organizing government 
through an elected legislature, an executive and a court system. This is more or less visible 
in the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure. Type II is embedded in type I and widespread at 
the local level. It encompasses a vast amount of members that can intersect and operate 
at many different jurisdictional levels. An example is Switzerland, where there are as many 
as six (intersecting) jurisdictional levels that form an addition to local governments and 
sometimes compete with them (Hooghe & Marks, 2003:237). Needless to say, both types 
can be found in the EU. Type I could be the overarching type for the European Union as an 
entity, but within this entity there are examples of type II multi-level governance everywhere. 
However, inherent in multi-level governance are coordination problems. When the number 
of actors increases, it becomes harder to punish those who defect. What then emerges is a 
cult of free riding. To diminish the chances for free riding to occur, both types have different 
ways to cope with the coordination dilemma. Type I limits the number of autonomous 
actors by decreasing the number of jurisdictional levels. Free riding is then likely to occur 
less. Type II does not limit the amount of actors, but creates specialised jurisdictions to limit 
externalities across the jurisdictions. This strategy also limits free riding (ibid.:240). From 
the above follows that type I and type II governance complement each other, which is why 
they are both present in the EU (Piattoni, 2009:171). 
2.4.2. Critique of (Multi-level) Governance and its Defence
Today, prominent features of the EU such as the community method, comitology, and 
its multi-level nature continue to fuel EU governance research even though the concept 
of governance still largely remains vague24. As such, studying governance lends itself to 
the use of various theories and methods of inquiry (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006:34-
24  See also Francis Fukuyama’s 2013 article focusing on the measurement of ‘governance’.
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43). This assertion, however, also offers a basis for criticism of the governance turn. The 
problem-orientedness of governance has innovative potential, but does not offer a theory. 
The consequence is that “we observe several streams of discussion that are more or less 
autonomous” (Jachtenfuchs, 2001:259). While this is not a problem per se, the exercise of 
integrating the governance approach in existing theories is challenging. The aforementioned 
vagueness of the concept of governance can also be a source of criticism, although it is 
also one of the reasons governance debates dominate the research agenda in EU studies. 
Another criticism of the governance approach is that it generally ignores political power 
and rule. Its strong focus on problem solving, however helpful, largely fails to account for 
the influence of concepts such as political power (Jachtenfuchs, 2001:258). Where the 
governance turn in EU studies does adequately describe how policy is made in the EU, it 
should be noted that these relationships between different actors, sectors, governments, 
and even levels of government are not unique to the EU but rather a feature of modern 
states (Börzel, 2011:54). The result is that theory-building around the governance concept 
remains difficult, and, at times, even “maddening” (Piattoni, 2009:175). 
More specifically geared toward criticising multi-level governance as theory, Jordan 
(2001:201) asserts that it is not a new concept — as its proponents stated in the early ‘90s 
— but rather an mixture of existing theoretical approaches such as neofunctionalism and 
neo-institutionalism25. Furthermore, MLG is criticised for lacking an explanatory mecha-
nism for integration. It is said to not have testable hypotheses. Looking at the content, 
MLG is criticised for overstating the autonomy of sub-national actors — and understating 
the role of the national state as a gatekeeper — and for having a too top-down view of 
sub-national authorities (Jeffery, 2000:8). Its lack of attention for other subnational actors 
such as pressure groups is also a source of criticism. On the other hand, Tortola (2017:241-
242) argues that MLG would have to convincingly show that the connection between state 
and society is a natural one, and that what is going on is more multi-level involvement and 
actual multi-level governance. Adopting an even more extreme interpretation of MLG, 
Rosenau (2004) suggests that it is a purely governmental affair, therefore lacking other 
elements that arise in today’s complex world where states have limited problem-solving 
capacity and interdependencies are abundant throughout societies. MLG is said to over-
state the power of sub-national mobilisation, wrongly equating it with influence (Jeffery, 
2000:8; Jordan, 2001:201), while at the same time ignoring the external (or international) 
level of the EU as well. Ultimately, Jordan (2001:202-204) criticises MLG for not being 
specific enough regarding the difference between multi-level governance and multi-level 
25  To be fair, Jordan only mentions historical institutionalism. But the question that then rises is how important the 
other institutionalisms are if they are not mentioned at all.
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government. His opinion is that there is insufficient proof to adopt MLG as a general view 
of how the EU operates.
In response to Jordan’s critique on MLG as a theory, George (2004) defended MLG and 
essentially claimed it — in fact — is a theory with testable hypotheses. The classic divide 
between liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism dwindled when even Ernst 
Haas had to admit that the idea of functional spillovers — the core of the theory — did 
not find evidence in practice (Jordan, 2001:197). The hypothesis of the interconnected-
ness of sectors, with integration in one sector leading to integration in other sectors, 
could not be maintained for the European polity as a whole. What could be maintained, 
however, was the notion of the importance of EU institutions. In essence, MLG revives the 
neofunctionalist idea of the European Commission forming coalitions with sub-national 
actors, leaving out the functional spillovers. Seen from this angle, Jordan’s statement that 
MLG is a mixture of theories such as neofunctionalism and historical institutionalism can 
be criticised by posing MLG as neofunctionalism’s replacement. The credibility of such a 
statement is strengthened when George points out that MLG does, in fact, have its own 
research questions and hypotheses. From the onset its main research question centred 
around explaining how national governments have let decision-making authority slip out 
of their hands. The theory offers three reasons, ranging from a conscious choice to do so to 
being powerless to stop it from happening. When national governments ‘surrender’ part 
of their decision-making authority, it becomes rational for sub-national actors (whether 
they be governments or not) to establish offices in Brussels and vie for direct links with the 
Commission. Effectively, such strategies result in a further withering away of the authority 
of the state. The intricate links between and across levels can serve to pool legitimacy 
and further strengthen participation of a multitude of actors at the EU level (Wessels, 
1997:291). 
This account is compelling, but does little to address a fundamental issue encountered 
by scholars actually adopting the MLG framework: applying Marks & Hooghe’s type I and 
type II MLG governance to empirical case studies has been useful, but has also led to 
widespread criticism of the dichotomy. This issue and the resulting revision of MLG will be 
discussed in the next section.
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2.4.3. Multi-Level Governance Revisited
MLG at its onset26 was defined as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers — supranational, national, regional, and local” 
(Marks, 1993:392) but, following a more recent interpretation, can consist of more than 
just state actors (cf. the edited volume by Enderlein, Wälti & Zürn, 2010). It is, after all, 
multi-level governance and not government. A good way to put private actors into MLG 
without over stretching the concept is to require private actors to solve public problems, 
which may be done with private solutions (Zürn, Wälti & Enderlein, 2010:2). In line with 
the chosen definition of governance for this dissertation, the governance addition to the 
concept allows for the involvement of both the public and the private sector in European 
policy-making (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006:34). Keeping that 
in mind, Zürn, Wälti and Enderlein (2010:4) define multi-level governance as 
“a set of general-purpose or functional jurisdictions that enjoy some degree of 
autonomy within a common governance arrangement and whose actors claim to 
engage in an enduring interaction in pursuit of a common good”. 
This definition is heavily oriented towards giving recognition to Hooghe & Marks’ two 
contrasting types of governance, yet one of MLG’s most striking features is the integration 
of general-purpose jurisdictions with task-specific jurisdictions, thereby often relying on the 
creation of ad-hoc networks (Piattoni, 2009:164). These networks can become permanent.
MLG as a conceptual and theoretical framework has recently been reconsidered by Piattoni 
in a 2010 publication called ‘The Theory of Multi-level Governance’ and by Bache, Bartle, 
Flinders and Marsden in their 2015 book on the multi-level governance of climate change. 
Many empirical studies have attempted to apply the type I/type II dichotomy — often called 
26  MLG quickly became the accepted dominant view of how the EU works. As a concept it has been used both 
analytically and normatively, “to capture the nature of decision-making and to advocate particular arrangements” 
(Bache, 2005:5). A term such as ‘good governance’ has also been adopted by the EU as a normative concept, 
exemplified by the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance, which identifies five principles 
(openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence) of good governance (European Commission, 
2001b:5). Together with subsidiarity and proportionality they constitute the foundation of values advocated by 
the EU. The principles advocate a more transparent and inclusive policy style with responsibilities being taken 
and shared by both the supranational and the domestic levels. Policies should be clear, effective, and coherent 
(European Commission, 2001b:10). It is not surprising that these principles are Europe’s answer to the widespread 
critique of its ‘democratic deficit’ and aim to enhance the Union’s democracy and legitimacy. Furthermore, the 
multi-level nature of the EU — as introduced by Gary Marks — is even celebrated by the Committee of the Regions 
(CoR), which organises yearly ateliers bringing together academics and practitioners (Stephenson, 2013:822-826). 
Given the fact that the CoR consists of lower-tier governments that try to influence the EU, it is not illogical for 
them to celebrate MLG.
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the ‘binary divide’ — to case studies and despite obvious successes (cf. Betshill & Bulkeley, 
2006; Bulkeley & Betshill, 2005; Milewa & Barry, 2005; Smith, 2007), other authors have 
found that some organisations cannot be placed in either category or that the relationship 
between both types requires clarification (cf. Gustavsson, Elander & Lundmark, 2009; 
Marsden & Rye, 2010; Skelcher, 2005; Smith, 2007). Smith (2007:6275) even concludes that 
hierarchy persists and that type II (often called ‘network governance’) needs type I. Conversely, 
Hooghe and Marks (2004) have presented their type I and type II MLG as contrasting visions. 
Moving beyond this narrow binary divide, Piattoni has let go of both types and has made 
a very comprehensive and compelling contribution to MLG theory. Because both MLG and 
neofunctionalism stress mobilisation of societal groups and the entrepreneurial capacity of 
supranational actors, MLG is often seen as a restatement of neofunctionalism (cf. George, 
also earlier in this chapter). However, Piattoni argues that the neofunctionalist belief that 
the state is not a unitary actor but rather composed of functional ministries contesting one 
another is not comparable to MLG’s sub-national authorities, because that would presume 
a “local articulation of one and the same national society and polity, with no political or 
cultural differences from the whole” (Piattoni, 2010:86). Territorial distinctiveness is actually 
an inherent feature of MLG, which is an essential difference with neofunctionalism. In 
her book, she reconceptualises multi-level governance as a theory and argues that MLG 
encompasses phenomena at the analytical levels of politics, policy and polity. The three 
levels are interconnected, which implies that changes in one level may lead to changes in 
the other two levels. MLG offers tools to look at these changes across the levels through a 
three-dimensional conceptualisation based on three pressures: (1) the domestic - international 
pressure, (2) the centre - periphery pressure, and (3) the state - society pressure. Alternatively 
the pressures can be identified as stemming from above, below, and within the nation state27. 
27  Piattoni adheres to a different order in her book: centre - periphery comes first, then domestic - international, 
and lastly state - society. She places centre - periphery first and argues it illustrates type I MLG, which probably is 
her reasoning for mentioning the pressure from below the nation state first. However, there does not seem to be 
an objection against placing the pressures in a different order, as I have done in this dissertation. The empirical 
chapters will follow the order suggested in table 2.4, which appeared to be the most logical order for these cases 
to be discussed in.
Table 2.4. How the nation state is pressured from above, below and within
Pressure Direction Elaboration
Domestic - international From above the nation state EU integration spurred by states working together 
following interdependencies created by non-
(national)state actor involvement at EU level
Centre - periphery From below the nation state Administrative, economic, and social efficiency lead 
to the existence of sub-national authorities
State - society From within the nation state Blurring of boundaries between state and society to 
enable effective governance
Adapted from: Piattoni, 2010:9-80.
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These three pressures inform the theoretical expectations of this dissertation, which are 
fleshed out in section §2.6. The pressure from above — domestic - international — leads to 
a transformation of the nation state by international organisations and transnational groups. 
Sub-national authorities across different states work together and are being pulled in by 
the European Commission in order to further its own integrative mission in exchange for 
financial support and acknowledgement. Expert groups provide evidence for this pressure. 
Furthermore, interdependencies created by business and civil society operating across national 
boundaries further leads to nation states having to coordinate their actions on a higher 
level. Supranational developments cannot be ignored by nation states and so, through their 
very existence, spur further EU integration. The reversed centre - periphery pressure lends 
an answer to the question why sub-national authorities exist. Administrative and economic 
efficiency allowed for better control and usage of locally based economic factors in the 
past. Furthermore, the ability to better invoke social values on the local — rather than the 
national — level allowed for greater social efficiency of sub-national authorities. These three 
efficiencies have led to a pressure on the nation state stemming from below. Regional actors 
may become important policy actors simply because they can organise themselves more 
efficiently than the national level. Finally, the state - society pressure is one from within the 
nation state and stems from the realisation that the national level cannot govern society 
without participation of society, thereby blurring the boundaries between the state and 
society. Private interests thus sometimes act in the general interest, whereas states can 
sometimes act in the interests of the few. The 
“boundaries between state and society at the European level have been torn down 
and […] governmental institutions increasingly use some of the same advocacy 
mechanisms that have been traditionally associated with the activities of interest 
groups, NGOs, and CSOs” (Piattoni, 2010:71-72). 
Private interests thus gain importance, which was often overlooked in the previous concep-
tualisation of MLG. These cross-linkages, along with the other two pressures, give saliency 
to the agency of actors. Actors in MLG arrangements pursue their own positions and goals, 
which redefines and activates new jurisdictions and constituencies on an appropriate level. 
Even though these networked arrangements defy hierarchies, they do not completely hollow 
out the importance of territorial government, which remains necessary for policy decisions. 
This expectation is especially true for policy domains closely tied to territory; factors such as 
the environment and infrastructure are not easily relocated (ibid.:250).
It is precisely the assumed interconnectedness of the three dimensions of pressure (see figure 
2.2) that gives MLG its theoretical uniqueness as it captures movements on all three axes 
(ibid.:252). Ultimately, through these dimensions MLG is able to capture three important 
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developments in EU governance, covering politics, policy and polity: (1) political mobilisation 
within and across national boundaries and through conventional and non-conventional 
means, (2) policy-making now encompasses all actors in all types of roles, and, (3) polity 
structures leading to policy decisions no longer operate just at nation state level but also 
at the supranational level of the EU. The implication is that an empirical case can thus be 
judged as a case of MLG if it meets the following three criteria:
1. different levels of government are simultaneously involved in policy-making;
2. non-governmental actors are involved at different governmental levels, and;
3. interrelationships that are created defy hierarchies and take on the form of non-
hierarchical networks (ibid.:83).
The crucial difference between MLG and neo-institutionalism is that MLG assumes that 
actors and their strategies are determinants of both policy-making and polity-restructuring, 
whereas neo-institutionalists would only support the claim relating to policy-making and 
refute the one regarding polity-restructuring (ibid.:249-253). Piattoni also contrasts MLG and 
Europeanisation, arguing that Europeanisation can come to encompass political change as 
a whole — not even just limited to the EU — which makes its realm of application difficult 
to determine, while MLG does not reach that far (ibid.:100-101). Yet it can also be argued 
that MLG fits in Börzel’s two-way stream within Europeanisation. Changes in both the EU 
O
Domestic - international dimension
Centre - periphery dimension
State - society dimension
Figure 2.2. MLG’s analytical space
Adapted from: Piattoni, 2010:27.
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and domestic political systems are assumed by Börzel as well as by Piattoni, which leads to 
co-evolving political systems, or downloading and uploading.
EU institutions and procedures thus are created and developed without substituting national 
actors, who are often involved in all phases of the EU’s policy cycle. National civil servants 
are increasingly sent to Brussels to participate in the policy process. National actors are, as 
such, incorporated in the European procedures (Wessels, 1997:279-280). Aside from growing 
participation of national actors on the European level, non-national actors such as interest 
groups, media and the private sector are increasingly present in Brussels. These intermediary 
groups are often found in informal, non-hierarchical networks vying for access to the 
Commission (Héritier, 1999b). The EC itself welcomes these actors in its pursuit of influence. 
Semi-public actors are represented in Brussels as well and maintain offices there (Wessels, 
1997:282). Networks and governance in networks are persistent terms in EU studies. The 
question, then, is whether it would be better to focus on network governance instead?
2.5. MULTI-LEVEL OR NETWORK GOVERNANCE?
Network governance was mentioned in a previous section as being part of Kohler-Koch’s 
typology of governance modes. It is also an often cited feature of governance as a concept. 
How does network governance link back to MLG? This section will address this question by 
comparing and contrasting MLG and network governance.
2.5.1. Policy Networks in the European Union
Héritier (1999b:273-274) focuses on the elements of democratic control present at the EU 
level and the efforts to create citizen support for European policies. Her findings are that a 
lot of European policy-making occurs in so-called supportive networks consisting of public 
and private (mostly corporate) actors stemming from multiple levels and across national 
boundaries. These supportive networks are mostly active in the policy formulation phase, 
where they advise the Commission and provide a counterbalance to national preferences 
and the dominance thereof. Many European policies are drafted in supportive networks, 
which can also be called policy networks. Even though policy networks are widespread and 
active in the policy formulation phase, the actual decision-making on EU legislation is still 
very much a hierarchical affair (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006:36). This observation has led 
to Börzel (quoted in Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006:36) distinguishing between governing 
in networks and governance with networks. The former is a rarity in the EU while the latter 
refers to the policy networks active in the formulation and implementation of EU policy. 
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Governance networks are networks of public and private actors that devise and implement 
policy (Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2007:619) and can thus also be called policy networks 
(Börzel, 1998:255; Rhodes, 2007; Klijn, 2008:122). Within these networks, relationships 
among the various actors are crosscutting and interwoven. This crisscrossing produces a 
complex system of interactions between interdependent actors employing various strategies 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The core assumption of network governance is that interests 
evolve and get redefined as negotiations between actors continue (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 
1999:5). These negotiations take place in arenas in which governments and various public 
and private actors participate, blurring the boundaries between public and private and 
thereby creating overlapping negotiating arenas. Interactions in the network are structured 
by rules of behaviour. The role of the state is largely that of an activator (Kohler-Koch, 
1999:23-24). The fact that actors in a network are interdependent because of their mutual 
dependency on each other’s resources leads to the need to coordinate their activities, i.e., 
align their preferences and strategies, in order to realise objectives that they share (Börzel, 
1998:259; Koppenjan, 2007:133; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). 
The EU seems very much aware of the necessity of an “inclusive policy style [...] aimed at 
acceptance of business actors and ordinary citizens” (Lenschow, 1999:39). The network ele-
ments of EU governance can have transformational effects on national modes of governance 
(Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999:267). One of the consequences of this mode of governance is 
a re-articulation of political space beyond the state. The ‘traditional’ supranational versus 
state debate gives way to a different one, because the EU 
“is transforming politics and government at the European and national levels into 
a system of multi-level, non-hierarchical, deliberative and apolitical governance, via 
a complex web of public/private network and quasi-autonomous agencies, which is 
primarily concerned with the re-regulation and de-regulation of the market” (Hix, 
1998:54). 
This shift leads to complex relationships characterised by mutual interdependency among 
regions, organised interests, member states, and the EU itself (Hueglin, 1999:249). Another 
consequence of EU governance is a new constitutionalism which redefines the rules by which 
governments and societies should operate. Furthermore, a new governmentality provides a 
new ideological frame for collective action. The resulting functionally differentiated policy 
communities in which territorial and societal actors at all levels are engaged in profes-
sionalised processes of lobbying, policy formulation, and regulation have a disaggregating 
effect on politics (ibid.:249-251).
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2.5.2. The Persistence of Hierarchy
Following Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden (2004:148-151, also see earlier in this chapter), 
three types of network governance can be identified in the literature on EU governance. 
These are summarised in table 2.5.
While public and private networks are forms of network governance on a very specific level, 
interpreting MLG as network governance cuts across levels and domains, thereby establishing 
policy networks. According to Eising & Kohler-Koch (1999:5), the different policy networks 
that emerge, and at times even surpass the national level by organising European-local 
networks, should be better termed network governance than multi-level governance because 
of their horizontal — rather than hierarchical — approach to coordination within the network. 
The authors’ idea of network governance is that
“political actors consider problem-solving the essence of politics and that the setting 
of policy-making is defined by the existence of highly organised social sub-systems. 
[…] Thus, in these patterns of interaction, state actors and a multitude of inter-
est organisations are involved in multilateral negotiations about the allocation of 
functionally specific ‘values’ (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999:5). 
Both the academic literature on MLG and network governance mention the blurring of 
the boundaries between state and society (cf. Piattoni, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2001 for 
MLG and Börzel, 2011 for network governance). They also share other features such as an 
emphasis on interdependencies, multiple actors, horizontal relationships, and the exchange of 
resources. Network governance, just as MLG, sees shortcomings in the ability of the national 
state to govern effectively (Piattoni, 2010:87). Changing relationships in (international) 
society offer new ways for non-state actors to participate in the policy-making process, 
especially at the European level. The national governments have lost their monopoly on 
Table 2.5. Three types of network governance
Type of network governance Elaboration
Public networks Networks formed by public institutions to govern 
their environments by exchanging information and 
resources in negotiation processes
Private networks Inter-firm cooperation of smaller firms in networks, 
governed by decision rights and a certain claim to 
profit
Multi-level governance Policy networks formed by multiple levels of 
government and the private sector engaging in 
policy-making or public-private partnerships
Adapted from: Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004:148-151.
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the representation of their business and citizenry (Kohler-Koch, 1999:19). Especially in the 
EU, network governance is seen as an appropriate method because it is “able to bridge the 
heterogeneity of the EC’s [European Community’s] members and compensate for the lack 
of democratic accountability by introducing elements of functional representation” (Eising 
& Kohler-Koch, 1999:274). Yet whereas network governance then often proceeds to look 
at coordinated efforts to reach a common policy goal, MLG stresses the contested nature of 
power and responsibility, even though it still does not adequately offer a conceptualisation 
of power. Both approaches differ in the degree to which they consider the formality and 
fluidity of networks and on the focus on consensus within networks. Network governance is 
mostly concerned with informal and highly fluid networks focusing on reaching consensus28. 
By contrast, MLG focuses on more formal and stable networks although it does not discount 
ad-hoc constructions (cf. Zürn, Wälti & Enderlein, 2010:4; Piattoni, 2010). 
It is not strange that networks as an image keep popping up in EU studies. MLG does 
encourage flexible and negotiated solutions to coordination, which leads to the conclusion 
that type II MLG is often more useful in describing the challenges of EU policy-making than 
type I MLG (cf. Bache, 2008; Conzelmann, 2008). Furthermore, the introduction of the 
network governance approach in EU studies was a criticism of the classic ‘90s interpretation 
of MLG for being too ‘level-oriented’ (Börzel, 2011:53) and is said to solve the joint-decision 
trap because negotiators often have more flexible instead of fixed mandates (Jachtenfuchs, 
2001:254). The more recent reinterpretation of MLG seems to address at least the first 
caveat by explicitly including non-state actors in analyses of EU policy-making. Another 
critique of MLG is that it is outdated since the “increasing issue and institutional complexity 
of EU policy-making activity can no longer be captured through an isolated, three-layered 
conceptualization” (Stephenson, 2013:833). Instead, Stephenson argues that the MLG 
approach should be complemented by studies of institutional or actor complexity. Smith 
has encountered this issue in his research on renewable energy policy in the UK. He states 
that power relations form the basis for negotiations due to often asymmetrical resource 
interdependencies, leading to the conclusion that “the need to enrol key interests and 
material priorities will structure renewable energy governance” (Smith, 2007:6269). A 
study of MLG can therefore benefit from specific attention for power relations, which will 
be confirmed in the empirical part of this book. 
The case that was chosen for this dissertation includes a variety of non-state (private sector) 
actors, which lends validity to the addition of a non-hierarchical viewpoint to contrast the 
traditional level-oriented governance approach to EU studies. In fact, it is difficult to move 
28  Though one could argue that the policy networks dichotomy of issue networks and policy communities leaves room 
for both sides of the formal/informal and fluid/stable spectra.
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completely away from hierarchy as state actors remain dominant in EU policy-making and 
the EC seems to show no interest in involving private actors beyond formal and informal 
consultations (Börzel, 2011:53-54). Even when governance takes place in type II arrange-
ments, multiple empirical studies asserted that the formal authority of type I is still necessary 
for effective governance. MLG offers insights to study both the network aspect of EU 
governance and the hierarchical tendencies that remain. The above leads to MLG providing 
a loose-standing analytical framework in its own right. Its strengths are that it shows which 
role governments and social actors play at different territorial levels, it highlights the levels 
lower than the national one, it does not assume that the national state can just ‘step in’ 
if MLG arrangements fail, and it reminds us that existing institutions cannot be ignored. It 
therefore connects the three dimensions of politics, policy and polity and “fully acknowledges 
this triple dynamic and the interrelations that it implies” (Piattoni, 2010:89-90, emphasis in 
original). Even so, MLG does have its limits. It is probably best applicable in policy domains 
where territory plays a major role, mostly due to the fact that much depends on territorial 
distinctiveness. Even with the newer research conducted using MLG theory, it also still lacks a 
proper incorporation of the importance of power in EU governance, which remains especially 
important in a highly politicised area such as energy policy. Furthermore, even though Marks 
and Hooghe’s distinction between type I and type II MLG is often criticised, type II MLG comes 
rather close in describing governance networks, thereby offering similarities between both 
approaches. However, MLG does help remind us that in the end some territorial authority 
must ‘bind policy knots together’. Territorial constituencies are therefore still at the heart of 
policy-making (Piattoni, 2010:257). This observation is especially true for the studied case 
of the Energy Port, as the region in which it is located has its own actors, with their own 
resources, preferences, and possibilities. Negotiations thus take place within the regional 
context (Smith, 2007:6269) even though — paradoxically — issues of climate change 
transcend administrative boundaries, making them obvious candidates to analyse from the 
perspective of multi-level governance (Marsden & Rye, 2010:670).
While recognising Eising & Kohler-Koch’s premise and stressing that studying the EU’s 
democratic deficit or legitimacy is not the purpose of this study, from this point onwards 
a distinction will be made between network governance and multi-level governance. The 
academic debates surrounding both approaches have their similarities, but should not be 
confused. I will apply the more recent interpretation of MLG, which allows continued use 
of how governance as a concept was defined in this chapter; leaving room for public and 
private actors. Piattoni’s conceptualisation is especially attractive because the three pressures 
she describes lend themselves well to empirical investigation. Chapters 5 and 6 will show 
the tensions and connections between these pressures and how they can be used to really 
show what happens in multi-level governance processes. Network governance can also 
shed light on such processes, but the added value of MLG is the reminder that hierarchy 
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persists, and analytical tools to investigate this assumption. For the development of MLG, 
the addition of private sector actors is “conceptually and empirically interesting” (Zürn, 
Wälti & Enderlein, 2010:3), which adds to the relevance of such an exercise.
2.6. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
Two a-priori assumptions of MLG are trust in the importance of supranational institutions 
and the belief that the agency of actors has influence on the politics, policy and even 
polity of the European Union. The first assumption needs elaboration. The incorporation 
of sub-national and private actors into European policy-making at all levels of government 
and often in non-hierarchical networks has led to a reconfiguration of the supranational 
level as a fundamental level of government (Piattoni, 2010:250). The European level thus 
becomes one of the fundamental levels, which does not mean it supersedes all other levels. 
Therefore, the interpretation of that statement in this thesis is that the supranational level 
should not be discounted, but that other governmental authorities remain important as 
well. Both parts of this statement — the presumably important role of supranational and 
lower levels of government — are already interesting to study in and of themselves. The 
second assumption, specifically applied to the case at hand, means that Rotterdam Energy 
Port actors defend their own positions and pursue goals (that they find legitimate). The 
rationalist underpinnings of MLG theory suggest that actors are aware of and can act on 
their own behalf, which suggests it may be beneficial for them to keep systemic changes 
open for the time being in order to retain a measure of flexibility (Piattoni, 2010:250). In 
essence, the polity-forming aspect of MLG encompasses both downloading and uploading 
and accepts that governance in the EU has a cyclical nature. This dissertation will focus mostly 
on the consequences of downloading, but will draw conclusions for uploading activities 
which, according to MLG, can lead to structural changes.
Taking the two assumptions outlined above as testing ground, I now turn to the theoretical 
expectations29 of this thesis. They will be structured along the three pressures as identified 
by Piattoni (2010) — discussed earlier in this chapter — and will therefore provide the 
three expectations of this dissertation. First, the domestic - international pressure addresses 
one of Jordan’s (2001:201-202) criticisms of MLG about its lack of attention to external 
developments for European policy-making. This pressure is one from above the nation state 
and assumes that policy coordination at a higher level than the national one is necessary 
29  The term ‘theoretical expectation’, or ‘proposition’, was chosen instead of ‘hypothesis’ since the expectations will 
not be tested quantitatively but rather used as a guiding tool for qualitative analysis. An explicit formulation of the 
limitations of using hypotheses in qualitative research would also have been possible, but what then remains are 
theoretical expectations, which is why the choice was made to call them what they are from the start.
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due to increased policy activism at the supranational level by actors other than national 
governments. Actors stemming from business, civil society (including European associations 
and transnational groups) and sub-national governments are pulled into the European sphere 
by the European Commission. They create interdependencies on an international level which 
national governments cannot ignore. It becomes only rational for them to coordinate at the 
supranational level as well, thereby spurring further EU integration (Wessels, 1997:274). The 
European Commission also uses agreements made internationally as a way to legitimise its 
own activism towards national governments (Piattoni, 2010:58-62, 148). The result is that 
the domestic - international distinction is overcome. The first expectation I therefore have 
is: actors create interdependencies between business, civil society, and government on an 
international level, which necessitates policy coordination at not only the national level but 
also the supranational level. Applying the proposition to the studied case would involve 
Energy Port actors participating in transnational and cross-border settings and policy-making 
at the European level. Zooming in even further, the expectation is that the PoR is one of 
many actors active at international level because the policy solutions the PoR needs cannot be 
provided at national level alone. The assumption of importance of supranational institutions 
would hereby seem correct.
Second, the centre - periphery pressure describes a pressure from below the national 
governments and effectively deals with the question why sub-national authorities exist. 
Since sub-national authorities are often territorially distinctive from their central govern-
ment — that is, they embody (slightly) different culture, values, politics, and so on — it 
stands to logic that for certain issues it may be easier to arrange coordination at the local 
or regional level than at the national level. Important for multi-level governance theory 
is the fact that the status and competences of sub-national authorities vary throughout 
the EU; some have a larger role than others. At the same time, the consequence of more 
efficient coordination at a lower level of governance creates opportunities for actors at that 
level to make more use of their power than originally intended by the national government 
(Piattoni, 2010:46-50). This mechanism is especially true in matters relating to territorial 
policies, such as land use planning, infrastructure, regional cohesion, and so on. A caveat 
of the new conceptualisation of MLG is that it does not specify how sub-national actors 
increase their power vis-à-vis the central government. It was chosen to call those actors 
‘policy actors’ in this thesis and to indicate a strengthening of their relative position in the 
network as a way to conceptualise the centre - periphery shift. The second expectation of 
this thesis is therefore: regional coordination in territorial matters is more efficient than 
national coordination, which leads to the strengthening of local policy actors. In this case 
I especially expect the Port of Rotterdam Authority to be empowered due to being able to 
employ its resources effectively when stimulating activities in Rotterdam.
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Finally, the state - society pressure puts pressure on national governments from within. This 
pressure is brought about by increasing cross-linkages between public and private actors 
based on the knowledge that the state and society need each other to ensure effective 
governance. Examples of movements in the state - society dimension are European NGOs, 
neo-corporatist arrangements, local mobilisation of civil society, and transnational advocacy 
coalitions. Governmental institutions at times use advocacy mechanisms traditionally associ-
ated with those of interest groups. What results from this blurring of boundaries between 
state and society is that private actors often assume public responsibilities30 while public 
parties start to act like private groups (ibid.:67-72). It is important to note that Piattoni’s view 
of the state - society pressure entails a more far-reaching blurring of state and society than 
often referred to by scholars of European and network governance. It is not just about public 
and private actors cooperating together in non-hierarchical networks. The fundamental factor 
here is the far-reaching blending of public and private advocacy and responsibilities. The third 
theoretical expectation thus posed in this thesis is as follows: cross-linkages between private 
and public actors lead to private parties assuming public responsibilities and public parties 
acting like private groups. In this specific situation it is expected that an analysis of Energy 
Port governance will reveal instances of cooperation between public and private actors, in 
which private actors have taken up tasks that are traditionally associated with the public 
sphere while public actors form coalitions with them against other governmental authorities. 
An example of the latter would be if the Dutch government would enlist the support of the 
private sector to advocate a certain energy target at the European level. Likewise, it is not 
unthinkable that a governmental authority could also ‘lobby’ a private actor. The challenge 
is to show if this far-reaching blurring of state and society is really happening, questioning 
what is considered ‘traditional tasks’ and what is not. Specifically applied to the Port of 
Rotterdam Authority, I expect the PoR to develop economic activity in cooperation with the 
private sector and to advocate its interests at EU level alongside Dutch governmental actors 
to obtain favourable policy conditions.
The three expectations formulated above (summarised in table 2.6) essentially cover 
mechanisms that were described previously: a blurring of state and society that trespasses 
the traditional boundaries of governmental competence and an apparent hollowing out 
of the nation state from two opposite directions. Turning back to the assumption of the 
importance of agency, the three shifts in governance help us understand how agency can 
manifest itself in multi-level governance. Agency guides the first three theoretical expecta-
tions, implying ongoing interaction between actors. According to Piattoni (2010:250), the 
interaction between actors results in shifts in multi-level governance arrangements and 
a redefinition and simultaneous activation of new jurisdictions and constituencies. It can 
30  One could, for example, imagine a company such as Shell offering policy advice to governments.
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thus be claimed that the three pressures lead to more and newer forms of interaction in 
mixed (public and private) systems. Examples of such arrangements are shadow lists for 
EC monitoring of legislative implementation of EU regulations in member states supplied 
by civil society, citizen monitoring31 and the formation of platforms spanning multiple 
territorial jurisdictions. However, one of the drawbacks of this conceptualisation of agency 
and interaction is that it misses the concept of power (cf. Smith, 2007; and to some extent 
Jachtenfuchs, 2001). In the case at hand, interaction takes place in the Energy Port network. 
Interactions in networks have the form of negotiations, which are based on power. The 
actors entering into negotiations do not necessarily have an equal distribution of resources 
or resource interdependencies. In fact, more often than not are negotiations based on an 
unequal distribution of power (Rhodes, 2007:1245; Smith, 2007:6269). 
Previous studies (cf. Marsden & Rye, 2010; Skelcher, 2005; Smith, 2007) that have attempted 
to apply Marks and Hooghe’s (2003, 2004, 2010) type I and type II multi-level governance 
have uncovered that, not only do some governance arrangements refuse easy placement 
in this dichotomy, in the end an actor with type I decision-making authority (ie., power) is 
almost always present or necessary to make policy decisions. The value of MLG is that it 
stresses territorial distinctiveness. It is thus not so much interested in the incorporation of 
national actors into EU policy-making as in how national actors give meaning to their role 
on their ‘own turf’. Furthermore, even though the inclusion of business, civil society and 
31  In the field of environmental policy an example of citizen monitoring is the use of eco-labels (Lenschow, 2005:321), 
which enables citizens to not only make a conscious environmental choice when buying household appliances but 
it also enables them to punish businesses based on their level of environmental friendliness.
Table 2.6. Theoretical expectations of multi-level governance
Pressure Theoretical expectation
Domestic - international Actors create interdependencies between business, civil society, and 
government on an international level, which necessitates policy coordination 
at not only the national level but also the supranational level
-> The PoR is one of many actors active at international level because the 
policy solutions the PoR needs cannot be provided at national level alone
Centre - periphery Regional coordination in territorial matters is more efficient than national 
coordination, which leads to the strengthening of local policy actors
-> PoR is empowered due to being able to employ its resources effectively 
when stimulating activities in Rotterdam
State - society Cross-linkages between private and public actors lead to private parties 
assuming public responsibilities and public parties acting like private groups
-> PoR develops economic activity in cooperation with the private sector and 
advocates its interests at EU level alongside Dutch governmental actors to 
obtain favourable policy conditions
Source: author’s own composition based on Piattoni (2010).
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sub-national governments in often non-hierarchical networks at the European level defies 
traditional hierarchy, the fact that some form of territorial government is necessary for policy 
decisions still holds. The newly created jurisdictions and constituencies may span multiple 
territories or form a sub-territory within a larger one, but the ‘original’ territories retain their 
importance because certain resources such as people, infrastructure and knowledge, and 
other factors such as the environment cannot easily be relocated (Piattoni, 2010:250). In 
other words, MLG does not expect governance to take place without a State. Phenomena 
such as self-governance by citizens or private governance by companies can thus never be 
part of multi-level governance.
It is important to note that, even though the theoretical expectations suggest a measure 
of sequentiality, in reality they probably interact, forming a mechanism. The exact way the 
various concepts depend on one another and interact will be analysed in the empirical part 
of this dissertation. The theoretical expectations thus act in concordance and are therefore 
not mutually exclusive.
2.7. CONCLUSIONS
Much like the European Union, governance is an ongoing project attracting the attention of 
many a scholar. It is expected that many studies covering governance issues will continue to 
be published in the near future. This flow of attention and the characteristics of governance 
make the study of it a dynamic and interesting exercise. This chapter has attempted to give 
a broad introduction into EU governance in research and practice, while taking into account 
that it cannot — and does not attempt to — cover all that has been written on this subject. 
The starting point was the concept of governance, which was taken as leading throughout 
the rest of this chapter. Attention was paid to its ‘fuzziness’ and many different definitions. 
In this study, governance will be understood as “the various institutionalized modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective 
goods” (Börzel & Risse, 2010:114). The adopted definitions of governance of authors such 
as Kohler-Koch, Eising, Börzel and Risse were consulted as sources of inspiration for the 
definition used in this study. The variety of approaches to governance was shown in bird’s 
view, ranging from Rhodes’ distinction of governance as possibly effective where markets 
and bureaucracies fail, to Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden’s nine approaches to governance 
which they distilled both from academia and from practice. These nine approaches are a 
mixture of analytical and normative approaches to governance.
This chapter discussed the twin concepts of Europeanisation and European integration 
as introduced by Schmidt, which are understood as the influence of the supranational 
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level on the domestic levels (Europeanisation) or the process of building institutions at the 
supranational level (European integration). These upstream and downstream approaches 
were classified as belonging to the older school of research, since, as Börzel has argued, 
European governance is a two-way interaction in which member states download EU 
policy but also upload their own preferences and policy styles to the supranational level. 
Downstream and upstream activities therefore take place in a parallel (or even circular, 
as suggested by Van Schendelen) fashion. The domestic level shapes what is happening 
at the EU level as well, and both approaches influence one another. An intricate pattern 
of dynamic interactions between the supranational and the domestic then lends itself to 
academic research, which has very often focused on the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU, its 
legitimacy, accountability, and efficiency. An important concept in EU research is thus its 
multi-level aspect. Introduced by Marks and subsequently taken up by the EU, the multi-level 
and multi-actor nature of European governance is widely accepted but also criticised for 
not providing a coherent theory. It is furthermore criticised for being too level-oriented 
and lacking an adequate conceptualisation of power. Even so, the EU’s multi-level nature 
is celebrated by EU bodies such as the Committee of the Regions and many scholars take 
MLG into account when studying the EU. Its celebrated strengths are the recognition of 
there being more than just EU institutions and national governments in EU policy-making. 
MLG effectively brought sub-national actors into debates about the EU. The application of 
Marks & Hooghe’s contrasting type I and type II governance visions and criticism of multi-level 
governance as a theoretical approach led to a renewed wave of research into MLG in the 
EU. In a comprehensive addition to scholarly literature in this domain, Piattoni identified 
three pressures (from above, below and within the nation state) that have consequences for 
national governments and subsequently for MLG arrangements in the domains of policy, 
politics and polity. The increased participation of sub-national authorities and private actors 
in policy-making leads to private actors assuming public responsibilities while public actors at 
times defend private interests. The European Commission actively supports the multi-actor 
system in its quest for legitimacy and power. In exchange, it provides financial support and 
access to the European policy-making process. As a result, national governments cannot 
ignore the supranational level, which necessitates coordination at that level. Further EU 
integration is spurred by this development, thereby reconfiguring the supranational level as 
a fundamental level of government. The governance mechanics that arise, in essence, are of 
a hybrid nature; horizontal governance is strengthened, but so are its vertical elements. MLG 
thus reconfigures the relationships between actors in a far-reaching manner as compared 
to the classic view of government-steering from above.
As the boundaries between state and society have started to blur and lower-tier govern-
ments and interest groups have increasingly sought the European arena in an effort to 
exert influence, authors such as Kohler-Koch and Eising have drawn attention to the EU’s 
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network nature and claimed that multi-level governance would better be termed ‘network 
governance’. I have argued that it is better to separate both terms so that the academic 
debates surrounding both approaches are not confused. Furthermore, Piattoni’s recent 
reconceptualisation of MLG offers interesting theoretical insights. This dissertation explores 
the degree in which these insights can be applied to empirical cases by applying the three 
pressures she identified to two nested cases. MLG will therefore be used as an analytical 
framework; data collection and analysis will be guided by the three theoretical expectations 
formulated in the previous section. The next chapter will discuss why a case study design 
was chosen to approach the empirical aspect of this thesis, present its methodology, and 
operationalise the theoretical expectations.
2
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Case Study Research Design
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical debates surrounding governance and European 
governance in particular. The theoretical approach that was ultimately chosen to inspire 
analysis of the Energy Port case was multi-level governance. The starting point of multi-level 
governance as an analytical framework is provided by Marks & Hooghe’s work, and has 
seen wide application in studies of European policy and governance. Several scholars, such 
as Bache, Flinders and Piattoni, have tried to take multi-level governance a step further and 
reconceptualised the theory. Chapter two ended with the formulation of three theoretical 
expectations that will act as a searchlight for data collection and analysis. 
The chosen research approach will be covered in this chapter. It will start (§3.2) with a 
discussion of retroductive research and its ontology and epistemology, then discuss the 
chosen research strategy of performing case study research. The case studied in this thesis 
should logically fit within the existing typology of case study designs. Then, the chapter 
will assess whether Rotterdam Energy Port is actually a case of multi-level governance. 
Following that, the chapter (§3.3) turns toward the operationalisation of the theoretical 
expectations, and the resulting research approach (§3.4). The expectations are linked to 
the sub-questions (see chapter one) guiding the thesis to ensure consistency and coherency 
of the analysis. Finally, the nested case selection process will be elaborated on in the last 
part of this chapter (§3.5) to include detailed information on the considerations that led 
to Energy Port being chosen as the case, and why CCS and small-scale LNG were chosen 
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as its nested cases. The conclusions (§3.6) provide a brief overview of the key decisions 
guiding the research design.
3.2. RETRODUCTIVE RESEARCH AND CASE STUDY DESIGNS
Blaikie (2000:91-99) provides an interesting view on the multiple strategies a researcher 
can use to answer research questions. He mentions four approaches: inductive, deductive, 
retroductive, and abductive, each with an appropriate set of research questions and methods 
of data collection and analysis32. Using the analogy of an alien civilisation studying human 
interactions taking place at a university, Blaikie discusses several ways to get an answer 
to how human social interactions in enclosed spaces can be understood. The inductive 
method generates many observations and attempts to generalise them into a theory. The 
deductive method works the other way around, starting with theory-infused hypotheses 
and testing them methodically in the field. Retroductive research is a mix of both inductive 
and deductive reasoning, starting with tentative mechanisms that could have produced 
the observed regularities and refining these mechanisms using empirical data in order to 
find the ‘real’ mechanism. The fourth approach, abductive research, allows the researcher 
to be ‘abducted’ by the studied object, often following it closely in an attempt to uncover 
how sense-making and the attribution of meaning occurs (fe., anthropological research). 
Given the lack of academic knowledge on climate and energy policy processes within port 
areas and the open-endedness of multi-level governance as a conceptual framework, I 
have chosen the retroductive approach. A purely deductive approach was not desirable due 
to the multiple blind spots this dissertation addresses. To name a few: the governance of 
port-industrial complexes, the quick evolution of climate and energy policies as one terrain33, 
the system-wide consequences of the introduction of a new fuel. Explorative research was 
therefore an important part of my initial approach to discover which factors to include in the 
analysis and which to exclude. At the same time, the PoR had the wish to better understand 
how they should approach the EU, so an EU-oriented theoretical framework was preferable 
over a purely inductive approach. Retroduction combines both requirements, allowing for 
theoretical expectations to be drawn while leaving enough room for unexpected twists and 
turns.  Chapter two posited three tentative theoretical expectations and social mechanisms, 
which I explore in chapters five and six, and further refine in chapter seven. As such, the 
retroductive approach leaves room to work with a theory, testing its merits and iteratively 
refining it during the research process.
32  Though it must be noted that what is deemed ‘appropriate’ is partly personal preference and not set in stone.
33  At the start of my research period (February 2013) climate and energy policies were often seen (or experienced) as 
separate. In the last few years views on their intertwinement have changed at an extremely rapid pace.
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3.2.1. Ontological and Epistemological Statement
Retroductive research is an alternative to positivism and critical rationalism, which constitute 
the logics behind inductive and deductive research (Blaikie, 2000:101). Its ontology — its 
understanding of reality — has three domains: the empirical (observable), the actual (events 
that happen, even if unobserved), and the real (underlying structures and mechanisms). Its 
epistemology — the way in which knowledge is perceived to be obtained — consists of 
‘laws’ that express the tendencies of things, or models which reveal underlying mechanisms. 
It is less about causality and more about underlying powers and opportunities, allowing the 
researcher to reveal mechanisms even when there is no observable change. A distinction is 
made between transitive and intransitive objects of science, the former being about concepts, 
theories and models while the latter refers to real entities and their relations. Retroductive 
research does not assume that prediction is possible in social sciences due to the open nature 
of social systems (Blaikie, 2000:108-113). As a researcher I share the belief that prediction 
is impossible in social sciences, and pose that trying to understand the consequences of 
European climate and energy policies for the Port of Rotterdam is most interesting to 
study from a perspective of unraveling social mechanisms and building a narrative around 
them, rather than by proving statistical causality. Causality is not always quantifiable. This 
dissertation qualitatively measures the key concepts discussed in section 3.3, but to determine 
their individual statistical impact on the Rotterdam port community lies beyond the nature 
of this case study. If one understands the underlying social mechanism, one has the tools 
in hand to influence outcomes. In a sense, I value the practical implications and usefulness 
of this academic research highly and it is my hope that this dissertation gives the studied 
actors insight in how they can help shape their own world. It is now time to turn toward 
the research strategy and discuss types of case study research.
3.2.2. Energy Port: A Case of Multi-level Governance?
The question why a case study strategy was chosen begins with the research problem as 
defined in chapter one. In order to gain knowledge regarding why climate and energy 
goals continue to be set yet not met, and in order to understand what consequences 
the formulation of climate and energy policy at European level has for an industrialised 
region such as the Port of Rotterdam, one needs to delve into a shining example of the 
problem. Case studies provide context-dependent knowledge that assists human beings 
in learning processes (Flyvbjerg, 2006:221). It can provide information that can illustrate 
a phenomenon by ‘force of example’ and test hypotheses or propositions. By virtue of 
being able to dig deep into a given case, a researcher is enabled to seek for deep causes 
of a problem (ibid.:228-229), which is the objective of this thesis so that lessons may 
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be drawn for the future. Flyvbjerg counters several misunderstandings about case study 
research in his 2006 article ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, though 
single case studies could remain vulnerable because the case may not turn out to be what 
is needed for proper analysis. Even doing two cases increases the researcher’s chances 
to arrive at valid results (Yin, 2009:60-61). For reasons of executability, the depth that 
is necessary for this dissertation cannot be established when doing more than one case. 
Therefore an embedded single-case study has been chosen instead of a holistic design. 
Within the main case (Energy Port), two nested cases (LNG hub and CO2 hub) have been 
chosen. While still performing a single case study, the nested cases can counter some of 
the criticism thrown at single case studies, such as non-generalisability (Yin, 2009:61). 
The research approach can thus still benefit from cross-case analysis of the nested cases 
and ensure the required depth within the case. But is Energy Port a representative case 
of multi-level governance?
When selecting cases for a single case study, there are five general information-oriented 
designs which can guide the selection process. First, the critical case can test a theory’s 
propositions to support, falsify, or extend the theory. It can also act as a critical case to 
establish which theory of multiple theories comes closest to explaining a phenomenon. 
Second, the extreme or deviant case can provide information on cases that have an un-
usual nature, for example by being extremely problematic or extremely good (Flyvbjerg, 
2006:230). An extreme case can test a theory in a setting where there are no other similar 
cases to be compared with. Third, the representative or average case shows takes an aver-
age example (for example, one project among many similar projects) to explain the general 
occurrence of a phenomenon (Yin, 2009:48-49). Fourth, the revelatory case is used when 
previously researchers have not had access to the study of a certain phenomenon. An 
example can be the study of drug cartels from within. Fifth, the longitudinal case studies 
a case at two (or more) points in time, which allows for the study of intra-case dynamics 
(Yin, 2009:49). 
Identifying what type of case we are dealing with requires a discussion of how Energy Port 
fits within the MLG paradigm. Applying the reconceptualised form of multi-level gover-
nance theory leads to the general expectation that multi-level governance arrangements 
put pressure on and reconfigure politics, policy and polity in the EU. Applying the former 
to the studied case, the expectation would be that the Rotterdam Energy Port, due to its 
context and its multi-level and multi-actor nature, operates in a dynamic constellation 
which defies hierarchy and challenges politics, policy, and polity on several levels of govern-
ment. In the scholarly literature on MLG, several criteria are identified if an empirical case is 
to be judged a case of MLG. The first three are suggested by Piattoni (2010:83), the latter 
by Zürn, Wälti & Enderlein (2010:2-4):
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1. different levels of government are simultaneously involved in policy-making;
2. non-governmental actors are involved at different governmental levels34;
3. interrelationships that are created defy hierarchies and take on the form of non-
hierarchical networks;
4. all private actors present in the governance arrangements may offer private solutions 
but must do so to solve a public problem, and;
5. the governance arrangements have a certain degree of durability.
The first criterium is easily defended and met. The involvement of the European Commis-
sion35 for the establishment of EU-wide energy and sustainability targets (most notably the 
emission targets) is obvious. Furthermore, the EU grants subsidies to promising projects 
and accepts policy advocacy documents in return. The Dutch national government is in 
charge of port policy and also governs through climate and energy targets coupled with 
financial support to Energy Port-related businesses planning projects. The municipality of 
Rotterdam is responsible for the port bye-laws (in Dutch: Havenbeheersverordening) which 
can be seen as the day-to-day port management rules for the Port of Rotterdam. They 
are relevant for the Energy Port since certain energy carriers that are part of Energy Port 
(such as LNG) can also be used as fuels for ships and therefore fall under Rotterdam’s 
bye-laws. Governments active in the Energy Port case are thus active on at least three 
levels. However, they must also simultaneously be involved in policy-making in order to 
fully meet the first criterium. In negotiations surrounding energy and climate policies, the 
EU welcomes input from its member states. Consequently, the Dutch government is active 
during the policy-making process to ensure that EU rules and targets do not exceed Dutch 
preferences or possibilities. The city of Rotterdam, in turn, is a prime information source 
for the Dutch government since about 20% of Dutch GHG emissions originate in the port 
of Rotterdam. Any regulations adopted by the EU or the Dutch government therefore have 
an enormous impact on the city of Rotterdam. The importance of local collaboration in 
order to meet local and international climate targets has led to the establishment of the 
Rotterdam Climate Initiative (RCI), in which both the municipality and the PoR take part. A 
network organisation such as provided by RCI facilitates negotiations and can therefore be 
34  In this dissertation the inclusion of non-governmental actors is mostly considered at the local/regional level rather 
than the EU level.
35  Recognising that the EU is not a unitary actor, this thesis focuses solely on the European Commission. The reasoning 
behind a specific focus on the Commission is the fact that it is the main body for policy preparation and initiatives, 
and because it funds projects carried out under the Energy Port. This dissertation does not wish to step into the 
debate on which EU institution is most important or most powerful and therefore does not claim that the EC is 
‘the’ institution to target at the EU level. However, for the chosen case, analysing the role of the Commission is the 
most logical choice.
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a welcome actor at other governmental levels. It is safe to say that in the Rotterdam Energy 
Port multiple levels of government are simultaneously involved in policy-making.
The second criterium of non-governmental actor involvement is also met by Rotterdam 
Energy Port. Several examples can be considered to support this claim. The Rotterdam Port 
Authority itself is a prime — but also ambiguous — example of the involvement of a non-
governmental actor at different governmental levels. Even though all 100% of the shares of 
the PoR are government-owned, the PoR is governed by private law. It is therefore allowed 
to make a profit and to invest that profit where it sees fit. At the same time, the PoR also 
has certain responsibilities that traditionally belong to public authorities. As a landowner the 
port authority is responsible for port infrastructure. Specialised employees of the port also 
function as police officers, first aid givers and firemen when patrolling port waters. As one 
of the most important motors of Dutch economy, the PoR is also aware of its contribution 
to Dutch society. Whether the PoR is advocating its business preferences or its public duty, 
however, it makes sure to be present at the local, regional, national and supranational levels 
of government. The port’s private ‘renters’ and partners in the Energy Port are companies 
such as Uniper, Engie, Shell, Air Liquide, Vopak, and many more. These companies often 
not only operate within the city of Rotterdam, but also advocate their goals at the national 
and supranational level. They can do so on their own or through membership of think 
tanks, advocacy networks, or European associations. An actor such as the LNG Platform 
(with membership of, for example, the PoR, Shell, and employer’s organisation Deltalinqs) is 
a bridge between local levels and the national level. Membership of European associations 
further increases the multi-level nature of non-governmental participation through advocacy 
of country-based firms at the supranational level. 
The third criterium flows from the consequences of the first and second criterium. Networks 
are established harbouring the participation of both governments and non-governmental 
actors. The Dutch government sometimes acts in concordance with Energy Port actors in 
order to secure subsidies at the European level. Dutch policy officers then support private 
parties when submitting their tenders. Backing from the national government also helps 
non-governmental actors gain access to Commission funds, as it is important for the EC to 
be shown that a project can be trusted and be carried through to its end. In the LNG case, 
Dutch policy officers from the ministry of Economic Affairs effectively advocated private 
interests when they helped secure major funding that made small-scale development of LNG 
as a fuel possible. The non-hierarchical entwinement in networks does not end there. In the 
same LNG case the Dutch government backed using LNG as fuel for inland-faring ships, but 
also had to officially sanction it. Safety studies were needed to ensure the new technology 
would not endanger citizens, so private parties, research institutes and government officials 
cooperated in studies geared towards finding out what the risks of LNG use in ships are. 
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Such studies need not only data but also resources required to collect and analyse it. A 
non-hierarchical cooperation made the successful completion of the safety studies possible. 
The findings have been shared throughout the network of actors and have also reached 
international actors such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). They are also 
used to change legislation and as source of inspiration for policy advocacy at the European 
level. Here is where hierarchy does seep back in.
The fourth criterium is a very interesting one, because it incites a discussion on what 
constitutes a ‘public’ problem and what constitutes a ‘private’ problem, and when a proposed 
solution is deemed private or public. It is not the aim of this dissertation to provide an 
answer to this philosophical discussion. According to the definition of governance adopted 
by Zürn, Wälti & Enderlein (2010:2), governance only occurs when public problems are 
solved collectively by actors, through processes and in structures. While their definition of 
governance is not exactly the same as, but very similar to, the one adopted in this dissertation, 
it offers a good way to limit the possibilities of governance as a concept; it excludes purely 
business-oriented processes. This limitation is helpful because it suggests that, if governance 
occurs in this case, and non-governmental actors are present, they will be contributing to 
solving a public problem. There will probably be no doubt about whether climate change 
is a public problem or not.
The fifth criterium of durability of governance arrangements helps distinguish MLG from 
issue networks. The public problem Energy Port seeks to solve is very similar to the goals 
of European Union climate and energy policies: battling the cross-border issue of climate 
change coupled with ensuring safe, adequate and affordable energy provision36. Part of the 
solution offered by Energy Port is the development of LNG and CCS. While the durability 
of the governance arrangements falling under the Energy Port is not as certain as the 
durability of a nation state, and while actors operating in the port change over time, big 
projects such as the development of LNG from the ground up (before 2010 there was no 
LNG in Rotterdam whatsoever) require a relatively stable set of actors — both public and 
private — operating in a relatively stable network. Furthermore, businesses do not invest 
in land and infrastructure to build up their operations just to move away again a year later. 
A measure of stability can be assumed. It is thus safe to say that the durability criterium 
can be defended.
36  Of course there is an economic argument for Energy Port actors to be found here as well: businesses will always 
be businesses. But that does not erode efforts made by them to minimise the climate effects of their day-to-day 
operations.
3
58 Chapter 3
All in all, it can be concluded that the Rotterdam Energy Port is a case befitting MLG, which 
validates the use of MLG theory to generate research questions and theoretical expectations 
to further guide this dissertation. For the remainder of this thesis, Energy Port will thus be 
treated as an example of multi-level governance. It is, however, not a unique case to MLG, 
and neither is it revelatory. The method of data collection does not include longitudinal 
data collection, so Energy Port is also not an example of a longitudinal case. This process of 
elimination leaves two possible case types: the critical case and the average case. Part of the 
rationale of the critical case is that if a theory holds in the critical case, it will probably also 
hold in average cases. However, nothing in the Energy Port case suggests that the case may 
have such critical and exemplary value that whatever it shows for MLG, other cases should 
also show. The case is therefore an average case; an example of how multi-level governance 
works in the European Union in terms of bringing multiple hierarchical levels together in 
both public and private settings. The unique value of the case lies in the academic novelty 
of it (ie. no previous known application of MLG to a port-related situation).
3.3. OPERATIONALISATION
The theoretical framework proposed in chapter two and specified in this chapter provides 
theoretical understanding and background for what I expect to find in the case study. Several 
important concepts can be identified in the three propositions. These concepts will each be 
discussed and operationalised in this section. 
3.3.1. Measurement of Key Concepts
Chapter one presented a very brief overview of the major players in the Energy Port com-
munity. Figure 1.2 will be further fleshed out per nested case in chapters five and six. What 
results is a qualitative social network analysis (QSNA) providing the reader with a information 
regarding the most important actors in the network, shown from the point of view of the 
Port of Rotterdam Authority. It will therefore be an ego-network (cf. Freeman, 1982) in which 
the organisations (separate DGs, the PoR, ministries, companies, etc.) make up the nodes. 
The edges (or the connections between the nodes) symbolise governance ties between 
actors, ie., direct coordination with the purpose of providing collectively binding rules or 
collective goods. The ego network graph will be controlled for betweenness centrality (the 
number of shortest paths going through a node - gauging how important a node is within 
the network), modularity (checking for separate communities within a network) and degree, 
or how many other nodes a node is directly connected with (Freeman, 1982: 293; Borgatti, 
Meyra, Brass & Labianca, 2009:892). The actors present in Energy Port, along with their 
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interests and interdependencies, have mostly been discerned through active participation 
and observation and confirmed either through desk research or interviews. The relationships 
between actors are based on resource flows which structure their (inter)actions through their 
preferences and interests (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999:5). The preferences and goals of actors 
have been identified through a careful reading of the public statements they made and other 
relevant desk research, along with interview questions geared towards uncovering implicit 
preferences. Since social network analysis does not help much in uncovering agency and 
meaning in a network, concepts requiring more content will be studied through different 
means. Extensive observation and participation in the Energy Port network, coupled with data 
from fifty-one interviewed experts37, allowed for thick descriptions to be incorporated into 
the social network analysis. Thick descriptions thus supplement the social network analysis 
and provide information for the measurement of concepts such as the agency and the role 
of territorial government. Table 3.1 gives a grand overview of the theoretical expectations, 
the underlying key concepts and their qualitative measurement.
I will discuss the key concepts one by one in this section, starting with interdependency 
between actors on an international level. This concept encompasses transnational advocacy 
networks or other substantial cross-border cooperation between business, civil society, and 
government. Therefore, a specific focus will be placed on the existence of cross-border 
networks (and the participation of Energy Port actors in these networks) and on actor 
representation in international organisations or associations. For the sake of feasibility, only 
clear examples of interdependency have been taken into account where expert interviews 
have pointed towards the existence and importance of an organisation or association. 
This decision was made to exclude obscure networks and dormant participation38. Policy 
coordination at the X level of government, the third concept, is used to analyse the specific 
governmental level at which policy coordination takes place. Input for the measurement of 
this concept is provided by the contextual analysis of the policies relevant for the Energy 
Port (see also chapters one and four) and by collecting data on policy output at the na-
tional and supranational level of government. Wessels’ (1997:275) indicator for increasing 
harmonisation may be of use here, since a higher policy output at the supranational level 
could indicate necessity of policy coordination at that level. Therefore, only binding decisions 
will be taken into account. To further strengthen the validity of this concept, data has also 
been gathered on national references to EU policy, or the necessity for EU policy. If the 
Dutch government explicitly states that EU decisions are needed in a certain area, it would 
37  39 interviews. Some interviews were dual interviews while some were written up as fieldwork.
38  By ‘dormant participation’ I mean official participation in a transnational network or organisation without actually 
contributing to it. It can be beneficial for one’s image to be included in certain organisations or networks, but that 
does not necessarily imply active and meaningful exchanges, which are necessary for interdependencies to arise.
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imply that coordination is necessary at not only the national level but also the supranational 
level. Policy coordination and the interdependencies between actors together help draw 
conclusions regarding the first theoretical expectation.
Table 3.1. Key concepts, indicators and measurement
Theoretical expectation Key concepts Indicators Measurement
1. Actors create 
interdependencies between 
business, civil society, and 
government on an international 
level, which necessitates policy 
coordination at not only the 
national level but also the 
supranational level 
-> The PoR is one of many actors 
active at international level 
because the policy solutions the 
PoR needs cannot be provided at 
national level alone
Interdependencies 
at international level
Substantial 
transnational/cross-
border connections 
between business, 
civil society, and 
government
1. Cross-border 
networks
2. Representation 
in international 
organisation or 
associations
Policy coordination 
at the X level of 
government
1. Relevant binding 
policy decisions 
at national and 
supranational level 
2. National references 
to EU-level 
decisions
1. Policy output of 
national and EU 
level 
2. National policy 
documents 
referring to EU 
decisions or to the 
necessity for EU 
decisions
2. Regional coordination in 
territorial matters is more 
efficient than national 
coordination, which leads to the 
strengthening of local policy 
actors
-> PoR is empowered due to 
being able to employ its resources 
effectively when stimulating 
activities in Rotterdam
Coordination of 
activities
Development and 
implementation of 
activities at local 
versus national level
Level of government 
at which most 
policy activities or 
implementation 
occur
Local empowerment Local actors are 
empowered
1. Local coordination 
of activities (see 
previous concept) 
2. Local actor(s) 
emerging as 
central (resource 
dependency in their 
favour) actor(s) in 
network analysis
3. Cross-linkages between 
private and public actors lead to 
private parties assuming public 
responsibilities and public parties 
acting like private groups
-> PoR develops economic activity 
in cooperation with the private 
sector and advocates its interests 
at EU level alongside Dutch 
governmental actors to obtain 
favourable policy conditions
Cross-linkages 
between public and 
private actors
Formal cooperation 
between public and 
private actors of 
Rotterdam Energy 
Port
1. Resource flows
2. Joint goal/target 
setting
Blurring of state and 
society
1. Private parties 
assuming public 
responsibilities
2. Public parties 
acting like private 
groups
1. Tasks with a public 
nature carried out 
by private actors
2. Lobby activity 
towards another 
level of government 
or coalition forming 
with various actors
Source: author’s own composition.
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The next key concept, coordination of activities, is not about policy coordination — otherwise 
it would overlap with the previous concept —, but about coordination of activities at the local 
level, be they carried out by a governmental authority or a private party. In this case, activities are 
defined as ‘policy implementation or the creation of policy initiatives’. If activities are carried out 
by and coordinated on the local rather than the national level, somebody needs to be responsible 
for it. As the expectation is that local coordination is easier to organise due to greater homogeny 
(social efficiency), economic efficiency, and administrative efficiency (Piattoni, 2010:45-48), it 
is likely for a local actor to become the coordinating policy actor. My expectation is that the 
Port of Rotterdam Authority fulfils this role. The original idea was to identify core actors in the 
network by looking at the distribution of resources. However, it proved empirically difficult to get 
a representative picture of the distribution of resources among the various actors. To be able to 
draw conclusions regarding the empowerment of local policy actors, the fourth concept, then, I 
have relied on interview data checking for how experts talk about local actors. An authority can 
be important when it is seen as important. If the national government is lobbied by the local 
government, its position apparently is one of importance. The facilitation of Energy Port affairs 
by the city of Rotterdam would have to be publicly legitimised and should also be accounted 
for in official documents, such as a yearly financial report. Interviews with experts in the field 
will supplement the findings and methods such as observation and participation have also 
proven to be especially useful to unearth power relations, because such information is often of 
a sensitive nature and therefore not easily documented. If the PoR or the city were perceived as 
(potentially) empowered, it was deemed enough. The empowerment of local actors leads to a 
shift in the centre - periphery divide, and consequently puts pressure on central government.
The third expectation is divided in cross-linkages between public and private actors and 
the blurring of state and society. An important part of the reconceptualisation of MLG is 
the explicit recognition of public and private linkages, which makes the study of multi-level 
governance dynamics even more interesting (Zürn, Wälti & Enderlein, 2010:3). For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is important to look at these linkages, but they must fit the chosen 
definition of governance. Therefore, the cross-linkages must have a formal aspect. A private 
actor sending a public actor an email with a newsletter therefore does not qualify as a 
cross-linkage. A measure of cooperation will be looked for when measuring this concept, 
which is expressed in resource flows from one actor to another. Resources flow when actors 
cooperate through cooperative agreements, joint projects, and joint participation in think 
tanks or platforms. Furthermore, joint goal or target setting, such as mutual agreements 
on climate and energy targets, can also express cross-linkages between public and private 
actors. The Port of Rotterdam Authority itself already provides and interesting example 
of cross-linkages at play due to its status as a hybrid organisation: publicly owned but 
governed by private law. The PoR has a dual public and private function and can prove to 
be an important link between purely public and purely private actors. The sixth concept, 
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blurring of state and society, essentially has two indicators: private actors assuming public 
responsibilities and public actors behaving like private groups. These indicators can be found 
wherever cross-linkages are identified. As stated previously in this chapter, an example of a 
private actor performing a public task is advising a governmental authority on policy matters. 
Therefore, documents can be a reliable source of information for the measurement of this 
indicator. The second indicator will most likely be expressed in public statements, contracts, 
agreements, and actions showing lobby activity (whether or not in coalition with others) 
towards another level of government. Desk research is well-suited to collect the data for 
these concepts due to the often codified nature of cooperation. Additionally, other methods 
of data collection such as interviews, observation and participation have been employed to 
triangulate the findings. Taken together these two concepts provide qualitative evidence 
testing the third theoretical expectation.
The three theoretical expectations end up uncovering the dynamics of European climate 
and energy governance applied to the port of Rotterdam context. In trying to identify 
how the agency of actors matters, Piattoni’s three shifts will provide necessary information 
regarding who has played a role where, when and how. Power may play a facilitating role 
as it structures the relationships between actors. Hierarchical relations are at play in the 
background of this dissertation and these relations are of a dynamic nature. At the same 
time, these relationships are infused with power and therefore so is this thesis. Chapters 
five, six and seven will show how power comes up retroductively. Governance is not static 
and can vary across themes, platforms, policies, and so on. It is highly likely that  various 
ways of dealing with policies will be observed in the case study, sometimes showing a strong 
hierarchical aspect and at other times showing much defiance of hierarchy.
3.3.2. Levels of Analysis
Applying multi-level governance implies analysis at multiple levels of hierarchical authority. 
Each nested case has been analysed at three levels of governance (see figure 3.1): the 
supranational level, the domestic level, and the private level. Doing so allows for a reconstruc-
tion of two distinct narratives: a political and an industrial narrative. The supranational and 
domestic level show how governmental authorities, guided by politics, construct policies and 
coordinate their implementation. The private level will show how third parties view these 
policies and what their consequences are for them. Narration was chosen to illustrate the 
data buried within the cases because of their function as sense-making tools. We humans are 
story-telling animals. The narrative is “an ancient method and perhaps our most fundamental 
form for making sense of experience” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:240). The narratives, added into the 
chapters as boxes, will provide the reader with an inside view of a formative event within 
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LNG or CCS and serve to illustrate why certain theoretical claims are made in this thesis. In a 
situation where both the political and private narratives are not in concordance, governance 
might not be successful. However, changes in politics, policy and polity are conceivable in 
both a situation where the narratives are aligned and a situation where they are not. What 
the addition of these narratives then does, is shed light into why changes happen instead 
of just showing that they happen.
The empirical cases also make extensive use of interview quotes to illustrate how the 
interviewed experts view important mechanics guiding the case. It is important to note that, 
wherever the interviews took place in Dutch, the quotes have been translated to English as 
precisely as possible for ease of readership. 
3.4. APPROACH
Data for each key concept is presented in chapters five and six. Chapter seven compares the 
data for both cases and derives governance mechanisms, thereby providing conclusions per 
theoretical expectation. Chapter eights brings everything together and delivers an answer 
to the main research question. The theoretical expectations can be numbered one through 
three and linked to the crucial factor they embody. Table 3.2 shows the consolidated 
approach of this dissertation.
Governance at EU 
level
Governance at 
domestic level
Coordination with 
third parties
MLG
Do
me
sti
c -
 in
te
rn
ati
on
al
State - society
Centre - periphery
Figure 3.1. Three levels of analysis along three pressures on the nation state
Source: author’s own composition.
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The starting point is an exploration of the relevant policy context to illustrate within which 
policy domain the nested cases can best be placed and through which means this policy 
domain is governed (sub-question I). Chapter four provides a comprehensive overview of 
dominant EU climate and energy policies, how LNG and CCS fit within these policies, and 
how the EU’s efforts to coordinate trickle down to the national level. Chapter four also 
provides insight in the progress made to reach EU goals and shows the inherent tension 
between the domestic and international level in the areas of climate and energy policy.
The chapters covering the nested cases start with a comprehensive qualitative social network 
analysis and a discussion of the context and key events driving the case. Data for the chapter 
on the CO2 hub was collected over the period of October 2015 through March 2016, while 
data regarding the LNG hub was collected between February and September 2015. Empirical 
data collection for the LNG hub took longer, both because this case was investigated first 
Table 3.2. Methodological approach
Sub-question Theoretical 
expectation
Methods of data 
collection
Method of 
analysis
Chapter
I: Which EU climate 
and energy policies are 
relevant for Rotterdam 
Energy Port?
Exploration of policy 
context needed for all 
theoretical expectations
Desk research, 
interviews, 
participation and 
observation
- 4
II: Which (multi-level) 
governance mechanisms 
are present in the 
implementation of these 
policies?
1. Spreading out of 
policy coordination over 
several governmental 
tiers
2. Local policy actors 
and coordination
3. Far-reaching blurring 
of state and society
Desk research, 
interviews, 
participation and 
observation
Content 
analysis 
using thick 
descriptions 
and QSNA
Single case:
5, 6 
Comparison: 7
III: How can the 
governance of climate 
and energy in the 
Rotterdam port area be 
improved?
Examines the usefulness 
of MLG as analytical 
framework for 
prescriptive purposes
Data gathered 
in fieldwork 
conducted for 
sub-question I & II
- 8
IV: What are lessons 
the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority can learn 
for its public affairs 
management of future 
rounds of climate and 
energy policy-making?
Examines the usefulness 
of MLG as analytical 
framework for 
prescriptive purposes 
and builds a connection 
to public affairs 
management
Data gathered in 
fieldwork
- 8
Source: author’s own composition.
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and because it is the least documented of the two topics39. Desk research has been the most 
important starting point to collect data for the analysis, including online archival research in 
the municipality of Rotterdam to gather information on how the city responded to CCS and 
LNG projects and to European and national policy measures. This data is complemented by 
audio-recorded interviews and, when too sensitive, more informal interviews40 (51 experts 
total), observations and participation. The CCS case has data from 22 expert interviews 
and 6 field work reports. The LNG case was fed by 19 expert interviews and 13 field work 
reports. Interviews were held with representatives from multiple DGs within the European 
Commission (such as DG ENER, DG MOVE, DG CLIMA), two ministerial departments in The 
Netherlands (energy and climate), policy officers working for the province of South-Holland, 
civil servants from the city of Rotterdam, director-level employees of the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority, researchers at applied research institutes who also write reports advising the 
national government, environmental NGOs, and a variety of people working for private 
companies at different positions. All these people are experts within their field and have 
been recommended by people working for the PoR or the government. The interviews were 
anonymised insofar that readers of this dissertation will know if a statement was made by 
someone from the public or private sector and which type of government they work for, 
without being able to discern the exact department or person. Where specific people are 
quoted, permission has been asked beforehand. 
The field work reports mainly consist of conversations with important stakeholders ‘over 
coffee’ but also include notes of my participatory observation activities, however only for 
the LNG case. The large difference in field work reports between CCS and LNG is explained 
by the enormous activity on LNG whilst the research was ongoing, whereas CCS was not 
in active development during the research phase. The interviews there had more of an 
ex-post nature while the LNG interviews dealt with topics that were in the midst of being 
legislated and developed. Both the interviews and field work reports have been coded using 
MAXQDA software. The coding scheme was developed both deductively (according to the 
operationalisation of MLG earlier in this chapter) and inductively (themes, like ‘power’, that 
kept popping up were eventually coded for) and can be found in annex I. The dataset ended 
up with close to 3000 coded segments; two-thirds of the codes are from the public sector 
and one-third is from private sector statements. Information gathered from publications, 
academic or otherwise, and websites was not coded.
39  In the end I decided to place the CCS chapter before the LNG chapter because CCS was further along in policy 
implementation than LNG and also an example of unsuccessful governance attempts.
40  Coded as ‘field work’.
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A ‘map’ of the PoR’s ego network results from each nested case and serves to provide 
information about important actors and who they are connected to in governance processes. 
The next phase in each nested case study consists of content analysis using data gathered for 
the social network analysis in order to answer sub-question II. Thick descriptions (cf. Geertz, 
1973) will serve to add content to the analysed network so that agency and meaning may 
be uncovered (Jack, 2005:1239; Rhodes, 2007:1252; Weber, 2012:1). Wherever necessary, 
additional data has been collected through interviews. The three theoretical expectations 
will be examined in this phase, uncovering governance mechanisms and their underlying 
drivers and challenges. The resulting data will be used to answer the second sub-question.
The third sub-question will be answered by comparing the results of both the CCS and 
small-scale LNG cases so that conclusions can be drawn with regards to improving governance 
in the port area. Attention will be paid to the validity of such a generalisation. The result 
will provide the answer to the main research question posed in chapter one: How do the 
European Union’s efforts to address climate and energy issues affect the Rotterdam port 
community, and what role can the Port of Rotterdam Authority play in its governance in 
order to reach climate and energy policy goals?
At the end of the dissertation, MLG theory is evaluated using empirical data from this thesis. 
A specific focus on the assumed shifts in the dimensions and the role of various levels of 
government will allow for a reasoned evaluation of MLG as theory. Additionally, sub-question 
IV invites recommendations to be made to the Port of Rotterdam Authority with respect to 
its own position in the governance of Energy Port. These recommendations are based on 
the results of this dissertation and the opinion of the researcher and connect results from 
MLG analysis to public affairs management. The recommendations are not a formal part of 
the thesis, but rather a practical benefit of it. The choice was made to include them at the 
very end of the dissertation so that they are recognised as resulting from the work done 
for the thesis and to strengthen its societal relevance. Likewise, recommendations will be 
given to governmental authorities. 
3.5. NESTED CASE SELECTION
Even though the research design involves a single case study, a choice was made to involve 
two embedded, or nested, cases. In order to reflect on the type of nested cases in the 
research design, two main approaches can be considered. The ‘most similar’ case design 
is geared towards explaining X. The researcher will therefore choose cases that strongly 
vary on the independent variable X to be investigated, but which are similar in their control 
variables (Blatter & Haverland, 2012:43; Sekhon, 2004). In contrast, the ‘most different’ 
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case design is geared towards explaining Y. The researcher will therefore choose cases that 
have a similar outcome so that the factors leading to that outcome can be established. 
There should therefore be no variation in Y (Blatter & Haverland, 2012:49; Sekhon, 2004). 
The most similar and most different case designs are not applicable to this dissertation 
because of the nested nature of LNG and the CO2 hub. The cases exhibit, by definition of 
being nested, certain similarities. Furthermore, there is no clear delineation of variables and 
hypotheses to be tested. Rather, the research design allows for more general conclusions to 
be drawn about the ‘governance of Energy Port’ through guidance by several key concepts 
and theoretical expectations.
The thick descriptions that are used alongside the qualitative social network analysis come 
somewhat close to the technique of causal process tracing, without necessarily claiming 
causality. When doing process tracing, there is no emphasis on the co-variation of variables 
across cases, and so the case study design is less important. Most important is that the 
cases are accessible in terms of information and that they meet the research goals. Internal 
validity is also very important; a case that has practical and social importance and can show 
a lot that is relevant to the studied group (Blatter & Haverland, 2012:99-103). The nature 
of this dissertation calls for these criteria to be judged of highest importance. Accessibility 
and internal validity should help get at the necessary depth and detail within the nested 
cases and allow for thick descriptions to guide the analysis. Both nested cases are accessible 
and both the LNG and the CCS community can stand to benefit from this analysis. Lastly, 
it is important to note that there is significant knowledge about the nested cases prior to 
studying them. The choice is therefore well-informed. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Rotterdam Energy Port is concept spanning 
multiple energy sectors. It is not possible to study all of them within the scope of this 
dissertation (see also annex II). Therefore, this thesis will adopt two embedded cases which 
will be studied in-depth. In order to make it possible to answer the research question, the 
following case selection criteria have been applied. Both cases:
1. must fall in the period after the Port of Rotterdam Authority’s corporatisation in 2004;
2. must fall under the Energy Port concept;
3. must have been brought to the attention of the European Commission;
4. must be local (include participation of the Port of Rotterdam Authority), and
5. can still be ongoing but must exhibit interaction (either positive or negative) between 
the European Commission and the Port of Rotterdam Authority.
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The decision to only include cases after 2004 has two reasons. The first is that the Port of 
Rotterdam Authority had a different legal status before its corporatisation41, which could 
potentially have an impact on network dynamics and would therefore muddle the results. 
The second reason is that 2004 roughly coincides with the emergence of the Energy Port 
concept42 and therefore with policy surrounding it. The cases must be part of the Energy 
Port concept to enable the use of Energy Port as an illustrative case. Cases concerning the 
five pillars of the Energy Port fall under the Energy Port concept: the LNG hub, the coal 
and biomass hub, the CO2 hub, (sustainable) electricity generation, and energy efficiency. 
Because the focus lies on studying the governance of Energy Port in its multi-level and 
multi-actor context, the case must have been taken to the European level (with most 
probably a concrete lobbying purpose). Purely Dutch affairs — if there still are any in this 
field — defeat the purpose of this research. On the local level, the researcher is interested 
in the role of the Port of Rotterdam as well, since it is at the heart of the main research 
question. Therefore, there must be participation of the Port of Rotterdam Authority, and 
so the case cannot solely be an industry affair. In order to be able to draw any conclusions, 
the case must have conclusive results in the sense that it is not enough for the EC to have 
been informed about the case (which could also occur through the national level), but there 
also has to be a response that is indicative of two-way communication. In short: a form 
of interaction must be present. Such interaction can also be negative (for example, the EC 
indicating it will not speak with the PoR directly).
The above discussion on the case study design has established that the design entails an 
embedded single-case study depicting the average case for MLG and with accessibility of 
information and internal case validity being of importance to the overall case study design. 
41  In effect, the Port of Rotterdam Authority went from being an actor governed by public law to an actor being 
governed by private law. Naturally, some behavioural changes are to be expected.
42  This information follows from conversations with R. Melieste and P. van Essen (both Port of Rotterdam Authority), 
June-July 2013.
Table 3.3. Embedded case selection results
Present after 
2004?
Part of Energy 
Port?
Brought to EC 
level?
Local? Interaction?
LNG hub Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coal & biomass hub Yes Yes No Yes Yes
CO2 hub Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(sustainable) 
Electricity
Yes Yes No Yes No
Energy efficiency Yes Yes No Yes No
Fuels hub Yes No No Yes Yes
Source: author’s own composition.
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It has also been mentioned that the nested cases will exhibit some natural similarities simply 
because they are part of one and the same main case. To conclude this methodological 
discussion it can therefore be interesting to look at the similarities and differences between 
the nested cases across the criteria identified above (see also table 3.3).
The first criterium is met by all considered cases, as they represent current hubs identified 
by the Port of Rotterdam Authority. The fuels hub is not part of Energy Port policy43 and 
therefore does not meet the criteria. While the coal and biomass hub has been presented to 
the EC, no action has been undertaken by the Port of Rotterdam Authority to lobby on its 
behalf, thereby eliminating it from the list of possible cases. Sustainable electricity generation 
is mostly a national target and had not included interaction between the EC and the port 
until 2013. The same argument goes for energy efficiency. The two bottlenecks appear to be 
the criteria that a case must have been taken to the EC level and that interaction between 
the port and the EC must take place. Only two of the five pillars fit all criteria: the LNG 
hub and the CO2 hub44. The LNG hub has been called a success by the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority, while the CO2 hub so far has not. They have both been under the attention of 
the European Commission after 2004, and in fact very recently from about 2009 until 2013, 
when the case selection was made45. They are also closely tied to relevant EU policy. The 
Port of Rotterdam Authority has actively participated in both hubs, trying to bring the cases 
to the attention of the EC and the Dutch government. Since one hub has been called a 
success and the other a failure, conclusive results from the EC side are present and indicative 
of some form of interaction. The conclusion is that both hubs fit the case selection criteria 
and have therefore been chosen as the nested cases to be studied. The CO2 hub mainly 
consists of the ROAD CCS project (and the cancelled Green Hydrogen project). Whereas 
the Green Hydrogen project did not receive EU funding, the ROAD project did. Due to the 
predominant focus on CCS I will call this case the CCS case from this point forward. The LNG 
hub consists of large-scale LNG, as energy commodity, and small-scale LNG; a fuel. I choose 
to focus on the small-scale LNG aspect due to its relative novelty. Small-scale LNG can be 
both maritime LNG (Highways of the Sea project) and LNG deployed on inland waterways 
(LNG Masterplan). Both projects have received EU funding, though the dynamics in each 
project are different enough to warrant a focus on just one of them. I will investigate the 
inland waterways aspect of the small-scale LNG case. Both nested cases can be related to 
43  The fuels hub is not ‘formally’ part of Energy Port policy, which is odd since it would fit well within the concept. 
However, that would make it more difficult to claim that Rotterdam Energy Port is sustainable and green.
44  Confirmed by R. Melieste, October 2013.
45  Confirmed by J. Hoogcarspel (Air Liquide - CO2), H. Schoenmakers (ROAD - CO2) and E. Groensmit (VOPAK - LNG). 
October 2013.
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statements issued by the EC in documents such as the Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, 
the 2030 climate and energy framework, and the Energy Roadmap 2050.
3.6. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has sought to explain why a nested case study design was chosen to answer the 
main research question posed in the introductory chapter. Choosing Rotterdam Energy Port 
as the main case, it showed how governance of the Energy Port fits within the multi-level 
governance approach. The theoretical foundations and expectations laid in chapter two 
were operationalised to guide data collection and analysis in the empirical part of this dis-
sertation. Most importantly, the three shifts identified by Piattoni — domestic - international, 
centre - periphery and state - society — were chosen as guiding lights to uncover what 
European efforts to coordinate climate and energy policies mean for the port community 
in Rotterdam, and what role the Port of Rotterdam Authority can play in the governance of 
Rotterdam Energy Port. Within the case two nested cases were chosen: CCS and small-scale 
LNG. These two nested cases will be investigated in chapters five and six. This chapter also 
discussed the research approach which is characterised by an in-depth qualitative analysis 
of governance mechanisms using thick descriptions, drawing heavily on expert interviews, 
and a depiction of the PoR’s social ego-network showing governance ties between the most 
important actors per nested case. Where potentially illuminating, narrative boxes will be used 
to showcase key tensions between the public and private sector, but also their strengths 
when both sectors find themselves on the same side of the table. The next chapter will dive 
deeply into European climate and energy policies and show how the nested cases relate to 
overarching European policies and their domestic counterparts. This overview is necessary 
to understand the policy frameworks guiding the governance of CCS and small-scale LNG.
4
From ‘Dirty’ to ‘Clean’ and in-between: 
European Climate and Energy Policies
4.1. INTRODUCTION
“[E]nergy has a crucial role to play in tackling climate change” (IEA, 2013:15). The EU-28 
is responsible for 6.1% of global energy production and 11.9% of global CO2 emissions. 
These figures make the EU rank last in energy production46, yet fourth in CO2 emissions 
and final energy consumption (European Commission, 2014c:11-19). Logical conclusions 
that can be drawn from these figures are that 1) the EU contributes relatively highly to the 
climate change problem and 2) the EU imports more energy than it produces. In fact, the 
EU’s energy import dependency stood at a grand total of 53.4% in 2012, with the highest 
level of dependency on petroleum and products. The most important exporting countries 
are Russia, Norway, and Saudi Arabia for crude oil, Russia, Norway, and Algeria for natural 
gas, and Russia, Colombia, and the US for solid fuels (ibid.:24-26). The EU will therefore 
not achieve much by only focusing on reducing emissions at the source, where economic 
fundamentals and geopolitical considerations are the main drivers (European Commission, 
2011b:4). While climate objectives are often agreed upon internationally, their implementa-
tion has a national character. Energy policy is a national affair as well. Any analysis of EU 
climate and energy policies must therefore focus on the nation state as well.
46  Identified regions are EU-28, China, United States, Middle East, Asia (excl. China), Russia, Africa and ‘Rest of the 
World’.
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However, policies alone are not enough. The author of The Energy of Nations, Jeremy 
Leggett47, warns against five global systemic risks which influence energy policies and 
challenge businesses around the world: oil shock (mismatch between supply and demand), 
climate shock, further crash in the global financial system, carbon bubble in capital markets, 
and the shale gas boom. The dominant view is that peak oil is far off, so there is nothing to 
worry about. The same goes for the climate shock; while many agree that there is a threat 
to the earth and mankind due to emissions, adaptation is viewed as being possible and so 
there is no reason to be too concerned about it. The carbon bubble adds to this problem 
by continuing investments in fossil fuels even though we know that there is more carbon in 
them than mankind can afford to burn. Should governments decide to counter this trend, 
fossil fuel assets will decline in value so dramatically that the carbon bubble will burst. The 
shale gas boom adds to global uncertainty because of the concerns guiding the exportability 
of it as a concept. Finally, the inability to rein in the financial sector versus the resiliency and 
cyclical nature of capitalism provide risks in the financial sector, with further crashes possibly 
having a detrimental effect on energy markets (Leggett, 2014:xiii-xv). Why are these five 
systemic risks relevant to this dissertation? They painfully show the interconnectedness of 
energy markets on a global scale, not only with each other but also with the financial system 
and with the policies adopted by the world’s nations. A port aptly showcases the importance 
of connections: without connections, there is no reason for a port to exist. Therefore, this 
chapter addresses both European climate and energy policies affecting the Dutch situation 
and the global context EU and port developments are embedded in. I start (§4.2) with a 
discussion of the history of EU climate and energy policies up until now, including current 
progress and global developments, then turn to Dutch energy and climate policies (§4.3) 
before concluding with the statement that the guiding policies are of a highly fragmented 
nature (§4.4).
4.2. ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICIES: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN?
Sustainable energy is a phrase that appeals to many audiences. Most people would not 
even think about the controversy that is implicit in the term. The desirability of sustainable 
energy is not translated into an actual global movement towards the abandonment of 
fossil fuels, because investments into it are very expensive and many systems are designed 
to run on fossil fuels. Energy and climate thus do not always go together, even though the 
concept of sustainable energy aims to fuse them. In the world of policy, the link between 
47  The Energy of Nations is not an academic publication, but its author, Jeremy Leggett, is an Associate Fellow at 
Oxford University’s Environmental Change Institute. The book was published in 2014 and provides an interesting 
account of the danger of peak oil and of risks inherent in the global energy system.
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energy and climate is not necessarily obvious either. Climate change action is often seen as 
an emissions reduction problem and not as an energy problem (Shaw, 2011:743). From its 
early commitments under the 1997 Kyoto protocol, the EU has gradually shifted from aspiring 
to fulfil its climate obligations as a climate leader, to wedding the economies of energy and 
climate in an effort to reduce the stress human activity places on the planet. Yet even though 
the EU has extensive competencies to combat climate change, large parts of energy policy 
still fall under the sovereignty of its member states (MS). Articles 191 through 194 TFEU48 
establish competence in the areas of environmental and energy policy. The EU’s competence 
in the environmental area is well-established, but it has no say in a country’s energy mix. 
Individual MS thus often make their own energy strategies and do not always implement 
EU internal market policies properly (Vogler, 2013:629-639). The organisation of both policy 
fields in the Commission lies with two separate DGs — DG ENER and DG CLIMA49 — with 
no formal coordination between them (Toke & Vezirgiannidou, 2013:544; Vogler, 2013:629) 
until 2014. They often differ considerably in their opinion on the same matter (Skovgaard, 
2014:12). Problematic are the multifaceted aspects of energy policy, which include market 
policies, security of supply, trade, but also a heavy national security component. 
4.2.1. A Brief History of Climate and Energy Policies in the European Union
Energy security was the basis for peace in Europe after the Second World War50, and member 
states are reluctant to surrender control over such an important part of their national security 
(Vogler, 2013:630). Energy cooperation is part of the EU’s history since the 1950s, yet real 
cooperation is still difficult to achieve. The Single European Act of 1986 foresaw convergence 
of energy policies across the European Community and was subsequently spurred along by 
exogenous events such as the fall of the Berlin wall, the Gulf War, and the fall of the Soviet 
Union (Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 2016:105-108). National monopolies in the gas and 
electricity sectors were cut with the adoption of market liberalisation and third party trade 
directives in 1996 (electricity) and 1998 (gas). Since oil is not as bound to infrastructure as 
gas and electricity, national monopolies were of much lower concern there although Europe’s 
dependence on oil import from non-EU countries was a potentially problematic issue (Claes 
& Frisvold, 2009:213-214). Fully realising that a disruption in energy supply directly affects 
citizens’ welfare, member states became very worried about their energy security in the 
48  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, see the 2012 consolidated version at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT].
49  DG CLIMA was established in 2010 when DG Environment was split into two DGs. The Juncker Commission (2014 
onwards) has kept DG ENER and DG CLIMA as two separate DGs but under one Commissioner. Perhaps more 
synergies will now occur between energy and climate policy.
50  For a comprehensive historical account of EU energy policy, see Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 2016:92-124.
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wake of tensions between Russia and the EU and the problems in the Gulf region. Using 
coal became interesting again since it could be mined in the EU (ibid.:216).
The first international climate conference took place in 1988 when over 300 scientists and 
world leaders discussed the impact of energy consumption on climate change. Basing itself 
on the IPCC’s 1990 report showing a decrease in emissions in all sectors except transport, 
the European Commission took a leadership role and published its first communication on 
energy and environment in the same year. The Commission used strong statements such 
as “sufficient energy and environmental quality are essential for the survival of the human 
race” (European Commission, 1990:6) and “[a] high level of environmental protection 
requires stringent legal measures to be applied in all Member States” (ibid.:15). The EC 
tried to establish a leading role in policy-making towards CO2 reduction by ‘inviting’ the 
Council to “collaborate closely with the Commission in the execution of this important 
work” (ibid.:12). The resulting document, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (approved by the EU in 1993), sets out to stabilise the concentration of 
GHG in the atmosphere, marking the first international agreement focusing on the impact 
human activity has on the climate51.
Subsequent proposals to introduce an energy tax were shot down by EU member states, but 
the environment was now firmly on the EU’s agenda (Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 2016:112). 
The first Kyoto Protocol (1997) saw the introduction of quantitative GHG reduction targets 
for 2008-2012. The EU kickstarted its implementation by establishing the European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP). Coal, attractive for its positive energy security component, 
became problematic from a climate perspective. Yet a country’s energy mix is up to national 
governments themselves. Most countries — also globally — treat energy and climate policies 
as two separate domains. Even so, some reconceptualisations of energy security now involve 
sustainability (Toke & Vezirgiannidou, 2013:538-547). There is an obvious link between 
energy security and sustainability, which is often forgotten in the realm of public debates on 
this topic: many negative climate impacts (f.e., water stress, sea level rise, tropical cyclones) 
will make fossil fuel extraction and transport much more difficult and costly, thereby neces-
sitating climate action simply to keep the engines running (IEA, 2013:92). The IEA writes 
51  That is not to say there were no protective measures before the ‘90s. The Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 1972, also called the London Convention or the London 
Protocol, attempts to reduce pollution of the seas caused by waste dumping by vessels, aircrafts and platforms. 
It also includes a prohibition on transboundary CO2, making it illegal to ‘trade’ CO2 for the purpose of offshore 
storage. An amendment has been made to change this situation, but it has not been ratified by the required amount 
of states. Furthermore, if the CO2 is used as a product (for example for EOR), trade is allowed. Another important 
convention, the OSPAR Convention of 1992, is meant to protect the North-East Atlantic and prohibits the storage 
of CO2 in the water columns or on the seabed. Sub-surface storage is allowed.
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“[u]nless the resilience of our energy system to climate change is considered more 
explicitly, energy supply and transformation will be exposed to greater physical risks, 
which will increase capital, maintenance and insurance costs, impair energy supply 
reliability and accelerate the depreciation and deterioration of assets” (IEA, 2013:97). 
There should thus be a clear incentive for governments and energy companies alike to 
aspire to successful climate change mitigation alongside the economics of energy security. 
Reframing energy security to make sustainability be a part of it makes investments into 
sustainability less ‘sacrificial’ to people, yet others argue that, as a result, sustainability will 
become a secondary consideration (Toke & Vezirgiannidou, 2013:541-542). This dissertation 
shows that the critics are partly right.
4.2.2. Towards 2020 and Beyond
Over the years the EU has tried to link debates surrounding energy and climate issues. Early 
examples of climate and energy policy links are the ECCP and EU ETS, but they were not 
components of a “wider energy and climate security strategy” (Vogler, 2013:637)52. The 
turning point was a European Council meeting in 2007, led by the German presidency, 
which was later dubbed the ‘Merkel Miracle’. After the Lisbon Strategy and the European 
Constitution failed, Commission president Barroso tried to re-establish the Commission’s 
honour by initiating the Climate & Energy package (the ’20/20/20 goals’) with support of 
Commissioners Piebalgs, Dimas and Verheugen. The goals included binding GHG reduction 
targets for member states and were supplemented by the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) — 
regulating emissions from transport fuels — and standards for CO2 emissions from cars. 
During the meeting of the European Council, German Chancellor Merkel succeeded in 
ensuring unanimous support for the 20/20/20 goals. Member states were united and 
leading in their ambitions to save the climate. Some, most notably Germany, Denmark and 
The Netherlands, even announced stricter reductions than the EU-level agreement (Claes & 
Frisvold, 2009:218-219). Hindsight teaches us that these commitments, though revolutionary 
as they were at the time, would be subject to political whims. Even so, the onset of 2009 
saw energy security and climate discourses finally brought together, yet not fused.
The Europe 2020 Strategy (COM(2010) 2020 final) was introduced in 2010, right after the 
economic and financial crisis hit the European Union. Its predecessor, the Lisbon Strategy 
(2000 - 2010), addressed the EU’s place in a global competitive environment in an attempt to 
transform European economies and solve socio-economic problems such as ageing, growing 
52  From 2001 onwards there was a concrete EU renewable energy policy.
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globalisation, and rapid innovation (Natali, 2010:5). The focus was very much on ensuring 
the EU’s competitive position in a global perspective, which meant not only strengthening 
economic governance but also liberalising the energy market, improving education and social 
policies, increasing overall productivity and employment, and protecting the environment 
(Begg, 2008:427-429; Natali, 2010:5). Governance was a focal point of the strategy. The 
EU believed very much that a lot could be achieved through soft coordination and its 
newly introduced Open Method of Coordination (OMC)53. In cases where the EU did not 
have sole regulatory power, soft coordination hinging on flexibility, participation, use of 
benchmarks, and multi-level (policy) integration, was to aid in the harmonisation of policies 
across the EU (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004:185-189)54. Its influence on domestic policies and 
participation was heavily questioned by the time the Europe 2020 strategy was launched 
(Natali, 2010:19-20). Furthermore, the importance assigned to liberalising financial markets 
under the Lisbon strategy left the EU disappointed in the wake of the financial crisis (Gros 
& Roth, 2012:10-11). As a result, the Europe 2020 strategy was to be more focused and 
include clearly quantifiable, reachable goals (ibid.:77). Its main goal — to achieve smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth — reflects the impact of the crisis. Barroso’s words in its 
preface deliver a clear message: “2010 must mark a new beginning. I want Europe to emerge 
stronger from the economic and financial crisis” (European Commission, 2010b:2, emphasis 
in original). In order to deliver the goals, European leaders agreed on five ‘headline targets’:
1. Employment 
¬ s¬ AT¬LEAST¬¬OF¬¬YEAROLDS¬EMPLOYED
2. R&D
¬ s¬ ¬OF¬THE¬%5S¬'$0¬INVESTED¬IN¬2$
3. Climate and energy
¬ s¬ ¬REDUCTION¬IN¬GREENHOUSE¬GAS¬EMISSIONS¬AS¬COMPARED¬TO¬¬LEVELS
¬ s¬ ¬OF¬ENERGY¬FROM¬RENEWABLES¬IN¬lNAL¬ENERGY¬CONSUMPTION
¬ s¬ ¬INCREASED¬ENERGY¬EFlCIENCY
4. Education
¬ s¬ AT¬LEAST¬¬OF¬¬YEAROLDS¬COMPLETING¬TERTIARY¬EDUCATION
¬ s¬ EARLY¬SCHOOL¬LEAVING¬BELOW¬
5. Fight against poverty and social exclusion
¬ s¬ AT¬LEAST¬¬MILLION¬FEWER¬PEOPLE¬IN¬OR¬AT¬RISK¬OF¬POVERTY¬AND¬SOCIAL¬EXCLUSION
53  The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is an example of an emerging form of EU governance around the 2000s. 
For more information on the OMC, see for example the Eurogov paper by Citi & Rhodes: ‘New Modes of Governance 
in the EU’, 2007.
54  The OMC was, through its emphasis on multi-level participation, another form of multi-level governance.
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A caveat of the Europe 2020 strategy is that member states are given the freedom (except 
in the area of climate and energy) to formulate their national goals themselves in their 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs). In the areas of employment, R&D and social cohesion 
the sum of these domestic goals does not add up to the goals European leaders have 
formulated at the EU-level (Gros & Roth, 2010:85)55. Since only the climate and energy 
goals are binding (except for energy efficiency), one would expect higher success in reach-
ing Europe 2020’s energy and climate goals than in the other areas. However, section 4.2.5 
will show that even this success is not yet guaranteed. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of 
the relevant policy and financial coordination mechanisms in place at EU level since 2010. 
The green boxes show which policies are the focus of this dissertation.
To support the headline targets under Europe 2020 the European leaders agreed to the 
launch of seven flagship programmes. The flagships are meant to help reach the targets 
and boost economic growth in European countries by making coordination between EU 
institutions and national authorities a prerequisite. The seven flagships are fitted into the 
2020 Strategy as shown in table 4.1. Because Europe 2020 was introduced in times of 
economic crisis, it is important to consider not just the coordination of policy but also 
the financial mechanisms that guide the implementation of the strategy. The European 
Economic Recovery Programme (EERP) was launched in 2008 and aims to resolve the crisis. 
Its main pillars are the establishment of mechanisms for crisis resolution, financial reform, 
and to reinforce EU economic governance. A very important tool to reinforce economic 
governance is the European Semester, which was launched in 2011. The European Semester 
is an annual, cyclical coordination mechanism geared towards harmonising economic 
policies across the EU (Gros & Roth, 2010:79). It requires member states to submit their 
National Reform Programmes — the economic policies — and Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs) — the budgetary policies — to the Commission for an in-depth review 
and recommendations. These reports also feed into the EC’s economic forecasts and, most 
notably, its Annual Growth Survey (AGS). Member states are invited to report on their 
action plans and progress towards achieving the Europe 2020 goals in the same cycle. 
These plans are also discussed in the European Council and the European Parliament. The 
European Semester is thus a tool of economic coordination and also provides a direct link 
to the policy coordination strategy introduced in Europe 2020, and can potentially impact 
(progress towards) the Europe 2020 goals (ibid.:79).
55  See also the 2015 annex to the key 2020 parameters on the European Commission website: [http://ec.europa.eu/
europe2020/pdf/annexii_en.pdf].
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 Figure 4.1. European policy and fi nancial coordination through Europe 2020 and EEPR
Source: own composition based on policy documents mentioned above and EC website.
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4.2.2.1. Agenda-setting in an energy insecure Europe
The road to 2020 began with two catchphrases: competitiveness and energy efficiency. 
The 2004 Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, called “Doing More With Less”, stresses the 
importance of competitiveness and represents the era during which the EU was trying to be 
‘the best’. Saving energy and efficient use of energy are examples of ways to ensure future 
EU competitiveness. The Green Paper aims to increase this cost-effective and efficient use 
of energy by reformulating the existing EU energy policy (European Commission, 2004:4-5), 
and, following the 2009 package, the subtitle of the ensuing Energy 2020 strategy (European 
Commission, 2010a) — “A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy” — neatly 
summarises the reformulation into three pillars. Incidentally, this reformulation happened 
after the EU realised that being the best was no longer a realistic expectation in a rapidly 
changing world where emerging economies where forcing the EU to focus on remaining 
afloat. EU leaders decided not to place all their eggs in one basket; aside from conventional 
coal, oil and gas, increased focus was placed on the role of renewables, nuclear energy 
and LNG. Domestic energy production could increase and its supply could be diversified to 
reduce import dependency on Russia. Geopolitical considerations were important agenda 
setters for EU energy policy, and incidentally helped climate efforts as well. The EC had to 
find a way around exclusive member state competency and climate changed provided a 
good way to do so.
Table 4.1. Flagship programs under Europe 2020
Europe 2020 goal Flagships Brief summary of goals
Smart growth
1) Digital Agenda for Europe
2) Innovation Union
3) Youth on the Move
1) Digital Single Market promoting 
access and economic growth
2) Fostering an innovation-friendly 
environment
3) Promoting young people to 
study, train or work abroad
Sustainable growth
4) A Resource Efficient Europe
5) An Industrial Policy for the 
Globalisation Era
4) Promoting resource efficiency 
and the transition to a low-carbon 
economy
5) Promoting a competitive and 
sustainable European industry
Inclusive growth
6) An Agenda for New Skills and 
Jobs
7) European Platform Against 
Poverty
6) Increasing employment and 
equipping people with the right 
skills for the future
7) Promoting social inclusion and 
fighting poverty
Source: European Commission’s Europe 2020 website (http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/
flagship-initiatives/index_en.htm).
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Around 2007, all sectors except for the transport sector were showing a break in the growing 
emissions trend. To the dismay of many governments and the EU, the transport sector was 
stubbornly emitting more each year. The Merkel Miracle also saw the adoption of standards 
for CO2 emissions from cars, but the car lobby was not thrilled. They campaigned for a 
so-called integrated approach which could “spread the burden of carbon intensity reduction 
over all parties contributing to carbon emissions” (Breemersch, 2015:3). Alternative fuels 
came up as an option to reduce emissions in novel ways and the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) 
focused on mixing-in biofuels for easy CO2 reductions. But a focus on just cars was not 
enough. The Joint Expert Group on Transport and Environment (JEGTE) explored additional 
options and came to the conclusion that heavy transport could not be approached in the 
same way as passenger cars. Each modality needed a specific approach. JEGTE’s advice for 
the Commission was to address alternative fuel routes for trucks, aviation, rail and waterways 
separately56, which later morphed into the Clean Power for Transport Directive.
4.2.2.2. Decision-making and outcomes: back to square one?
“The price of failure is too high” 
 — (European Commission, 2010a:2, emphasis in original)
The introduction to the EU’s Energy 2020 strategy says it all: the Union needs energy that is 
secure, safe, affordable, competitive, but also sustainable. The Lisbon Treaty has addressed 
energy policy as a shared European competence for the first time and laid down the goals 
of the Union’s energy policy: security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. The EU’s 
energy goals have been formulated in the knowledge that if the EU does not diversify its 
energy resources and modernise its energy infrastructure, European society will face large 
costs and higher insecurity for both the short and the longer term future. The Energy 2020 
strategy was formulated when the realisation hit that the EU is adapting too slowly to the 
changing energy reality, and that decisive action is necessary if the EU is to successfully 
face upcoming energy and security challenges (ibid.:2). The entire 2020 Climate & Energy 
package was proposed and adopted within a span of 15 months. By the end of November 
2008, all proposals were adopted by the committees of the EP and awaited a final vote. 
The EU took its 2020 targets to the Poznań Climate Change Conference in December 2009, 
and the EP voted on the climate and energy package after the conference ended. From 
that point onward swift adoption of the whole package was seen as desirable by the EU 
and by national governments to serve as input for the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference, or COP-15. The EU was keen to maintain its international leadership on climate 
56  Personal communications with R. Cuelenaere. The report can also be found at [https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/
transport/files/themes/urban/cts/doc/jeg_cts_report_201105.pdf]. 
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change and energy (Council of the EU, 2008:3; Kulovesi, Morgera & Muñoz, 2011:830; 
Skjaerseth, 2016:509)57.
As stated previously, this dissertation focuses on the ‘green’ boxes of figure 4.1: the Climate 
and Energy Package and the flagship programmes A Resource Efficient Europe. The other 
pillars of the strategy come with their own policies, but these will not be discussed in this 
dissertation and are therefore left blank. The 2009 policy package for energy and climate 
was incorporated into the Energy 2020 Strategy58 under Europe 2020 a year later. Its 
goals have been directly imported into the climate and energy headline of the strategy 
(see table 4.2). The package rests squarely on two pillars: ETS and effort sharing, with 
two technology-specific directives included to make it easier to sell the package politically 
(Skjaerseth, 2016:516-520). At the time the package was proposed, DG ENV had a climate 
department which issued climate-related proposals. It established the EU ETS in 2003, much 
to the dismay of DG Energy (then DG TREN). They disliked interference with their domain (EU 
ETS influenced the prices of fossil fuels, nuclear energy and renewables) and feared market 
distortions. Cooperation between DG ENV and DG TREN was necessary and key people in 
both DGs began working on finding synergies between both policy fields (ibid.:513-14). The 
Renewable Energy Directive will not be discussed further in the context of this dissertation, 
though it is important to state that Directive 2009/28/EC dealt with highly contentious issues 
and needed much deliberation in the Energy and Environment Councils, especially on the 
topic of biofuels. The CCS part of the package was likewise deliberated on within both the 
Energy and Environment Council and became linked to the ETS Directive during negotiations.
The EU-15 were generally in favour of a more stringent climate policy, whereas the newly 
accessed Eastern European countries were more concerned with their energy security. Full 
policy coordination was not reached. The 2020 package provides a mixture of binding, yet 
nationally established goals and a politically constructed effort sharing. The poorer countries 
were promised such compensation in turn for their backing of the package (Skjaerseth, 
2016:516-517)59. Contrary to energy efficiency, the GHG emission reduction goal and the 
renewable goal come with legally binding targets at the national level. These targets have 
been set with regards to the difference in wealth between individual countries; wealthier 
economies have to put in more effort whereas less wealthy economies have lower targets 
(Eurostat, 2015:84-85). Even though such effort sharing was necessary to get all member 
57  On April 6th, 2009, the Council unanimously approved the amended proposal at the first reading, along with the 
other proposals in the energy and climate package.
58  COM(2010) 639 final.
59  Though the inclusion of the NER 300 for CCS purposes could potentially benefit a country such as The Netherlands 
as well.
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states to agree to the directives, it has led to nearly half of the EU’s countries60 being allowed 
an increase of GHG emissions rather than a decrease to stimulate their economic growth. 
Overall, the EU-28’s progress shows positive signs.
As visible in figure 4.2, GHG emissions dropped quite drastically after the recession hit. The 
2010 rebound appears to have been temporary as emissions have dropped continuously 
afterwards. The emission rise in 2015 could be another such brief rebound reflecting an 
improving economic situation throughout the EU. Major contributors to the decrease in 
60  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia are allowed a net increase in non-ETS emissions in 2020 (as compared to base year 2005). See also Annex 
III.
Table 4.2. Energy and Climate under Europe 2020
Proposal Summary of main issues Document 
number
Leading DG
EU ETS 
Directive - (ETS)
1) Establishes an EU-wide cap for GHG emissions 
from power generation, industrial plants, and 
aviation
2) Allocation methods, carbon leakage, NER fund, 
and application to small installations
Directive 
2009/29/
EC*
DG CLIMA (at the 
time of introduction 
still part of DG ENV)
Effort Sharing 
Decision - (ESD)
1) Defines legally binding national GHG emission 
targets for the non-ETS sectors
2) Issues of flexibility and interaction with ETS
Decision 
406/2009/EC
DG ENV
Renewable 
Energy 
Directive - 
(RED)
1) Defines the EU renewable energy target in 
gross final energy consumption for 2020, defines 
legally binding national renewable energy targets, 
requires formulation of National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans by 2010
2) Renewable transport fuels, reinforcing measures
Directive 
2009/28/EC
DG ENER (at the 
time of introduction 
DG TREN)
Energy 
Efficiency 
Directive - 
(EED)**
1) Defines the EU energy efficiency target for 
2020, requires member states to set an indicative 
national target, requires formulation of National 
Energy Efficiency Action Plans by 2014
2) Energy saving in distribution and retail, building 
efficiency, renovations, empowering consumers, 
energy audits, monitoring
Directive 
2012/27/EU
DG ENER
CCS Directive 1) Lays down a framework for safe capture, 
transport and storage of carbon dioxide and the 
composition of CO2 stream
2) Proposes solutions for permitting, monitoring, 
transfer of responsibility, capture readiness and 
financing issues
Directive 
2009/31/EC
DG CLIMA (at the 
time of introduction 
still part of DG ENV)
Source: Commission documents (see numbers in table). * Originally introduced in 2005, now in its third phase (phase I: 
2005-2007, phase II: 2008-2012, phase III: 2013-2020, phase IV: >2021). Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are also 
part of the EU ETS. ** The Energy Efficiency Directive is a loose-standing directive that is part of Energy 2020.
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emissions are electricity and heat production, manufacturing industries (including iron 
and steel), and residential fuel use (EEA, 2016:vi). Member states reporting the largest 
reductions in 2013-2014 are Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. However, for non-ETS 
emissions Germany is among the worst performers, along with The Netherlands, Belgium, 
Finland, Denmark and Luxembourg61. Furthermore, emissions from international aviation and 
international shipping increased by 95% and 24% respectively between 1990 and 2014, 
contributing to 6% of the EU’s GHG emissions in latest reports (ibid.:xi). 
By 2014, the EU-28 had reached its GHG emissions reduction target for 2020. The share of 
renewables in fi nal energy production was 16% in the same year, with best performers being 
Sweden (52,6%), Latvia (38,7%), Finland (38,7%) and Austria (33%), and worst performers 
being Luxembourg (4,5%), Malta (4,7%), The Netherlands (5,5%) and the UK (7%). In total, 
nine out of 28 member states had reached their 2020 target62. The 10% biofuels in transport 
target has been under considerable duress from the beginning, suffering from differences 
in opinion between member states, critiques that biofuel production and usage hurts 
other sectors, and doubts about the environmental friendliness of biofuel production. The 
results are mixed success across the EU, with Sweden being a high outlier (The Netherlands 
stood at 5% in 2012) and little or no progress being made in Bulgaria, Spain and Estonia 
61  Annex II to COM(2014) 130 fi nal/2.
62  Some of the best performers, for example Latvia, had not reached their target even though they were far above the 
20% share by 2014. Source: Eurostat, online data code t2020_31.
2015:84-85). Even though such effort sharing was necessary to get all member states to agree 
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Figure 4.2. Greenhouse gas emissions for EU-28 *, 1990 - 2015
* Emissions include aviation but exclude emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
Source: Eurostat (online data code t2020_30).
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(Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 2016:170-173). Lastly, the energy efficiency target for the 
EU-28 also had not been reached by 2014, standing at an aggregate of 15,7%. Most EU 
member states reported a decrease in primary energy consumption, with Finland, Poland 
and Estonia being the exceptions63. It can be concluded that the EU as a whole is on track 
to reach the 2020 targets, but that MS performance varies considerably which makes the 
outlook for 2030 quite bleak; the 40% GHG reductions target will not be met with current 
policies, renewable energy share has ceased to be a legally binding target at national level 
and the Energy Efficiency Directive — with merely indicative targets formulated at national 
level — had not been legally transposed by the majority of member states by 2015 and needs 
additional measures in particularly the building, transport and energy generation sectors 
(European Commission, 2015a:11-13). The fact that the Commission cannot decide on a 
country’s actual energy mix makes harmonisation at the EU level only possible with decisive 
activity at the national level64. While 2010 may have been a turning point for the climate in 
the EU’s discourse and high-level ambitions, performance is lagging behind. The ongoing 
tensions between EU-level commitments and national interests are discussed in section 4.2.5.
4.2.2.3. The role of CCS
The CCS case will be discussed at length in chapter five, though this section will provide a 
comprehensive overview of the relevant CCS policies in place. The 2007 Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan65 (SET-Plan) identified six priority technologies: wind, solar, electricity grids, 
bioenergy, carbon capture and storage, and nuclear fusion. On the political agenda of the 
EU, the potential of CCS was first recognised in 2005 (Martínez Arranz, 2015:249; Nykvist, 
2013:683) following the IPCC’s special report examining the potential of CCS to stabilise 
the climate (IPCC, 2005). Before that, the technology was studied extensively in academia 
(especially in The Netherlands) and advocated by scholars outside of IPCC as well. The EU 
responded by establishing a cross-sectoral think tank to advise the EC, the Zero Emissions 
Platform (ZEP)66. Furthermore, in 2005 a cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions was intro-
duced with the EU ETS, to which the price of capturing and storing CO2 was subsequently 
linked as part of the EU ETS review in the climate and energy package for 2020.
63  Source: Eurostat, online data code t2020_33.
64  Instead, what the Commission has been doing is investing funds into R&D and pilot projects to stimulate private 
sector involvement (Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 2016:179), which is its classic response when its competences in a 
certain area are weak (cf. Van Schendelen, 2017).
65  COM(2007) 723 final, originally a required output of the 2007 March Council meeting. Since 2015-2016 supported 
by European Technology and Innovation Platforms (ETIPs). The 2020 timeline of the SET-Plan is supposed to aid in 
reaching the goals of Europe 2020. Mentioned in bibliography as 2007b.
66  Currently ZEP is also one of the European Technology and Innovation Platforms (ETIPs) that helps implement the 
integrated SET-Plan under the Energy Union strategy.
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That package also contained a communication on supporting early demonstration of 
sustainable power (COM(2008) 13). It is a supportive document to the CCS Directive and 
outlined the Commission’s view on how CCS should be deployed in the EU. The goal was 
to have CCS commercially feasible in power plants around 2020 with strong support from 
a well-functioning EU ETS (European Commission, 2008:3). While the EC admitted that 
CCS is very expensive, the expectation based on industry estimates was that the costs of 
CCS could be brought down by 50% by 2020. Wide application could then lead to CO2 
emissions reductions of 161 Mt in 2030 and 800-850 Mt in 2050, which would amount to 
respectively 3.7% and 18-20% of the overall EU CO2 emission levels in 2008. A role for CCS 
was also envisaged in the energy intensive industries. To overcome the legal and financial 
obstacles to CCS, the Commission proposed the CCS Directive and stressed the importance 
of quick adoption and transposition by member states (ibid.:4-6). Energy companies were 
expected to be willing to invest into CCS to retain their market position and gain new 
business opportunities, but the Commission also admitted that public funds may be needed 
for a limited time67. The EC’s trust in the promise and possibility of CCS is visible in the 
following confident statement:
“Without bold funding decisions by the companies at the earliest opportunity, 
complementary public funding may not be triggered. The longer the power industry 
takes to start embracing the CCS technology, the more policymakers will be obliged 
to look at the option of compulsory application of CCS technology as the only way 
forward” (European Commission, 2008:9).
To this day, the Commission’s implicit threat has not been made reality because it would not 
pass voting in the Council. The EC further asserted that it is in the member states’ interest to 
develop CCS, hinting at the responsibility of the national governments to provide additional 
funding where needed, yet also stating that co-funding from the EU would be a possibility. 
The Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) were 
mentioned as possible catalysts for CCS investments at EU level (European Commission, 
2008:9-10). Clearly, the potential promise of CCS for European decarbonisation led to a 
technology-biased approach from the EC. It would later discover that such an approach 
does not work.
67  In general, a distinction is made between the development/demonstration phase and the commercial phase. Public 
support is often expected — and granted — in the demonstration phase but not in the commercial phase as 
companies are expected to be able to apply the technologies competitively.
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The CCS Directive was discussed seven times in the energy and environmental setting of 
the European Council between February68 and December 2008. On December 17, 2008, 
the European Parliament adopted the Directive in the first reading with an overwhelm-
ing majority69, proposing 144 amendments prepared by two committees (Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety, and Industry, Research and Energy). The Directive’s main 
parliamentary rapporteur was Chris Davies, who had previously attempted to put in place 
a financial mechanism for CCS and to stimulate the creation of a regulation for Emission 
Performance Standards (EPS) in the dirtiest power plants in the EU. However, his attempts 
were opposed by the EC and the Council. The overall opinion of the EP was favourable to 
the CCS Directive, although the possibility of EPS was greatly favoured by the Green Party 
over CCS investments. The Greens wanted EPS and the exclusion of EOR, with one German 
member stating that “the commitment with which a technology that does not even work 
yet is being canvassed seems absurd”70. The EP made sure to underline that CCS is but one 
of the means to combat climate change and that its use should not increase the number of 
power plants burning fossil fuels. The EC accepted the amended proposal on the same day 
the EP approved it. Similarly to the optimism reflected in EU proceedings at the time, the 
Dutch opinion on CCS was also very positive. In Rotterdam, and especially with the help of 
the Rotterdam Climate Initiative, it was seen as the way to decarbonise the mainport region. 
Recognising that the demonstration of CCS was necessary to further develop the technology 
and make it more affordable for upscaling until 2030, the June 2008 Council agreed to try 
to make 12 CCS demonstration projects happen across the EU by 2015 to at least make 
it a possibility. The Commission was to play a role in this development through (financial) 
incentives71. These were provided under the NER 300 — led by DG CLIMA — and the 
European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) — led by DG ENER — but due to the 
financial crisis and high public investment into renewables the CO2 price under EU ETS fell 
too sharply to make the business case for CCS demonstration even remotely positive72. 
Lacking other targets, CCS in EU policy is now officially only covered by the CCS Directive, 
which mostly has a legal and technical nature to ensure that implementation conditions 
are harmonised across EU member states. However, even this directive faced delays in 
68  The CCS Directive was sent to the Council and the EP in January 2008.
69  623 in favour, 68 against, 22 abstentions. The other components of the package were adopted as well and with 
similar majorities, although the Shared Effort decision had a harder time with 555 votes in favour, 93 against and 
60 abstentions (source: Europarliament votes document number PE 417.804/ 12).
70  See CRE 16/12/2008 - 13 on the Eur-lex website for more information on the EP debate.
71  See Decision 2010/670/EU.
72  These issues are discussed in more detail in section 5.1.2.3. of chapter 5.
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implementation in all EU member states (except Spain73) and was eventually transposed in 
different ways across the EU74. Whilst officially part of the climate and energy package for 
2020, CCS has no current targets embedded in EU policy and getting the private sector to 
invest is proving to be extremely difficult.
4.2.2.4. The role of LNG
Whereas CCS was originally meant to offset emissions from the burning of coal, European 
leaders have also recognised the transition potential of gas. Gas-fired power plants achieve 
about 50% lower CO2 emissions than coal-fired power plants (IEA, 2015a:35). In 2010, 
increasing the use of gas instead of coal was therefore also politically attractive, but it came 
with issues of dependency (mostly on Russia). The global gas market has been changing, 
most notably through the shale gas boom in the US and Canada. Using LNG will make the 
gas market increasingly global since transport will be more independent from pipelines 
(European Commission, 2011a:12), which would satisfy the energy security criterium. In fact, 
LNG is becoming a cornerstone of EU energy policy precisely because it enhances Europe’s 
energy security and diversity (Schubert, Kreutler & Pollak, 2016:244). But LNG can be used 
for more than a source of energy supply. One of the possibilities that offer great potential 
to reduce GHG emissions (from shipping) is provided by the development of LNG as fuel. 
This development is part of a larger EU strategy to transition towards more sustainable 
fuels for transport. The EU linked the climate impact of transport to energy policy in a 
2000 Green Paper (European Commission, 2000:66) on security of supply, noting that the 
transport sector was responsible for 28% of CO2 emissions in 1998. Reducing energy use 
and diversifying sources was paramount. In its 2001 White Paper on European transport 
policy, the Commission stated the need for reducing EU oil dependency by introducing 
alternative fuels, noting that
“[t]he most promising forms are biofuels in the short and medium term, natural 
gas in the medium and long term and hydrogen in the very long term” (European 
Commission, 2001a:86).
The EC also stressed the importance of synchromodality (flexibility in transport mode usage 
allowing for highest efficiency), arguing that one 135m container carrier vessel could 
substitute up to 470 trucks, making inland shipping a good alternative for road transport 
(ibid.:43-44). Even though there was not yet a concrete vision on alternative fuels, a heavier 
73  Spain was the first country to start a CCS demonstration but the project was cancelled before it the real 
demonstration phase.
74  For a detailed discussion, see section 5.2.3.1. of chapter 5.
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emphasis on inland shipping fit within the preferences of a river-laden country such as The 
Netherlands. With increasing emphasis on environmental performance, greening the fleet 
was also an interesting option for the Port of Rotterdam to reduce port-related emissions.
The Europe 2020 flagship A Resource Efficient Europe75 stimulates clean transitions in the 
energy, agricultural, industrial and transport systems. To deliver a low-carbon transport 
system by 2050 the EU commits itself to developing and executing a vision on how to 
transition to a cleaner transport system (European Commission, 2011e:5-11). The resulting 
2011 White Paper on Transport76 provides the starting point, announcing the development 
of an alternative fuels strategy including appropriate infrastructure development (European 
Commission, 2011c:24). The EU sets as goal to reduce transport-related GHG emissions with 
60% by 2050 (European Commission, 2011b:3). Whilst no targets are set for inland shipping, 
the EU wishes to see maritime CO2 emissions cut, using low-carbon fuels, by 40% by 2050. 
After 2001, the EC lost its adamant advocacy of inland waterway transport (IWT). The 2011 
White Paper mentions only that inland navigation needs a suitable framework to integrate it 
with other modalities and that there is ample capacity to be filled (ibid.:19). This change in 
focus likely has to do with the fact that most EU member states have little or no IWT capacity, 
rendering advocacy of the sector useless in the eyes of most countries. Furthermore, inland 
shipping is perceived to be relatively clean, although that is not necessarily true since the 
EU’s NAIADES programme calculated that, if one looks not just at the climate change costs 
but also the air pollution costs, IWT’s external costs roughly equal those of road transport 
(European Commission, 2013d:7). Finding ways to reduce emissions from inland shipping 
therefore remained important in the eyes of DG MOVE77.
The 2011 White Paper morphed into the Clean Power for Transport Directive78 (CPfT) in 
2014. It marks the EU’s first holistic coordination attempt aimed at structurally changing the 
EU’s fuel usage79. Before 2013, the Commission tried — and failed — to incentivise cleaner 
light-duty vehicles using voluntary agreements80 and to lay down requirements to increase 
75  COM(2011) 21 final.
76  COM(2011) 144 final: Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area.
77  An example of a development often mentioned in the interviews were engine standards. For ships, these are 
regulated through the EU’s Non-Road Mobile Machinery (NRMM) Regulation, even though inland shipping only 
comprises about 2% of all engines governed by NRMM. Every manufacturer has to comply with this Regulation, 
and member states need to keep an eye on that.
78  2014/94/EU.
79  As discussed in the CCS chapter, biofuels were part of the 2009 Energy & Climate package but they only cover a 
small range of possibilities to make European transport more sustainable.
80  COM(2007) 19 final. Mentioned in bibliography as 2007c.
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the share of biofuels in the EU81. The Clean Power for Transport Directive82 proposes wider 
development of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), compressed 
natural gas (CNG), gas-to-liquid (GTL), electricity, (liquid) biofuels, and hydrogen as fuels 
for the transport sector (European Commission, 2013a:2). CPfT’s first draft provided every 
member state with country-specific targets83, but this approach did not make it through 
the negotiations. It is up to member states to decide how large they want the contribution 
of LNG to be. LNG thus becomes part of a larger European narrative advocating climate 
action through transport policy instruments. The benefit of LNG is its broad application in 
the sense that 
“LNG development into a global commodity can improve security of energy supply in 
general by boosting the use of natural gas as fuel for transport. LNG use in transport 
can also increase the value of gas otherwise flared” (European Commission, 2013g:5).
This quote from the EC communication (COM(2013) 17) showcases the discursive coupling 
of climate change mitigation and energy policy, stating the security of energy supply aspect 
as an important benefit of relatively clean LNG initiatives. Since the security of gas supply 
is higher than that of oil, LNG is seen as a potentially vital resource to help reach climate 
targets while ensuring security of energy supply. Furthermore, the economic argument of 
the value-increase of gas otherwise flared is another example meant to make climate change 
action seem more desirable. Even though the industry still largely needs to be convinced of 
the added benefits of LNG, the price of LNG is attractive. From an environmental perspective, 
it is worth it; LNG fuel allows for a reduction of sulphur emissions to nearly 0%, reductions 
of NOx by 53,5% as compared to Euro VI, PM by 95% as compared to Euro VI, and 
well-to-wheel CO2 is reduced by 15% in dedicated LNG engines (LNG Platform, n.d.:3). Its 
use can aid European states in achieving the targets set out in the Commission’s National 
Emission Ceilings and Air Quality Directives84.
81  Directive 2003/30/EC and Directive 2009/28/EC. There is a binding target for biofuels until 2020, but the 
Commission decided not to set another target for the period after 2020, partly because of indirect land-use change.
82  Adopted by the Council on the first reading on December 5th, 2013 and subsequently with suggested amendments 
by the European Parliament on April 15th, 2014. The European Commission approved the EP’s amendments on 
July 9th, 2014.
83  See [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-24_en.htm] for the initially proposed targets.
84  Currently, heavy-duty road transport is subject to the Euro VI norm regulating truck emissions. However, the real 
driving emissions of many trucks exceed the Euro VI norm, especially concerning NOx emissions. If diesel fuelled 
trucks are not maintained properly, their emissions will rise further after several years. Countries can therefore also 
attempt to get their NOx emissions down by adopting more stringent inland shipping emission norms to regulate 
another part of the transport market as well. LNG becomes very interesting to get these NOx emissions down. 
(Information based on interviews 9 and 10.)
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The directive further prescribes the building of LNG refuelling points in all maritime and 
inland waterway ports of the TEN-T network by the end of 2025 (for maritime) or 2030 
(inland). Aside from the formulation of national policy frameworks, the Directive includes 
the requirements as outlined in table 4.3. The EU has also committed itself to establishing 
technical and legal rules for the safe use and transport of LNG and is providing financial 
support through the TEN-T program and the European Investment Bank (EIB) (European 
Commission, 2013f:3). Since LNG is not a renewable source of energy, using it as fuel does 
not count towards the auxiliary goal of 10% energy use from renewables in transport under 
the Energy 2020 strategy, unless it is bio-LNG. The transport White Paper and the Clean 
Power for Transport Directive are clear examples of the EU’s efforts to harmonise transport 
policies across member states. The importance of being less dependent on oil is stressed, 
but heavy emphasis is placed on the climate as well.
Technological development is to move along Horizon 2020 funding, the roadmaps under the 
EU’s transport technology strategy85, public-private partnerships, and via EU joint research 
centre projects. The Transport Council asked the European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) for their opinions86. Both organs expressed a 
favourable opinion even though they had some concerns as well. EESC’s main worry was the 
focus on biofuels due to the indirect land-use change discussion, and it also warned against 
investing too much into LNG for shipping while better, cheaper or cleaner alternatives were 
being developed. In terms of financing, the EESC underlined the importance of trans-border 
continuity of infrastructure coverage because of: 
85  COM(2012) 501 final.
86  EESC’s opinion is marked TEN/506 and CoR’s opinion is can be found in JO C/2013/280/66.
Table 4.3. National Requirements of Clean Power for Transport Directive
Coverage Timing
Electricity and CNG in urban/suburban and other densely populated areas End of 2020
CNG along the TEN-T core network End of 2025
Electricity at shore-side End of 2025
Hydrogen in MS who choose to develop it End of 2025
LNG at maritime ports End of 2025
LNG at inland ports End of 2030
LNG for heavy-duty vehicles End of 2025
Source: European Commission, 2014b.
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“the level of investment costs and uncertainty of markets the EESC takes the view 
that there will be a general and long term need for public financing of dedicated 
refuelling/recharging infrastructure for alternative fuels” (EESC, 2013:8).
The original EC proposal did not indicate the necessity of long term public financing. CoR, 
unsurprisingly, underlined the importance of regional and local authorities in helping to 
draw up a policy framework which can ensure local viability. Furthermore, CoR stated that 
general energy policy has to be considered as well and that alternative fuels are therefore 
not just a transport issue. In CoR’s view, businesses are beneficiaries of the Directive and 
should therefore do the investments themselves. Both institutions were in favour of EU-level 
coordination. The Transport Council expressed a favourable stance towards the Directive 
in December 2013.
The European Parliament approved the Directive on the first reading. The transport com-
mittee87 proposed 119 amendments, its members largely being in favour of the Directive. 
Most importantly, the EP wanted to underline that the list of alternative fuels may change 
in the future and that it is important for the EU to be technology neutral. More explicit 
references to the climate impact of transport (and the Directive’s contribution to 2050 goals) 
and the need to reduce oil dependency were added as well. The EP’s debate underlined the 
importance of common standards an technical harmony, yet some MEPs suggested that 
‘national egoism’ was delaying or watering down agreements. Especially the greener-minded 
parties expressed regret for not being able to agree to more ambitious goals. Eventually, 
the EP approved the Directive in April 2014, upon which the EC accepted the amendments 
in July and the Council voted in favour in September 2014.
Whilst there is no hard LNG target, and the directive has not yet passed its transposition 
date, it is too early to measure its success but especially in The Netherlands there have 
been public and private investments into small-scale LNG deployment. Furthermore, the 
construction of refuelling points across core ports in the EU does imply use of LNG as fuel, 
simply because it would make no sense to build access points only to leave them unused.
87  The rapporteur from the transport committee (TRAN) asked the environment (ENVI), agriculture (AGRI), industry 
(ITRE), internal market (IMCO) and regional development (REGI) committees for an opinion, but only ITRE decided 
to give one.
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4.2.3. Global Climate Progress and Objectives
Following the lack of clear mitigation commitments in the UNFCCC in the ’90s, the EU 
decided to start acting as the global agenda-setter in climate matters (Schubert, Pollak & 
Kreutler, 2016:168). In 2010, around the formal adoption of the 2020 targets, the European 
Commission established a special Directorate-General for Climate Action and gave it the 
climate-related competencies previously held by DG Environment. While part of the split was 
due to the enlargement of the EU and subsequent need for more Commissioner functions, 
it also marked a turning point in the EU’s view of its own role in climate action. The internal 
dimension of EU energy and climate policy was geared towards preventing the potentially 
disastrous consequences of climate change and mostly revolved around increasing the share 
of renewable energy across the EU. The external face of the policy was meant to make the 
EU an example for the rest of the world to follow (ibid.:167). This frontrunner role was 
advocated globally, yet succumbed under the weight of the declining competitiveness of the 
European economy88. Worries about carbon leakage to the US and China led to a less ambi-
tious climate and energy framework for 2030 (ibid.:250), as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
However, in preparation for the Paris Climate Summit of December 2015, COP-21, the EU 
restated the need to move away from uncoordinated national energy policies and towards 
an integrated, sustainable European Energy Union (European Commission, 2015b:3)89. The 
change in discourse was to be followed by a change in practical implementation. At the 
same time90 the Commission published the Paris Protocol which would serve as the EU’s 
input for global climate negotiations. The Commission restated the EU’s ambition to reduce 
CO2 emissions by at least 40% by 2030 and called for global action as the only way to 
effectively mitigate climate change. The EU’s vision was to promote both public and private 
financing for clean technologies while at the same time restating that it is up to countries 
themselves to choose which technologies to support (European Commission, 2015c:11). 
Just like what happened around the Copenhagen summit, the EU was able to unite in the 
wake of COP-21. International pressures help persuade EU member states to commit to 
EU-level goals which are otherwise difficult to negotiate.
COP-21 led to the Paris Agreement which the Commission calls “a historically significant 
landmark in the global fight against climate change” (European Commission, 2016a:2). The 
agreement includes a commitment to keep global warming below 2°C above pre-industrial 
88  Which, painfully, was the opposite of what the EU had been trying to achieve with its Lisbon strategy.
89  The subtitle of the Energy Union package says it all: ‘A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a 
Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’.
90  Both Communications were published in February 2015. Their identifiers are COM(2015) 80 final and COM(2015) 
81 final.
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levels and an aspiration to limit it to 1,5°C. The agreement entered into force in November 
2016 and stands at 126 ratifications (out of 197 parties) in January 2017 (UNFCCC, 25 
January 2017). Parties are obliged to pursue domestic mitigation measures in an effort 
to reach the goals of the agreement. The EU acts as a facilitator between member states 
and their obligations under the Paris Agreement and is committed to revising the ETS to 
make it more functional again and adapting the ESD whilst “providing maximum flexibility 
for Member States and striking the right balance between national and EU level action” 
(European Commission, 2016a:9). What this means for the vision of an integrated, sustain-
able Energy Union remains to be seen. COP-21 does not contain enforcement measures. Its 
legally binding nature is therefore limited.
The aftermath of COP-21 may have given credence to the Commission’s 2030 Climate & 
Energy framework, but the national authorities are still in the driver’s seat. Aside from the 
development of member states being unwilling to commit to legally binding targets after 
2020, each member state still chooses its own future energy mix as it pleases. In the words 
of Schubert, Pollak and Kreutler (2016:252):
“Once again, the negotiations behind the 2030 framework revealed that the old 
game between the Commission and the member states continues unabated. The 
Commission proposes big changes, the Council confirms, but then waters them down, 
while the member states take their time selectively implementing those aspects that 
best befit [sic] their national interest. The EU’s member states continue to sing the 
same song, but dance to a different tune.”
Whereas the Scandinavian states seem to be taking the renewable route, Germany’s invest-
ment into renewables is being offset by an increase in the usage of coal and The Netherlands 
has chosen to rely more on gas as a transition fuel than on renewables. Harmonisation across 
the EU therefore still seems far off. This development is also visible in the policy processes 
surrounding LNG and CCS.
4.2.4. What About Ports?
There is no overarching port policy in the EU, yet activities from several of the Commission’s 
DGs impact ports on a day-to-day basis. Since the existence of the European Union, Europe’s 
ports have resisted becoming ‘captured’ by the EU policy-making process. This phenomenon 
is mainly due to too much variety in port characteristics, rendering a comprehensive policy 
framework difficult to ‘sell’ to the more than 800 ports Europe currently counts (Pallis, 
2007:491-492; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998:255; Pallis & Tsiotsis, 2008:17; Chlomoudis 
4
94 Chapter 4
& Pallis, 2005, Verhoeven, 2009:79). Differences between ports are visible in, for example, 
size, geographical location, management, operations, labour type, and financial autonomy 
(Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998:256; Verhoeven & Vanoutrive, 2012:184-185). In fact, 
the European Commission itself admits that “no two ports [are] operating in exactly the 
same way” (European Commission, 2013c:5). Previous research has shown that efforts to 
Europeanise have consistently led sectors to unify in Eurofeds (Eising, 1999:213). Indeed, 
the differences between ports have led to a slow start towards a European Ports Policy with 
Europeanising efforts consistently being thwarted by the ports themselves and their European 
umbrella organisation: the European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO). European legislative 
‘successes’ have mainly led to policies in the fields of transportation and infrastructure, but 
other than that the European Union has employed a policy of non-intervention with respect 
to ports for a long time (Chlomoudis & Pallis, 2005:21-22). Member states are responsible for 
their own port policies and diversity in port management and operation is to be respected.
In 2007, the European Commission published a communication on European Ports Policy 
(EPP), which mainly deals with issues of port performance, a level playing field and respect 
for the environment (Verhoeven, 2009:87-88). While this Communication states the im-
portance of sustainable transport in ensuring the vitality of hinterland connections and 
port performance as a whole, it also states that, at this stage, it leaves “this matter to 
regional and national authorities and to the market” (European Commission, 2007a:4). 
The Communication also explicitly states that the EC does not wish to intervene in the way 
member states organise their port management, effectively leaving ample room for the 
heterogeneity that characterises the European port system at present. It does, however, 
recognise and underline the economic efficiency of ports that enjoy a ‘sufficient’ degree of 
autonomy, i.e., landlord-type ports (European Commission, 2007a:8) such as the Port of 
Rotterdam. In other words, even though there have been tendencies to Europeanise which 
continue through soft law practices, there has been no real European Ports Policy because 
he EC cannot seem to get a grip on ports. The European Commission admits the ‘failure’ 
of its 2007 incentive in its 2013 revision of EPP and states that the soft measures proposed 
in 2007 have had “little or no impact” (European Commission, 2013c:4). Since ports are 
seen as vital to the functioning of the EU, the Commission sees ample reason to propose 
more intensive regulation. The 2013 revision, called “Ports: an engine for growth”, reiterates 
the earlier finding that there are structural performance gaps in the European port system. 
This situation is seen as problematic, because even though just three ports91 are able to 
handle 20% of today’s import of goods, the predicted volume of goods will increase by 
about 50% by 2030. The EC underlines the necessity for better inclusion of other ports in 
91  These are the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg.
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the Trans-European Network (TEN-T) to accommodate the expected rise92. The Commission 
is reluctant to try to impose a uniform model for ports (ibid.:5), probably having learned 
from previous experiences with negative outcomes.
Instead, the Commission attempts to influence ports indirectly through the creation of 
links with other policy fields, most notably through funding arrangements. Transport policy 
has shown that the EC can attempt to Europeanise through the advocacy of post-material 
values, drawing in actors sensitive to these values and thereby creating ‘soft issue alliances’ 
(Aspinwall, 1999:128). Furthermore, the EC is trying to use earlier agreements under 
transport policy — and the related TEN-T and Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) programs93 
— to influence port management. Connecting the development of small-scale LNG to 
ports is logical due to their position next to roads, rail- and waterways. The regulation of 
inland navigation in Europe is governed by multiple bodies, such as “river-specific naviga-
tion commissions, the EU, UNECE and pan-European ministerial conferences” (UNECE, 
2011:37). Of the river-specific navigation commissions, most important for the Rotterdam 
region is the CCNR, which governs through the Mannheim Convention of 1868. UNECE is 
most well-known for its 2000 European Agreement concerning the International Carriage 
of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (ADN). Pan-European ministerial conferences 
are organised every couple of years and mostly focus on harmonising and integrating the 
regulatory frameworks for inland navigation. There is now also attention for environmental 
issues. The EU itself is increasingly gaining importance in this sector by its attempts to legislate 
(through the NAIADES Programme) and stimulate harmonisation between its own regime 
and that of CCNR (UNECE, 2011:38-58)94.
When port authorities are looking for EU funding, the Commission will assess the added 
value of the proposed projects for EU transport policy (European Commission, 2013c:7). The 
same goes for environmental policy. The EC is very much aware of the impact ports have 
on emissions, noise, water and soil pollution. Emissions from maritime transport account 
for 3% of global GHG emissions today and are expected to rise to 5% by 2050 (European 
Commission, 25 September 2014). As yet, maritime transport is not included in the EU’s 
GHG emission reduction system even though it contributes up to 4% of EU-wide GHG 
92  Even so, the revision of EPP (ibid.:9-12) still only consists of five core measures: 1. Common rules to ensure port 
service charges are fair and that economic activity is subject to competition rules; 2. Rules to ensure transparency 
on the relationship between a port authority and public authorities; 3. State aid subjected to strict rules; 4. A degree 
of autonomy for port authorities to establish their own port dues, as long as they are fair and transparent, and; 5. 
Rules governing working conditions and safeguarding workers’ health in port areas. While these rules certainly can 
have an impact on ports that still rely greatly on state aid, the scope of EPP remains small.
93  More on CEF and TEN-T in the LNG chapter (chapter 6).
94  Through a newly established organ called CESNI.
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emissions. In fact, only for the EU, the emission rise is expected to amount to a whopping 
51% by 2050 as compared to 2010 levels (European Commission, 2013a:2). The European 
Union has adopted an expectant attitude towards the integration of maritime transport into 
any emission schemes, instead preferring that any action be undertaken by the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO). However, the IMO has to date not been able to agree on clear 
targets for emission reductions. Integrating maritime emissions into the emissions regime is 
therefore proposed through a gradual approach consisting of three steps. The first step is 
the implementation of a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system for maritime 
emissions. Based on this MRV, the second step will be to define the reduction targets for 
the sector as a whole. The third step is to apply market-based measures (MBMs) in order to 
stimulate emission reductions. The Commission prefers to work with MBMs as it sees such 
incentives as cost-effective and flexible (European Commission, 2013d:4-5). Interestingly, 
this COM document explicitly mentions a link to the 2030 climate and energy framework. 
Future considerations regarding maritime emissions should consult the energy and climate 
framework to ensure consistency (ibid.:5). Another interesting example in the environmental 
policy field is the policy covering birds and habitats guidelines, which is also applicable to 
port areas (European Commission, 2013c:12). Better said, almost all activities covered in 
climate and energy policy are not necessarily port-related; they just happen to take place in 
a port area (such as the ROAD CCS project). The result is an intertwinement of port activities 
with different policy fields at the EU level, the origins of which are varied and guided by 
logic that does not de facto cover ports. As the Commission’s DGs are often at odds with 
each other (Aspinwall, 1999:127), it is only expected that port authorities will find European 
policy confusing yet hugely important in their day-to-day management.
The Dutch national government has used the concept of ‘mainports’ since the end of 
the ‘80s and recognised the importance of a port such as the Port of Rotterdam to the 
Dutch economy (Rijksoverheid, 6 January 2014). In devising policy, the government has 
acknowledged the fact that the Port of Rotterdam is not simply a transport hub, but also a 
vast industrial complex. It has sought to strengthen this complex (Edelenbos, Gerrits & Van 
Gils, 2008:52-53; Kuipers & Manshanden, 2010:7). Some scholars take their argument even 
further. In their article, Edelenbos, Gerrits and Van Gils conclude that the Dutch port policy 
system seems to follow port developments, instead of the other way around, and devises 
policy to fit what is already happening in practice. This empirical observation implies efforts 
to “codify and maybe support the actual developments of the port” (Edelenbos, Gerrits & 
Van Gils, 2008:57), rather than trying to determine the exact future of the port. It should be 
noted that this conclusion does not suggest that the port is not influenced by national policy 
making at all, however. The authors speak of co-evolution and concede (Edelenbos, Gerrits 
& Van Gils, 2008:56) that the port and national port policy systems influence one another. 
The PoR thus becomes a policy actor. By contrast, while the EU has formally recognised 
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the possibility of the existence of industrial complexes in ports and the importance of the 
Rotterdam case for the Dutch economy (European Commission, 2013b:1), further actions 
have not been undertaken, and in issues of transport the EU remains an advocate of spreading 
opportunities instead of focusing on one strong mainport95.
4.2.5. Reaching Goals? The EU versus National Governments
Even though highly ambitious in its vision to create a sustainable future for every citizen of 
the EU, the Commission has also criticised actual progress towards reaching the ambitious 
targets. Member states have been developing National Energy Efficiency Action Plans since 
2008, yet the Commission has called the quality of these plans “disappointing” (European 
Commission, 2010a:3). In 2010 it was judged that the renewable target of 20% by 2020 
was not the problem, but the energy efficiency was another matter altogether. The bleak 
outlooks published by the IEA in 2009 and 2010 were set aside and even the Ukrainian 
gas crisis did not lead to concerted European action towards a more secure and energy 
efficient Europe. Yet, only three years later, the Commission reported (European Commission, 
2013b:2) positively on the progress towards the Energy 2020 targets. The years between 
2010 and 2013 were marked by the aftermath of the financial crisis (which affected the 
transport sector as well), milder winters (except in 2012), increasing energy prices for 
households, and a relatively large increase in renewable energy share (EEA, 2014a:3-4). 
Eurostat provides the most recent data (currently until 2015 - see table 4.4).
Overall, the EU seems to be on track towards reaching the targets as set out by the Energy 
2020 strategy. This progress is not only due to the energy and climate policies the EU has put 
in place, but is also the result of milder weather conditions and the economic and financial 
95  This notion has been further confirmed in Commissioner Kallas’ (DG Transport) speech of 23 May 2013. The EU’s 
reason to advocate spreading opportunities fits within its integrative mission and attention for development of 
underdeveloped regions. It is therefore understandable that the Commission does not want to seem to favour any 
port over another.
Table 4.4. Progress towards the 2020 objectives for climate and energy
Target 2020 objective Progress until 2015
GHG emissions reduction 20% reduction 22,1%*
Share of renewables in energy 
mix (consumption)
20% 17%
Energy efficiency 20% more efficient energy use 16,7%
*  Reported CO2 reduction was 28% between 1995 and 2010. Source: Eurostat (2016); Eurostat, online data codes 
t2020_30, t2020_31 and t2020_33.
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crises that hit the EU since 2008. Nevertheless, the EU notes challenges to the European 
energy system. The centre of gravity of global energy demand has shifted towards emerging 
economies such as China and India. Energy prices (and price differences) are rising in the 
EU as compared to other countries, and an internal market measure such as the Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) has led to an ineffective and low carbon price. Renewable energy 
development has taken off but at the same time also challenges the existing balance in 
the energy system. The German Energiewende and the consequences of energy dumping 
in The Netherlands have been discussed in the introductory chapter as an example of such 
a challenge. Additionally, climate change scholars continue to publish studies confirming 
the impact of human agency on climate change. Along with the systemic changes noted 
above, the confirmation of human influence on the world’s climate has led the EU to 
reconsider its climate and energy strategy. The results are twofold: a general 2050 strategy 
called the Energy Roadmap 2050 and the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework. The table 
below outlines the envisaged progress to 2030 and 2050 as compared to the Energy 2020 
strategy. It is important to note that there are only legally binding targets up to 2020. As 
table 4.5 shows, the 2030 and 2050 objectives are not met with commitments at MS level.
The need for clear milestones has driven the EU to also establish a 60% GHG emissions 
reduction target by 2040 (European Commission, 20 October 2014), which neatly sits in 
between the 2030 and 2050 objectives. The 2030 target is set to be achieved in two ways. 
Sectors covered by the EU ETS system need to reduce their emissions by 43%, while sectors 
outside the ETS need to cut their emissions by 30% (both below 2005 levels). Whilst the GHG 
reduction target is most relevant to this dissertation, the three main targets are interrelated.
Compared to the 2030 climate and energy framework, the Energy Roadmap 2050 is a more 
visionary document. The lack of, for example, a clear 2050 objective for the share of renew-
ables in the European energy mix shows that this document has more of an agenda-setting 
purpose than a prescriptive nature, which is ideal for zooming into policies which are meant 
Table 4.5. European Energy and climate objectives between 2020 and 2050
Target 2020 objective 2030 objective 2050 objective
GHG emissions 
reduction
20% reduction 40% reduction 80-95% reduction
Share of renewables 
in energy mix 
(consumption)
20% (10% binding 
target for renewable use 
in transport fuels)
27% Majority is renewable
Energy efficiency 
20% more efficient 
energy use
27% 30%
Sources: COM(2010) 639, COM(2011) 885, and COM(2014) 15.
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to govern markets that are still very much in development96 but also reflects the unwillingness 
of member states to make long-term commitments. The 2050 Roadmap acknowledges that 
decarbonisation is possible and even states that the costs associated with transforming the 
energy system are not that different from a scenario that the Commission calls the Current 
Policy Initiatives (CPI) scenario (European Commission, 2011a:5). The Commission foresees 
electricity to play an increasing role in the future energy mix, not only for heating and 
cooling purposes but also in transport. Crucial for any success of EU energy and climate 
policies are energy savings and the increasing share of renewables in the European energy 
mix, which both contribute to decreasing GHG emissions. These predictions fit the 2020 
and 2030 strategies. Conversely, those strategies remain silent about nuclear power while 
the 2050 Roadmap identifies nuclear power as having an important contribution to make 
in the process of energy system transformation (ibid.:5-8). An example of this ambition is 
the approval by the EC and UK to build two new nuclear reactors at Hinkley Point C in the 
UK (Financial Times, 8 October 2014).
The combination of Europe 2020, the economic crisis, and coordination through the 
European Semester led to a turning point in European energy and climate policy. The pre-
2010 focus on competitiveness was replaced by a focus on sustainability while remaining 
competitive. In the most recent Juncker Commission (after 2014)97, DG CLIMA and DG 
ENER have — for the first time in EU history — the same Commissioner. This move is not 
illogical; the majority of global emissions is energy-related, and even when emissions are 
not directly related to energy, they often stem from human practices that are ‘energetic’98 
(Shaw, 2011:744). Treating energy and climate policy as a single policy is a feature that is 
fairly unique to the EU. Unfortunately, there are still many disjunctures between the two 
domains (Toke & Vezirgiannidou, 2013:543). The differences in GHG emission goals across 
EU member states and fears surrounding carbon leakage show that competitiveness still has 
the upper hand. Discourse has linked energy and climate, but action is largely lacking. Part of 
the incoherence stems from a largely supranational environmental policy and a fragmented 
climate policy, in contrast to the MS-exclusive components of energy policy. Another reason 
for ineffective coupling of energy and climate policies is the tension that arises between 
energy and climate solutions, which are often contradictory. For example, natural gas is 
cleaner than coal but it also makes the EU more dependent on external suppliers who are not 
always reliable (Vogler, 2013:631-640). In essence, Skovgaard (2014:2-5) argues that there 
are two conflicting frames at play: green growth (‘win-win’) and trade-off (‘sustainability 
96  Both LNG and CCS policy — the two case studies covered in this dissertation — fit in this category.
97  See Annex IV for an overview of the two Commission formations — Barroso’s and Juncker’s — spanning this 
dissertation.
98  Waste treatment is an example of a human practice that is energetic.
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is bad for the economy’). There are people who see the relationship between climate and 
economic growth policies as potentially synergetic, but others see conflicts. Economy often 
wins, though sustainability appears to gain some land in times of prosperity. Both these 
frames will be visible in the case studies.
4.3. CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
This section discusses the relevant Dutch climate and energy policies for the two nested 
cases studied in chapters five and six: CCS and LNG. Dutch energy policy is cemented in 
the Energieakkoord and updated yearly through the Energierapport. The Energieakkoord 
resulted from extensive consultations with civil society and the private sector, epitomised 
in the way it was published: not by the government itself, but by the Dutch Social and 
Economic Council (in Dutch: Sociaal-Economische Raad, or SER). Its core components are 
energy saving, increasing renewable electricity production, decentralised electricity produc-
tion, a strong energy network, a functioning EU ETS, a responsible decrease in coal-fired 
power plants, emissions reductions in transport and mobility, an increase in jobs in the 
energy sector, energy innovation and export, and programmatic financial incentives. These 
ten pillars are cemented in a governance structure in which the government is responsible 
for the formulation, implementation, execution and evaluation of policy measures and the 
private sector is responsible for meeting the goals they agreed to. Continuing interaction 
between all involved parties is facilitated through a permanent commission under the SER 
that consists of representatives of all involved sectors. No formal control and enforcement 
mechanism was agreed upon (SER, 2013:12-27).
The most recent Energierapport (2016) includes a ‘CCS vision’ even though there are still 
no CCS projects operational99. The government states that if CCS is not developed in The 
Netherlands, where the technology is among the most promising due to an abundance of 
offshore gas and oil fields for storage, the costs for effective climate mitigation will increase 
significantly (Ministerie EZ, 2016a:117). At the end of 2016, the Dutch government released 
the Energieagenda (translated: energy agenda) outlining its goals for the period after the 
Energieakkoord ends. Dutch energy policy consists of three key assumptions: energy and 
climate policy is international policy, CO2 reduction is the focal point, and a long-term vision 
is essential (Ministerie EZ, 2016b:23-25). The government’s logic for the first assumption 
is that if just The Netherlands adopts stringent policy to reduce GHG emissions they will 
be emitted elsewhere,  so international agreements are necessary. The empirical chapters 
show that this argument can also be used as an excuse for inaction. The second assumption 
99  CCS is slated to be responsible for up to 50% of Dutch low carbon options (Ministerie EZ, 2016a:119).
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has as a consequence that the Dutch government does not want further binding energy 
efficiency and renewables goals past 2020, which fits with the EC’s inability thus far to set 
binding goals for 2030 and beyond. The third assumption admits that the private sector 
needs long-term goals to guide their investment decisions, though when push comes to 
shove the Dutch government appears reluctant to make strong statements regarding its 
domestic fuels mix policy, favouring technology neutrality in the national policy documents 
such as the Brandstofvisie (Ministerie I&M, 2014a). The lines set out in national documents 
largely follow EU policy and existing initiatives and in the Energieagenda the government 
speaks of a Dutch energy policy and a European climate policy. The implications are clear: 
stay out of our energy mix, but ensure a level playing-field when climate policy is concerned. 
Brandstofvisie furthermore acknowledges that the bulk of Dutch policy in this regard follows 
the European Clean Power for Transport Directive (Ministerie I&M, 2014a:6-38) and is 
therefore adaptive rather than pioneering. The Dutch government did not make the choice 
to rely heavily on renewables, as seen in the Energieakkoord. Arguably, keeping fossil fuels 
in should give a technology such as CCS a fighting chance and even though there has been 
a lot of (political) opposition against CCS, it has been a stable factor in policy documents 
since 2007.
With respect to seaports, The Netherlands has formulated a working programme for seaports 
(in Dutch: Werkprogramma Zeehavens 2014-2016) for the period 2014-2016 (Ministerie 
I&M, 2014b:4-12). It was established as a joint effort between the national government, 
seaport authorities, the private sector established in the ports and the Topteam Logistiek100. 
Based on a threat-assessment and the importance of Dutch seaports for Dutch and European 
economy and industry, the working programme outlines six policy priorities with a level 
playing-field and supporting sustainable initiatives being the most notable for this case101. 
The Dutch maritime strategy (in Dutch: Nederlandse Maritieme Strategie) for 2015-2025 
formulates the government’s wish to support the transition towards zero-emission ships. 
The elimination of legal barriers hampering this transition are also discussed, along with the 
potential of the Clean Power for Transport Directive (Ministerie I&M, 2015:9-16).
100  Topteam Logistiek is a group of elite people from business, government and academia and represents the top 
sector logistics. For more information on Dutch top sector policy, see [http://topsectoren.nl/english]. 
101  Full six priorities: a level-playing-field, better hinterland connections, lessening the administrative burdens of the 
business sector and improving training, supporting sustainable initiatives (BBE, CCS and LNG are mentioned), 
sharing of best practices under Natura 2000, and fostering cooperation between ports plus defending national 
interests.
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4.3.1. The Netherlands and CCS
The Netherlands has to implement EU environmental law, but is free to set stronger goals. At 
present, this is not being done, although organisations such as Natuur & Milieu (2016:7) call 
for more activity from the national government when it comes to setting stricter standards 
or increasing the carbon price. With ETS as it is, however, doing so could lead to an 
even lower EUA price (Groenenberg & De Coninck, 2008:658). Specifically for CCS, The 
Netherlands will only accept offshore storage after the Barendrecht debacle. Furthermore, 
in the implementation of the CCS Directive the Dutch government has decided to give a 
single permit for the whole CCS chain up until the end of the injection process. The Mining 
Law (in Dutch: Mijnbouwwet) was changed to allow for these permits. The consequence 
is that Dutch law does not allow for simultaneous ownership of both a storage permit and 
an operation permit as needed for EOR/EGR, which can cause legal issues for CCS projects.
In The Netherlands, EU proposals go through a procedure called BNC fiche prior to approval. 
The CCS Directive case file102 stated that CCS was an indispensable part of the climate goals 
of the cabinet at the time. However, the Dutch position was such that it was hesitant to 
provide funding mechanisms — hence the contentment with the possibilities offered by 
NER 300 — and it also had its reservations regarding some of the proposal’s details. The 
Dutch wanted primary responsibility for CCS development to lie with member states so 
as to reduce red tape, but also wanted the EU to finance CCS projects without telling the 
national government how to allocate its national budget. From this position follows that in 
terms of financing there was some discrepancy between the expectations the EU had and 
those of the Dutch government.
The Dutch position underwent a change from being an ally of the 2020 package (although 
the government’s views differed from those of the EU regarding who should be paying for 
CCS projects) to an opponent of renewed EU coordination. The Netherlands had its separate 
EU-related CCS debates between 2009 and 2015; various files within the BNC dossier were 
attributed to CCS103. In 2009 the Dutch Parliament voiced negative opinions about investing 
in CCS, which was subsequently linked to energy efficiency plans in 2011. By then, the 
government was backing ROAD in the EEPR funding race by promising a 150 million euros 
investment. Its initial stance that the EU should be covering the funding had shifted with 
the realisation that The Netherlands, as a fossil fuel country, could reach its climate targets 
while continuing to use fossil fuels. However, in 2013 the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
102  Number 22112 - 619. Available on the website of the Dutch parliament.
103  All files have the base dossier number 22112. Between 2009 and 2015 the CCS related discussions were recorded 
in files 822, 1232, 1756, 1952 and 1998. They are accessible through the website of the Dutch parliament.
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Environment sent a letter to the Parliament stating that CCS is not happening in the EU 
right now but that it still is important for the 2030 climate and energy plans. Therefore, 
even though CCS had an explicit place in the Energieakkoord, the EU should fund it. The 
Netherlands, along with several other countries such as the UK, Italy and Poland, further 
opposed the setting of new binding renewable energy and energy efficiency targets at 
EU level (European Commission, 2013b; Ibec, 2013), representing a turn away from the 
ambitions of the 2020 package and underlining national sovereignty. In a 2015 letter from 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, the government reiterated its wish for a 
light governance structure of the Energy Union with respect for national competency. It 
wanted as little red tape as possible yet with a view towards accomplishing 2030 and 2050 
objectives. National efforts to generate more funding for the ROAD project increased in 
an attempt to further stimulate CCS. The Dutch wanted to reap the fruits of EU funding 
without accepting further interference with domestic energy policy. A representative from 
the Dutch government illustrated Dutch efforts as follows:
“What’s typically Dutch is that we try to just barely reach goals by putting in the 
least amount of money as possible.”104
In light of the most recent discussion about low-carbon investments and their link to the 
EU’s NER 400 programme, CCS was again a topic of debate. No new projects or nationwide 
CCS initiatives resulted from parliamentary deliberations. In fact, similarly to what happened 
with the inclusion of the CCS Directive in the 2020 Climate and Energy package at EU level, 
the Dutch government decided to incorporate its ‘CCS Vision’ into the Energierapport so as 
to avoid a CCS-specific discussion in the Parliament105. Similarly, the EU has not put a new 
regulatory proposal for CCS forward due to extremely low interest across EU member states 
(European Commission, 2013c:2). The Netherlands did not even respond to the consultation.
The province of South Holland is committed to realising national and European energy and 
climate goals, but does not make policy in these areas. It is the responsible authority for 
environmental permits and (sub-)surface operations and delegates executive tasks to DCMR. 
The city of Rotterdam supports the development of CCS and even made an agreement 
with the ROAD project partners that their power plants were not allowed to commence 
operations without the simultaneous application of CCS. Unfortunately, the delay in the 
final investment decision (FID) regarding ROAD led to problems between the parties, with 
the city eventually agreeing to allow the plants to start up even without CCS. Rotterdam has 
its own sustainability program Programma Duurzaam, through which it aims to become the 
104  Interview 31.
105  Confirmed by a government employee, interview 31.
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cleanest port city in the world by 2030. Similar to the Dutch government, the city prefers 
re-using CO2 over storing it. RCI’s 2007-2010 programme calls for the establishment of a CCS 
Platform and a CO2 cooperation agreement (RCI, 2007:16). During a city council discussion 
in December 2007, there was a big debate about the appropriateness of the construction 
of Electrabel’s (now Engie) coal power plant after adopting highly ambitious climate goals 
for the Rotterdam region. Opponents (GroenLinks, Leefbaar Rotterdam and SP) feared the 
power plant would not use CCS because it cannot be made obligatory, whereas proponents 
(CDA, VVD, ChristenUnie-SGP) expressed their trust and stated that CCS is necessary for 
climate mitigation. Without CCS, no RCI goals would be achieved106. CCS was part of the 
ambitious Energy Port goal to reduce CO2 emissions by 50% in 2025107 in the port-industrial 
complex. The start was to be made in the power sector, which amounted to 30% of port-
related CO2 emissions in 2005. Infrastructure would be developed and Deltalinqs — an RCI 
partner — would seek businesses willing to sign five letters of cooperation for CCS projects 
in the near future (RCI, 2009:21-25). Of the 3,5 million euros available RCI funds (for 2009) 
for developing the Energy Port, nearly 2 million was earmarked for CCS purposes. Almost 
half of those funds were accounted for by DCMR, which had extensive responsibilities 
under the RCI programme. A year later 1,7 million euros was earmarked for CCS (ibid.:13).
4.3.2. The Netherlands and LNG
The Dutch government is obliged to create and communicate a framework for implementa-
tion of the Clean Power for Transport Directive by November 18, 2016 (Article 7 Directive 
2014/94/EU)108. The European Commission will have another year to consider the coherence 
of all the national frameworks. The Dutch government is also obliged to send progress 
reports concerning the implementation of the Directive and will have to follow guidelines 
for reporting as established by the EC. The government will have some leeway transposing 
the Directive and choosing appropriate instruments for policy implementation — it can 
therefore decide for itself how it values the contribution of LNG to the Dutch transposition 
of the Directive —, but will have to comply to the terms of the Directive at set deadlines109. 
Recommendations from the EC may be sent should The Netherlands be judged to do an 
106  Notulen raadsvergadering 20 december 2007. Accessible at the Rotterdam city archives [www.ris.rotterdam.
nl]. To provide a full picture of the positions, D66 and PvdA expressed doubts but were not necessarily negative.
107  Baseyear 1990.
108  In doing so, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment consults with actors such as the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority regarding TEN-T participation and LNG safety requirements.
109  The Directive outlines deadlines for 2025 and 2030.
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insufficient job of implementing the Directive110. The question is whether sanctions will 
follow should a country not implement CPfT correctly. Since the EC seems internally divided 
over the usefulness of the Directive — with some DGs dismissing alternative fuels in favour 
of electrification — the enforcement of proper implementation of the Directive is unsure.
A year after the Commission published the Clean Power for Transport Directive, the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Environment led the negotiations surrounding a national fuel plan 
which would include LNG. The Brandstofvisie immediately fit within the requirements of the 
Directive but also kept an express link to Dutch energy policy because of the importance of 
LNG to energy security. In November 2014, the Dutch cabinet111 reaffirmed its position to 
keep applying for CEF funding, noting that LNG could be one of the focal points in the Dutch 
CEF strategy. The Dutch government envisages four tools which can be used to support a 
sustainable business case: regulations/standards, subsidies for R&D, policy that offers positive 
discrimination to the use of sustainable fuels, and fiscal policy. The latter is problematic for 
LNG, as both the shipping sector and the LNG sector pay low taxes. The other three tools 
can thus be more effective (Ministerie I&M, 2014a:12-32). Brandstofvisie (Ministerie I&M, 
2014a) also reflects on the relationship between the various governmental levels. There is 
explicit recognition of complexity due to globalisation, multiple levels of policy-making, the 
economy, and various other factors. Sustainable transport policy therefore crosses several 
different hierarchical levels. The Regeling Groenprojecten (sustainable projects regulation) 
of 2010 includes the possibility to provide tax benefits to project owners of single fuel LNG 
engines and dual fuel engines for inland ships.
Local governments are asked by the Energieakkoord to consider climate and sustainability in 
their spatial policies in the future. The private sector played a large part in the formulation 
of both the Energieakkoord and the Brandstofvisie, indicating the importance the Dutch 
government attributed to the private sector. LNG came up at the municipal level in Rotterdam 
in 2009-2010112, when the port bye-law (in Dutch: Havenbeheersverordening) was changed 
to accommodate the construction of the GATE terminal. The Gas Port (in Dutch: Gashaven) 
concept was added to the law and the RCI and the private sector began looking at how the 
cold produced at GATE (to keep the LNG cool) could be used for other means. One of the 
first thoughts was to make a connection between GATE and the coal-fired power plants and 
liquefy captured CO2 for transport and storage (RCI, 2010:38). Transport applications were 
110  This goes for all other European governments as well.
111  See Dutch parliamentary proceedings, #21501-33 512.
112  The online city archives show 70 unique results (not including concept documents) when performing a search for 
‘LNG brandstof’ between 1-1-2010 and 11-8-2016. The results include policy documents, documents of auxiliary 
organs, year reports, college letters informing the Council, and laws. Interestingly, no meeting notes of the Council 
discussing small-scale LNG show up.
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considered immediately as well, and within the Regional Air Quality Programme (In Dutch: 
Regionale Aanpak Luchtkwaliteit) 500.000 euros was set aside to look at the possibilities 
of small-scale LNG in Rotterdam113.
4.4. CONCLUSIONS: FRAGMENTED BUT AMBITIOUS CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
POLICIES
The EU stands before a fundamental problem of wanting to act against climate change 
whilst ensuring the competitiveness of the European economy. Its member states have 
committed themselves to help solve the problem, but question the solutions in the wake 
of the need for global action. Broadly speaking, the EU’s climate and energy policy can 
be divided into a pre-2010 era and a post-2010 era (see table 4.6). The pre-2010 era was 
marked by a focus on European competitiveness in a globalising world. The Lisbon Strategy 
addressed the need for sustainability but the modernisation of the European economy was 
a more pressing concern. Within the European Commission one large DG Environment 
was responsible for both climate and environmental concerns and GHG emissions declined 
particularly because of a switch to less carbon intensive fuels (eg. coal to gas) and higher 
efficiency in electricity production (EEA, 2014b:3-4). Energy and climate policies were drafted 
separately. The period after the economic and financial crises hit marked a turning point in 
European discourse on and organisation of energy and climate policies. The Climate and 
Energy Package of 2009 incorporated binding national targets for both GHG emissions 
reductions and the share of renewables. The climate department within DG ENV became its 
own DG CLIMA and energy and climate were mentioned as a single headline target under 
the ambitious Europe 2020 Strategy. 
113  See Herijking RAP/RAL 2011 in the online Rotterdam city archives at [http://www.ris.rotterdam.nl].
Table 4.6. EU climate and energy focus shifted in goals, beliefs, results and instruments
EU approach on 
climate & energy 
policy
90s - 2007 2007 - 2010 2010-
Policy goals Competitiveness Competitiveness + 
sustainability
Competitiveness + 
sustainability
Underlying belief No technological 
preferences
Technological preferences 
(fe. CCS)
Technological neutrality
Policy result Energy efficiency as main 
focus
Energy efficiency & 
renewables as main focus
“We support everything” 
(but preferably energy 
efficiency & renewables)
Target formulation - Hard Soft
Source: author’s own compilation based on desk research and interviews.
From ‘Dirty’ to ‘Clean’ and in-between: European Climate and Energy Policies 107
The results show mixed success. Whereas the EU is on track to meeting the 2020 targets 
for climate and energy, there are large differences in performance across its member states. 
Why? European leaders have been unwilling to commit to further binding targets for 2030 
and beyond. There are vast differences between member state preferences in the high-level 
politics area of energy policy. National agendas on climate change do not converge, and 
EU policies can be summed up to edging more toward the “multidimensional pursuit of 
comprehensive energy security” (Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 2016:125). National govern-
ments still seem very much concerned with their own energy security and sovereignty, not 
wanting the EU to dictate their energy mix choices. Sweden and Denmark prefer renewables, 
The Netherlands has chosen the gas route, Germany has invested heavily into renewables 
but is also burning a lot of brown coal, Poland is mostly operating on coal, France is heavily 
nuclear and the UK has invested in both renewable energy and nuclear energy. The EU’s 
recent Energy Union strategy — an attempt to harmonise energy and climate policies and 
governance across the EU — will not necessarily lead to more integration as countries have 
chosen to maintain in the driver’s seat even after the success of the global Paris agreement 
at COP-21. The EU’s ambitious climate leadership is further offset by the increase in global 
GHG emissions. We are observing a multi-level interplay of political logics that often do 
not fit together nicely.
Within the European Commission there has been a noticeable switch from making techno-
logical choices in the pre-2010 era — also visible in the original SET-Plan — to attempting 
to be technology neutral post-2010 and seeing the energy system as an integrated whole 
under the Energy Union. Fostering innovation and R&D is the EU’s harmonisation tool by 
providing funding for technological development that aids in reaching both the 2020 goals 
and longer-term goals. The new iteration of the SET-Plan, however, continues the EU’s 
earlier focus on renewables (also in transport) and energy efficiency. Additional financing 
mechanisms are provided by funds such as the NER 300 and the TEN-T Programme, which 
support the notion of nation state sovereignty regarding their energy mix; both CCS and 
small-scale LNG can receive funding from these programmes even though real European 
policy goals regarding these developments are lacking. It is difficult to predict whether 
the Energy Union strategy will lead to a more unified European climate and energy policy, 
but the inherent tension between climate and energy remains. The empirical part of this 
dissertation will show the trade-off between the three pillars of EU energy policy: is the 
quest for simultaneous energy security, competitiveness and sustainability doomed to fail?
4
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CCS: A Case of EU Multi-level Governance Failure?
5.1. INTRODUCTION
Rotterdam’s developing CO2 hub is geared towards reducing emissions and making CO2 a 
commodity to be traded on the market. The longer term vision is that CO2 will be transported 
to Rotterdam (for example, using barges commuting to and from the Ruhr area on a regular 
basis) where it can be stored or traded as a product to be used in other industries. Broadly 
speaking, there are two ways to handle excess CO2: it can be stored, or it can be used. 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) entails the capture of waste CO2 and storing it so that 
it does not enter the earth’s atmosphere. Carbon Capture and Usage (CCU) uses up the gas 
instead, for example in the horticultural sector to stimulate plant growth or by embedding 
it in a product. In doing so, CCS and CCU can help to mitigate the contribution of fossil 
fuels to global warming, and therefore contribute positively to combating climate change. 
However, CCS is a very contentious issue in many countries, mostly due to citizens’ fear 
of the technology’s safety and the often used criticism that CCS enables large emitters to 
retain their methods of production instead of having to significantly change their processes. 
CCS is thus often seen as a palliative measure. While the main focus in this chapter lies 
with CCS, CCU will also be discussed where relevant as it is a new development with much 
ongoing research.
This chapter tells the CCS story in Rotterdam as part of Dutch and European efforts to 
mitigate CO2 emissions. I start with an overview (§5.2) of the context within which CCS 
operates, introducing CCS and motivations for its application, examples of CCS projects 
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already underway and discussing milestones and other important developments. This part 
ends with a brief overview of recent developments and a summary of the policies applicable 
to CCS. In the next part (§5.3) I apply Piattoni’s theory to the case, diving deeply into the 
governance of CCS, drawing extensively on interview data and desk research. Section §5.4 
discusses the consequences of this case for the Port of Rotterdam and the role its authority 
can play. Section §5.5 discusses the theoretical and empirical conclusions for the governance 
of EU energy and climate policy based on this case. 
5.2. CCS: WHAT, WHY AND WHEN?
What every reader must know before delving into this case study is that CO2 essentially is 
a waste product of the combustion of fuels necessary for industrial activity and transport, 
which is why the greenhouse gas is emitted on a large scale. It is also part of the natural 
environment as we know it and necessary to ensure plant growth. However, too much CO2 
in the air (>10%) can also kill people (EEA, 2011:24). The impact of CO2 and other GHGs 
on the climate is measured by looking at their Global Warming Potential (GWP), which 
indicates how long the gas remains in the earth’s atmosphere, thereby heating it up114. 
Methane (CH4), for example, is estimated to be 34 times as bad for the climate as CO2 over 
a period of 100 years (IPCC, 2013:714). However, CO2 is emitted in much higher amounts 
than methane, as visible in figure 5.1.
Of all these emissions, more than half comes from the energy sector (including all transporta-
tion other than maritime and aviation), and another ±13% is due to agriculture (EPA, 2014a). 
While North American and European CO2 emissions have more or less stabilised or even 
decreased, Asian emissions have nearly doubled since 2002 (EPA, 2014b). Since industrial 
activity is paramount to humanity’s current way of life, and because CO2 emissions are 
harmful to the climate, methods for reducing emissions while ensuring industrial activity 
have been developed. According to the International Energy Agency, a key role in the 
decarbonisation process will be played by CCS (IEA, 2015b:5). Since the energy sector is 
by far the largest sector emitting CO2, the remainder of this introduction will focus on the 
application of CCS within the energy sector.
CCS can be broken down into the three components that it is conceptually comprised of: 
carbon capture, carbon transport, and carbon storage. Each of these components will be 
discussed briefly to provide a basis for understanding of the case. Carbon capture — the 
most expensive component of CCS (IPCC, 2005:342) — entails the separation of CO2 
114  CO2 is used as the reference gas upon which the GWPs of all other GHGs are based.
CCS: A Case of EU Multi-level Governance Failure? 111
from fossil fuels or biomass. Carbon capture can be applied to coal-fi red plants as well as 
natural gas plants. Co-fi ring of biomass also leaves the possibility to apply CCS. The capture 
technology115 can be installed in new power plants or added to already existing power plants 
after they are remodelled. The latter can be very expensive, especially when the plant is far 
from the storage site116. An important consideration in the application of carbon capture 
technologies is the energy penalty associated with it; because the capture technology 
needs to be powered as well, a power plant will need more resources to generate the same 
amount of electricity than it would without the application of CCS. Consequently, non-CO2 
emissions from that power plant will increase if the plant continues to produce the same 
amount of electricity (EEA, 2011:6-14).
115  There are four technologies that can be used to capture CO2: post-combustion, pre-combustion, oxyfuel 
combustion, and by establishing it in industrial processes. For those interested in the technical aspects of these 
techniques I would like to refer to the EEA report (2011) on the ‘Air pollution impact of CCS’.
116  The plant - storage site distance can prove especially problematic in countries where there are no (or few) 
adequate storage opportunities. Examples are Finland and Luxembourg. Refi tting coal-fi red power plants for CCS 
can be highly cost ineffi cient in such cases.
 Figure 5.1. CO2 emissions highest of all global GHG emissions 
Source: PBL, 2017:9.
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The transport of carbon dioxide can occur through a pipeline, using ships, trucks or trains, 
although pipelines and ships seem most promising due to possible volumes and the as-
sociated costs (EEA, 2011:18). One limitation to any plans concerning CO2 hubs is the ban 
on transboundary CO2 under Art. 6 of the London Protocol, which effectively means that 
countries are not allowed to trade CO2 for dumping purposes, since it is considered a waste 
product (IEA, 2011:8-10). Cross boundary trade would be necessary for countries without 
suitable sequestration locations to be able to apply CCS. The 2008 amendment to the 
London Protocol117 allowing for CO2 trade for purposes of sequestration has not yet been 
ratified by enough parties to enter into force (IEAGHG, 6 January 2016). CO2 trade for CCS 
activities is thus still forbidden.
Carbon storage — also called sequestration — is the step that makes CCS interesting for 
policymakers concerned with decarbonisation. It entails the storage of CO2 in order to prevent 
its emission. CO2  can be stored in deep geological media, in oceans, and through surface 
mineral carbonation. At present, of these three options the only viable option is storage in 
deep geological media, such as depleted oil or gas fields. The other two options are very 
costly and pose dangers to the environment. Furthermore, the EU’s CCS Directive118 prohibits 
sequestration in oceans (EEA, 2011:18-19). Aside from depleted oil and gas fields, other 
options for storage are in deep saline formations and in deep non-mineable coal seams. While 
deep saline formations are expected to allow for the largest amount of storage (ibid.:19), 
injection in oil and gas fields becomes especially interesting when the fields are not yet 
depleted. Injection of CO2 can help with the extraction of the oil or gas, which is referred 
to as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) and Enhanced Gas Recovery (EGR) respectively119. The 
irony of such practices is that it facilitates the continued use of fossil fuels — making it one 
of the main arguments of environmental NGOs arguing against CCS — but some argue that 
it may be the only way to get CCS going in the first place. The main concern with carbon 
storage is the potential of leakage, although the European Environment Agency reports 
that they consider the risk of carbon leakage “relatively small” (EEA, 2011:23). Since the 
storage capacity across the globe is estimated to be very large, and the retention time is 
very high (up to millions of years), carbon storage is seen as a promising tool to combat 
climate change (EEA, 2011:19).
117  See Resolution LP.1(1) [http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=17614&filename=01.pdf] or 
IEA, 2011 [https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CCS_London_Protocol.pdf].
118  Directive 2009/31/EC, Art. 2 outlines the prohibition of CO2 storage in oceans.
119  Legally speaking, however, EOR/EGR are not seen as CCS. For CCS a specific storage permit is needed under the 
EU’s CCS Directive, whereas EOR/EGR activities require different permits. Furthermore, some people would argue 
that injecting CO2 to extract more oil or gas to be burned later is not climate-friendly and therefore not a part 
of CCS.
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Wide and quick application of large-scale CCS throughout the world is unlikely due to the 
lack of a comprehensive policy framework (Deetman et al., 2013:159), associated costs, the 
competition with renewable energy, the limits of storage, and the fact that CCS does not 
mitigate CO2 production. These are significant hurdles for a further development of CCS. 
Furthermore, the aspect of safety has shown — as in the Dutch Barendrecht case — that 
a negative public opinion can block CCS projects entirely (Van Alphen et al., 2007:4369). 
Even so, certain steps have been made. The key developments influencing Rotterdam are 
summarised in the timeline in figure 5.2. The carbon price seems related to the ebb and 
flow of CCS projects, with projects being developed during high carbon price and stalled 
when the carbon price drops.
5.2.1. Historical Context and Recent Developments
5.2.1.1. 1970 - 1988: Carbon capture, injection and usage
None of the components of CCS are technologically ‘new’. Carbonated drinks are an 
example of captured ‘injected’ CO2, and the gas is often used for food packaging or made 
into solid form (also called ‘dry ice’) to aid in the wine making process. In The Netherlands, 
companies such as Air Liquide and Linde Gas have been selling CO2 for years. This type 
of carbon capture has purely economic motives: the CO2 is used in chemical, industrial 
or other processes to facilitate the manufacturing of products. These practices constitute 
small-scale activities, whereas the climate enthusiasts focus on large-scale CCS where much 
larger volumes are captured and processed. As such, carbon capture initially did not have 
any climate-oriented component. 
The injection of CO2 for Enhanced Oil Recovery also is not new. The oldest running EOR 
project is Val Verde in Texas, USA. Since 1972, CO2 there has been captured in natural gas 
treating plants and transported through pipelines to oil fields. The second oldest project 
started in 1982, also concerns EOR and is situated in Oklahoma, USA, at the Enid Fertilizer 
plant. Captured CO2 is used in depleted oil fields in the southern part of Oklahoma120. 
These early EOR projects were also fed by economic incentives, rather than concerns about 
the climate. It is the ‘storage’ component, binding capture and transport together into a 
single chain, that provides the novelty of CCS as a still pre-commercial technology even 
though its separate components have already proved themselves (Krahé, Heidug, Ward & 
Smale, 2013:754).
120  Source: Global CCS Institute, project view: [https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/projects/large-scale-ccs-
projects#overview].
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5.2.1.2. 1988 - 2005: Thinking about CCS and the climate
Whereas academics have been concerned with anthropogenic climate change well before 
the 1990s, it was not until then that the debate shifted from whether we have enough fossil 
fuels left on this planet to how much we can still use before global climate disasters start to 
happen. CCS fits into this new debate, as experts and policy-makers began to think about 
other ways to get rid of excess CO2. In 1992 the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established, underlining international concern for the climate 
(IPCC, 2005:20). Globally, power plants and the industry emit much more CO2 than can 
realistically be used with current (and prospective) technologies (Styring, De Coninck, Reith 
& Armstrong, 2011:10). Finding a way to store carbon dioxide without letting it escape into 
the environment therefore became a priority. Underground storage of CO2 makes no sense 
economically: there is no added value to storing the gas without the application of EOR. The 
addition of dedicated storage to carbon capture is therefore purely climate-oriented (Krahé 
et al., 2013:754; Nykvist, 2013:684). Dutch researchers at Utrecht University began looking 
into CCS in 1988 and in 1990 the SOP research programme (in Dutch: Samenwerkend 
Onderzoeksprogramma) was launched, which included CCS as a research topic (De Vos, 
2014:35). In 1995 a first attempt was made to start a CCS demonstration project, but this 
failed due to low interest from the Dutch ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance (Van 
der Hoeven, 2008:40)121. Norway then took over and, in 1996, developed Sleipner, the first 
dedicated geological storage project in the world. Sleipner captures CO2 during natural gas 
processing and directly injects it into a deep offshore location122. The Dutch continued their 
research on CCS, but there were no implementation attempts. However, when in 2004 the 
Dutch government feared electricity shortages, it asked the private sector to build coal-fired 
power plants to diversify the country’s energy sources and secure affordable energy for its 
citizens. Two of the resulting power plants, Uniper’s (formerly E.on) and Engie’s (formerly 
GDF Suez) plants on Maasvlakte 2, were built with concrete plans to apply CCS as of 2013.
Simultaneously with Dutch activities the European Union undertook its first CCS research 
initiative under the third Framework Programme (FP3) between 1990 and 1994. However, it 
was not until 2005 that CCS started to appear on the political agenda of the EU (Martínez 
Arranz, 2015:249; Nykvist, 2013:683). By then, CCS projects had started to pop up globally 
and the IPCC had published its special report examining the potential of CCS to stabilise the 
climate (IPCC, 2005). The IPCC states that a combination of technologies is needed to bring 
121  Also confirmed in interview 20. Then Dutch Minister of Finance Gerrit Zalm supposedly said that it is nonsense to 
put money underground (in Dutch: het is onzin om geld onder de grond te stoppen). See also the article 
‘Dromen van verstoppertje in de broeikas’ in Volkskrant, 25 February 2006.
122  See footnote 5.
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about the required emissions reductions, but also stresses that “CCS has the potential to 
reduce overall mitigation costs and increase flexibility in achieving greenhouse gas emission 
reductions” (ibid.:3). The Zero Emissions Platform was then established by the EU, bringing 
together a variety of CCS stakeholders from the public and private sector, research institutes 
and NGOs and geared towards advising the European Commission on CCS issues (ZEP, 9 
June 2016). The Commission also launched the Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 2005 as 
one of the tools to implement the Kyoto Protocol. The overarching vision was that ETS will 
help “promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically 
efficient manner”123.
5.2.1.3. 2005 - Today: CCS projects, or not?
Serious Dutch attention for CCS started with the establishment of the CATO programme in 
2004, which had as objective to find out if CCS is a promising option for The Netherlands. 
The city of Rotterdam became interested in CCS and made it one of the main priorities of 
the Rotterdam Climate Initiative124. In 2008 the Public Task Force CCS was established, led 
by ex-prime minister Lubbers. Still, the Dutch government chose to leave the choice to the 
market, meaning there was no active push towards CCS development. Two notable onshore 
CCS projects were developing around this time: the Barendrecht project125 in the province 
of South Holland and the Eemshaven project126 in the northern part of The Netherlands. 
However, the political and public tide turned against storing CO2 onshore and close to 
populated areas, not in the least due to failed communication regarding the specifics and 
safety of the project (Feenstra, Mikunda & Brunsting, 2010:28-30). The public’s fears that 
the CO2 would leak out of the reservoirs and pose a danger to public health trickled into 
the political debate. Shell and the Ministry of Economic Affairs undertook attempts to repair 
their communication towards citizens, but the Barendrecht project had become societally 
unacceptable127. Eventually, the minister of Economic Affairs decided to cancel Barendrecht 
and banned onshore CO2 storage for the foreseeable future. Again, Dutch CCS developments 
seemed to come to a halt.
123  Art. 1 ETS Directive (2003/87/EC).
124  Launched in 2007 after Clinton (and the Clinton Climate Initiative) challenged Rotterdam to reduce its emissions.
125  Operated by Shell.
126  Operated by Essent (now part of RWE).
127  For further reading on what happened with the Barendrecht case, see Feenstra, Mikunda & Brunsting, 2010. 
Accessible from [http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/www.globalccsinstitute.com/files/publications/8172/
barendrecht-ccs-project-case-study.pdf].
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As for the EU, CCS picked up speed in 2007 when the Commission published a Communica-
tion titled Sustainable power generation from fossil fuels: aiming for near-zero emissions 
from coal after 2020. The title reveals a goal which — we now know — will definitely not 
be attained by 2020, but it does mark the start of EU funding for CCS projects. The Zero 
Emissions Platform (ZEP) called for a CCS flagship program in order to ensure that CCS 
would be economically viable by 2020 (ZEP, 2007). The flagship program for CCS was 
launched under DG Climate’s NER 300 programme. The Green Hydrogen project by Air 
Liquide attempted to get funding under that programme, but failed. Eventually just one CCS 
project was awarded funding under NER 300128. In 2008 the European Council called for a 
mechanism — to be created by the EC — to incentivise investments into CCS, specifically 
asking for the construction of twelve CCS demonstration projects by 2015129. Following the 
economic crisis, the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR), led by DG Energy, 
was also launched. It contained the call for six CCS projects to be spread all across Europe 
and covering all possible aspects of CCS together. In The Netherlands, energy companies 
were considering the implications of CCS for their own operations. E.on (now Uniper) and 
Electrabel (now Engie) were doing research to try to obtain funding for a CCS project. EEPR 
would divide 1 billion euros equally among the winning projects. The rule was that only 
one project per country could be selected for the competition, so Dutch companies had to 
compete with one another. In total there were three Dutch projects: E.on, Electrabel, and 
Nuon (in the north). Since E.on’s and Electrabel’s plants were situated merely 1km apart, 
both companies thought it better to bundle forces and create a project together so as to 
increase their chances of being selected by the government. Their project, ROAD, received a 
positive EU funding decision in 2010. The Rotterdam region also applied for project funding 
for Air Liquide’s CCS project under NER 300. The project was highly feasible; most of the 
steps were already part of common practice in the energy industry. The newer, most risky, 
part was the injection of CO2 into the ground. This process was not part of Air Liquide’s 
responsibility, but would be taken up by Danish Underground. However, Air Liquide could 
not vouch for the safety of the process, since it lacked knowledge on the topic. The official 
story is that the project was not awarded funding when the Dutch government could not 
guarantee a matching subsidy, which was a precondition for funding, and due to a wrongly 
ticked box on the application form. The unofficial story as told by people involved in and 
around the project is that DG Climate found an inventive way to kick CCS projects out of 
NER 300 because it favoured the development of renewable energy130. The truth is probably 
somewhere in the middle.
128  The project that did get funding commitment under NER 300 was the White Rose CCS project in the UK. However, 
since the project has been put on hold it has not received any of the funding (yet).
129  This led to Commission Decision 2010/670/EU of 3 November 2010.
130  This claim has not been verified.
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The outlook for CCS seemed promising in 2009 with the demonstration plans under the 
EEPR and the adoption of the CCS Directive (2009/31/EC). The Directive outlines a framework 
within which the EU feels CCS should operate in Europe, thereby leaving considerable leeway 
for MS to implement the Directive in whichever way they want. It specifically calls CCS a 
“bridging technology that will contribute to mitigating climate change” and states that 
CCS “should not serve as an incentive to increase the share of fossil fuel power plants”131. 
However, CCS alone is foreseen to contribute to about 15% of CO2 reductions by 2030. 
Whereas CCS appeared to have a bright future around the time the economic crisis started, 
that promise did not last long. Under the ETS the CO2 price dropped from 25 euros per ton 
in 2008 to around 5 euros per ton in 2013. CCS projects suddenly became unattractive due 
to the financial hole created by the low CO2 value. Of the 6 projects selected under EEPR, 
the projects died one by one until only one (ROAD) survived. The dramatically low price of 
CO2 was the primary reason for premature CCS death across Europe, since businesses now 
faced a tremendous financial gap in their CCS business cases. Neither the EU nor national 
governments have renewed their efforts to financially incentivise CCS after 2010. In fact, 
in November 2015, the UK government decided to end its 3-year running 1 million pound 
CCS competition programme, which may lead to all of the proposed CCS projects there to 
be cancelled as well. 
The Paris agreement (COP-21) of December 2015 represents global commitment to keep 
the temperature rise under 2°C, and preferably under 1,5°C, and came at a time when an 
important technology identified by the IPCC became difficult to develop in the EU. Near the 
end of 2015 the discussion regarding the legitimacy of coal-fired power plants flared up in 
The Netherlands, likely leading to a ban on unmitigated coal burning by 2030. Applying 
CCS may now be the only possible license to operate companies such as Engie and Uniper 
will have. While the exact consequences of this discussion are not yet known, it may very 
well be that they will get CCS going in The Netherlands.
5.2.1.4. Facts and market developments
Early in 2016, of the six projects selected in the EEPR program only the British and the 
Dutch projects were left, yet both were still not in operation. Overall, there seems to be 
issue competition between CO2-reduction and renewables within the EC132. There are more 
member states developing renewable energy than CCS. With declining economic advantages, 
131  Directive 2009/31/EC, 05-06-2009, preamble (4), p.1.
132  There is much literature on issue competition, linking the victory of certain issues over others to, for example, 
competing demands or the dominance of political parties or ideologies. See also Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 
(2010), Baumgartner, Jones & Wilkerson (2011) or Wolfe, Jones & Baumgartner (2013).
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the EU’s interest in developing CCS has waned. In the last EEPR round no CCS project was 
put forward, and the same seems to be happening in the current round.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has identified CCS as a game changer in climate 
change and has stated that CCS is necessary to mitigate global warming. Due to American 
coal dumping in Europe, CCS would seem promising but is as yet undeveloped. Countries 
still relying on coal for their electricity supply, such as Poland, can benefit from CCS because 
it allows them to keep using coal while reducing carbon emissions. In this way CCS ties into 
energy security strategies as well as into sustainability. 
According to the Global CCS Institute133, there are 40 large-scale134 CCS projects existing 
worldwide, of which 15 are operational, 7 under construction, 6 in a very advanced stage of 
development planning, and 12 in an earlier stage. There are six projects in Europe, although 
the only two operational projects are in Norway135. The UK has three projects136 in the early 
stage of development and The Netherlands has one project (ROAD) with a planned operation 
date by 2020. All projects in Europe concern carbon storage in a dedicated geological site, 
whereas worldwide there is a fairly equal division between geological storage and EOR. 
By far the most popular form of carbon transportation is by pipeline. Outside the EU there 
is one notable project in the power generation sector: the Boundary Dam CCS Project in 
Canada, which is operational since 2014 and stores CO2 by employing EOR137. Just like in 
the EU, CCS is only barely developed globally.
5.2.2. Policy Context
Any case study in this field should consider the political and legislative contexts it operates 
in. Chapter 4 discussed the relevant policies at length. This section acts as a brief summary 
and foregrounds key policies, goals and tools. As with other climate-related issues, EU 
133  The information in this paragraph can be found on the website of the Global CCS Institute [https://www.
globalccsinstitute.com/projects/large-scale-ccs-projects] and is offered in an interactive format. Last checked on 
July 15th, 2016.
134  A large-scale CCS project involves the capture, transport and storage of CO2 of at least 800,000 tonnes annually 
(coal-fired power plant) or at least 400,000 tonnes annually for other emissions-intensive industrial facilities 
(Global CCS Institute, 7 January 2016).
135  Sleipner (1996) and Snøhvit (2008), both used for natural gas processing and not for electricity generation.
136  Don Valley (2020), Caledonia Clean Energy (2022) and Teesside (2020s), all in the power generation sector, 
although Teesside has a broader scope allowing for other industries to hook up as well.
137  Other notable projects that are already in operation are in the U.S. (since 1972), Canada (since 2000), Algeria 
(since 2004), Brazil (since 2013) and Saudi Arabia (since 2015).
5
120 Chapter 5
involvement seems quite obvious. Transboundary problems require supranational action to 
set goals, although their implementation is done nationally or even locally. As discussed in 
chapter 4, CO2  reductions are part of the 2020 Climate and Energy package, the 2030 Energy 
and Climate framework and the 2050 Roadmap. These documents provide a basis for EU 
involvement; if MS are to reduce their carbon emissions, the EU can help them develop CCS 
by funding research and pilot projects. However, options are kept open for MS, meaning 
that they do not necessarily have to invest in CCS. Under the current Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) it is cheaper to emit CO2 than it is to store it.
Figure 5.3 shows the price of the carbon allowances (EUA) under the ETS between 2005 
and 2015. At the time when CCS projects started popping up in Europe, the price was 
about 30 euros per ton CO2. Most projects were cancelled between 2011 and 2013 when 
the carbon price dropped below 5 euros due to low prices in commodity markets, permit 
surpluses and subsidies given to renewables. Currently, a good business case for a CCS 
project in the power sector needs a carbon price of between 40-50 euros, which could 
drop to around 30-35 euros. For the industry a carbon price of 80-90 euros is needed138. It 
is clear that the EU ETS price is nowhere near a good CCS — or any other costly low-carbon 
technology — business case, and the price volatility does not help either. Many policy-
makers, companies and politicians alike feel that this is part of the reason why ETS reform 
138  Interviews 19, 27.
 Figure 5.3. Carbon price trends showing dramatic drop in CO2 price without recovery
Source: EEA, 2015:22.
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is needed. Furthermore, agriculture and horticulture are not included in the ETS, which 
means that they have no incentive to participate in reduction strategies such as CCU. 
One of the reasons why ETS reform is slow is because the competitiveness of European 
companies needs to be safeguarded as well; with a very strict ETS and absent a global ETS, 
European companies are at risk of losing competitiveness. Table 5.1 shows a brief summary 
of the CCS policy context.
Table 5.1. Governments want sustainability, but policy to support CCS lacking power
Level of 
government
Main policies Goals Policy instruments
EU 1. ETS Directive
2. CCS Directive
3. Energy 2020
4.  2030 Energy & 
Climate Framework 
5.  Energy Roadmap 
2050
6.  (National Emission 
Ceilings Directive)
7.  (Industrial Emissions 
Directive)
s¬ ¬%NSURE¬SAFETY¬OF¬
CCS (for public and 
environment)
s¬ ¬$ROP¬OF¬TOTAL¬EMISSIONS¬
(43% in 2030) of ETS 
sectors
s¬ ¬¬TOTAL¬#/2 
reduction by 2050
s¬ ¬ENERGY¬EFlCIENCY
s¬ ¬-AJORITY¬OF¬ENERGY¬IS¬
renewable
s¬ ¬&UNDING¬.%2¬¬
EEPR, Horizon 2020/Era-net, 
Innovation Fund)
s¬ ¬%MISSIONS¬LEGISLATION¬AND¬
environmental law
s¬ ¬'IVES¬OPINION¬ON¬-3PROPOSED¬
storage permit
s¬ ¬.O¬HARD¬OR¬SOFT¬TARGETS¬EXCEPT¬
for previous 12 demos by 2015 
goal)
Dutch national 
government
1. Energieakkoord
2. Energierapport
s¬ ¬¬#/2 reduction 
in 2050
s¬ ¬¬RENEWABLES¬IN¬
2023
s¬ ##3¬DEMONSTRATION
s¬ ¬/NLY¬USE¬##3¬IF¬NO¬
other options are 
available
s¬ &UNDING¬FOR¬2/!$	
s¬ ¬#OORDINATION¬OF¬%RANET¬FOR¬
ROAD
s¬ !WARDING¬STORAGE¬PERMIT
s¬ ¬0ROHIBITION¬ON¬ONSHORE¬##3¬
demonstration
s¬ ¬%NERGY¬POLICY¬¬COMPETENCE¬TO¬
introduce emission ceilings)
s¬ 'REEN¬$EALS
Province of 
South Holland
1. Energieagenda
2.  Beleidsvisie 
Duurzaamheid en 
Milieu
s¬ ¬¬ENERGY¬SAVED¬IN¬
2020
s¬ ¬LOWER¬#/2 
emissions in 2020
s¬ ¬RENEWABLES¬IN¬
2020
s¬ 3TIMULATE¬REUSE¬OF¬
waste (such as CO2)
s¬ .O¬SPECIlC¬INSTRUMENT¬TO¬
support CCS, but is in charge of 
environmental permits
s¬ %NVIRONMENTAL¬AND¬SUB	SURFACE¬
legislation
s¬ $ELEGATES¬TASKS¬TO¬$#-2
s¬ 0ARTICIPATES¬IN¬'REEN¬$EALS
City of 
Rotterdam
1. Programma 
Duurzaam
s¬ #LEANEST¬PORT¬CITY¬IN¬THE¬
world by 2030
s¬ 2EUSE¬OF¬WASTE¬SUCH¬
as CO2)
s¬ 3TIMULATE¬#/2 capture 
(first CCU, then CCS)
s¬ #ONSTRUCTION¬PERMITS¬ENERGY
industry
s¬ !CTIVE¬THROUGH¬2#)
s¬ -OSTLY¬POLITICAL¬PRESSURE
Source: author’s own composition based on desk research.
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The Port of Rotterdam develops its CO2 hub within the described policy context and therefore 
encounters multiple layers of government regarding different aspects of the hub. As becomes 
clear from table 5.1, the European level is responsible for long-term goals and short-term 
project funding. While the national authority is allowed to go beyond European goals, it 
currently chooses not to do so. Instead, it broadly adheres to EU goals and participates in 
CCS funding efforts and research. The decentralised levels of government have very specific 
tools needed for CCS, such as the permits. While they do have certain policy goals, they 
are not involved in actual policy-making regarding CCS. The city of Rotterdam did place a 
strong emphasis on the contribution of CCS to its sustainability, especially around the time 
Rotterdam Climate Initiative was created. In that sense, the city has been important for the 
Port of Rotterdam’s ambitions regarding its potential hub-function for CCS.
5.3. BEHIND THE SCENES: THE GOVERNANCE OF CCS
The previous part of the chapter focused on the context of the CCS case. The second part 
of this chapter will focus on the governance dynamics driving the case. This section will 
thus introduce the empirical data collected through the interviews conducted with experts, 
desk research and observations made at the Port of Rotterdam Authority.
For the Port of Rotterdam, CCS is part of its plans to be a CO2 hub; a hub for large-scale 
capture, trade and storage of CO2. It is therefore very important to the PoR that the first 
demo project, ROAD (Rotterdam Opslag en Afvang Demonstratieproject, which literally 
means Rotterdam Storage and Capture Demonstration project), is realised. Furthermore, 
the hub function also spreads to the use of carbon in, for example, horticulture. Invest-
ments are made in pipelines to this sector as well as in infrastructure to make ROAD 
possible. ROAD is a project jointly led by Uniper and Engie. The project is a CCS demonstra-
tion project for offshore (25km) storage. Originally, the plan was to capture and store 1,1 
million tonnes of CO2 coming from Uniper’s coal-based power plant on Maasvlakte 2 for a 
period of 5 years and starting in 2015. The Dutch government required a 5-year running 
period as basis for funding. This project received EU funding under the EEPR Program but 
is still struggling with a financial gap and a delayed final investment decision, leading to 
changes in its scope and running time. Mid-2016 the project runtime was revised to 2-3 
years, starting in 2019 or 2020. For the further development of the Rotterdam CO2 hub, 
the OCAP pipeline makes carbon streams through the port possible and both Shell and 
Abengoa supply regional greenhouses with their waste CO2 this way. Efforts are being 
made to supply greenhouses with excess heat generated in the industry — thereby possibly 
increasing the transport of CO2 as well — within the province of South Holland under a 
project called Warmtenet.
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5.3.1. The ‘CCS Network’
Who is actually involved in CCS in, or related to, the Rotterdam area? This question is 
an important one to answer if the impact of this case on European energy policy is to be 
considered. Figure 5.4 shows the involved actors in the multi-level context. A more detailed 
overview can be found in annex V. 
Not every actor can be considered in this dissertation. The ETS and CCS Directives are 
implemented by other EU member states as well, although The Netherlands and the UK 
presently are the only countries with a CCS project that might see daylight. Non-EU countries 
applying CCS have been discussed in section 5.1.2.4. and will be referred to when they 
contribute to the Dutch case. Multiple governmental and non-governmental organisations 
IGOs (IEA, IPCC)
Other countries 
(Canada, US, 
China, Norway, 
Germany)
International 
platforms (Global 
CCS Institute, 
North Sea Basin 
Task Force)
DG Industry
DG Energy
DG RTD
DG Climate
DG Environment
Zero Emissions 
Platform (ZEP)
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs
CATO
Ministry of 
Infrastructure and 
Environment
Environmental 
organisations 
(Greenpeace, 
Natuur & Milieu)
Research 
institutes (TNO, 
Ecofys)
OCAP
Province of South 
Holland DCMR
Energy producers 
(Uniper, Engie)
Rotterdam 
Climate Initiative
City of Rotterdam Port of Rotterdam Authority
Industry (Shell, 
Abengoa, Air 
Liquide)
Deltalinqs
International
Supranational
National
Regional
Local
 Figure 5.4. The CCS network in multi-level perspective
Source: author’s own compilation based on fi eldwork. Companies such as Shell are labelled local even though they 
operate on all levels and could be placed in multiple categories.
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have published on CCS and their data will be used throughout this chapter when relevant. 
Not all the actors in figure 5.4 are part of the CCS core network. The interviews probed 
how actors are related to each other in this case, specifically looking at whether they have 
specific governance ties with the purpose of delivering public goods. Figure 5.5 shows the 
ego network for the Port of Rotterdam Authority in the CCS case.
A surprising finding of this study is that, in the PoR’s small-scale CCS ego network, the PoR 
does not seem to have a pivotal place139. Its betweenness centrality is 1.35, meaning others 
would still be connected to each other if the PoR were removed. However, the PoR is also 
represented in RCI (the same goes for the city and DCMR), so RCI’s connections should 
also be counted towards the PoR. Outliers are the Ministry of Economic Affairs (12.51), the 
industry (10.7) and research institutes (10.31). The Ministry can potentially be powerful, 
yet the question is whether it uses its power to advance or block the interests of others. 
As the qualitative analysis will show, EZ has actively tried to acquire more international 
funding for the ROAD project, though this study determines that EZ’s own policy-making 
is rather passive. The industry is well-connected both at national and EU level, speaking to 
139  In the minds of other actors, however, the PoR does play a large role. See section 5.3.4.1. for further discussion.
IGOs
International platforms
DG RTD
DG CLIMA
DG ENER
ZEP
Ministry of I&M
Ministry of EZ
Province of SH
CATO
Research institutes
Environmental organisations
OCAP
Energy producers
RCI
DCMR
City of Rotterdam
Industry
Deltalinqs
PoR
Figure 5.5. CCS ego network for the Port of Rotterdam Authority
Source: author’s own composition based on fieldwork. The darker the node, the higher its degree. Minimum set edges per 
node is 10 (maximum is 20). The average degree is 12.4, the density is 0.653 and the modularity is 0.19, so there are no 
analytically meaningful communities in this network. Used software: Gephi (ver. 0.9.2). 
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private sector actors, policy-makers and researchers alike. The pivotal role of academia has 
also been discussed earlier in this chapter so its centrality is unsurprising, though research 
institutes otherwise lack resources to really make deployment happen. Actors with the 
lowest betweenness centrality — potentially low influence — are DG RTD (0.4) and DG 
ENV (0.0). DG ENV watches CCS from the sidelines, while DG RTD has been important for 
CCS research but apparently does not offer many unique connections. Figure 5.5 provides 
justification for leaving other countries out of the analysis unless relevant on a micro-level. 
5.3.2. Governance at EU Level - the Domestic — International Dimension
As discussed earlier in the historical overview, the connection between CCS and climate 
change mitigation was first made in academia. The Dutch government then officially began 
to consider the prospects of CCS, but no large-scale demonstration projects were carried 
out before the EU’s CCS Directive (2009/31/EC) was launched. MLG hypothesises a shift 
from domestic to international coordination spurred by the necessity for supranational 
coordination due to international interdependencies which cannot be ignored. It is therefore 
expected that policy coordination — in increasing amounts — will take place at the European 
level (Piattoni, 2010) and that the PoR is also active at the international level since the 
required policy solutions cannot be provided by the national government alone. This section 
will look specifically at this first theoretical expectation and present its key concepts: the 
interdependencies at international level (with substantial cross-border connections between 
business, civil society and government) and the level at which policy coordination occurs. I 
will start with the latter and show where most of the relevant binding policy decisions are 
taken and whether the Dutch government actively refers to the necessity of EU decisions.
5.3.2.1. CCS as part of larger EU energy and climate policy coordination efforts
From the onset, CCS was seen as a way to drastically reduce CO2 emissions in Europe. The 
European Commission deftly incorporated it into its efforts to coordinate climate mitigation 
policies across the EU by proposing the CCS Directive as part of a larger, first of its kind140, 
climate and energy package in 2009. The Commission argued for its competence in this 
area by stressing that “in a world of global interdependence, energy policy necessarily has 
a European dimension” (European Commission, 2006:17). In other words, the EC was 
seeking harmonisation of energy policies across Europe. As discussed in chapter 4.2.2.2, it 
was aided by serendipitous circumstances: international climate negotiations. The EU’s quest 
for a political victory led to domestic acceptance and upscaling of policies to the EU level.
140  An earlier (1991) effort to link climate and energy policies failed (Skjaerseth, 2016:512).
5
126 Chapter 5
The EU’s drive to be a global climate leader and its ability to gain support from its member 
states shows how international interdependencies reflect back onto the decision-making 
process at the domestic level. The climate and energy package lost its momentum after it 
was adopted, not in the least due to the economic crisis and the continuously dropping CO2 
price under the ETS. However, the implementation of the package also posed problems for 
some countries (Skjaerseth, 2016:521). As mentioned in box 5.1 and discussed in more detail 
in section 5.2.3, the implementation of the CCS Directive was delayed in many countries. 
A Commission representative showed the EC is aware of its lack of success and linked it to 
the original wish to be a global climate leader: 
“If ROAD will be built, it will show that the EU’s plans for CCS were 
only largely a failure instead of a complete failure. The plan was to have 
12 plants operating by 2015. That plan was definitely not achieved. 
But having ROAD in operation would be a game changer, showing 
we do have a CCS plant in the EU.”141
141  Interview 29.
Box 5.1. When political victories lead to unwanted side-effects
The choice for CCS - the political narrative
COP15 was just around the corner in 2008. The financial crisis was in its early days, and the EU was recovering 
from a failed Lisbon Strategy and the rejection of the European Constitution. The European Commission needed 
a political victory. It set out to formulate the Climate & Energy package, heavily aided by German chancellor 
Merkel, who was able to secure unanimous support for the package. The technocratic Commission saw great 
potential in CCS technology to drastically reduce European emissions. A CCS Directive was included in the 
package. The European drive to present itself as the global climate leader during COP15 (2009) led to a swift 
adoption of all the legislative documents under the Climate & Energy package. Demonstrating low carbon 
technologies such as renewable power generation and CCS was linked to the EU ETS in an effort to spur them 
along. The EU showed climate leadership in Copenhagen, but the implementation of the packages was yet to 
come.
The choice for CCS - the industrial narrative
With the formulation of the CCS Directive in 2008 and the underlying financial instruments to get CCS 
demonstration going, the European power generation sector set out to define CCS demonstration projects. 
Spirits were high because there seemed to be political support and the carbon price under the EU ETS was at a 
good 30 euros per ton. As projects were being lined up, European member states began to implement the CCS 
Directive. Nearly all countries delayed proper implementation or made it difficult to get permits and additional 
financial instruments. Some countries invested heavily into renewables, granting large subsidies that pressed on 
the carbon price, which dropped by 50% in 2010. The CCS projects that had been approved by the EU in the 
meantime started to flounder. Without a functioning national legislative framework and the ability to make a 
business case, companies started cancelling their CCS projects one by one. 
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The quote above also helps explain why a lot of effort has been made by the Commission 
to get ROAD going. Yet, as box 5.1 shows, the larger picture remains unchanged: the EU 
attempted to coordinate the development of CCS, but in reality each MS retained its own 
CCS policy preferences.
5.3.2.2. A vicious cycle of policy coordination
After the adoption of the 2020 Climate and Energy package, expectations regarding CCS 
development in Europe were high, but the 12 CCS projects the EC and the Council hoped 
for did not come to fruition. In a televised debate on June 22nd, 2016142, one of the DG 
CLIMA deputy heads, Tom van Ierland, stated that private investors mostly blame the low 
carbon price under the EU ETS for the lack of CCS projects. My interviews confirm that the 
EU ETS is often called the main driver for CCS, but that it is currently not driving it. Most 
actors are therefore calling for ETS reform, implicitly (sometimes explicitly) claiming that 
policy needs to be coordinated at a higher level than the national level. One employee from 
the Dutch government put it as follows:
“The incentive for companies to demonstrate CCS is low. The ETS 
does not help incentivise this, but The Netherlands cannot do much 
about this on its own. The national government is powerless in this 
respect. The Netherlands is also looking at what other countries are 
doing to maintain a level playing field. That is important because 
otherwise the industry could go elsewhere and that is a problem as 
well.”143
Just as judicial sentencing creates precedents, so does EU coordination. The EU’s natural 
response to failing policy coordination seems to be more policy coordination, but using a 
slightly altered approach. In 2013 the European Parliament reviewed144 the development 
and implementation of CCS and stressed again that the technology might have a big role 
to play in Europe’s ambitions to decarbonise. The EP also stated that the member states 
who foresee a role for CCS in their future cannot expect the private sector to do everything 
on its own; a financing mechanism is necessary. Those MS who do not want CCS should 
consider their 2050 strategy in their National Action Plans (NAPs) and critically reflect on what 
they need to do to reach long-term climate targets. In other words, the previously adopted 
142  The debate was organised by ViEUws and can be found at [http://www.vieuws.eu/live-panel-debate/cop21/paris-
deliver-low-carbon-investment-signal-europe-needs-22-june-2016-live-panel-debate/].
143  Interview 22.
144  Procedure 2013/2079(INI).
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technology-biased approach was traded in for a more technology-neutral approach, which 
befits the wishes of governments and businesses alike145. An official from the Commission 
made the following statement during an interview:
“Nowadays, the Commission’s stance is starkly technology neutral. 
That was not the case in 2008/2009. Back then there were very specific 
targets. But targets are an indication of a certain preference. What is 
really needed is to achieve emission reductions in the cheapest possible 
way. That is also why the ETS was set. The market can then find the 
cheapest solutions.”146
Apparently, setting a regulatory framework with specific targets in place was not sufficient 
to spur development. The EU’s approach therefore shifted from prescribing targets in 
directives to believing in market-based strategies and facilitating incentives through (co-)
funding: covert coordination. Yet the carbon price under the EU ETS remained low, making 
it difficult to place trust in its effectiveness to stimulate decarbonisation. Lacking member 
state support for further ambitious climate and energy initiatives, the EU tried to coordinate 
in yet another way in 2015, when the European Commission (2015f:2-22) reviewed the state 
of the ETS and proposed the adoption of two financing mechanisms: the Modernisation 
Fund and the Innovation Fund. If adopted, the Modernisation Fund will be made up of 2% 
of the overall quantity of allowances and should help modernise the energy sector of low 
income countries, with a particular focus on small-scale installations. The Innovation Fund is 
basically an extension of the NER 300 programme and supports new low-carbon initiatives 
in the power sector as well as in the industry. The Directive has not yet been adopted as 
it is awaiting discussions in the EP’s committees in December 2016. The EU’s continued 
attempts to coordinate are linked to the concept of international interdependencies, which 
is discussed next.
5.3.2.3. International interdependencies cause counteracting forces
The previous two sections show that national governments have willingly created interdepen-
dencies at international level, both due to a global political context (COP-15) and in order to 
maintain a level playing field across countries. The Dutch were one of the early advocates of 
CCS — which is also visible in the CCS research conducted since the early ‘90s — yet some 
interviewees have stated that politically CCS was never a done deal at the national level 
145  See also [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations/consultation-future-clean-coal-technologies-and-carbon-
capture-and-storage-ccs]. Confirmed in my interviews with EC officials and business representatives.
146  Interview 28.
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either. Between and within ministries, opinions on CCS differed147. Barendrecht failed due to 
opposition from the general public (see also box 5.2), but offshore CCS remains an option. 
CCS is called an end of pipe solution, which means that unwanted substances are still created 
but are being prevented from being emitted: the artificial cleaning of a polluting stream148. An 
interviewee from the private sector aptly summarised the feeling of unease that surrounds CCS: 
“It is sort of crazy to put new gas under the ground in the most 
highly populated country of the world.”149
Piattoni claims that international interdependencies are also created by actors such as NGOs, 
sub-national authorities and business. Let’s review these actors for the CCS case, starting 
with NGOs. An NGO such as Greenpeace has actively campaigned against CCS, arguing that 
it prolongs the life of fossil fuels, though the potential of CCS for heavy industries such as 
the steel and cement industry is being considered. However, Greenpeace has actively chosen 
not to participate in joint public - private discussions for fear of being misrepresented as 
being supportive of CCS merely by showing up. It does speak privately with the national 
government and provides input for the Energieakkoord150. Another Dutch environmental 
organisation, Natuur & Milieu (in English: Nature & Environment), does participate in public 
- private discussions and sees potential in CCS when applied to gas-fired power plants 
(in the transition phase to renewables) and heavy industry151. Yet the best examples of 
agenda-setting and subsequent creation of awareness for international coordination have 
been the IPCC, IEA, and ZEP (IGOs). Hedging CCS technology as a potential ‘climate saviour’ 
and arguing for a global carbon price stuck in the minds of many domestic policy-makers; 
some using it as a reason to push forward with CCS, others using it as a way to excuse 
themselves from domestic initiatives whilst letting the EU struggle to adopt legislation. 
ZEP is the only platform specifically new for CCS; the other channels are long established.
Second, and in contrast to Piattoni’s model, my interviews did not confirm any particular 
importance of sub-national authorities in propelling international coordination. The Rot-
terdam Climate Initiative locally is a well-known initiative and strong coalition of the municipal 
government, DCMR, Deltalinqs, and the Port of Rotterdam Authority. RCI acknowledged the 
necessity of the application of CCS in the Rotterdam region, but none of the Commission 
147  Interview 31, 37, field work reports N, Q.
148  It fits the Dutch idiom ‘dweilen met de kraan open’, which hints at the pointless activity of fighting symptoms 
but not the disease.
149  Interview 24.
150  Interview 38.
151  Interview 39.
5
130 Chapter 5
experts I interviewed had heard of it even though RCI actively advocated CCS. The German 
Länder (provinces) actually counteract EU coordination with most of them banning on-shore 
CCS in their implementation of the CCS Directive. Section 5.3.3 will investigate whether SNAs 
are empowered domestically, but in international policy-making they seem to have played 
a marginal role and have certainly not created cross-border linkages. The PoR, in turn, also 
advocated the ROAD project together with the project partners and received much traction 
at national level and even among friendly Commission officials. Its Havenvisie 2030 vision 
is well-known to them and policy-makers listen eagerly to the PoR’s vision on a potential 
transnational CO2 hub, especially in light of its potential to store the CO2 emitted by industries 
in Germany. The potential international significance of the ROAD project — partly advocated 
by the PoR — is the reason why The Netherlands, Germany, Norway and the EC have been 
developing a separate funding mechanism for ROAD under Era-net152.
Third, business mechanics have played an important role in this case not because of the 
existence of CCS business networks but rather through policy-makers’ fear of potential 
carbon leakage if climate policies (and measures such as carbon taxation) spanned too little 
territory, which was readily confirmed by potentially affected industries (using their traditional 
umbrella organisation channels). Their rationale is that if individual countries, or even just 
the EU, adopt too stringent climate measures, the industry will just pack up and leave for 
greener pastures elsewhere where the climate is not regulated too strictly. Losing chemical 
industry and heavy industries could hurt the European economy severely and therefore 
the incentive to subject these industries to stringent targets has been small. Most of these 
industries are exempted from the EU ETS or get free allowances, causing them no worries in 
their production process. The power generation sector is often tied to national governments 
or infrastructure and is therefore not easily subjected to carbon leakage, which is why it made 
sense in the minds of policy-makers to start demonstrating CCS in that sector. However, 
companies called for financial support to demonstrate the technology in order to kickstart its 
upscaling, which caused political unease due to discussions surrounding government support 
of fossil fuels and the public’s negative perception of the safety of CCS. Box 5.2 shows how 
differing opinions in the industry were eventually politically outmatched by public opinion.
To summarise this first section, most of CCS activity went through already established 
channels, creating very few new cross-border linkages and maintaining policy coordination 
in domestic hands rather than subjecting to the EC’s attempts at supranational coordination. 
The call for coordination on the international level implies a shift away from the domestic 
level, yet the power remaining in the hands of national governments cannot be ignored. 
It is up to them to decide whether there is a place for CCS in their energy mix and climate 
152  Interviews 28 and 31.
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mitigation strategy. Multi-level governance illuminates the complex intertwinement of 
the domestic and the supranational level. The CCS case shows a symbolic shift to the 
supranational level, to be filled with the activity of national governments or further hollowed 
out by them. The PoR has actively tried to use the EU’s support to elicit domestic change.
5.3.3. Governance at National Level - the Centre — Periphery Dimension
5.3.3.1. One directive, 28 implementations
Before delving into the centre - periphery dimension, this paragraph provides international 
context to how domestic actors in The Netherlands have behaved. Whereas the adoption 
of the CCS Directive went quite flawlessly, its implementation is an entirely different matter. 
Only Spain had transposed the Directive to the Commission’s satisfaction within the set time 
Box 5.2. When public opinion outweighs differentiated industrial opinions
Deploying CCS - the political narrative
The Dutch national government has tried to develop CCS projects since the ‘90s. A key demonstration project 
would have been Shell’s Barendrecht project, though the public’s negative opinion of the safety of CCS and 
their fear of suffocating if the gas escaped underground reservoirs caused the government to pull the plug out 
of the project and ban on-shore carbon storage for the foreseeable future. Looking toward off-shore storage, 
the government decided to support the ROAD project. National realisation of EU climate targets for 2020 were 
in large part dependent on the success of ROAD. The public did not seem as negative about ROAD because the 
CO2 would be stored in the sea and not on land, lowering its perceived threat. However, a political discussion 
regarding the legitimacy of subsidising CCS for coal-fired power plants flared up, and public opinion turned 
against ‘prolonging coal’. The government could no longer legitimately show open support for ROAD by 
increasing its funding, yet also found itself in a difficult position due to making its climate mitigation success 
dependent on CCS. Behind the scenes, it began helping ROAD to secure more financing through the EU and 
other national governments.
Deploying CCS - the industrial narrative
Shell severely burned their fingers on the Barendrecht project and decided in its aftermath to move their CCS 
operations to the United Kingdom. Engie and Uniper, as the main partners behind the ROAD project, knew 
they had to decrease their CO2 emissions under a functioning EU ETS and saw a potential license to operate 
their coal-fired power plants provided they implemented CCS. While CCS was used widely on a small-scale 
and for EOR purposes, its large-scale use for dedicated storage purposes needed more demonstration, also 
to show the public that it is a safe technology. A further decline of the carbon price increased the need for 
additional funding to support a failing business case, but would help The Netherlands reach its climate targets 
and hopefully turn the tide of public opinion. Yet the support for CCS in the power generation sector was not 
matched by support from other industries, who warned policy-makers about potential carbon leakage if climate 
measures would go too far. They had no interest in being subjected to EU ETS. Differentiated interests in the 
private sector made it difficult to advocate CCS effectively. 
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limit153. Poland and Croatia154 were the last two countries to report full transposition of the 
Directive (Shogenova et al., 2014:6663). Some countries still prohibit CO2 storage while others 
allow it and have laid down laws to facilitate it155. The significant leeway this directive gives 
to national authorities in terms of its transposition has therefore not led to a harmonised 
CCS policy framework across the EU. By the time the directive was implemented, the CCS 
projects proposed under NER 300156 and EEPR had started to disintegrate. Most of the newly 
accessed member states noticed that the issues linked at EU level in the 2020 package did 
not work that well at the domestic level, which is a perfect illustration of the tension between 
domestic and supranational agendas. Poland, for example, voted in favour of the package due 
to high hopes for ETS revenues, CCS and renewables. But the trade-off between investments 
into low-carbon technologies and carbon price market mechanisms thwarted their plans 
(Skjaerseth, 2016:519). The first grand energy - climate package of its kind was a sour lesson 
learned. Table 5.2 summarises the six main EEPR projects and their reason for cancellation.
Interestingly, Spain, which completed the transposition of the CCS Directive first, was also 
where the first pilot project under the EEPR took place. While it was ultimately cancelled 
for the scale up phase, it did fulfil its obligations under the EEPR programme. The other 
projects suffered from a combination of lacking national regulatory frameworks and a 
financial gap, which makes it difficult for businesses to legitimise positive investment 
decisions. The German, Polish and Italian projects have been cancelled due to problems with 
their respective governments, ranging from the lack of transposition of the CCS Directive 
to problems regarding permits. The Don Valley (formerly Hatfield) project has changed 
ownership and scope since 2009 but is officially still scheduled for 2020157. Its transport 
and storage infrastructure were being developed in tandem with the White Rose project, 
153  Art. 39 of the Directive requires its transposition, and the notification thereof, by national authorities by June 25th, 
2011. The EC sent letters of formal notice for non-communication to the other 26 states and reported satisfaction 
with the Directive’s transposition for 20 of the 28 countries by the end of 2013; more than two years overdue. 
154  Poland was initially opposed to the 2020 Energy and Climate package and even threatened to veto it (cf. Skjaerseth, 
2016). Croatia only entered the EU in July 2013 and immediately transposed the CCS Directive upon entry.
155  CO2 storage prohibited in Finland, Luxembourg, Austria, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the 
Brussels capital region of Belgium. CO2 storage restricted in Czech Republic and Germany. CO2 storage allowed 
in the remaining countries (European Commission, 2014a:3). Whilst the countries themselves are in charge of 
the permitting process, Art. 10 of the CCS Directive requires national authorities to send draft storage permits to 
the Commission for an opinion. The Netherlands was the first country to submit a draft permit and received an 
opinion in 2012 (European Commission, 2014a:4). Since then only the UK submitted another draft permit meant 
for Shell’s Peterhead project (European Commission, 2016b:2).
156  NER 300 only awarded a positive funding decision to one project: White Rose in the UK, which was cancelled in 
2016 due to the UK’s withdrawal of its Competition Fund.
157  The project has had a bumpy ride being denied both NER 300 funding and being excluded from the — now 
cancelled — 1 billion pound CCS fund of the British government.
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which did receive NER 300 funding (European Commission, 2015d:5) but has since been 
cancelled. The Dutch ROAD project remains on hold, with current prospects for a financial 
investment decision to be taken at the end of 2016158. This project also experienced a change 
in scope, reducing transport and storage costs so as to decrease the financial gap (ibid.:6)159.
5.3.3.2. CCS as an issue for decentralised levels of government
The domestic - international shift was shown to be mostly symbolic: there is EU coordination 
because member states desire EU funding for expensive CCS projects, yet new cross-border 
connections are hardly established and coordination is mostly national. What does this 
mean for peripheral activity? After nearly all CCS projects under the EEPR were cancelled, 
Rotterdam suddenly became very important for DG ENER’s CCS ambitions. However, involving 
sub-national authorities at the European level does not necessarily mean they are influential. 
It is important to look at whether the pull exerted by decentralised governments can be 
reflected in the level at which the coordination of activities takes place and the level of 
empowerment of local actors, which make up the key concepts of the second theoretical 
expectation posing that regional coordination is more efficient than national coordination and 
158  Well after the period of data collection for this case study ended, it was announced that ROAD has been cancelled 
entirely. In this text, however, it is treated as being in the FID phase.
159  The EEPR’s success regarding CCS is largely absent, but the programme as a whole also covered gas and electricity 
infrastructure and offshore wind projects. Of the total EEPR programme, 34 out of 59 projects were fully completed 
by June 2015 (European Commission, 2015d:2).
Table 5.2. The six CCS projects under EEPR
Project (country) Reason for delay/cancellation Year delayed/
cancelled
Don Valley (UK)* Financial gap; sold to a Norwegian company at the end of 
2014 which changed the scope of the project
Now scheduled to 
start in 2020
ROAD 
(Netherlands)
Financial gap FID delayed until end 
of 2016
Jänschwalde 
(Germany)*
Cancelled due to delayed transposition of CCS Directive into 
German law
December 2011
Bełchatów 
(Poland)*
Financial gap, technical risks and lack of transposition of CCS 
Directive
May 2013
Porto Tolle (Italy) Permitting problems (resistance from environmental groups 
and local industry) and financial gap
August 2013
Compostilla (Spain) Pilot study completed in 2012, then decision not to 
commence full scale demonstration by the company
2013
Sources: European Commission, 2013e, 2015; MIT, 2016.* These projects also applied for NER 300 funding but were not 
selected.
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that this efficiency strengthens local policy actors. The PoR and the city of Rotterdam could 
thus potentially be empowered. Table 5.3 reviews CCS activities at each level of governance.
The previous section showed that the EU as centre of policy coordination has spurred little 
direct peripheral policy activity. Rather, nation states have retained their gatekeeping role. 
Yet Rotterdam has not been passive. The most prominent example of CCS being taken 
up by a local government is RCI’s focus on the technology. CCS was part of the ambitious 
Energy Port goal to reduce CO2 emissions by 50% in 2025160 in the port-industrial complex. 
Without CCS, no RCI goals would be achieved161. The start was to be made in the power 
sector, which amounted to 30% of port-related CO2 emissions in 2005. Infrastructure would 
be developed and Deltalinqs — an RCI partner — would seek businesses willing to sign 
five letters of cooperation for CCS projects in the near future (RCI, 2009:21-25). Of the 3,5 
million euros available RCI funds (for 2009) for developing the Energy Port, nearly 2 million 
was earmarked162 for CCS purposes. A year later 1,7 million euros were earmarked for CCS 
(ibid.:13). As such, serious effort was made in Rotterdam to stimulate CCS.
Early CCS development in Rotterdam is a perfect illustration of how triple helix cooperation 
can be effective. During and after the Barendrecht debacle — which was also discussed in 
the city council163 — new environmental alderwoman Van Huffelen introduced the ROAD 
project and the city kept stressing the project’s importance for the achievement of RCI 
goals. The city’s Programma Duurzaam (sustainability policy programme) of 2011 adopted 
160  Base year 1990.
161  Notulen raadsvergadering 20 december 2007. Accessible at the Rotterdam city archives [www.ris.rotterdam.
nl]. To provide a full picture of the positions, D66 and PvdA expressed doubts but were not necessarily negative.
162  Almost half of those funds were accounted for by DCMR, which had extensive responsibilities under the RCI 
programme. 
163  See, for example, the meeting notes of the December 3, 2009 Council meeting and the alderman Grashoff’s letter 
dated 01-02-2010. Available in the city archives.
Table 5.3. The ambivalence of coordination of CCS activities
Level of governance Activity
EU Funding, coordination and monitoring, policy papers, plus organisation of 
platforms such as ZEP
National Funding (also for research), expected to coordinate and formulate a vision, but 
currently lacking
Regional Active when competent (permits) but otherwise more passive, mostly monitoring 
emissions
Local Lot of activity through RCI, yet currently no clear role in CCS goals or ambitions 
from the city of Rotterdam, however there is lots of local activity within the 
private sector and the PoR
Source: author’s own composition based on fieldwork.
CCS: A Case of EU Multi-level Governance Failure? 135
CCS as a policy goal and roughly 1,6 million euros was to be spent on CCS activities such 
as developing ROAD, helping the Green Hydrogen project prepare for its NER 300 subsidy 
application, activities under the CCS Platform, and contributions to the national CATO2 
research programme164. A year later, CCS was losing its momentum. Box 5.3 shows how the 
ROAD partners and the city drifted apart due to their different means of assessing a project’s 
desirability. By November 2014, ROAD was perceived dead by the Council and RCI’s budget 
was to be reduced and its goals changed165. It can be concluded that the city of Rotterdam 
tried to get CCS going by (financially) supporting partnerships between governmental 
agencies and businesses and cementing these efforts in the RCI programme, but its physical 
effects have been minor. Rotterdam might not realise a large-scale CCS demonstration, and 
the city’s squabbles with the ROAD partners and the province hurt its image166.
164  See letter to the Economy, Port, Environment and Transport Commission by Van Huffelen on July 28th, 2011. 
Accessible through the city archives [www.ris.rotterdam.nl].
165  See meeting notes of the November 6 and 11, 2014 Council meetings in the city archives. Also confirmed in field 
work report M.
166  Interview 23, 31 and 32. Field work report O.
Box 5.3. When investment logic does not match politics
Political promise or business case? - the political narrative
In 2004, the Dutch government asked the electricity sector to build coal-fired power plants, fearing future 
electricity shortages. Engie and Uniper commenced the building of their plants on the Maasvlakte. At the 
same time, much to the appreciation of the city of Rotterdam, the province of South Holland and the Port 
of Rotterdam Authority, they launched the ROAD CCS project. The companies held many discussions with 
city representatives, saying they would deploy CCS to capture part of their carbon emissions and thereby 
contribute heavily to the city’s climate programme. The municipality viewed this as a political promise. Their 
RCI programme was heavily dependent on ROAD; political careers were on the line. When the ROAD partners 
began backing out of the project due to a large financial gap, the city’s environmental alderwoman angrily 
reminded them of their promise. Rotterdam tried to add an obligation to deploy CCS to the plants’ permit, but 
the province declined their plea, arguing that the promise had no legal stature.
Political promise or business case? - the industrial narrative
When the ROAD partners launched their CCS project, the carbon price was high and both the EU and the 
Dutch government had funding available to cover part of the project. Demonstrating CCS would give the 
companies a longer term license to operate and be good for their PR. In their discussions with the city of 
Rotterdam the ROAD partners indicated their willingness to demonstrate CCS, thereby securing political 
support for their investment plans. When the carbon price unexpectedly declined to a dramatic low it could not 
seem to recover from, the CCS business case dissipated quickly. Together with the Dutch government, Engie 
and Uniper began looking for additional funding. They delayed their FID awaiting the result. In their eyes, they 
did not promise to deploy CCS and going forward with the project without the proper finances would hurt their 
financial stability.
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5.3.3.3. The quest for local empowerment
As the previous paragraph shows, sub-national mobilisation seemed very effective in 2007 - 
2009, and later it declined. However, whether this decline is a consequence of the domestic 
- international shift or other factors (politics, EU ETS failure) is hard to tell. My interviews and 
analysis of the city archives167 give an impression that most battles are fought locally — between 
the public and private sector — while the coordination of funding and policy comes from 
higher up. This discrepancy makes sense due to the local nature of CO2 storage projects. 
Furthermore, the concept of a CO2 hub is by definition a local affair, since it involves the 
creation of a cluster. Even though the projects have a local nature, at present they cannot exist 
without national and supranational (financial) support. I have shown that during and after the 
conclusion of the centralised policy-making process, peripheral activity was high but without 
success. Theoretically, Rotterdam would still be an ideal place to create a CO2 hub, which would 
strengthen the region’s economy and make it an important player in Dutch emissions reduction 
activities. Furthermore, the longer-term possibilities of a CO2 hub would allow Germany and 
Belgium to transport their CO2 to storage fields through the Port of Rotterdam. In a situation 
where industries could share and easily dispose of their waste products (such as CO2) in an 
environmentally responsible way, a CO2 hub could provide an attractive investment climate. 
These arguments are also used to advocate Port of Rotterdam Authority activity:
“[T]hey could be a catalyst. They should unify opinions because 
they have access to different industries with different interests and 
different views, and they can mediate between them to make the 
business case for CCS possible. Finding synergies is important, so that 
every stakeholder can find a reason to participate and engage in the 
CCS story. If they don’t have a reason to participate, they won’t. That 
is a challenging task, but a public authority can also keep in mind the 
common interest.”168
The synergy argument — for both companies and as a way to link to other policy sectors 
such as employment — comes up in other interviews and field work as well169 and is often 
well-received at the EU level170. Box 5.4 illustrates this argument. A hub would arguably 
empower the Rotterdam region, but at present this hub does not exist. Neither the city 
nor the PoR have thus far succeeded in developing the hub — though their advocacy of 
167  101 separate CCS-related documents found between 2007 and March 2016.
168  Interview 19.
169  Interviews 22, 29, 31, 33, 34, and field work report M.
170  An emphasis on synergies, after all, was how the 2020 Climate & Energy package got adopted in the first place.
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it makes great sense — nor have they led a CCS project to see daylight. One interviewee 
went as far as to state that
“If the ROAD project eventually does happen, it will solely be due to 
the efforts made by the EU. They have made a lot of subsidy available 
and have consequently put programs on it. Multiple Commissioners 
have really made an effort as well. So if negotiations succeed now, it 
will really be due to the perseverance of the EU.”171
This quote represents an extreme opinion, but it does show the limits of local (semi-)
governmental power and provides a good example of the fickleness of politics. Whereas it 
can be argued that, per Piattoni’s MLG, there is a lot of potential for local empowerment 
and efficiency, the local level currently mostly looks like a battlefield and its empowerment 
seems limited due to external factors such as political and public battles over the desirability 
and safety of CCS, differentiated MS interests, and a low carbon price. In the CCS case, the 
periphery can only be empowered when the context is right. This finding adds a very useful 
(temporal) nuance to the centre - periphery dimension.
171  Interview 18.
Box 5.4. The hub narrative
The attractiveness of hubs - the political narrative
The European Commission is set up to be a neutral, EU-minded organ. It therefore is a great proponent of 
cross-border projects and any developments that benefit a larger European region or the EU as a whole. Ports, 
and especially seaports, cater for a larger region by nature. In the EU’s efforts to combat climate change and 
get its members to agree to meet certain climate targets, the Commission welcomes any ideas that have the 
potential to make climate mitigation easier across borders. The Port of Rotterdam’s CO2 hub fits perfectly 
into this mindset, for it not only helps reduce Dutch emissions but can potentially store German and Belgian 
CO2 as well if the right infrastructure is in place. As such, placing CO2 infrastructure can be a catalyst for CCS 
development in multiple EU member states, making the Commission eager to support it.
The attractiveness of hubs - the industrial narrative
The Port of Rotterdam Authority does not own large chimneys through which CO2 enters the atmosphere. It is 
therefore not the most likely partner for CCS projects, but its role as infrastructure provider is crucial: the ROAD 
project benefited greatly from the PoR’s willingness to invest into the needed infrastructure to transport CO2. 
Having this infrastructure in place makes the port of Rotterdam attractive to other businesses, since they would 
be able to plug into the infrastructure and deploy CCS more cheaply. If climate targets continue to get more 
strict, a CO2 hub will make for an increasingly attractive investment climate. Because of the potential to aid not 
just Dutch industry but also German and Belgian industry, the PoR’s economic reasoning to develop this hub 
matches the EU’s mindset perfectly. It therefore makes sense to develop the infrastructure even if the ROAD 
project does not come to fruition.
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5.3.4. Coordination with Third Parties - the State — Society Dimension
We have arrived at the third theoretical expectation focusing on the cross-linkages between 
the public and private sectors leading to a blurring of state and society. National governments 
still have considerable autonomy when it comes to CCS, yet if projects face local battles 
and difficult circumstances due to other agreements at supranational level, what then is 
the consequence of EU CCS initiatives for the coordination with third parties, such as the 
Port of Rotterdam Authority172 and businesses in the port area? Piattoni (2010) identifies 
a state — society shift in which cross-linkages between the public and private sector with 
joint goal-setting and a blurring of state and society comprise key elements of governance 
structures. She also defends the notion that government needs society to govern effectively. 
A discussion of these cross-linkages and the blurring of state and society shows that the EU is 
an enabler of public-private cooperation, yet that this mostly happens along traditional lines.
5.3.4.1. Cross-linkages are enabled by the Port of Rotterdam and the EU
I have operationalised the cross-linkages as the extent to which there is resource interde-
pendency and if the public and private sector jointly set goals. Figure 5.5 showed that the 
PoR does not have a high betweenness centrality in the CCS case. Theoretically, without 
the PoR other actors would still be connected to each other. Yet such analyses can lack 
important qualitative nuances: the companies are dependent on the PoR as their landlord 
to lease them their land. With it come requirements, which makes the PoR an important 
actor in the network. It is often said to be able to act as a catalyst and facilitator because 
it has good connections to both governments and the private sector. The CCS Directive 
itself had no direct impact on the Port of Rotterdam Authority and ports were not part 
of the deliberations at EU level. However, the larger 2020 Climate and Energy package 
the directive was part of contains commitments to reduce GHG emissions. As such, the 
ambitions the Dutch government ascribed to have a direct impact on the business conducted 
in the port area. As one of the main partners in RCI, the PoR was already active in climate 
policy before the adoption of the European package. RCI also responded on behalf of its 
partners to the 2013 Commission consultation regarding the future of CCS. RCI outlines 
the potential strength of the North Sea region for CCS application and calls for additional 
mechanisms atop EU ETS, since the low carbon price does not incentivise much needed 
CCS demonstration173. Implicitly, the port wants the EU — not the Dutch government! — to 
172  It can be argued that the PoR is not a 3rd party in the sense that companies such as, for example, Engie and 
Uniper are because of its semi-public nature, yet it is not involved in CCS policy-making and its company-like 
characteristics allow for some leniency in this regard.
173  All responses to the consultation can be found at [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations/consultation-
future-clean-coal-technologies-and-carbon-capture-and-storage-ccs].
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prioritise the Rotterdam region (as part of the North Sea area) and offer financial support 
to demonstrate CCS and develop its CO2 hub.
CCS features in the 2030 Port Compass, though it is noted that it is up to the port-based 
companies to develop it. Whereas the port authority itself cannot implement CCS, it is seen 
as a catalyst by governments and companies alike. In the words of an EC representative:
“If someone like the Port of Rotterdam is in, it keeps others on board 
too. They have a facilitating role. They also are able to keep the city 
of Rotterdam on board.”174
In other words, the PoR facilitates cooperation between public and private parties. And a 
representative from the Dutch government stated:
“The influence of the Port Authority on the way of thinking within 
Rotterdam is large. People listen to the opinion of the CEO of the Port 
Authority. They also have a lot of money they can invest.”175
Including the influential PoR in the ambitious RCI is logical, yet what is it that the port 
authority does? The PoR aims to develop its ‘Rotterdam Coal Port’ with respect to the climate, 
yet with an eye for economic opportunities176. As such, CCS and CCU are part of the PoR’s 
ambitions, alongside biomass use (which can be burned in appropriately fitted coal-fired 
power plants) and re-use of waste heat (PoR, 2015:2)177. The PoR also shows its commitment 
to developing a CO2 hub by investing 9 million euros in a pipeline for the ROAD project. 
Even though the PoR itself cannot apply CCS, it can invest into basic conditions that make 
CCS possible. It could also lobby for CCS and add CCS requirements to the contracts it signs 
with port-based businesses, although at present this is not being done178. Over the years, 
the port authority seems to have become more ambivalent to CCS. The PoR’s capabilities in 
174  Interview 29.
175  Interview 31.
176  In other words, even if Dutch power plants stop burning coal, the German industry is still likely to need it and 
therefore the PoR will continue to facilitate the transshipment of coal.
177  Interview 36. Keeping the newly built Uniper and Engie coal-fired power plants in business is in line with the 
policy priorities of the PoR, provided they keep their emissions in check. The PoR sees opportunities for the plants 
in both areas of biomass and use of waste heat. The plants can make connections to other industrial actors in the 
larger port complex, and even be part of a chain of heating and CO2 distribution in the whole province. OCAP is 
already operating in the port area and providing a pipeline to distribute CO2 to greenhouses in the western part 
of the country. Its current suppliers are Shell (oil refinery) and Abengoa (biofuel factory). Together they supply 0,5 
million ton CO2 to greenhouses, but demand is higher than that.
178  Interview 27.
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this case do not stretch far beyond ‘soft’ power, and continuous disappointments regarding 
ROAD’s future may have contributed to the PoR’s attitude. Nevertheless, the port authority 
is an integral part of the CCS network by virtue of having a system overview and potentially 
advocating on behalf of a region instead of a single company.
In multi-level governance, mutual interdependencies lead to the sharing of resources in 
networks. These resource interdependencies are indeed present in the CCS case. There is an 
abundance of resource flows between the public and private sector in the area of CCS. In the 
1990s and early 2000s most capital resource flows went from the public to the private sector 
to fund research on CCS. The knowledge gained was then sluiced back to the government. 
Now, when most policy-makers and businesses agree that projects are needed, the public 
and private sector seem caught in a funding deadlock: the private sector wants subsidies 
from the government to cover the high costs of CCS (and offset the uncertainty regarding 
longer-term policy priorities), but the public sector is hesitant to invest due to a history of 
public opposition to CCS and the lack of a clear vision on the role CCS should play in the 
(near) future. As one interviewee from the private sector put it:
“As long as governments do not think about their future energy mix 
thoroughly they will have no place for CCS either.”179
With the current price under ETS, it seems very unlikely that projects will happen without 
a capital flow from the public to the private sector. The advent of more EU attempts at 
coordinating CCS is an enabler for state - society cooperation (EU funding needs domestic 
support), though in The Netherlands such cooperation was definitely also present before 
EEPR and NER.
Knowledge and expertise still mostly lie with the private sector, although the heavy invest-
ments into past research have made experts out of knowledge institutes as well. The 
policy-making capacity lies with all levels of government, which has been discussed in section 
5.2.2. While the EU is responsible for overall emissions reduction targets, it is entirely up 
to the national government whether to stimulate CCS or not, through either additional 
policy or funding instruments. As such, the government can require new coal-fired power 
plants to be ‘capture ready’, and it can also set emission performance standards or provide 
tax incentives to stimulate the price of CO2. There is therefore a whole arsenal of policy 
instruments available to the national government, but it is not being used at present. As 
the permitting process for power plants goes through regional and local governments as 
well, they have agency in spatial planning and environmental requirements. In general, it 
179  Interview 33.
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seems that the existence of ETS is being used as an argument by governments to not set 
further CO2 standards and by the private sector to not implement CCS, which leads to the 
situation where everyone is waiting for the EU to make a move180.
Resource flows, as identified in table 5.4, can indicate cooperation between actors. The 
most crucial resources for CCS are policy-making capacity and capital. Both resources mainly 
reside with the public sector, although the private sector has significant own investment 
capacity which it does not use to develop CCS. In turn, the public sector needs information 
and expertise in order to make policy, but it can call on both the private sector and civil 
society (in a broad sense) to provide it. Research institutes and environmental NGOs are 
more than happy to share their CCS knowledge with governments. If the crucial resources 
lie with the public sector, and there are many cross-linkages, then is there also a blurring 
of state and society? 
5.3.4.2. Cross-linkages do not necessarily lead to a blurring of state and society
Piattoni refers to a blurring of state and society; a situation in which the public and private 
sector perform activities or tasks traditionally associated with the opposing sector181. The 
CCS case could potentially be the best case to show a blurring of state and society since 
no money can be made with it. CCS is an end of pipe solution; there is no end user buying 
the product. There is also a matter of risk sharing between the private and public sector 
(see box 5.5). Therefore if CCS is deployed, it must mean state and society cooperated in 
180  Interviews 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 37, and 38. Also discussed in previous sections.
181  Please note that this is a very far-reaching interpretation of blurring of state and society. It is an extreme version of 
the cross-linkages between the public and private sector, which is the more traditional interpretation of blurring. 
Table 5.4. Resource flows between state and society crucial in CCS
Resource Summary Direction of flow
Knowledge Mostly embedded in the private sector and research 
institutes, shared with public sector through 
networks, meetings and research
Private —> public
Civil society —> public
Policy-making capacity Public sector prerogative, sets the framework in 
which the private sector operates
Public —> private
Personnel Relatively low FTE capacity in public sector, private 
sector has also reduced FTEs for CCS, advocacy 
through several well-known people
None
Capital Investment capacity relies on both public and private 
investments because of the high costs of doing CCS
Public —> private
(+ private sector’s own 
investment capacity)
Source: author’s own field work and interviews.
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providing a public good. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, even though projects 
have been proposed there has not been real progress in the CCS field in the EU for years.
The clearest example of blurring at EU level is the widespread inclusion of business and civil 
society in consultations preceding proposals. In The Netherlands blurring is visible in the 
formulation of the Dutch Energieakkoord, which functions as the country’s main energy 
policy document. Representing the wishes of the private sector in a policy document 
supposedly makes it easier to carry out the policy, but it does place the private sector in the 
chair of the policymaker. 
One would expect governmental authorities to lobby for CCS toward either other gov-
ernmental bodies or the private sector. Especially the Dutch national government has 
lobbied and tried to support CCS projects at the EU level. National government support 
(and funding) is a requirement for obtaining EU funding under NER 300 and the EEPR, 
so this support is to be expected to some degree. More unique are the efforts made by 
the Dutch national government to secure additional funding for the ROAD projects from 
other national governments. To this end, the EU’s Era-net programme could soon facilitate 
extra funding for ROAD from the German and Norwegian governments. Additionally, the 
Box 5.5. Narratives of risk sharing
Risk sharing - the political narrative
The CO2 that is captured can be stored in (nearly) depleted offshore oil and gas fields. Companies that ‘work’ 
these fields have permits to do so, and need a separate permit for CCS. The purpose of storing CO2 in these 
fields is to contain it on a very long term: in principle, the gas should be stored underground permanently. 
However, storage operators and insurers face potential risks of residual leakage. While these risks are unknown, 
it is difficult for them to take them on especially since the long-term price of carbon is uncertain. Governments 
are asked to take on part of these risks to make CO2 storage less of a liability. Furthermore, the field is 
transferred back into the government’s hands when the field is full, as no profit-oriented company has an 
interest in monitoring the field on the long term. Governments are hesitant to take such assets back, fearing 
future leakages and societal costs.
Risk sharing - the industrial narrative
The company capturing CO2 is not necessarily the company operating the storage site for the gas. Storage 
operators and capture operators run risks that are not easily extrapolated for and therefore difficult to insure. 
These uncertainties are not necessarily easy to bear for companies that depend on profit and the opinion 
of their shareholders. Since storage is essentially performed on lands owned by governmental authorities, it 
makes sense for the private sector to ask governments to share some of the risks. The private sector also does 
not want to have to keep monitoring a field after it has been filled up, since it does not provide them with 
any revenue. The CCS Directive prescribes the adoption of transferral times in national frameworks. In effect, 
many governmental authorities have several chosen decades before a field is transferred back to them. These 
additional risks make calculating a business case difficult.
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Commission will add 50 cents to every euro spent by these governments, up to a maximum 
of 20 million euros. In this way, ROAD could benefit from an additional 60 million euros 
funded partly by other countries and with help from the Dutch government182. This is 
quite an interesting move which only makes sense if the Dutch government has significant 
interest in making ROAD successful. The demonstration of CCS — be it in the power sector 
or in industry — and extensive deliberations between state and society can be taken up 
in public-private partnerships, blurring the traditional areas of responsibility. Already there 
are government representatives lobbying for ROAD at the EU level, and private companies 
advising governments on the possible future role of CCS. The PoR is also seen to step in 
to coordinate and facilitate public-private connections. Extending these activities therefore 
shows promise, but it is not without risk. 
As per Dutch tradition, many interactions between the public and private sector result in 
a measure of joint goal-setting. While most mentions by interviewees were positive, some 
also hinted at conflicts. The most visible conflict pitted the city of Rotterdam and the ROAD 
partners against each other, since the city maintained that a CCS promise had been made 
to them when applying for construction permits for the coal-fired power plants, while Engie 
and Uniper stated they shared the city’s wish to reduce carbon emissions through CCS but 
that they had never made a binding promise to the local government to do so. The conflict 
escalated, receiving a lot of media attention and eventually led to appeasement efforts 
undertaken by mayor Aboutaleb183. Many interviewees underline the importance of public-
private cooperation, especially since emissions reductions can be seen as a public good, but 
the emission sources (ie. the private sector) are the ones who need to implement emission 
reductions. In the present situation the financial picture for CCS does not give much hope, 
and the national government’s lax attitude coupled with the EU’s now mostly soft coordination 
keeps progress at bay. To conclude, while there is much activity between state and societal 
actors as predicted, when push comes to shove CCS is too contentious and everyone prefers 
to stay in their own corner. The expected far-reaching blurring of state and society does not 
seem present. The PoR, while able to bridge the gap between public and private actors, is 
also too dependent on both sectors to be able to make a difference on their own.
5.3.5. Discussion of the Three Theoretical Dimensions
CCS could be one of the solutions to the problem of climate change. It is tackled through 
the adoption and implementation of climate and energy policy at EU level and within nation 
182  Interview 23, 28, 31 and 34.
183  Interview 31.
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states. Three shifts were explored in this chapter: the state - society shift, the domestic 
- international shift, and the centre - periphery shift. These shifts are connected to each 
other through the dynamics that occur within them. MLG focuses on contestation along 
these three dimensions, since it does not assume that there is complete coherence between 
them (Piattoni, 2010:87-88). The three shifts, along with areas where they clash, will be 
reviewed now (see table 5.5). 
In terms of the state - society shift it becomes obvious that neither the (supra)national 
government’s aim to reduce carbon emissions nor the PoR’s wish to become a CO2 hub can 
be realised without participation of the private sector. The governance of CCS is therefore 
not a government affair, but a governance affair, ie., non-governmental actors are indeed 
needed to govern climate and energy policies effectively, which lends credibility to the 
newer, more horizontally oriented reconceptualisation of MLG. However, this study shows 
that the hierarchical dimension remains important as well. Lacking a clear long-term signal 
regarding the future of CCS in governmental policies, and facing poor business cases due 
to the low CO2 price under the EU ETS, companies are reluctant to invest in carbon capture 
Table 5.5. Results of CCS case per key concept of MLG
Dimension of MLG Key concepts Results of CCS case
Domestic - 
international 
dimension
Interdependencies at 
international level
1. Hardly new cross-border networks created
2. Representation in international organisation or 
associations along traditional lines
Policy coordination at the X 
level of government
1. EU attempts to coordinate policy, but mostly in 
national hands
2. National policy documents do refer to the necessity 
for EU decisions as excuse to do nothing (level 
playing-field)
Centre - periphery 
dimension
Coordination of activities Many local attempts at coordination, first through 
effective triple helix cooperation and then characterised 
by conflict
Local empowerment 1. Many attempts at local coordination
2. PoR perceived as important locally but potential 
empowerment of local actors blocked by external 
factors
State - society 
dimension
Cross-linkages between 
public and private actors
1. Many resource flows between public and private 
actors, capital and policy-making capacity are crucial
2. Joint goal/target setting present but not without 
debate
Blurring of state and 
society
1. CCS potentially perfect example of blurring through 
risk sharing but currently not happening
2. Dutch government lobbies other governments for 
funding for ROAD project. Other than that hardly 
any blurring of state and society
Source: author’s own composition based on case study.
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and storage. They call for governmental authorities to provide stable guidance using the 
resources they have at hand: capital and policy-making capacity. A representative from the 
European Commission argues why stability is key:
“CCS is a long-term investment, so one cannot play around with 
investors and support CCS one year and not another year. They need 
a predictable framework so that they know what they are committing 
to. Changing the rules in the middle makes them run away, and that 
is what’s going on right now.”184
National governments are either criticised by the EU or the private sector for their lack of 
a long-term energy and climate strategy, or they are dependent on each other to instigate 
changes at EU level. A reform of the ETS, for example, has to go through the regular 
EU decision-making procedure and will take time. This dependency on the international 
dimension (or, the shift away from the domestic level) is used by the Dutch government to 
legitimise inaction. In addition, the national government seems unwilling to set emission 
performance standards or to implement a CO2 ceiling185, which would spur the private sector 
into action. Wanting to ensure a level playing-field enables the national government to push 
responsibility over to the EU level or even the global level. Paradoxically, EU funding schemes 
rely on financial support from national governments (in for example NER 300 and EEPR, 
but also in the newly established Era-net/ACT)186, which means that national governments 
are forced to think about their position with regards to CCS and whether they are willing 
to fund it. The long timeframe of CCS demonstration and implementation necessitates a 
long-term vision from national governments, which is lacking. As such the shift from domestic 
governance to international governance was first initiated, and then slowed by national 
governments. Applying MLG uncovered these tensions in this case quite well.
The unintended effects of political debates, supranational policy-making and the adoption 
of the 2020 package also had its consequences for the centre - periphery dimension. While 
the decision-making regarding the legal framework for CCS was centralised, the periphery 
was very active in its application. In fact, precisely because CCS has a local impact it makes 
sense to look for concrete developments at that level. RCI tried very hard to enable CCS 
in Rotterdam: CCS alone would contribute 60% to the city’s decarbonisation goals. Its 
ambitious policy goals could not be realised because of the constantly declining business 
case for CCS. The EU ETS did not work as intended and even hampered investments into 
184  Interview 19.
185  Leaving aside whether such a ceiling would be advisable or not, as opinions differ on this matter.
186  For more information, see [http://www.act-ccs.eu/news/].
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low-carbon technologies. In Rotterdam, this problem led to a clash between the city and 
the ROAD partners. Eventually, local politicians turned against the technology as well and 
the city lost its drive to make CCS happen. There is high potential for a strong CO2 cluster in 
Rotterdam, which is also acknowledged by the EU, but this potential has not been realised 
(yet). The Port of Rotterdam is committed to CCS and is willing to invest in the necessary 
infrastructure, but it has not been able to achieve more than that. The port authority is 
seen as a catalyst and mediator between public and private parties, but it lacks ‘hard’ 
power. This study adds more nuance to MLG by showing that the local level is potentially 
efficient, but cannot be empowered without the right framework in place. The international 
(EU) dimension is therefore a leading factor in the CCS case, both in terms of its policy 
frameworks backfiring and in the minds of domestic actors who are waiting for the EU to 
change. Future policy-making and implementation of CCS may thus be extremely difficult.
5.3.6. Secondary findings; the Role of Power and Uncertainty
Two concepts were often mentioned in my interviews, though the questions did not explicitly 
probe for them187: the role of power on the one hand, and uncertainty on the other. 
Both will be discussed in this section. MLG has long been criticised for its lack of a good 
conceptualisation of power (see chapter two for a discussion). However, power, and especially 
politics, seems to play an important role in the CCS case. In the brief words of someone 
from the private sector:
“Energy is politics and CCS is extremely so.”188
Two issues regarding power are of particular interest: public opinion and member state 
sovereignty. First, it is clear that during the initial phase of the CCS Directive, the EU 
expected member states to jump into any financing gap and help the private sector kickstart 
investments into CCS. The EU was willing to stimulate such developments both financially 
and through the CCS Directive, but expected national government activity. When that 
did not happen the EU first called upon the governments’ responsibility to think through 
long-term energy and climate strategies. This effort did not get the expected results either. 
The EU’s current, officially technology-neutral, approach is to again give financial support 
to promising projects hoping to get CCS going in this way. Specifically for the ROAD project 
increased coordination is being organised through the Eranet-ACT co-fund and a possible 
187  Their importance became apparent during the coding of the interviews when many statements could be attributed 
to either power or uncertainty.
188  Interview 24.
CCS: A Case of EU Multi-level Governance Failure? 147
Horizon 2020 call189. Furthermore, CCS continues to be mentioned in the 2030 Climate 
and Energy framework and the 2050 Roadmap but both documents offer fewer strict 
climate targets and implicitly favour the economics of energy policy, reflecting a move back 
to the pre-2009 situation where EU targets were mostly soft and non-binding (Skjaerseth, 
2016:512). While this continuous cycle of policy coordination seems supported by national 
and private sector actors as well, activity is as yet not guaranteed. Policy coordination, as 
one interviewee states, might not be sufficient to bring about change: 
“The real breakthrough will eventually have to come from Europe. 
But everything starts with wanting to do something. We first need 
to want it.”190
This simple statement is of crucial importance in the CCS case. When asked about the dis-
crepancy between official documents stating the necessity of CCS and actual non-existence 
of CCS projects across Europe, almost all respondents replied that there is indeed a feeling 
of unease surrounding the technology. Polarisation runs rampant in debates. Words such 
as ‘absurd’ and ‘crazy’ are not uncommon, whereas CCS enthusiasts see it as the rational 
way to decarbonise an economy they know will be driven by fossil fuels for some time to 
come. Perhaps not in all of the EU, but definitely in still developing countries. Public opinion 
is generally against CCS, which makes governmental financial support difficult. A previous 
study shows that even citizens are more inclined to be convinced by economic arguments 
than climate-oriented arguments, which runs counter to the primary goal of CCS (Broecks 
et al., 2016:64-65). One of the results of the 2013 review of the future of CCS shows that 
“39% of all respondents (most citizens) consider that successful CCS demonstration 
has been prevented by its own absurdity and harmful effects” (European Commission, 
2013h:10). 
Both the supporters and adversaries are probably right to some degree, and as long as it is 
unclear which direction governments take, the private sector faces risky investments into a 
technology that is not guaranteed to provide a return on their initial investment. 
Second, EU members retain considerable sovereignty in their climate mitigation efforts and 
energy policies, even though the EU is perhaps better at formulating a long-term vision than 
national governments. Especially the private sector is waiting for concrete changes at the EU 
189  Interview 23, 28, 31 and 34.
190  Field work report O.
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level (for example ETS reform)191. Now, the Commission will probably not receive support 
to tweak its CCS policy although most national governments are unlikely to decline any 
financial incentives from the EU. The national government seems fine with that because it 
allows them to justify inaction that way. In the words of a Commission official:
“In climate, energy and environmental files there is a lot of diver-
gence between Member States in terms of how readily they accept the 
proposed goals. Some are much more hesitant to push for these goals. 
It is already a big fight to set the GHG reduction targets. For these 
targets efforts need to be shared. But for the renewables target, for 
example, it’s an EU-level target which needs to be reached by Member 
States individually. It is unknown if they will actually reach the target, 
and it’s a big question what the Commission can do to ensure they 
reach the targets […]. The trade-off made when agreeing on the 2030 
targets was the consent to a 40% GHG emissions reduction target 
and 27% renewables, but leaving a lot of leeway for Member States 
in deciding how to reach these targets.”192
Paradoxically, a lot is left to national governments whereas at the same time nearly everyone 
agrees that supranational targets are necessary when it comes to decarbonising the economy. 
In an analysis of the decision making process preceding the package, Skjaerseth (2016:514) 
found that significant respect for member state autonomy was necessary to get them to 
agree to the package. However, in the process of negotiations heavy emphasis was placed 
on climate and energy synergies, whereas potential trade-offs were ignored. CCS was linked 
to the EU ETS to accommodate heavy-industry friendly member states (such as Germany) 
during the negotiations of the 2020 package. Wanting quick adoption of the package to 
show international climate leadership in Copenhagen (COP-15), the EU did its best to sell the 
package by linking issues that provided an advantage and offering side payments through, for 
example, NER 300. Now, the Commission is restrained by lack of member state support and 
ever since national governments experienced the trade-offs of the ambitious 2020 package, 
no highly ambitious package has been adopted. Instead, many member states are now 
underlining their sovereignty and resisting further binding climate and energy targets at the 
EU level. Both CCS and renewable energy projects have suffered from these developments 
(Skjaerseth, 2016:516-518)193. Multi-level governance might face conceptual challenges 
191  Interview 24, 30, 33, 37, 38, and field work report O.
192  Interview 35.
193  As part of a side payment to heavy-industry friendly countries (with Germany in the lead), 300 million allowances 
under EU ETS were auctioned off to finance CCS and renewable projects. They suffered from a drop in carbon price, 
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explaining these mechanisms due to its underlying belief that Europeanisation will lead to 
ever greater coordination and restrict the power of national governments. This assumption 
does not hold when the majority of European states turns against further EU coordination.
Policy uncertainty was also found to have explanatory value in the CCS case. Investments 
into CCS are expensive, future carbon prices are uncertain and national governments are 
hesitant to support CCS. When a government does not try to enforce its policy goals by 
either legislation or financial incentives, the market faces uncertainty in the actual longer 
term policy priorities of the government. Box 5.6 illustrates how this uncertainty is a major 
hurdle to get projects going which only pay themselves off in the long run. Furthermore, 
companies also invest based on the perceived costs and benefits of their investments. 
According to Barradale (2014:521-531), investors make their decisions not so much based 
on the (expected) carbon price, but on what the author calls ‘payment probability’. The 
probability of having to pay for carbon-intensive investment rises if governments adopt 
carbon policies, if no exemptions (also called grandfathering) are provided by governments 
lowering actual funding and creating financial gaps for CCS projects.
Box 5.6. Narratives of uncertainty
Waiting for policy choices - the political narrative
CCS development was linked to the EU ETS at EU level when the NER 300 financial mechanism was set up 
which was tied to the carbon price. The consequence of a low carbon price is that NER 300 grants became 
lower than intended, and CCS projects faced ever increasing financial gaps. The Dutch government has always 
stated it wants the ROAD project to happen. In order to help cover the financial gap, the Dutch government 
has an array of possible instruments: it could, among others, provide the project with more funding, institute 
a national carbon tax, lobby the EU for a revised EU ETS, or obtain funding from other countries. Thus far, the 
government has been unwilling (and perhaps politically unable) to tinker with the finances at national level, 
and has therefore advocated an EU ETS revision and tried to secure funding from other countries. To the private 
sector it has given one message: we cannot do anything on our own, we need to wait for EU action.
Waiting for policy choices - the industrial narrative
The ROAD project is looking less and less likely to reach a positive FID phase. Linking CCS to the EU ETS 
has led to unwanted and unpredicted side-effects. Uniper and Engie are unwilling to invest in the project if 
the financial gap remains large. Since CCS seems to play a large role in Dutch ambitions to reach European 
climate targets, the ROAD partners turn to the Dutch government for a solution. Given that demonstrating CCS 
has value in itself and could help kickstart further CCS development in the port of Rotterdam, they hope the 
government is willing to help bridge the financial gap. They are happy to hear that the government is trying to 
secure funding through Era-net, but policy-wise not many changes are on the horizon. A revision of EU ETS will 
take years. The companies have no choice but to invest more themselves, or wait for governmental authorities 
to take action.
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and if the costs cannot easily be passed on to someone else (for example, the tax payer). 
Therefore, if
“people in the industry anticipate various possibilities for investors to avoid paying 
the price of carbon […] then policy impact is weakened” (Barradale, 2014:531).
If governments implement lax policy or easily give permits lengthening the life of carbon-
intensive investments, investors may not have any incentive to pay for expensive technologies 
such as CCS since they will not have to pay for their carbon emissions anyway. Public 
opposition to CCS further shows that, without support from non-governmental actors, 
governments may not be able to govern the energy and climate domain effectively. Table 
5.6 summarises the hurdles most often mentioned by interviewees.
On the politics and policy side the lack of political will and a long-term vision causes 
uncertainty for investors because they do not know how governments see the future of CCS 
and it is therefore very difficult to calculate the real costs of it. This uncertainty contributes 
to companies asking for public funding for their CCS projects, which can be seen as a proxy 
for approval of the technology in future policy. In the words of Shell:
“CCS also suffers from the lack of a long-term signal that it will play a key role in 
EU decarbonisation efforts. CCS has a huge potential to support EU decarbonisation 
goals. Low carbon technologies have historically succeeded by policy makers giving 
a clear indication that they will play a role and by setting appropriate milestones 
for their development and deployment. In addition to a long-term signal, CCS 
projects have suffered from a lack of capital support. [Shell] notes the need for an 
effective demonstration fund, potentially linked to the ETS, which improves on the 
experience of the NER300 and delivers much needed investment support to CCS 
projects.” (Shell, 2013)
Table 5.6. Which factors prevent CCS from seeing daylight?
Politics/policy Finance Technology
Political will lacking / it feels wrong CCS is expensive Benefits are unclear and not 
demonstrated
No long-term vision and CCS is not needed 
to reach short-term goals
Low carbon price under 
EU ETS
Safety concerns
Fossil fuel lock-in fears Funding problems at 
national and EU level
Lobby against CCS and unfavourable public 
opinion
Level playing field lacking
Source: interviews, each hurdle has been mentioned by at least four people and is commonly found in evaluative 
documents. Ranging from most to least mentioned in this table.
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This position is supported by umbrella organisation Eurelectric, which also calls on the EC to 
make better use of its soft powers by stimulating cross-sectoral CCS discussions (Eurelectric, 
2013). All these hurdles create uncertainty for those involved in CCS; be it in the public 
sector or the private sector. The Port of Rotterdam Authority as facilitator and catalyst lacks 
formal mandates and cannot solve these problems on its own, since power is spread across 
actors in all level of governance. 
5.4. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM
How much can the port authority do on its own? It is clear that the PoR wants to develop 
a CO2 hub, but that it is dependent on many other parties to make it happen. The PoR is 
often seen as a strong ally able to keep others on board and mitigate between public and 
private parties. However, it has its own preferences and interests as well. Since CCS projects 
have chiefly been cancelled due to delayed transposition of the CCS Directive (now solved) 
and financial gaps caused by the low carbon price under the EU ETS (as yet unsolved), the 
PoR has to take into account that its vision for the CO2 hub is currently constrained by forces 
operating at EU level. The Dutch government seems reluctant to set its own carbon pricing 
or follow in the footsteps of pro-active countries such as Germany and the UK, so it is likely 
that only changes at the EU level will turn things around for the PoR. In the meantime, what 
the PoR can do — and is doing — is keep local parties on board and continue preparations 
for CCS, for example by laying out a CO2 infrastructure. Especially with a view towards a 
possible future where the industry might have to apply the technology, the PoR has the 
tools in hand to think ahead and formulate a CCS strategy. 
Solving long-term problems such as climate change requires long-term solutions. Such 
solutions can be problematic for national governments due to their inclination to not look 
far beyond their governing period. The Port of Rotterdam Authority, although facing the 
uncertainty of governmental policy-making as well, can make long-term visions more easily. 
At the very least it should be able to give (potential) investors in the port area clear policy 
signals for the future by expressing the direction in which it wants to go. If activities for the 
construction of CO2 infrastructure are planned or underway, it might attract companies to 
the port. The PoR’s network is established well enough for it to be able to cooperate with 
interested parties towards clear goals. However, not everyone is happy with the PoR’s position 
as a spider-in-the-web in the CCS case. Representatives from environmental organisations 
have stated that while they see that the PoR is interested in the business model created by 
the transport, storage and re-use of CO2, they do not understand the PoR’s role in these 
developments and feel that these efforts counter any climate efforts undertaken by the 
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port authority194. Government representatives show support for the PoR’s facilitating role, 
adding that it helps create jobs and supports synergies between businesses in the port195.
The international domain is more and more important for the port because of the level 
playing-field argument as well. The cross-border nature of climate change and the market-
driven energy trade keeps national governments aiming for agreements at international 
level. Stricter energy and climate goals and applying CCS in the industrial sector will have 
an impact on the PoR’s day-to-day business. As there is a lot of industry in the port region 
and carbon leakage remains an issue, the PoR is considering a scenario in which 50% of 
current industry in the EU will have disappeared by 2030. As a landlord port it is in the 
authority’s interest to avoid empty plots, meaning that the PoR has to take into account 
that a different business model could be impending.
The advantage the PoR has is its soft power; local and national influence. Initially, it also 
benefitted from strong local support for CCS, although the city lacks resources to make CCS 
happen. The Port of Rotterdam is also extremely important for the Dutch economy, making 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs a natural ally. In CCS matters, the position of the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Environment is more unsure and poses a higher risk. At the EU level, 
potential allies are DG ENER (generally pro-CCS and worked hard to get ROAD going under 
the EEPR), DG GROW (considering CCS in the industry but only if it does not harm the sector) 
and DG RTD (for research and development), with some ambivalence within DG CLIMA. 
The climate department’s initial enthusiasm seems to have dwindled and its focus is now 
more heavily placed on renewables. Whereas the PoR decided to respond to the 2013 CCS 
review under the banners of RCI, this choice is not viable anymore due to the slow but sure 
withdrawal of support for RCI from the city’s side. EU decisions impacting the energy and 
industrial sectors indirectly impact the port, so there should be significant interest in making 
sure that the port authority retains its position as mediator in the network. Its ability to 
provide a system overview rather than a single company standpoint is a unique selling point.
5.5. CONCLUSIONS
Looking at this case from a MLG perspective uncovers the dynamics of a seemingly local initia-
tive, which is highly dependent on EU-level efforts. The complexities of energy governance 
in the EU lead to a cascade of responsibilities and competencies which make untangling its 
governance difficult. Nevertheless, this chapter has sought to provide insight in the dynamics 
194  Interview 38 and 39.
195  Interview 19, 27, 31 and 34.
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of the governance of CCS. Table 5.7 summarises the conclusions per theoretical expectation, 
and though not strictly part of the framework, this concluding section will also reflect on 
the effectiveness of the governance of CCS.
The 2020 Climate and Energy package they negotiated contained the first ever legal 
framework for CCS and was meant to streamline and kickstart its development across the 
EU. This effort was matched by funding opportunities at the EU level through the EEPR 
and NER 300. Yet the governmental authorities and EU bodies did not foresee that their 
package would lead to trade-offs. When carbon prices dropped during the financial crisis, 
the willingness to invest in low-carbon technologies faded away. The EU was left with an 
ambitious package no-one wanted to implement. National governments, and especially the 
Eastern European countries, learned that issue linkage at the EU level may not be beneficial 
at the domestic level. Supranational CCS policy is a case of symbolic policy coordination 
while national governments keep the reins firmly in hand. 
Table 5.7. CCS conclusions per theoretical expectation
Theoretical expectation Conclusions for CCS case
Actors create interdependencies between 
business, civil society, and government on an 
international level, which necessitates policy 
coordination at not only the national level but 
also the supranational level
-> The PoR is one of many actors active at 
international level because the policy solutions 
the PoR needs cannot be provided at national 
level alone
Symbolic shift (just soft coordination) from the 
domestic to the international, with governmental 
authorities retaining their decision-making 
competencies and crucial position in ensuring risk 
sharing (strengthening vertical governance). Mutual 
interdependencies are maintained in traditional 
networks by actors such as the PoR, and by 
societal actors in a broad sense, but supranational 
coordination is mostly spurred through nation state 
and EU activity due to global climate negotiations.
Regional coordination in territorial matters 
is more efficient than national coordination, 
which leads to the strengthening of local policy 
actors
-> PoR is empowered due to being able 
to employ its resources effectively when 
stimulating activities in Rotterdam
Creation of a new centre at EU level yet seems 
blocked by national government passivity. External 
factors such as politics and low carbon price hamper 
local effectiveness. The dependence on international 
action renders peripheral actors such as the Port 
of Rotterdam Authority and the city of Rotterdam 
(nearly) powerless.
Cross-linkages between private and public 
actors lead to private parties assuming public 
responsibilities and public parties acting like 
private groups
-> PoR develops economic activity in 
cooperation with the private sector and 
advocates its interests at EU level alongside 
Dutch governmental actors to obtain favourable 
policy conditions
Shift from the state to society due to the critical 
nature of resource flows, resulting in more horizontal 
governance, where the public and private sector 
jointly — yet not blurred — attempt to implement 
a technology to meet climate targets. The PoR 
is politically successful in advocating its CO2 hub 
concept with the private sector and at EU level, yet 
implementation is still lacking.
Source: author’s own composition based on case study.
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Supranational coordination did not lead to empowered peripheral activity, partly due to the 
vast differences in implementation of the CCS directive across EU members. Furthermore, 
the EU is often mentioned as the reason for a passive attitude from both the national 
government and the private sector. The state of the EU ETS is used as an argument for 
inaction, and therefore it is up to the EU to change the situation. Yet within the larger 
climate and energy package the EU ETS and effort sharing (in non-ETS sectors) together cover 
all emissions, so a technology-specific directive such as the CCS Directive was not strictly 
necessary. The EC used the opportunity to get a better grasp on energy policy coordination 
in proposing these directives. Both EU institutions and national governments fell short in 
the construction of the Climate and Energy package. On the one hand, the private sector 
can therefore not be blamed for its resistance to investing into CCS. On the other hand, if 
climate change is to be taken seriously, the private sector will have to take its responsibility 
and heavy emitters could be expected to pay for making their business cleaner, be that by 
using CCS or other methods.
At the local level, it is clear that the city of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam Authority, the 
other RCI partners and companies such as Engie and Uniper have been important. Without 
their commitment to CCS the ROAD project might already have been cancelled alongside the 
other projects under the EEPR. These local actors have actively sought to cement their efforts 
at the national level, gaining traction in the Ministry of Economic Affairs — which sought 
to diversify the Dutch energy mix by adding coal to the mostly gas-powered electricity sec-
tor — and causing CCS to be part of the Energieakkoord and the Energierapport. However, 
the Dutch parliament continuously questions the implementation of the Energieakkoord 
and there is little support for public financing of CCS projects. So far, none of the efforts 
undertaken by the EU, the Dutch government, the PoR or other actors have led to effective 
governance: the problem of high emissions is still not solved, and CCS as one of its solutions 
has not developed. Supranational coordination has provided a catch-22 for CCS: it is deemed 
necessary by all parties involved, but it creates problems which persist because the necessary 
level of agreement to solve them is now absent.
What is the ‘engine’ that seems to be at work in this case but is frustrated by other factors? 
The wish the EU and its members have to be a global climate leader led to permission from 
MS to harmonise climate goals at EU level. The result was an EU-wide vision guiding COP-15 
negotiations and resulting binding climate targets at EU level, including a CCS Directive. With 
the Directive came EU funding for CCS demonstration projects. So far, so good. Normally, 
one would expect demonstration projects to happen successfully, leading to more rounds of 
EU policy harmonisation as actors learned from the demonstration projects, resulting in wider 
implementation and cemented EU competencies. However, national governments hesitated 
in their implementation of the CCS Directive, resulting in delays and various interpretations 
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of where and how CCS could take place. These delays, and the dramatic drop in the carbon 
price under EU ETS, made the implementation engine grind to a halt. Demonstration did 
not happen, member states had no interest in subsequent rounds of revision of the CCS 
Directive, public opinion turned against CCS, and potential large-scale implementation of 
CCS became unlikely. Especially The Netherlands, as one of the most promising countries for 
CCS, hesitated after the Barendrecht CCS project left both the government and the private 
sector (in this case Shell) scarred. The Port of Rotterdam cannot break through so many 
showstoppers at various levels of governance. Getting CCS back on track might require a 
fresh start, for example as a result of the EU’s ambitions under COP-21.
Multi-level governance shows how the policy processes work at the EU level and reminds 
us that governments are dependent on each other and on non-governmental actors for 
effective governance. Exactly because energy and climate policy in the EU works through 
complex multi-level governance mechanisms, the absence of political, legal or financial 
factors at any level make governance problematic. The CCS case shows that initially effective 
regional coordination can be nullified by unforeseen effects of international coordination. 
While public-private cooperation is necessary, the predicted far-reaching blurring of state and 
society has not occurred. However, increasing (soft-)coordination attempts by the European 
Commission do enable more public-private cooperation at domestic level in order to get 
favourable arrangements at EU level. Concepts such as power and uncertainty add their 
explanatory value here as well, showing how a technology such as CCS can become deeply 
political (and thus not ‘neutral’) and giving insight into how multi-level governance helps 
tackle uncertainties surrounding the role of CCS in European climate and energy policy. 
Whether power and uncertainty are covered adequately by Piattoni’s conceptualisation of 
MLG will be discussed in chapter seven, after exploring whether the small-scale LNG case 
also shows that power and uncertainty help explain governance mechanisms.
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Small-scale LNG:  
A Case of EU Multi-level Governance Success?
6.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the complex dynamics behind the governance of small-scale LNG to 
see whether the theoretical expectations reflect reality and give MLG a further theoretical 
boost. By identifying the challenges of governance and how power links into its dynamics, 
I demonstrate that MLG can be improved upon. While there are multiple options to make 
transport more sustainable, this chapter focuses on just one of these options: using liquefied 
gas as a fuel. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is natural gas that has been converted to liquid. 
In order to liquefy natural gas, the gas must be cooled to about -162°C. Because LNG has 
a lower volume than compressed natural gas, liquefying the gas makes its transport over 
long distances more cost-efficient. Although LNG is mostly converted back to compressed 
natural gas after transport (large-scale LNG), an increasing number of vehicles and vessels 
have now started to use LNG as a source of fuel (small-scale LNG). Risks associated with 
LNG are high flammability after conversion to its gaseous state (when certain conditions 
are met), freezing, and asphyxia. Therefore, LNG is subjected to strict regulation. In contrast 
to CCS, not much academic work could be found on small-scale LNG during the data 
collection process (chiefly February through September 2015). This chapter therefore is the 
first to offer a thorough case study, applying MLG to it and showing what small-scale LNG 
means for a port. 
This chapter is comprised of two distinct parts: a discussion of the (international) small-scale 
LNG context (§6.2) and the application of Piattoni’s theory to the case. Within Energy Port 
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the small-scale LNG case is part of the LNG hub. While the science behind using LNG has 
been developing for decades, the use of LNG as a relatively clean fuel is still considered 
an emerging technology. Section §6.3 dives into the governance of small-scale LNG in 
Rotterdam, guiding the reader through how multi-level governance works in this case and 
making extensive use of interview data to show its mechanics. Section §6.4 discusses the 
consequences of this case for the Port of Rotterdam and the role its authority can play. 
Section §6.5 discusses the theoretical and empirical conclusions for the governance of EU 
energy and climate policy based on this case.
6.2. LNG: WHAT, WHY AND WHEN?
LNG ‘simply’ is natural gas in its liquid phase. Natural gas is one of the most important 
commodities on the planet and accounts for roughly a quarter of the world’s energy demand 
(IGU, 2015b:6). At the same time, the global energy sector is the number one contributor 
to GHG emissions and is in second place196 when it comes to methane emissions. In 2010, 
more than two-thirds of the world’s GHG emissions came from the energy sector. If climate 
change is to be tackled effectively, the energy sector needs to change. Even so, the projections 
are that global energy consumption will increase in the future and that fossil fuels will play 
a major part in this consumption (IEA, 2013:15). 
Not all fossil fuels are equally polluting. For instance, switching from coal to natural gas is 
often mentioned as a way to at least improve the emissions situation. Burning gas leads to 
lower emissions than burning coal; on average, natural gas is twice as clean as coal, although 
the increased methane emissions associated with the production and distribution of natural 
gas decrease the relative cleanliness of gas (ibid.:28). Still, gas has become more popular in 
recent years and the possibility to easily transport it in liquid form has sped the market along. 
LNG can be an important step towards a cleaner use of what essentially still is a fossil fuel. 
Because there is potential in LNG, the trade has increased to levels that warrant close study197. 
The share of LNG has grown faster than any other source of gas; in 1990 the share of LNG 
in the global gas supply was only 4% and the projections for LNG only show growth in the 
near future (IGU, 2015b:6). In the EU, LNG imports peaked in 2011 and then dropped by 50% 
in 2014. The somewhat dramatic drop in imports may be partially explained by competition 
from the shale gas boom in the US, increasing US domestic gas consumption and decreasing 
US demand for coal. Coal was then ‘dumped’ on the European markets for a very low price. 
196  Agriculture is the world’s largest source of methane emissions.
197  In 2014, global LNG trade reached 241 million tonnes, which constitutes about 10% of the global gas supply.
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Power plants operate in a merit order with the cheapest power plant being turned on first. 
Thus, when coal prices in Europe plummeted, coal consumption in the EU rose as coal-fired 
power plants were favoured over gas-fired power plants198. The worsening economic situation 
and the uptake of renewable energy also led to a declining demand for natural gas (PwC, 
2013:34). In addition, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster caused a rise in the demand for LNG 
in Japan, bumping up its prices in the Asian region. LNG transports were therefore rerouted 
to Asia where a higher price was paid for the commodity, causing the demand for gas in 
the EU to decline further (IGU, 2015b:12-15). So, how and why did small-scale LNG develop 
in times of decreasing LNG demand in Europe? To answer that question, it is imperative to 
first consider the potential costs and benefits of small-scale LNG (summarised in table 6.1).
In its 2013 special report, the International Energy Agency shows where several major policies 
overlap with climate change mitigation. Three policies are considered: energy security, 
environment, and economic/social development (IEA, 2013:20). Interestingly, transport is 
not mentioned as a separate policy field. In the case of LNG, transport policy can prove 
to be a powerful policy area to help combat climate change. The use of LNG as fuel has 
benefits for both air quality and the climate. According to the European Commission 
“the EU population will benefit from reduced emissions of substances that are harmful to 
human health, in particular NOx and PM” (European Commission, 2013i:24). This benefit 
to local air quality is such that both port cities and cities along the European riverbanks will 
probably benefit the most from the improved air quality. In the Rotterdam region, 40% of 
the particulate matter (PM) emissions is due to the transport sector alone (shipping: 22% 
and road: 18%). Another 41% comes from the industry in the region (MSR, 2010a). The 
concentration of PM in the Rotterdam region is the root cause of 200-300 hospitalisations 
per year, with most people suffering from lung diseases and heart conditions (MSR, 2010b). 
198  Also based on interview 3.
Table 6.1. Small-scale LNG is promising but will not save the world
Pros Cons
Benefits climate System-wide change needed (different engines, refueling 
hoses, bunker points, regulation, training, etc.)
Benefits local air quality Expensive
Single fuel engines very clean Dual fuel engines have methane slip
New market opportunities for shipping sector 
and fuel production industry
Still a fossil fuel (unless bio-LNG)
Best option for newly built vessels Retrofitting a ship takes it out of service
Source: author’s own composition based on sources cited in this section.
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The Netherlands wants to meet the EU’s required emissions reduction norms. In 2012, The 
Netherlands still emitted 93% of the GHG emissions emitted in 1990. In comparison, the 
EU-28 average was 82%. Note that this low decrease in emissions does not necessarily 
mean total Dutch GHG emissions are high, it merely means that the reduction of emissions 
is not proceeding as quickly as in the rest of the EU. For the EU as a whole, in 2011 10% of 
GHG emissions came from commercial transport. The acidifying gases (SO2, NOx, NH3) that 
were released in the same year had a transport share of 14% (Eurostat, 2014:150-160). 
The emissions problem is therefore twofold: it is bad for human health and it is bad for the 
climate and the environment. Greening the fleet can contribute to improving this situation, 
and LNG could have a part to play in the solution. On the other hand, the Commission also 
states that “[t]here may be marginal environmental effects, both positive (reduced CO2 
and PM emissions) and negative (increased methane emissions)” (European Commission, 
2013i:24). The EC is thus also looking at the negative climate effects of using LNG as fuel, 
as there is a significant methane slip if the ship uses a dual fuel engine and does not possess 
extra treatment facilities199. Dedicated LNG engines are more environmentally-friendly, but 
this benefit comes at the cost of being unable to handle changes in power demand well due 
to their relatively low capacity. However, increased use of LNG may have a positive effect on 
the market opportunities for the shipping sector and the fuel production industry (ibid.:24).
The downsides of LNG are the associated costs with the switch and the necessity for what is 
basically a system-wide change: for LNG to be a competitor fuel, LNG infrastructure will have 
to be built across Europe. The Clean Power for Transport Directive (see section 6.1.3) goes a 
long way towards demanding the construction of such infrastructure, but a change in laws, 
regulations and even the mindset of shipping companies is also paramount to ensuring the 
development of the small-scale LNG market. As of yet there is no standardisation of LNG 
equipment, which makes the costs of retrofitting a ship to accommodate the new fuel very 
high. Furthermore, retrofitting operations take a ship out of service for a limited amount of 
time, resulting in a loss of potential income for the shipper (ibid.:24). Analyses performed 
by — among others — the EC, have also shown that the adoption of LNG is most beneficial 
for newly built vessels which are either large or have to perform heavy-duty tasks (ibid.:25; 
Panteia, 2013)200. LNG is therefore not the best option for ‘everyone’. Other challenges for 
LNG development will be discussed in section 6.4, but for now it is important to know that 
the small-scale LNG transition is mainly driven forward by environmental concerns and at 
the same time slowed down by financial and regulatory challenges. For The Netherlands 
specifically, small-scale LNG demand rose to counter decreasing large-scale LNG demand.
199  A methane catalyst would help solve the problem, but requiring its use would increase the prices of LNG engines; 
a prospect which grates engine manufacturers.
200  Also backed by interviews 1, 5, 12 and 16.
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the key events marking the rise of small-scale LNG in Europe. Major 
tipping points for Rotterdam are the construction of GATE and the Argonon, the adoption 
of Clean Power for Transport, and subsequent legalisation of overall LNG operations in the 
Rotterdam port area. Note that the upswings of LNG seem to happen right after peaks in 
oil price, and the downswings happen after drops in the oil price.
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 Figure 6.1. Timeline of small-scale LNG in Europe and major global (oil-related) events 
Source: author’s own reconstruction.
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6.2.1. Historical Context and Recent Developments
6.2.1.1. 1965 - 2000: Large-scale (conventional) LNG
The act of liquefying natural gas is not a new development. Natural gas often is freed during 
the process of oil drilling and used to be considered a byproduct. Without the necessary 
pipelines from the well to a market demanding gas, there would be no use for the gas and 
it would therefore be flared. However, as energy markets started to change due to new 
technologies and the exploration of new — often remote — gas fields, companies started 
to liquefy both the gas-byproduct from oil drilling and the gas from gas wells for overseas 
transport to LNG import terminals. Suddenly gas could be transported across the globe 
by ship and re-gasified once transferred to a terminal, increasing the world’s potential gas 
supply. The origin of LNG thus is that it is a solution to a transport problem: while ways of 
transporting gas over long distances were absent, there was no LNG. Especially in European 
countries such as Spain (as early as 1969), Italy, France (as early as 1965) and the UK, LNG 
was imported and then injected into the gas grid once returned to its gaseous state (IGU, 
2015b:79-81). The mostly South-European LNG terminals201 and the large energy companies 
together are at the head of half a century of experience in transporting and storing LNG 
in large tanks. Engie (formerly GDF Suez) is an example of a big energy company with 50 
years of experience with LNG. Shell also has about 50 years of experience with the transport 
of LNG in seagoing vessels. These two companies are major players in the European LNG 
sector. Northern Europe followed its southern neighbours with the construction of an 
LNG import terminal in Zeebrugge (Belgium) in 1987. The main use of LNG in these years 
was re-gasification and injection into national gas grids, which is also referred to as the 
conventional — large-scale — use of LNG. The Netherlands did not need LNG because it was 
extracting gas from the country’s own gas reserves and using its pipeline system to transport 
it. The government did consider constructing an LNG terminal in the 1970s (interestingly, 
Eemshaven in the north was preferred over the Port of Rotterdam), but public concerns about 
safety and the onset of risk calculations in spatial planning of industrial and energy activity 
took the upper hand (Oostendorp, Zwaard, Van Gulijk, Lemkowitz & Swuste, 2013:75-80).
6.2.1.2. 2000 - 2010: From large-scale to small-scale LNG
Small-scale LNG essentially means using LNG in transport (as fuel) instead of on the energy 
market (as an energy carrier), as previously intended. Small-scale LNG can be used for road 
transport, maritime transport, short-sea, inland shipping, and break bulk202. For inland 
201  The LNG experience started in Southern Europe because of LNG imports from Algeria.
202  Break bulk entails sending small ships filled with LNG to supply the resource to a small terminal or end user.
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shipping, switching over to LNG became a chicken-and-egg challenge: the infrastructure 
was not being built due to low use of LNG as fuel, but shippers were also hesitant to adopt 
LNG because of the lack of infrastructure (cf. Danish Maritime Authority, 2012:15; PwC, 
2013:25; IGU, 2015a:63; Innovation Norway, 2015203). The first European country that 
made the move from large-scale to small-scale LNG was Norway204, due to its multitude of 
off-shore drilling platforms, a lack of pipelines, and largely due to the 2008 NOx Fund205. 
Since LNG can contribute strongly to the reduction of NOx emissions, using it as a fuel was 
an easy match for Norway and subsequently kickstarted the development of small-scale 
LNG in other parts of Europe. Many Norwegian companies are involved in the LNG sector 
and have conquered a leading position in LNG distribution; Gasnor (nowadays a sister 
company of Shell) provides LNG bunkering at ferry berths, Wärtsilä builds LNG engines, 
Statoil is a large LNG distributor, and DNV GL holds a lot of LNG expertise and technical 
know-how. The Norwegian experience with small-scale LNG started to trickle down to the 
rest of Northern Europe through partnerships (for example, Shell - Gasnor and Cofely’s 
involvement in Norway’s small-scale LNG sector) and data collection and reporting by Gas 
LNG Europe (GLE)206. GLE started reporting on the status of LNG in Europe in 2004, focusing 
on the conventional use of LNG with attention for the small-scale terminals proliferating 
in Norway. The possibility to use LNG as fuel reached Deen Shipping when in 2006 the 
company began to think about ways to make ships cleaner and thereby meet longer term 
emission standards. Eventually this led to the construction of the Argonon, which is the first 
new-built tanker ship sailing on dual fuel in European waters207.
In 2008, at the start of the economic crisis which would later cause EU gas demand to 
decrease, 55 of the world’s key ports agreed to put more effort into reducing GHG emissions 
and cemented their commitment in an initiative called the World Ports Climate Initiative 
(WPCI, 2008). The oil price was high, making LNG an attractive alternative. One of the 
WPCI’s key projects is the Environmental Ship Index (ESI), which came to life in 2010. ESI 
offers tools to evaluate the environmental performance of maritime — or seagoing — ships 
by looking at their NOx, SOx, PM and GHG emissions. Ports can then offer financial rewards 
to ships meeting current IMO emission standards (WPCI, 2010:1-4). The Port of Rotterdam, 
203  Innovation Norway gave a presentation about the potential for LNG in India in which the chicken-and-egg 
problem is mentioned (slide 19).
204  Note that Norway is not a member of the European Union.
205  The NOx Fund is an environmental agreement between the Norwegian government and 15 organisations in which 
it is possible to pay a participant fee instead of having to pay NOx taxes. The government then offers financial 
support for projects that contribute to NOx reduction (nortrade.com, 2011). In Norway, the first LNG-powered 
ferry was built in 2000, followed by dual-fuel supply vessels and more ferries between 2003 and 2010
206  Now part of a larger umbrella organisation Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE).
207  The MTS Argonon was christened in November 2011.
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for example, rewards clean ships (such as LNG ships) by reducing their seaport dues208. 
While ESI focuses on seagoing ships and not inland ships, it does promote the uptake of 
LNG in the maritime sector and could indirectly influence the uptake in the inland shipping 
sector as well.
6.2.1.3. 2010 - Today: Small-scale LNG in the EU on the rise
Small-scale LNG took flight in the EU since 2010. In The Netherlands, change occurred 
when the lifespan of the country’s own Slochteren gas started to shorten. The endangered 
competitive position of the Dutch gas market was reason enough to reconsider LNG, which 
led to the construction of the Gateway to Europe (GATE) terminal by Vopak and GasUnie. 
This terminal would import LNG and use it in the conventional way; re-gasify it and send it 
onward as simple gas. Because of the previously mentioned risks associated with LNG, GATE 
had to be located in a separate dock (in Dutch: insteekhaven). GATE was under construction 
when European LNG imports were rising and the oil price was high. However, Slochteren gas 
made a transition and was suddenly cheaper when hauled out of Qatar. Furthermore, the 
free market dynamics favoured Slochteren gas and the Japanese nuclear situation also had 
an effect on the energy sector as a whole, with LNG being rerouted to Asia to fill the energy 
gaps created by the nuclear failure. Fukushima also sparked the German Energiewende 
and the resulting rise in renewable energy reduced EU gas demand further, right after the 
import of LNG peaked in 2011. GATE, which entered into operation in that year, now faced 
an economic problem as it was not being used enough to be economically viable. As stated 
earlier in this chapter, LNG imports in the EU peaked in 2011 and then dropped dramatically 
in the next few years, while the oil price went down as well (making conventional oil-based 
fuels more attractive again). When LNG ships finally began docking at GATE since mid-2013, 
this increase in activity still was not enough to make GATE profitable. The response was to 
look for alternative solutions, which is how the use of LNG on a small scale was introduced 
as an extra goal for GATE. The terminal has been expanded to accommodate space for liquid 
break-bulk terminal operations (LBBR) which have officially commenced in 2016. Small-scale 
LNG in The Netherlands thus was meant to offset the effect of the maturing Dutch gas 
market. The Dutch government became a staunch supporter of LNG in order to kickstart the 
process of legislative adjustment at the international level to enable the use of LNG as fuel.
Policy-making needs expert knowledge. In 2012, the Danish Maritime Authority published 
an influential (and EU-funded) report on the future possibilities for the use of LNG as a fuel 
in shipping, including recommendations regarding infrastructure development and ways 
208  For more information see [https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/shipping/port-dues/discounts-on-port-dues/
esi-discount].
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to get the LNG to the end user209. Among the contributors to the report are the Port of 
Rotterdam, Zeebrugge, Gasnor, MAN, and even Gazprom. The Dutch National LNG Platform 
was established in the same year with the goal to speed up the Dutch uptake of small-scale 
LNG in the road transport and shipping sectors210. The Danish report served as a baseline 
for EU thinking about small-scale LNG, which led to several developments in the next year. 
The Clean Power for Transport Directive was adopted in 2013 and includes LNG — to a 
large extent due to the strong Dutch advocacy for it — as an option to make transport more 
sustainable211. A largely technology neutral approach was chosen to ensure support in the 
Council, since some MS have better access to certain technologies and fuel types than others. 
The Directive was generally well-received among the EU countries (Council of the European 
Union, 2013:8). Another study on the climate contribution of LNG as fuel was published 
by Panteia, which also served as input for EU policy. It compares different ways to reduce 
emissions from inland shipping from an environmental, social and economic perspective. 
Both retrofits and new-built ships are considered. The study concludes that LNG is a good 
option for inland shipping but that more R&D is required to solve the methane slip problem. 
The difficulty with financing is also discussed and the report mentions that there is no clear 
delineation of tasks between multiple governmental levels, which makes the creation of a 
good funding landscape difficult (Panteia, 2013:109-120). This last conclusion is practically 
problematic, but academically interesting where MLG is considered.
The year 2013 also saw Shell revealing its two newly built LNG tankers: Greenstream and 
Greenrhine, and the Port of Rotterdam receiving EU funding for a major European LNG project 
called ‘LNG Masterplan’. The nature of the project is such that if it ends up being successful, 
the infrastructure and ships resulting from it would cover Europe’s main arteries: the Rhine 
and the Danube. LNG dispersal on Europe’s main arteries could have a significant impact on 
the small-scale LNG business as a whole. The new LNG ships coupled with the LNG project 
meant the PoR had to introduce a change to its port regulation to allow for LNG bunkering. 
As of 2014, LNG bunkering is officially mandated in the port. That year also saw the birth of 
two additional LNG ships in The Netherlands: the Sirocco (Chemgas) and the Eiger Nordwand 
(Danser). Additionally, more LNG projects were approved under the CEF Program, including 
209  The report looks at the demand and supply of LNG in Europe, the available infrastructure, oil price relations, 
technical and safety aspects, and regulatory concerns. It concludes that LNG must be treated as a ‘dangerous 
good’ which requires proper personnel training, safety measures and a coordinated permit process (Danish 
Maritime Authority, 2012:13-14).
210  In The Netherlands, PwC published a report on the economic impact of small-scale LNG in The Netherlands, 
concluding that the use of LNG in the transport sector can lead to about €2.7 billion worth of economic growth 
and 8000 extra FTE by 2030. Investments into LNG infrastructure, bio-LNG, a pricing mechanism that is beneficial 
in comparison to oil, and a good business case for end users will be necessary (PwC, 2013:4-49). 
211  For more information see chapter 4, section 4.3.2.
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projects in the Rotterdam area. Shell has committed to chartering thirty LNG ships for a 
longer term and is thereby trying to push the market forward. Engie announced plans to 
realise about the same amount of ships. The reason these companies are committing now 
is because the Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR) — responsible for 
regulation covering Rhine navigation212 — has made regulations to facilitate the use of LNG 
as fuel on the Rhine213 and because they have an interest in the development of this market. 
CCNR has five members (Germany, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, and Switzerland) 
and also fosters an observer’s agreement with the EU. For a while, letting a ship filled with 
LNG sail down the Rhine was prohibited by the CCNR. The new rules entered into force in 
2016-2017. In the meantime, national regulatory bodies in combination with the CCNR 
were tasked with giving legal exemptions to allow for the use of LNG as fuel (European 
Commission, 2013i:10). Small-scale LNG is thus beginning to become institutionalised in 
the EU and international organisations such as CCNR and IGU. At the same time, the EU is 
giving a lot of attention to the strategic importance of large-scale LNG by formulating an 
LNG Strategy, which was published in the first quarter of 2016.
6.2.1.4. Facts and market developments
This section discusses how the small-scale market is embedded in the global LNG market, as 
the developments on the global gas markets have a significant impact on the attractiveness 
of LNG fuel for the private sector. Small-scale LNG developed in times of decreasing EU gas 
demand and in part to offset that trend and to take action against climate change. What is 
the situation now? The map in figure 6.2 shows the LNG landscape in and around Europe 
in late 2015. As becomes clear, LNG is not (yet) readily available throughout the EU. LNG is 
mainly imported in the southern and western parts of the EU. South-Europe was frontrunner 
in this development due to the availability of Algerian LNG as early as during the 1960s. 
In countries such as Spain and Portugal the contribution of LNG to their gas supply has 
even been nearly 50% (IGU, 2015b:13). The construction of LNG terminals spread to other 
key seaports on the continent and LNG is now also available in, for example, the UK, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and Greece. Central and Eastern Europe have been heavily dependent 
on Russian gas, which is imported through the extensive pipeline system running from Russia 
to large parts of Europe. It is therefore no surprise that these countries have not yet secured 
access to LNG. However, terminals are now planned or even under construction in Finland, 
Lithuania214, Poland, Estonia and Latvia. In addition, Ukraine and Turkey are planning to build 
LNG import terminals as well. Among LNG exporting countries around the EU are Norway, 
212  Other rivers are regulated by similar commissions, such as the Danube Commission for the Danube river.
213  Adjustments to the ADN will follow as well.
214  The Lithuanian terminal is actually a floating terminal and entered into operation in late 2014.
Small-scale LNG: A Case of EU Multi-level Governance Success? 167
Russia, Algeria, Egypt and Libya. As stated in the introduction of this chapter, however, 
the use of LNG makes it easy to import it from all parts of the world. Other notable LNG 
exporters, then, are Qatar, Malaysia, Australia, Nigeria and Indonesia. US export of LNG 
started in 2014 and is on the rise as well (IGU, 2015b:9).
The global LNG market is not an integrated market. Broadly speaking, there are two ‘ba-
sins’: the Asian-Pacifi c Basin and the Atlantic Basin215. Both basins have their own pricing 
mechanisms, but are also interconnected due to the strategic positioning of Qatar on the 
border of both markets. Since the Fukushima disaster a lot of the LNG from Qatar re-routed 
to the Asian market. However, three developments will most likely introduce lower demand 
and/or higher price competition in the Asian LNG market: Japan is reintroducing nuclear 
215  These two basins came into being due to the two geographic bottlenecks existing in maritime transport: the Suez 
Canal and the Panama Canal. According to a respondent (interview 3) the prices to go through either of the canals 
vary between 0.5 million and 1 million euros per ship. Traversing both canals is very expensive so there must be a 
good price-related reason for a company to use them.
Legend
= EU country with LNG import 
= EU country with LNG import
terminal under construction 
= EU country with planned 
LNG import
= (non)-EU country with 
(planned) LNG import
= LNG exporting country
 Figure 6.2. LNG not available in all European countries
Source: IGU, 2015b.
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energy into its energy mix, the Chinese economy is stagnating and Australia is investing a 
lot into the construction of new LNG export terminals. With its new terminals, Australia will 
be able to supply the bulk of the demand in the Asian-Pacific Basin, which could lead to a 
rerouting of LNG exports from Qatar to the European market. Analysis of these market forces 
suggests that it is quite likely that the LNG price in the EU will go down, making LNG imports 
attractive. Especially from the point of view of securing independence from Russian gas, the 
EU may stimulate LNG imports from other parts of the world. The European LNG market is 
also dependent on the price of oil216. According to PwC, the LNG pricing mechanism used 
in Europe has come under pressure because “high oil-linked gas prices no longer reflected 
gas supply-demand fundamentals. This has led to moving away from oil-linked prices to 
more hub-based prices” (PwC, 2013:34), such as what is used in the US. Still, a low oil 
price makes it more attractive for ship owners to continue to use oil-based fuels instead of 
making the switch to LNG. Longer term projections of global oil and gas prices, however, 
expect oil prices to increase again and gas prices to decrease, making LNG more attractive 
in the near future (ibid.:37-39). The global demand for LNG has grown 7% per year on 
average since 2000 and the current investments into LNG throughout the world do not 
suggest a stagnation in the near future. The end of the economic crisis may also make life 
better for shipping companies and increase their investment possibilities (IGU, 2015b:12).
6.2.2. Policy Context
Any case study in this field should consider the political and legislative context it operates 
in. Chapter 4 discussed the relevant policies at length. This section acts as a brief summary 
and foregrounds key policies, goals and tools. The 2001 White Paper on Transport placed 
heavy emphasis on stimulating the modal split through the EU’s Marco Polo Program. 
According to the EU,
“The biggest missing link is the lack of a close connection between sea, inland 
waterways and rail. For centuries sea and river dominated goods transport in Europe. 
[…] Nowadays, despite a slight revival, water transport is the poor relation even 
though it is a mode which is not expensive and does less damage to the environment 
than road transport” (European Commission, 2001a:41). 
The inland shipping sector was seen as quite clean in the early 2000s, yet transport as a 
whole had already been identified as a major source of GHG emissions. The 2001 White Paper 
216  In North America the price of LNG is set at liquid trading hubs, whereas Europe and Asia tend to prefer oil-linked 
pricing (IGU, 2015b)
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mentioned natural gas (preferably bio-gas) as a potential fuel in the medium and long term 
(European Commission, 2001a:86). That medium term arrived in the 2011 White Paper on 
Transport, which has a much more urgent tone when it comes to GHG emissions. A strong 
emphasis was placed on investing into R&D for alternative fuels (European Commission, 
2011c:24). Several years later, the use of LNG as fuel has become part of a larger EU strategy 
to transition towards more sustainable fuels for transport. Table 6.2 shows which level of 
government employs which types of policies aimed at the shipping sector.
MLG contends that the multi-level context asks for coordination between levels and policies. 
While all policies identified in table 6.3 have an impact on the LNG hub in Rotterdam, it is 
clear that they differ in scope. The goals set and tools used at the European level tend to be 
more all-encompassing (for example, developing alternative fuels for transport) while goals 
and tools at decentralised levels of government tend to be more concrete (for example, the 
fund for NOx-free ships). At the same time, it appears that the more binding and strategic 
policy goals are set at higher levels of government and that the decentralised levels then 
have the freedom to act within these goals.
6.3. BEHIND THE SCENES: THE GOVERNANCE OF SMALL-SCALE LNG
The first part of this chapter focused on the context of the LNG case. The next part delves 
into the application of MLG to the case in an effort to reach behind the scenes. This section 
thus introduces the empirical data collected through the nineteen interviews conducted with 
experts, desk research and observations made at the Port of Rotterdam Authority. Before 
delving into this data, a few words on the focus of this case. This case study deliberately 
focuses only on inland shipping — and not on maritime shipping — to offer a precise analysis 
of the governance mechanisms of small-scale LNG to help this field develop.
217  Shipping policy for seafaring ships is also made on the international level by the IMO, while inland shipping policy 
is also part of the daily work of the CCR. With ‘contextual policy’, the Brandstofvisie document refers to, as 
examples, parking privileges and emission-free zones.
Table 6.2. Shipping-related policy competencies are spread over hierarchical levels
Government level Competency
EU Standards, maritime policy, inland shipping policy, innovation policy
National government Fiscal policy, innovation policy
Local government Contextual policy, innovation policy
Source: Brandstofvisie, Ministerie I&M, 2014a.217
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The European mainland can be divided into seven basins, also called ‘corridors’: Rhine-
Danube, Azov-Black-Caspian seas, Baltic area, Czech-Slovak centred network, Rhône-Saône 
basin, Seine-Oise basin, and the coastal routes connecting to inland waterways. The largest 
corridor, Rhine-Danube (47,6% of the total), is of critical importance to The Netherlands. 
In 2010, nearly 7000 inland vessels were operational on the Rhine river alone, totalling a 
capacity of 108,550,000 tonnes (UNECE, 2011:10-15). An average inland vessel with a 
2000 tonnes capacity roughly equals 80 trucks, or 50 railway cars, allowing for an enormous 
carrying capacity per transport unit (Naiades, n.d.). About 84% of the Rhine fleet dates 
from before 1990 (some 600 vessels date from before 1930), indicating the long lifespan 
of inland vessels (UNECE, 2011:15). 
Table 6.3. LNG policy context: a patchwork of policies at all levels of government
Level of 
government
Main policies Goals Policy instruments
EU 1. Clean Power for 
Transport
2. Europe 2020
3. 2030 Energy & 
Climate Framework
4. Energy Roadmap 2050
5. NAIADES
6. National Emission 
Ceilings Directive
7. Air Quality Directive
8. Non-Road Mobile 
Machinery Directive
s¬ $EVELOPMENT¬OF¬
alternative fuels for 
(commercial) transport
s¬ ¬REDUCTION¬OF¬#/2 
by 2050
s¬ -AJORITY¬OF¬ENERGY¬IS¬
renewable
s¬ ¬ENERGY¬EFlCIENCY
s¬ 2EDUCTION¬OF¬'('¬
emissions
s¬ )MPROVING¬AIR¬QUALITY
s¬ #LEANER¬SHIP¬ENGINES
s¬ -IX¬OF¬SOFT¬AND¬HARD¬TARGETS¬
Emission performance of 
ship engines is a regulation, 
which does not allow any 
deviation. On the other hand, 
renewable energy has no hard 
target and its implementation 
possibilities vary per country
s¬ &INANCINGSUBSIDIES¬THROUGH¬
CEF or EIB
Dutch national 
government
1. Energieakkoord
2. Brandstofvisie
3. Werkprogramma 
Zeehavens
s¬ ¬'('¬EMISSIONS¬
reduction from 
transport by 2050
s¬ ¬REDUCTION¬OF¬
CO2 by 2050
s¬ ¬RENEWABLE¬ENERGY¬
in 2023
s¬ ,EVEL¬PLAYING¬lELD¬FOR¬
ports and supporting 
sustainable initiatives
s¬ 'REEN¬$EALS¬¬COOPERATION¬
with private sector)
s¬ -IX¬OF¬HARD¬AND¬SOFT¬TARGETS¬
The emissions reduction 
targets are compulsory but 
the support for sustainable 
initiatives in ports is a policy 
commitment
s¬ &INANCIAL¬INCENTIVES
Province of 
South Holland
1. Visie Ruimte & 
Mobiliteit
s¬ !LL¬PUBLIC¬TRANSPORT¬
fossil fuel-free by 2035
s¬ &OSTERING¬CONNECTIONS¬
between industries and 
strengthening clusters
s¬ &INANCIAL¬INCENTIVES¬THROUGH¬
the EFRO program (indirect 
EU subsidy)
s¬ 'RANTING¬OF¬PERMITS
s¬ !PPROVING¬USE¬OF¬LAND
City of 
Rotterdam
1. Stadsvisie Rotterdam
2. Programma Duurzaam
s¬ #LEANEST¬PORT¬CITY¬IN¬THE¬
world by 2030
s¬ #LEANER¬TRANSPORT
s¬ &INANCIAL¬INCENTIVES¬FE¬FOR¬
NOx-free ships)
s¬ -OSTLY¬INFORMAL¬NETWORKING¬
and expertise sharing
Source: desk research and interviews.
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The Netherlands, especially Rotterdam, is a good subject for the study of inland shipping 
due to the exceptionally large contribution inland shipping makes to the Dutch transport 
sector. The Netherlands also has the largest inland shipping sector in Europe. The table 
below compares the Dutch modal split to the EU-28 average and several other countries. 
Table 6.4 shows that the Dutch inland shipping sector is much larger than it is in other parts 
of the EU. Several states have next to no inland shipping sector, which can be explained 
by their geographic location and the absence of large rivers flowing through them. Other 
countries with a considerable inland shipping sector are Belgium, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Denmark. Ports and companies located in the first three countries are also part of the 
LNG Masterplan yet only the Netherlands has built several inland LNG ships, marking its 
importance as a case.
It is worth noting that the inland shipping market for LNG has experienced a lift from 
mid-2015 due to the improving economic climate and aggressive pushes onto the market 
coming from Shell and Engie218. Of the 44 LNG as fuel or bunkering projects listed in the 
database of the Observatory of European Inland Navigation (OEIN), 30 were still ongoing 
or being planned. Twenty of those are (partly) Dutch projects (OEIN, 12 October 2015). 
The maritime LNG business case still looks more promising, not least because of the explicit 
regulation of sulphur emissions in the Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECAs). Small-scale 
LNG essentially lengthens LNG’s value chain by adding new end users and applications. 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate this extension from the moment LNG is imported. For the Port 
of Rotterdam, the significant value of small-scale LNG begins with the reloading activity, 
which constitutes any activity that does not re-gasify the LNG for injection into the gas grid. 
218  Referring back to the ±30 LNG ships each company will be putting on the market in the coming years.
Table 6.4. Modal split in the EU varies strongly per country (in percentages)
Country Road (%) Rail (%) Inland waterways (%)
The Netherlands 56,2 5,1 38,7
Belgium 58,3 17,5 24,3
Romania 53,3 24,2 22,5
Bulgaria 74,7 8,9 16,4
Denmark 64,6 23,1 12,3
Poland 81,9 18 0
Italy 85,9 14 0,1
France 80,6 15,2 4,2
United Kingdom 87,7 12,1 0,1
EU-28 75,1 18,2 6,7
Source: Eurostat, 2014:132. Data is from 2012.
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Figure 6.4 shows how small-scale LNG potentially increases the size of Rotterdam’s LNG hub. 
The reloading of LNG for small-scale operations adds a whole chain of activities that can be 
performed in the port and therefore generate income for a port authority. 
Focusing only on the Rotterdam region means this case study is not telling the whole 
small-scale LNG story, but it does have the benefi t of being able to dive deeply into the 
details and dynamics of the case. As the next part of this chapter will show, such detail 
proves highly enriching for the study of multi-level governance.
6.3.1. The ‘Small-Scale LNG Network’
Who is actually involved in small-scale LNG in the Rotterdam area? This question is an impor-
tant one to answer if the impact of this case on European energy policy is to be considered. 
Figure 6.5 shows the involved actors in the multi-level context219. While this study cannot 
examine every possible actor involved in small-scale LNG, it has gone beyond past previous 
studies in providing depth to what motivates actors within this fi eld. The efforts of other EU 
member states, who also have to implement Clean Power for Transport, cannot be discussed 
within the scope of this dissertation, but the fact that several Eastern European countries 
have begun constructing LNG terminals and LNG-fuelled ships is a testament to the further 
rise of LNG in the EU. Ports in other European member states infl uence the development 
of LNG in Rotterdam, as it is no use developing a new type of fuel if the ships using that 
fuel cannot refuel in any other ports than Rotterdam. For purposes of manageability they 
219  A more detailed overview can be found in annex VI.
 Figure 6.3. LNG applications as gas, fuel and export material
Source: Port of Rotterdam (presentation).
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will not be considered specifi cally, but may be referred to when relevant. The international 
LNG producers and exporters will also be left out of the analysis, since the small-scale 
use of LNG comprises only 1-2% of total LNG import220. The international LNG producers 
are thus not highly relevant in this case, though the global market developments are (see 
§6.3.2.1). The remaining actors will be discussed where relevant. Lastly, companies such 
as Shell — now called ‘local’ because they have an offi ce in Rotterdam — operate on all 
levels and can therefore be placed in multiple categories. One actor that is not mentioned 
in the fi gure is the IMO. The International Maritime Organization does not concern itself 
with inland shipping, which is why it was left out of the fi gure. However, it is important to 
note that any emission standards or other LNG-related requirements set by the IMO for the 
global maritime sector may have an infl uence on the prospects of LNG fuels in the European 
inland shipping sector. Where that is the case, the IMO will be mentioned in the analysis.
Not all of the actors shown in fi gure 6.5 are part of the LNG core network. Throughout 
this chapter it will become clear that there are many crucial actors at local level, but that 
they are dependent on the regulatory authority of the Dutch government, the European 
220  Based on interview 3.
 Figure 6.4. Small-scale and LNG fuel value chain extends port operations
Source: IGU, 2015a:11.
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Commission, and international bodies. Unsurprisingly, while there are multiple Commission 
DGs involved in the LNG dossier, DG MOVE is the most connected. The other three DGs 
(CLIMA, ENV and ENER) are important due to their respective areas of competence, but 
within the theme of sustainable transport it is mainly DG MOVE that coordinates and devises 
policy. Furthermore, interviews with representatives from the other DGs revealed that areas 
of competence appear to be strictly divided between DGs, with one DG being unwilling to 
say much about another DG’s area of competence. In one of the interviews, when asked 
to refl ect on the link alternative fuels policy creates between energy policy, transport policy 
and climate policy, a respondent replied by saying: “my unit does not look at this”221. This 
reply is very illustrative of the attitude DGs have towards each other’s policy area and begs 
221  Interview 15.
Foreign ports 
(Hamburg, 
Antwerp, Le 
Havre)
International LNG 
producers Regulatory bodies 
(CCNR, UNECE)
DG Mobility and 
Transport
DG Energy DG Climate
DG Environment
ESPO/EFIP
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs
Ministry of 
Infrastructure and 
Environment
Other Dutch ports 
(Amsterdam, 
Eemshaven)
LNG Platform
Rotterdam 
Climate Initiative
Province of South 
Holland
EICB Terminals (GATE)
City of Rotterdam
Port of Rotterdam 
Authority Business/industry 
(Shell, Kooiman, 
Engie, Vopak)Deltalinqs
International
Supranational
National
Regional
Local
Research institutes 
(Erasmus, VSL)
Bunker operators 
(Argos)
Barge and ship 
owners (Anthony 
Veder, Chemgas) 
 Figure 6.5. Rotterdam’s small-scale LNG network in multi-level perspective
Source: author’s own compilation based on fi eldwork.
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the question whether policy integration has a chance of succeeding, since it has not before 
(Geerlings & Stead, 2003:189-195).
A surprising finding is that, in the PoR’s small-scale LNG ego network, DG ENV falls out of the 
picture. It has a role to play through the Commission’s inter-service consultation procedure 
and devises contingent policies which impact small-scale LNG, but has no direct connection 
to the PoR in this matter. Regarding betweenness centrality two actors stand out on the 
high side: the PoR and the Ministry of I&M. That the PoR has a high betweenness centrality 
(19.78) makes sense due to the local focus of the network (small-scale LNG development in 
Rotterdam) and its role as port authority. The Ministry’s high betweenness centrality (14.36) 
indicates it is potentially powerful, yet the question is whether it uses its power to advance or 
block the interests of others. As the qualitative analysis will show, I&M has chosen a degree 
of passivity in the LNG case after an initial period of high activity. Actors with the lowest 
betweenness centrality — potentially low influence — are bunker operators and research 
institutes (0.94). These actors will likely not make or break the case.
Figure 6.6 provides justification for leaving foreign ports and international LNG producers 
out of the analysis unless relevant on a micro-level. Another actor that does not meet the 
set degree requirements but will be mentioned often in this chapter is GATE. Along with 
the other purely private sector parties (energy companies, barge and ship owners, bunker 
operators) GATE is mostly concerned with its business case. However, companies are tied to 
the public sector or umbrella organisations to regulate this new market by helping to provide, 
for example, regulations for standardisation of equipment. In the end, these activities help 
their business case as well but are also meant to provide collective goods.
6.3.2. Governance at EU Level — the Domestic - International Dimension
Chapter four and section 6.2.2 provided a comprehensive overview of the LNG policy 
context as it currently is in place. MLG hypothesises a shift from domestic to international 
coordination spurred by the necessity for supranational coordination due to international 
interdependencies (the first key concept) which cannot be ignored. The second concept is 
the level at which policy coordination mostly occurs. I expect the PoR to use its various ties 
to respond to policies. As this chapter will show, the consequences of increased EU and 
international legislation are indeed that strategic decisions are taken at those levels while 
the national government retains competency for practical issues. The PoR moves freely 
within this arena, though international focus on IWT is limited. The national government is 
far from obsolete, but is pushed into a different role than it used to have.
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6.3.2.1. International interdependencies as key manifestation of MLG
Mutual interdependencies drive the multi-level governance of EU energy and climate policy, 
which is why investigating how they work is important. At EU level, inland shipping has not 
been a main priority. The Clean Power for Transport Directive went through the legislative 
process quite easily, even though it was watered down in negotiations. Piattoni (2010) 
identifies two mechanisms structuring international interdependencies: the inclusion of 
sub-national authorities in European policy-making and the interdependencies created 
by business and civil society operating across national boundaries. Both mechanisms are 
discussed below. In addition, the CCS case found another mechanism affecting the level 
at which policy coordination occurs: nation states creating interdependencies of their own 
volition. This case adds a fourth factor: the influence of global market dynamics. 
First, even though a member state can decide on its energy mix, the Commission makes 
an effort to play a coordinating role in setting up a European LNG strategy. As port areas 
are very important in global energy flows (Meyer, Nillesen & Zonneveld, 2012:80), the EC 
ESPO/EFIP
DG MOVE
Other Dutch ports
DG CLIMA
DG ENER
Regulatory bodies
Ministry of I&M
Ministry of EZ
Province of SH
LNG Platform
Research institutes
Barge/ship owners
Bunker operators
Energy industry
City of Rotterdam
EICB
PoR
Figure 6.6. Small-scale LNG ego network for Port of Rotterdam Authority
Source: author’s own composition based on fieldwork. The darker the node, the higher its degree. Minimum set edges per 
node is 9 (maximum is 20). The average degree is 10.8, the density is 0.568 and the modularity is 0.148, so there are no 
analytically meaningful communities in this network. Used software: Gephi (ver. 0.9.2).
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welcomes the input of port authorities and decentralised governments, which the PoR readily 
provides. Regarding cities, my interviews did not reveal a large emphasis on their inclusion in 
the European process of policy-making for alternative fuels for inland shipping, even though 
the sector is partly covered by projects running under the Covenant of Mayors222. Save 
for a recognition of the impact local government action can have, no Commission official 
indicated that including cities and regions in this policy area is of paramount importance223. 
On the other hand, research has also shown that to “seize and make use of these political, 
informational, and administrative resources required spontaneous initiatives on the part of 
regional leaders” (Smyrl, 1997:298) and that at times regions get captured by the national 
government acting as a gatekeeper to the EU (ibid.:305). In the case of small-scale LNG, 
stimulating the use of LNG as a fuel is part of the ESI initiative set up under the WPCI 
(see section 6.1.2.2). Port authorities are, in large parts of the world, still part of local 
governmental authorities, and their initiative to cooperate in making ports more sustainable 
is a good example of decentralised authorities working together in a cross-border context. 
The ESI program is supported by sea-ports umbrella organisation ESPO, thus also by the PoR, 
and complies with EU directives regarding emission norms. It also fits within EU ambitions to 
make reporting of ship emissions mandatory224. Both initiatives, however, focus on maritime 
transport and not on inland shipping. While it is a recent addition to the EU’s climate worries, 
attention to reducing emissions from inland shipping still is not copious. In fact, during one 
interview with a Commission official the following statement was made:
“If you disregard fuels for international flights and international 
marine transport, then 95% is cars, so road transport. And all the 
rest is marginal. If you want to devise a policy that is relevant for the 
current emissions in transport […] what are you looking for? Are you 
looking at this tiny little sector or are you looking at the 95%?”225
222  The Covenant of Mayors is an EU-supported initiative stimulating cooperation between local and regional 
authorities in the EU in the area of sustainable energy. For more information see [http://www.conventiondesmaires.
eu/about/covenant-of-mayors_en.html]. An example of an initiative covering small-scale LNG is the Baltic Energy 
Forum. Furthermore, the Province of South Holland is asking for EU attention for cleaner inland shipping through 
the CLINSH Project (DG ENV).
223  In the broader sense of the potential impact of city-wide policies for climate change adaptation and mitigation, 
however, scholarly research has shown that cities have a significant role to play in combating climate change due 
to their ability to mobilise local action (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006:141-143). This role has been recognised by the EU 
in an initiative called ‘LA21’, which promotes the articulation of local agendas and cooperation between cities, 
both nationally and internationally. The Dutch Brandstofvisie (Ministerie I&M, 2014a) also explicitly recognises 
complexity due to globalisation, multiple levels of policy-making, the economy, and various other factors.
224  Regulation 2015/757.
225  Interview 2.
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This attitude, while on the extreme side, is very telling of the general attitude policy-makers 
seem to have towards the inland shipping sector. Because it traditionally is not the most 
polluting sector, and because it is relatively small, they prefer to focus on other sectors and 
therefore often overlook the inland shipping sector226. Contrary to MLG’s thesis, in small-scale 
LNG policy-making subnational authorities mostly play a symbolic role.
The interdependencies created by civil society (such as NGO activity) and business are the 
second factor mentioned by Piattoni. The activities of NGOs award low priority to inland 
shipping, mostly focusing around advocating cleaner road transport and aviation, with 
maritime transport being a secondary concern. Even European NGOs such as Transport & 
Environment and the Climate Action Network Europe focus more on maritime transport 
than on the inland waterways of Europe227. None of the people interviewed mentioned 
NGO activity as being crucial in advocating sustainable inland shipping in the EU, which 
appears to confirm the low policy priority of the sector. As such, NGOs also do not spur 
supranational coordination in this case. 
In keeping with Piattoni’s line of inquiry, one must ask whether business creates the in-
terdependencies at an international level? Not for small-scale LNG for inland shipping. 
Cross-border networks are present of necessity through the nature of the energy and shipping 
business; shipping is international and many companies are multinationals operating in 
more than one country. They are often represented in umbrella organisations at EU-level 
(for example the European Community Shipowners’ Associations, ECSA) through their own 
national association. Furthermore, ports themselves are part of various formal cross-border 
networks (for example ESPO and the European Federation of Inland Ports, EFIP) and informal 
networks. None of these cross-border networks are new or appear to be sticklers for sustain-
ability. While sustainability is acknowledged to be important, economic viability and ensuring 
a level playing-field seem to be the top priorities of these networks228. According to EFIP,
“EFIP supports policies aimed at further reducing emissions from inland waterway 
transport. At the same time, the relatively bleak economic situation of the sector 
should be taken into account. Stricter emission standards therefore need to be 
226  The EC was even criticised for this omission in the consultation round for the mid-term review of the 2011 White 
Paper on Transport (European Commission, 2015e:10). A city such as Rotterdam, with a port heavily dependent on 
IWT, does focus on inland shipping emissions through its Programma Duurzaam and RAP/RAL.
227  See their aims, goals and projects on their websites at [http://www.transportenvironment.org/] and [http://www.
caneurope.org].
228  See, for example, ESPO’s and EFIP’s yearly reports. There is some focus on sustainability in general, but it is clearly 
not their main concern.
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accompanied by meaningful financial support measures, in particular for the retro-
fitting of the existing fleet” (EFIP, 2014:23).
Arguably the most prominent example of business activity, although initiated by the EC, 
is the European Sustainable Shipping Forum (ESSF); an expert group under DG MOVE229. 
It is mostly made up of MS authorities, companies, and business associations and has a 
subgroup on LNG in which the PoR is active. The ESSF is meant to assist in policy formulation 
and implementation and functions as a platform for the exchange of views on sustainable 
shipping. It relies heavily on the expertise brought in by non-state actors. Again, maritime 
LNG receives more attention than IWT.
As the above analyses have indicated, Piattoni’s two factors indicating growing interdepen-
dencies at the international level do not resonate strongly in the small-scale LNG case, mostly 
because the focus on inland shipping is limited. My interviews show two other important 
factors: nation state activity and global market dynamics. My network analysis deliberately 
left out the IMO — a UN subsidiary — since the IMO focuses on maritime transport rather 
than on inland waterways. The IMO, however, does have an influence in this case. An 
employee representing the Dutch government at the CCNR explained:
“Member States refer to IMO-norms when it comes to engines. 
Engines for inland waterway vessels have the same bandwidth as 
engines for sea-faring vessels. Many engine manufacturers thus sell 
both types of engines, not in the least because the inland shipping sec-
tor is relatively small; fewer than 200 engines sold per year in Europe. 
For them it is very annoying if inland shipping norms are different from 
maritime emission norms. The norm that holds for maritime transport, 
IMO Tier 4, therefore is often used as starting point in the discussions 
concerning emission norms for inland shipping. Some small tweaks 
can then still be made, such as regarding PM or methane slip, and it 
does allow engine manufacturers to sell the exact same engine for both 
maritime and inland transport, with small adjustments.”230
Since all EU member states are IMO members, agreements made in the IMO are automatically 
relevant for the EU as a whole. In the interest of a level playing-field, the shipping sector and 
national authorities prefer to let IMO negotiate and try to come to legislation and emission 
229  Registry number E02869. See [http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.
groupDetail&groupID=2869] for more information.
230  Interview 12.
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standards so that the rules apply to as large a group as possible. Thus, nation states willingly 
maintain the interdependencies that necessitate supra- or international coordination, at 
the same time knowing that the established channels like the IMO are slow due to specific 
catering to the interests of the shipping sector, the difficulty of finding consensus between 
so many participants, and their view that other transport modes should also decarbonise 
(Oberthür, 2003:195-199)231. When it comes to pure CO2-reductions, the shipping sector 
is very divided. As a result, the international shipping community has not been able to set 
a CO2-reduction target232, although the IMO does have an energy efficiency design index. 
Since the engines used by inland shipping are often adjusted maritime engines, an LNG push 
in the maritime sector could be a catalyst for the transition in the inland shipping sector.
Rivers do not heed national borders. The Netherlands thinks it can be an LNG hub because 
of the strong positions of the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam233. At the same time, 
Brandstofvisie acknowledges that the bulk of Dutch policy in this regard follows the European 
Clean Power for Transport Directive (Ministerie I&M, 2014a:6-38) and is therefore adaptive 
rather than pioneering. National governments hardly have a choice but to cooperate when 
inland waterway transport is concerned. According to a Dutch policy officer: 
“the national government is […] more and more dependent on 
international bodies”234.   
These ‘international bodies’ are mostly existing bodies. The CCNR coordinates cooperation 
for the Rhine river. However, the CCNR’s policy cycle is shorter than the EU’s, which leads 
the EU to struggle to keep up with new rules adopted by CCNR. The EU can influence235 
231  From a cynical point of view, that may also be a reason why national authorities prefer international standard 
setting over national standard setting; if no standards are agreed upon, countries will not have to act.
232  Some other agreements are in place as well. The MARPOL (short for Marine Pollution) Protocol is a UN document 
prescribing limits to pollution coming from sea-faring ships. A result of this protocol are the Emission Control 
Areas (ECAs), which limit certain emissions (mostly sulphur oxides) in defined areas such as the North Sea and 
the Baltic Sea. Currently the Mediterranean Sea is not included in the ECAs, but there are plans to do so on the 
short term. The ECAs are not popular amongst all companies. The short-sea sector was especially against setting 
more stringent emission norms. The Dutch government was a strong proponent, as was the European Commission. 
The PoR took up a position favourable to the ECAs because of the construction of Maasvlakte 2, which requires 
ships to have low emissions due to the potential impact on the environment. Based on respondents 3, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14 and 17.
233  Another way of looking at the possible interest of The Netherlands in LNG is when considering the switch Shell 
has been making from being an oil company to being a gas company with significant stakes in the production, 
trading and use of LNG.
234  Interview 13.
235  See the ‘Administrative arrangement concerning a framework for cooperation between The Secretariat of the 
Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine and The Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport of the 
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decision-making in CCNR and usually adopts agreements made by it as EU law (CCNR, 6 
April 2015)236. However, with the EU delaying transposition and the CCNR left without one 
of its main policy instruments, the development of new emission norms for inland shipping 
has come to a standstill over the last few years. When it comes to the safety of LNG, the 
ADN Safety Committee (under UN ECE), tasked with the safety check for LNG ships, is also 
an important party due to legislation concerning the transport of high-risk substances. 
CESNI, a newly founded EU entity, allows EU-wide membership and is responsible for the 
drafting of technical and crew requirements for the inland shipping sector. The standards 
developed by CESNI automatically become part of the EU’s and CCNR’s legislation (Council 
of the European Union, 2015)237, so national governments cannot ignore them. CESNI is 
the best example of nation states willingly creating new international interdependencies, 
which lead to supranational coordination.
European Commission’, signed in Brussels on 22 May 2013.
236  EU members — such as The Netherlands — are not allowed to agree to change emission norms in another 
international body (eg., CCNR) without consulting the EU first. It is expected that the CCNR will fully regulate the 
use of LNG as fuel by 2017. The consequence of this regulation is that the Dutch government should not have to 
keep reviewing every single LNG ship prior to approval by classification bodies.
237  Based on interview 12.
Box 6.1. Choosing LNG for different reasons
The choice for LNG - the political narrative
The Netherlands traditionally is a gas country with excellent gas infrastructure. As the only net gas producing 
country in the EU, The Netherlands has significant interest in maintaining the status quo for natural gas. With 
Slochteren gas decreasing in quantity and production, the government needed a viable substitution for its 
natural gas supply, preferably independent from Russian gas. Importing LNG from production facilities spread 
across the globe was an attractive alternative. The Dutch government therefore became a staunch supporter of 
the construction of the GATE terminal, meant to secure the nation’s gas grid. Small-scale LNG is a non-issue 
compared to the importance of national energy security, though gains saliency when GATE struggles to be 
competitive.
The choice for LNG - the industrial narrative
Exogenous effects such as the Fukushima disaster and a low oil price cause a dramatic drop in LNG imports in 
the EU, right after the GATE terminal enters into operation. The sparse LNG ships docking at GATE can provide 
natural gas to the Dutch gas grid, but GATE’s business case is in jeopardy. To safeguard GATE’s profitability, 
Gasunie and Vopak explore their options and arrive at the great potential for the use of LNG as fuel; small-
scale LNG. They begin talks with the Port of Rotterdam Authority to explore possibilities for using LNG as 
fuel in the port. The LNG Masterplan and the construction of the liquid breakbulk facility commence shortly 
afterwards, giving GATE value beyond its role in national energy security, yet securing it at the same time. 
Market possibilities drive decision-making regarding LNG.
6
182 Chapter 6
The fourth, perhaps strongest, important factor in this case concerns global market dynamics. 
The LNG market is globalising, which in turn creates new interdependencies. The EU imports 
most of its gas, and with the increased use of LNG the potential sources of gas have diversi-
fied. In the first section of this chapter it was mentioned that the use of LNG as fuel flows 
from the large-scale use of LNG to supply national gas grids. To that end, The Netherlands 
built the GATE terminal (see also box 6.1). Small-scale LNG developed because the large-scale 
market did not provide enough business prospects, which was an important driver of the 
thought processes regarding possible alternative uses of LNG. Currently, LNG terminals 
are being built all over the world. These market dynamics regulate the interdependencies 
between countries in terms of their energy policies and therefore also impact the options the 
EU has to make its transport cleaner. If the amount of LNG being pushed onto the market 
increases, thus decreasing its price even further in comparison to oil, it will become a more 
interesting fuel for inland shipping. As an expert put it:
“LNG could take up a large share of the fuels mix in the inland 
shipping sector. Europe is investing heavily in LNG, also outside of its 
application in inland shipping, which will cause supply to rise further 
and further, and therefore also the supply of LNG as fuel. The price 
difference between oil and LNG will probably only increase, which will 
make the switch to LNG financially interesting.”
The choices made by the EU in terms of its energy policy and energy mix may therefore also 
impact the development of LNG as fuel. These choices are at least partially dependent on the 
global energy market238. Likewise, small-scale LNG developments in other EU countries could 
impact the Rotterdam case as well. A market-building project such as the LNG Masterplan 
creates interdependencies at the European level due to the connection between the Rhine 
and Danube rivers and European coordination of the project. Efforts to introduce LNG as 
fuel for shipping have thus been made in Romania and Bulgaria, albeit with little success so 
far239. With growing availability of LNG in those parts of Europe the situation may change. 
Global market dynamics thus influence choices made by countries individually, but also as 
part of, the EU. This finding adds more nuance to MLG’s domestic - international dimension.
238  Based on interviews 3, 6, 7 and 15.
239  In fall 2015, twenty implementation projects for small-scale LNG outside of The Netherlands were planned or 
on-going, the bulk of which were meant for German waterways, one in France, and two in the Danube-Main 
corridor (OIEN, 12 October 2015).
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6.3.2.2. EU policy coordination leaves room for national diversity
My interviews confirmed that international coordination is necessary simply because a fuel 
can only be used if refuelling points at certain intervals are available. The Commission seems 
to be managing to make a measure of coordination happen where previously there was none. 
Whether this coordination will continue in the future is questionable, as box 6.2 illustrates.
Originally the EC also wanted to use CPfT to dictate how many refuelling points each MS 
had to construct240. Even though The Netherlands responded favourably to the directive, its 
Parliament was concerned with the appropriateness of the EC deciding upon the amount 
of refuelling points needed, arguing that infrastructure is a matter of national competence. 
EU member states wanted more control and delayed the directive’s timeline by five years. By 
2015 the Dutch government was cautiously backing away from supporting LNG because of 
the methane slip associated with combustion of gas and a discussion surrounding potential 
lock-in of LNG, which the government fears could be harmful to development of hybrid 
and electric techniques. The environmentally oriented side of the Dutch government prefers 
240  This information can be found in the Dutch parliamentary procedures, #21501-33 410 and #21501-33 457 at 
[https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl].
Box 6.2. Narratives of EU policy coordination
EU policy coordination - the political narrative
The European Commission knows all too well it is difficult to agree on anything with 28 member states. When 
deciding on an attempt to coordinate national fuel policies in order to reduce emissions from transport and 
reduce oil-dependence, the Commission immediately decided to opt for a Directive, called Clean Power for 
Transport, instead of a Regulation, allowing national governments to retain control over the implementation. 
Such a construction, resulting in a measure of EU policy coordination, was deemed favourable over having 
no EU-wide alternative fuels strategy at all. Private parties are encouraged to invest in alternative fuels. The 
Commission watches developments across the EU closely to judge whether it can try to coordinate even further 
in the future.
EU policy coordination - the industrial narrative
Inland waterway transport often crosses borders. Even though rivers are coordinated by special river 
committees, national laws govern the berthing of ships and the handling of (dangerous) cargo. When laws and 
regulations differ across countries, shipping companies are left with a difficult choice: either comply with the 
strictest of standards, or change their operations. Since Directives leave a lot of room for national governments 
to diverge in their implementation of the goals, whilst transposition of a Directive is ongoing it is uncertain for 
the private sector what the variation across nations will be. It is also unclear whether ships will even be able to 
refuel at the needed intervals. Investing into long-range LNG powered ships becomes too risky and is therefore 
placed on the back-burner until policies are sorted out.
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transport to become electrified, which coincides with the positions of DG ENV and DG 
CLIMA241. One striking finding is the Commission’s 2014 communication regarding GHG 
reduction targets for transport beyond 2020, in which the EC announces that: 
“The Commission does not think it appropriate to establish new targets for renewable 
energy or the greenhouse gas intensity of fuels used in the transport sector or any 
other sub-sector after 2020” (European Commission, 2014d:6).
The question why the EC chooses not to establish targets beyond 2020 was posed during 
an interview with a representative from the European Commission. The main reason behind 
this decision is that efforts to reach GHG reduction targets from transport have, thus far, 
been challenging and that the costs for mitigation from transport are too high. For now the 
EC prefers to mitigate climate change through cheaper means by using the ETS system242. 
Another directive such as Clean Power for Transport might thus not be proposed any time 
soon.
6.3.2.3. Soft coordination: implementation through TEN-T funds
Supranational coordination often takes on a soft nature, with funding instruments taking 
up a large portion of it (cf. Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004; Citi & Rhodes, 2007; Stephenson, 
2013). This case confirms this claim. The Commission seeks to stimulate LNG development 
with “targeted, limited public financial support” and a “harmonised framework for rules 
and procedures” (European Commission, 2013f:3). Existing rules need to be scrutinised, 
and, where necessary, adapted to fit LNG. Pioneer projects are meant to shape the EU LNG 
framework and to enable learning through best practices (ibid.:3-5). The current TEN-T 
Regulation243 focuses on removing bottlenecks, building missing cross-border connections 
and promoting modal integration and interoperability. Additional goals are to promote 
clean fuel, other innovative transport solutions and to integrate urban areas into TEN-T. To 
accomplish its goals, the Regulation divides the EU into nine corridors, three of which include 
241  Based on interviews 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13.
242  Based on interview 2.
243  Regulation 1315/2013, amended in 2014. The TEN-T network and its link to the EU’s alternative fuel strategy 
goes back to the origins of EU transport policy in the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the resulting extremely slow 
cross-border infrastructure development. The situation started to change when the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 
obliged the EC and EP to make Trans-European Network (TEN) guidelines. For transport, the first TEN-T guidelines 
were made in 1996, then revised in 2004 and 2013 (Fraunhofer ISI, 2015:17). See annex VII for a comprehensive 
overview of the TEN-T corridors.
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Rotterdam and are therefore important to The Netherlands244. The effect of soft coordination, 
as shown in this study, through funding is that cross-border networks between companies 
are built which obtain EU funding and liaise with EU officials. A good example is the LNG 
Masterplan, supported by key public and private actors from the Rhine-Danube corridor.
National governments liaise with the Innovation & Networks Executive Agency (INEA) in 
implementing TEN-T. They need to make sure that their seaports have alternative fuels 
available, and that they support on-shore activities and intermodal connections. Inland ports 
are expected to adhere to navigability and inter-modality requirements. INEA also manages 
the funding instruments belonging to TEN-T: the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)245, by far 
244  Note that these corridors are not the same as the IWT corridors on p.13 of this chapter. The Port of Rotterdam is 
part of the Rhine - Alpine, North Sea - Mediterranean, and North Sea - Baltic corridors running from north to south 
and west to east. A closer look at the work plans of each of these three corridors reveals an interesting finding: 
since most bottlenecks are identified in areas of the corridor other than Rotterdam, most of the activity (and 
funding) is geared towards improving those areas. The exception is the North Sea - Baltic corridor, which stresses 
that it depends on ports on both ends of the corridor for its success, but even so attention is then focused on the 
Port of Amsterdam. The sea lock at the Port of Amsterdam is identified as a bottleneck for further development. 
For the PoR, this focus is unfortunate since they would prefer to get (more) funding instead.
245  Regulation 1316/2013. The current CEF Programme runs from 2014 to 2020 and contains 22,4 billion euros, of 
which 87% has been awarded between 2014-2015. According to INEA, 42% of the funding goes to the private 
sector, 41% to the public sector, 16% to member states and 1% to ‘other’. By far most of the funding goes to 
rail projects. The 3 corridors the Port of Rotterdam is part of receive less money as compared to other corridors. 
For alternative fuel supply points, 79% of funding goes to electricity projects, 10% to LNG, 10% to CNG and 1% 
to hydrogen (INEA, 2016). Nearly 90% of that funding went to cross-border infrastructure projects and 1,5% 
Box 6.3. Funding narratives
Funding - the political narrative
The EU has multiple funding mechanisms the private sector can call upon to implement new technologies and 
new fuels. These funding mechanisms rely heavily on the construction of infrastructure to aid the deployment of 
ships sailing on alternative fuels. National governments therefore decide not to subsidise deployment in their 
own country too heavily, since EU funding is available and they do not want other member states to receive 
more financial support than they do. When private sector parties talk to national governments about their LNG 
plans, the national government tells them to apply for EU funding. Initiatives are supported by the national 
government as well, but this support never covers the requested financial support.
Funding - the industrial narrative
Obtaining EU subsidies is a tedious process involving much bureaucracy and a very low chance of success. 
The EU’s method of spreading out subsidies over all regions as evenly as possible, to maximise economic gain, 
makes clustering of projects in a small region impossible. Smaller companies often lack the needed manpower 
to manage an EU-funded project, leading them to not try to get EU funding in the first place. Landing EU 
projects becomes the prerogative of large companies and actors such as port authorities. Since national funding 
is mostly absent, a small company will not invest in small-scale LNG unless it wants to be a pioneer and is 
financially able to do so.
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the main funding instrument, and the relevant parts of Horizon 2020. National governments 
can submit projects for funding under these programmes, as well as under the Cohesion 
Fund and the European Regional Development Fund (EFRO)246. Clearly, the promise of 
massive EU funding incentivises cross-border cooperation for companies and governmental 
authorities alike. At the same time managing EU projects is a tiresome task (see box 6.3). My 
observations at and conversations with people from the PoR show that another EU-funded 
project is not likely to take place anytime soon with the same team of people247.
6.3.2.4. The absence of coordinated policy
Having a directive in place does not imply EU-wide policy coordination. Policy documents 
often refer to the ‘appropriate’ level to tackle an issue, which can indicate policy coordination 
as I have operationalised it. Where the EU sees ensuring that there is an EU-wide network of 
LNG refuelling points as a supranational task, its member states and the private sector see 
standard-setting for the shipping sector as something the IMO and CCNR need to do. The 
EU is willing to provide the necessary regulation and limited funding, but is otherwise letting 
member states decide on their own how to meet the requirements of the Clean Power for 
Transport Directive. Consequently, the Dutch government is taking up that task, but also 
playing the ball back into the EU’s court where financial incentives, the methane leakage, 
and ETS problems are concerned. Brandstofvisie has a clear message for the European 
level. It advocates placing CO2-reductions and the methane slip on the EU agenda, as well 
as the creation of financial incentives by governments to stimulate LNG development and 
bunkering (Ministerie of I&M, 2014a:iii). Additionally, ETS problems are mentioned as a 
factor that hampers investments in clean technology (ibid.:32). Going even further down 
the hierarchical ladder, local governments are asked by the Energieakkoord to consider 
climate and sustainability in their spatial policies in the future. Furthermore, the City of 
Rotterdam had to make changes to its port bye-law to accommodate for small-scale LNG. The 
municipality is also financially stimulating clean ships in order to help The Netherlands meet 
the EU’s air quality standards. Cross-referencing in policy documents emanating from several 
governmental levels clearly is very common, especially when governments want another 
level to carry out a task. The private sector, on the other hand, calls on these governments 
to solve the legal issues surrounding Rhine navigation and to financially support business 
went to deploying sustainable and efficient transport (INEA, 2016:10-14). It should be clear that this funding 
instrument is not meant for actual vehicle deployment. A single LNG ship will most likely not receive funding 
under CEF.
246  The first Dutch LNG ship, Argonon, was partly funded by EFRO funds.
247  Most of their complaints were about the amount of bureaucracy involved with an EU project, which takes up much 
of their time while they prefer to spend it doing business development.
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cases which would otherwise not be sufficiently promising. They want governments to act 
as facilitators.
Concluding this section, the bulk of the ‘policy weight’ seems to lie at a higher level than 
the national one248, which supports MLG’s notion of a shift from the domestic to the 
international and indicates a move towards potential harmonisation of transport policies 
through directives such as Clean Power for Transport. The setting of emission norms may 
theoretically become the sole prerogative of international organisations, supported by the 
EU. In practice, failure to coordinate effectively in the past has led to today’s uncoordinated 
LNG policy249. When asked about who actually makes LNG policy, representatives from the 
Dutch government evasively said that ‘everyone does a little bit’. In November 2014, the 
Dutch cabinet250 noted that LNG could be one of the focal points in the Dutch CEF strategy 
and that the international nature of transport requires international coordination. Continuing 
the discussion on how to further stimulate the development of low- and zero-emission fuels 
at EU level therefore remains a priority for the government251. The possibility of funding serves 
as an instrument of implementation through soft coordination, with EU bodies presiding 
over the decision which projects fit within EU priorities, and which do not. The result is 
that the EU provides a long-term vision for its members to implement as they choose. The 
PoR responds by mobilising its network to make use of the EU’s soft coordination tools and 
attract funding for the port.
6.3.3. Governance at National Level — the Centre - Periphery Dimension
According to Piattoni (2010:86), states are not unitary actors, but are comprised of multiple 
levels of hierarchy which are territorially distinctive. Decentralised authorities are thought to 
be better equipped to organise administrative, economic and social efficiency than national 
authorities, although the question is whether they will be able to make proper use of the 
tools at hand (Smyrl, 1997:298). My analysis of the domestic - international dimension 
showed that sub-national authorities have not been important in European small-scale LNG 
policy-making. In light of the criticism directed at MLG regarding its overstatement of the 
248  In the interviews, most of the statements regarding policy output are related to EU policy and international 
agreements made in bodies such as IMO and CCNR. There are significantly fewer statements mentioning the 
Dutch policy output and hardly any mentions of the decentralised authorities.
249  Before the EU’s LNG strategy (COM(2016) 49 final) was published in 2016 (2016c in bibliography), there was no 
LNG policy document. This strategy comprises the role of LNG in the EU’s energy policy as a whole, which is of 
strategic importance to the EU. Also based on field work report C and interviews 6 and 15.
250  See Dutch parliamentary proceedings, #21501-33 512.
251  See Dutch parliamentary proceedings, #21501-33 578.
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power of sub-national mobilisation (Jeffery, 2000:8; Jordan, 2001:201) it is important to 
analyse if the pull exerted by decentralised governments is reflected in the centre - periphery 
dimension consisting of two key concepts: the level at which the domestic coordination 
of activities takes place and the level of empowerment of local actors. Can the PoR use its 
resources effectively to stimulate regional activity?
6.3.3.1. How decentralised authorities matter
In attempting to coordinate the uptake of alternative fuels in transport, the EC invariably 
added IWT to its target groups even though not much energy is spent on the sector. At the 
national level, inland shipping receives more attention252. As discussed previously in this 
chapter, the slow uptake of LNG import through the GATE terminal led to a re-evaluation 
of possible uses of LNG253. The initial focus of the government lay with short-sea and inland 
shipping254. The Dutch focus on inland shipping does not fit with the EU’s focus, but its 
ambitions — and reservations — regarding LNG as fuel resemble those of the Commission. 
At the city level, these reservations do not seem as strong. LNG came up in Rotterdam in 
2009-2010, when the port bye-law (in Dutch: Havenbeheersverordening) was changed 
to accommodate the construction of the GATE terminal. While the safety of using LNG as 
fuel was a concern, the city was willing to be convinced of the fuel’s safety through pilot 
projects255. Because the city wants to be the cleanest port city in the world, — a goal still 
remaining in its most recent Programma Duurzaam 2015-2018 — it saw the LNG terminal 
and its possible applications as contributors to this goal, especially in terms of air quality 
benefits (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011:18)256. Over time, the city accommodated develop-
ments within the port by adjusting the port bye-law so as to legalise all activities related to 
small-scale LNG and allowing the Port of Rotterdam Authority to incorporate plans to be an 
LNG hub into its long-term strategy (Havenvisie 2030)257. The most recent policy documents 
252  When the Dutch government considered building an LNG import terminal in the northern part of the country in the 
1970s, safety concerns and public opposition halted the project. Had the Dutch not reconsidered the construction 
of an LNG terminal in the mid-2000s, perhaps LNG as fuel option would not have developed so quickly in The 
Netherlands.
253  The Dutch also advocated for the use of LNG as fuel at an informal Transport Council in Antwerp in September 
2010, and reaffirmed the importance of hubs to distribute LNG as fuel.
254  See Dutch parliamentary proceedings, #21501-33 290, #21501-33 292 and #21501-33 383 at [https://zoek.
officielebekendmakingen.nl].
255  See the Replijst Commissie Economie en Haven for 2011 and 2012 in the online Rotterdam city archives.
256  The city (and PoR) has also argued that not all planned shore-power installations can be placed due to other 
circumstances, therefore proposing to use LNG as fuel could offset potential negative air quality consequences of 
having fewer shore-power installations than originally envisaged.
257  The city also mentioned the LNG Platform’s plans to realise 50 inland ships, 50 maritime ships and 500 trucks by 
2015 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2013:92). This ambition has not been reached. In mid-2016 there were 350 LNG 
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(for example the Stedelijke agenda haven 2016, the city’s vision on the synergy between 
the city and the port) still support small-scale LNG as a contributor to national sustainable 
goals. Rotterdam has stimulated clean shipping with investments of up to 5 million euros in 
2013 and 2014. Part of the reason to do so is to allow The Netherlands to meet the EU’s air 
quality requirements. Furthermore, subsidies are available for the development of NOx-free 
ships (rotterdam.nl, 2 February 2015).
The relative ease with which the port and business could introduce small-scale LNG leads to 
the conclusion that it has not been a contentious issue. The local government cooperated 
with business, demonstrating economic and social efficiency as expected by MLG, and went 
unimpeded by the national government258. Especially the PoR emerged as a strong peripheral 
actor which was able to provide manpower, discounts for clean ships and land allotment 
for the purposes of developing small-scale LNG. Higher levels of government may provide a 
long-term vision, but decentralised authorities matter when it comes to achieving this vision. 
trucks and 6 operational LNG ships, with 35 ships pending construction (LNG Platform, n.d.).
258  The growing use of LNG as fuel has recently begun to worry the Veiligheidsregio Rotterdam-Rijnmond (an 
organisation assessing threats in the greater Rotterdam region) as a higher amount of LNG vehicles on the 
road and the waters could lead to incidents with the substance, and, according to VRR, it should therefore be 
well-known how to deal with any incidents that come up (VRR, 2016:61).
Box 6.4. When narratives match — the case of Albert Heijn’s LNG trucks
LNG trucks - the political narrative
Cities often have strict rules for the allowed restocking hours of retail stores, especially when these stores 
are located in highly populated downtown areas. Trucks are traditionally noisy, so restocking at night is not 
an option because it disturbs citizens’ night rest. Supply hours therefore are scheduled during daytime, often 
leading to traffic congestions and air pollution through idling engines. When supermarket chain Albert Heijn 
comes with the proposal to do a pilot with LNG-fuelled trucks, several city governments decide to allow it. The 
pilots result in empirical evidence showing the trucks are silent and better for air quality than diesel fuelled 
trucks, so city governments permanently extend supply hours for LNG trucks to include evening hours and 
the early morning. City councils are satisfied because they can protect their citizens while reducing traffic 
congestion and cater to local retail.
LNG trucks - the industrial narrative
When a truck with fresh supplies is stuck in a traffic congestion, a store may not be restocked in time and the 
extra time needed to resupply costs money. It would be much more efficient to be allowed to resupply at night, 
but that is prohibited in most cities. Hearing of the potential of LNG-fuelled trucks, Albert Heijn decides to 
invest money in the acquisition of such trucks in order to be allowed extended supply hours. The supermarket 
chain convinces several city governments to allow a pilot, showcasing the delivery trucks’ silence and reduced 
emissions. The pilots lead to permanently extended supply hours, allowing Albert Heijn to restock its stores 
outside of rush hours for more efficient operations, a green image and happy customers. The pilot also 
catalyses the small-scale LNG sector.
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Developing LNG infrastructure and pilot-testing the ships has a geographical component 
that necessitates local action and support from relevant local authorities. A good example is 
the introduction of LNG trucks (see box 6.4). If the participating cities had been unwilling to 
change the restocking hours for supermarkets on the condition that relatively quiet trucks 
were used, Albert Heijn may not have invested in switching over to LNG fuel. But it is not 
just about the municipalities. According to a safety expert from the private sector: 
“The fire department also has to know how to deal with an 
LNG-related incident. […] The department can only give a positive 
recommendation [for projects] when they know how to respond to 
LNG incidents”259. 
The first LNG ship sets an entire local chain into motion, which is based on the competence 
delegated by the national government. In addition, small-scale LNG touches upon territorial 
policies such as infrastructure policy and environmental policy, which are fundamentally 
local in nature and therefore not easily relocated to a different hierarchical level (Piattoni, 
2010:250). Because of the territorial distinctiveness within decentralised states such as 
The Netherlands, the preferences of local governments (and business and society!) matter.
6.3.3.2. The limits of local empowerment
Unfortunately, the inland shipping sector is not as straightforward an example of empower-
ment of local authorities as was the case in the example of Albert Heijn’s trucks. Betsill and 
Bulkeley discuss the role of cities in climate change mitigation and claim that 
“it is increasingly clear that nation-states will be unable to meet their international 
commitments for addressing climate change without more explicit engagement with 
subnational action. GHG emissions originate from processes that are embedded in 
specific places, and it is often argued that the local is the most appropriate political 
jurisdiction for bringing about necessary reductions in these emissions” (Betsill & 
Bulkeley, 2006:141).
Betsill and Bulkeley effectively reiterate the efficiency of local governments, though box 6.5 
shows that problems arise when the local and national level are not sufficiently aligned. The 
competence of a city such as Rotterdam in efforts to make urban mobility more sustainable is 
straightforward. Rotterdam can, for example, choose to only use e-transport or stimulate the 
use of bicycles instead of cars. But it cannot do so alone. In the city’s Programma Duurzaam, 
259  Interview 8.
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the role of the Rotterdam Port Authority and Deltalinqs are explicitly mentioned as being of 
crucial importance in making the city more sustainable. My observations in the field have 
confirmed that the PoR’s activity was hugely important during the launch of small-scale 
LNG, providing much needed support to shipping companies through mutual business 
development and the provision of facilitating incentives.
As the Albert Heijn example shows, local entrepreneurship is not lacking, yet at the same 
time the city admits it only has a limited budget and that it can mostly play a facilitating 
role in providing expertise, bringing people together and conducting exploratory research 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2015:63-68). Practically speaking, local coordination of activities is 
the most logical course of action. That does not mean that the coordinative activities are 
actually performed by a governmental authority or that central government is not needed 
at all. With an international transport mode such as inland shipping, the power of the city 
is not so easily established. Rotterdam will not go too far in its support of small-scale LNG 
for inland shipping due to limited resources and because ships only spend several hours in 
the city before they sail elsewhere260. Coordination between governmental authorities is 
needed in order to align territorial preferences.
260  Based on interviews 5 and 9.
Box 6.5. When the local and national levels are not mutually reinforcing
Local or national? - the political narrative
Cities are very concerned about air quality, since it directly impacts the health of their citizens. Using LNG as 
fuel is good for air quality, making it an interesting alternative for conventional fuels. Aiding in the deployment 
of small-scale LNG, however, is difficult for local governments. The city of Rotterdam has a limited budget and 
since ships do not stay in Rotterdam for very long, it is difficult to legitimise spending financial resources on 
incentivising the use of LNG as a fuel. Instead, the city government makes sure manpower is put on small-
scale LNG so that companies who do want to invest can apply for permits and prove compliance with safety 
regulations. The national government, in turn, is more concerned with the climate, more precisely, with CO2 
emissions, than with air quality. LNG scores mediocrely on the climate scale. Fearing a technological lock-in and 
favouring the promise of electric vehicles, the national government chooses to not support LNG financially too 
much either. It does make sure that a government representative is present during relevant CCNR, ADN and 
IMO meetings to obtain favourable regulatory conditions.
Local or national? - the industrial narrative
The private sector is called upon by the European Commission and the national government to deploy 
LNG fuelled vehicles and ships. Lacking enough support from both the local government and the national 
government, and knowing that heavy-duty transport will not be electrified in the near feature, the transport 
sector defaults back to oil-based fuels, especially during times when the oil price is low. Regulatory uncertainty 
does not help investment decisions into LNG either because it is difficult to convince shareholders that 
investments into small-scale LNG will repay themselves in the long run. Who should champion LNG?
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This study shows that local, business-driven processes such as the development of small-scale 
LNG eventually interact with and can be captured by a higher level of governance. In fact, 
the international nature of transport requires coordination on an international level. The 
coordination of legal exemptions has an international nature through negotiations between 
representatives from national ministries261. Furthermore, the source of funding is of crucial 
importance since the actor who finances projects also gets to lay down the rules. The 
development of LNG infrastructure is done locally or regionally (with some financial support 
from the territorial authorities), but in the case of Rotterdam the bulk of the financing 
comes from the EU. Since there is no point in establishing LNG infrastructure in just one 
port, initiatives for small-scale LNG often have a cross-border nature and are therefore 
eligible for EU funding under the CEF programme. Therefore, since the EU is funding 
many small-scale LNG projects, the Commission gets to make demands and coordinate the 
aggregated efforts across all of the EU. To conclude, it appears that an EU centre provides 
vision and funding opportunities to cover the necessary expensive investments, enabling 
the periphery to efficiently oversee the practical implementation of this long-term vision. 
Local actors can exert influence by marshalling local and regional forces, yet only within the 
confines of frameworks established by higher authorities. Remaining national competencies 
suggest that the boundaries of the centre and the periphery are being stretched. EU funding 
also places the private sector in direct contact with Commission officials262, thereby defying 
hierarchy by bypassing the national government in the development the small-scale LNG 
market. This finding fits with MLG’s expectations.
6.3.4. Coordination with Third Parties — the State - Society Dimension
Piattoni (2010) identifies a state-society shift in which cross-linkages between the public 
and private sector with joint goal-setting and a blurring of state and society comprise key 
elements of multi-level governance. This section will argue that especially the concept of 
cross-linkages between public and private actors, measured by resource flows and joint-goal 
setting, is crucial in the small-scale LNG case, and that the PoR acts as an intermediary.
261  Based on field work report B. Exemptions for Netherlands-based ships are officially given by the Inspectie 
Leefomgeving en Transport (ILT), yet only after prior approval by the countries represented in the CCNR.
262  There are project controllers who are responsible for monitoring progress. During an informal conversation with 
an EU insider, however, it was suggested that the amount of projects being monitored by EC officials is so large 
that the Commission is unable to manage them well. The Commission is considering a move towards co-financing, 
in part to make project management more manageable. Based on field work report K.
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6.3.4.1. Resource dependency guiding state - society interactions
The various policy areas of energy, climate and transport policy are connected to each 
other in the LNG case, which allows for a variety of actors to be involved to various extents. 
Interconnectedness shows itself both in the connections between hierarchical levels of 
government and between the public and private sector, which results in different actors 
being ‘responsible’ for different parts of developing the small-scale LNG market, leading to 
a dense resource flow between actors, and efforts to coordinate objectives and activities 
(Börzel, 1998:259), as visible in table 6.5.
The government acts as a facilitator and an activator (Kohler-Koch, 1999:23-24), bring-
ing public and private parties together, stimulating private sector efforts and fostering 
cooperation between both sectors. For example, the private sector played a large part in 
the formulation of the Dutch Brandstofvisie and Energieakkoord, indicating the importance 
the Dutch government attributed to the opinion of private sector. Without private sector 
action, none of the sustainable goals can be attained. The interdependencies go deeper when 
one considers how LNG as a fuel for shipping develops into a new market; new engines 
need to be constructed by engine-building companies, significant investments need to be 
made by shipowners to retrofit existing ships or to build new ships, new infrastructure that 
allows ships to refuel wherever they go is needed across inland ports and seaports, new 
safety procedures have to be established, personnel needs to be trained, the environmental 
impact of using LNG as a fuel needs to be analysed, and so on. In general, many respondents 
indicate that the public and private sector need each other to transition to a more sustainable 
Table 6.5. Resource flows guide cross-linkages between public and private actors
Resource Summary Direction of flow
Knowledge Mostly embedded in the private sector due to experience with 
LNG and transport, shared with public sector through platforms, 
networks and meetings
Private —> public
Policy-making 
capacity
Public sector prerogative, sets the framework in which the private 
sector operates
Public —> private
Personnel Overlap in international organisations and relatively low FTE 
capacity in public sector
None
Capital Investment capacity lies with both public and private sector (and 
banks!), with a general belief that the private sector should do 
the bulk of the investments
Public —> private
(+ private sector’s own 
investment capacity)
Source: fieldwork and interviews.
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economy and that joint goal-setting is necessary to ensure cooperation263. One interviewee 
aptly put it as follows:
“Broad support is necessary: cooperation between the public and the 
private sector and the inclusion of relevant agencies for implementation 
and control.”264
The experiences of private sector actors with LNG are crucial input for policy-makers, as 
information is needed on, for example, technical possibilities and actual emissions. Busi-
ness cases are made by the private sector based on these experiences and on projections 
concerning initial and operational costs. In the case of the PoR, its corporatisation in 2004 
left it in charge of its own port policy. The city of Rotterdam thus lost employees with 
extensive knowledge of port operations, which they are only now compensating for. The 
Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment has relatively few people working on LNG 
and port-related issues and therefore also lacks expertise. The same goes for the European 
Commission where civil servants have expertise in the area they work on but do not want 
to engage in cross-sectoral discussions, perhaps in fear of encroaching on the territory of 
another DG. In general, the interviews show that the public sector actors mostly lack the 
detailed knowledge necessary to make policy related to the use of LNG265. As policy-makers 
prefer to be on the safe side — it is no use enforcing a norm that is not technically feasible 
— they need precise information in order to devise policy. Or, as one respondent put it: 
“It is important to be on the safe side when legislating because the 
shipping sector needs to be able to meet the norms.”266 
As such, there is a crucial knowledge flow from the private to the public sector regarding 
technical feasibility which serves as input for policy-making. 
Capital is hugely important yet also the most fuzzy of the resources. Both the public and 
private sector have investment capacity, albeit to a different extent and guided by different 
motivations. Many interviewees have touched upon the question ‘who pays for sustain-
ability?’. The answer is not clear-cut. In part, the private sector depends on governmental 
263  As indicated by interviews 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13. Of course, such statements are also politically correct, yet that 
does not take away from what happens in practice.
264  Interview 9.
265  Indicated by interviews 9, 13, 14 and 16. The development is of a highly technical nature, with even information 
regarding the exact emissions of LNG engines still missing in mid-2015, two years after the LNG Masterplan 
started. A project to measure emissions was in preparation in late 2015.
266  Interview 14.
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authorities for funding due to the high amount of investments necessary to transition to 
LNG fuel and the uncertainty surrounding long-term policy goals. Securing funding from the 
government is therefore a proxy for government support of LNG; the importance of which 
should not be underestimated in a sector that is dealing with severe economic and financial 
problems. However, the consensus seems to be that the larger part of investments should 
come from the private sector267, preferably with some support from a public authority and 
with a large role for banks. One private sector respondent stated:
“If a government wants something, it will have to shape the frame-
work within which that specific development can take place. That the 
government then does not invest all by itself is understandable. That’s 
up to the private sector. They can complain […] but in the end they 
have to execute it. […] It does help if such plans can be made [by the 
public and private sector] together.”268
Conversely, private sector actors have also indicated that the market will provide whatever 
is needed if the government presents clear policy choices. Especially larger companies do 
not need to rely on public finances to invest in sustainability. Still, with new developments 
such as the use of LNG as fuel, a measure of public sector support is helpful. The Dutch 
government has been withdrawing from financial involvement, fittingly described by one 
interviewee as: 
“at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, the possibilities 
are as good as dried up.”269 
Resource interdependencies create a necessity for cooperation between the public and 
private sector at multiple governmental levels (Börzel, 1998:259; Hueglin, 1999:249), even 
for a small part of the transition to come about. A certain measure of joint target-setting, 
as has been done in, for example, the Dutch Brandstofvisie, is therefore inevitable yet not 
without its own problems. When new ships for some reason do not get a legal exemption 
from CCNR, or their request is delayed, ship owners are likely to hold off investments into 
LNG due to the uncertainty of the regulatory outcome. Absent a political decision to actively 
invest in clean fuel deployment, the private sector has little choice but to look elsewhere 
or abstain from investing altogether (see box 6.6). Mutual interdependencies can thus also 
delay progress.
267  Indicated by interviews 1, 3, 4, 11 and 17. Some of them are representatives of private sector actors.
268  Interview 3.
269  Interview 5.
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6.3.4.2. Cooperation, though not much blurring of state and society
MLG theorists often speak about a blurring of state and society; a situation in which the 
public and private sector perform activities or tasks traditionally associated with the opposing 
sector270. Whilst there are not many examples of Piattoni’s interpretation of blurring of state 
and society, the clearest example is the policy document made under the LNG Masterplan 
— fed by the pilot projects — which should serve as input for LNG related policy at EU level. 
The safety program set up under the auspices of the LNG Platform is based on questions 
asked by the public sector to which the private sector did not have an immediate answer. As 
the program continues and the private sector gathers the necessary data, this information 
will be used by the national government to devise LNG safety policy271. The private sector 
here acts as an advisor to policy-makers. 
A second example is provided by the Rotterdam region. In the words of a representative 
from the energy business: 
270  Please note that Piattoni’s is a very far-reaching interpretation of blurring of state and society. It is an extreme 
version of the cross-linkages between the public and private sector, which is the more traditional interpretation 
of blurring. 
271  Based on interview 8.
Box 6.6. Narratives of deployment; when worlds collide
Deployment strategy - the political narrative
LNG as fuel might be a fairly new market in the transport sector, but it is not a case of a technology that has 
recently been developed and is in need of demonstration and upscaling. Rather, using LNG as fuel can be 
done with existing technologies. It is therefore not allowed by European state aid rules to directly subsidise the 
construction of new LNG-fuelled ships. It is also politically contentious to do so because of the methane slip 
associated with (dual-fuel) engines and the fear of a technology lock-in, possibly delaying the more preferable 
switch to electric vehicles. But if technology is market ready, transport companies can meet NRMM standards 
better using LNG, and gas is cheap, why is the market not investing?
Deployment strategy - the industrial narrative
Ships have a long lifespan and are not often replaced by new ships. The inland shipping sector is in heavy 
weather, with many ships forced into receivership. It is clear to private companies that the Dutch government 
supports LNG half-heartedly: EU-funded projects are supported, but the government prefers electric vehicles 
even though they are not available for heavy-duty transport. Facing regulatory uncertainty with no early 
prospect of resolution, it is safest to resort to a well-known fuel. Why would a company invest in LNG if there is 
no certainty it is viable in the longer run?
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“Rotterdam is good at this. It was never that clear to me, but I’m 
starting to realise that more and more. What happens is the following: 
we, as the small-scale LNG industry, come together and make a plan. Of 
course you have to make sure whatever you do is within the boundaries 
of competition laws, but if you are transparent and invite everyone 
to join in, that’s alright. So we say that we see this small-scale LNG 
market as an interesting development. LNG as transport fuel. These 
are the reasons why, and we want to do it this and that way. We are 
willing to invest this much into it. And then you go to the government 
and tell them ‘we as an industry want to do this, and what we need 
of you is a change in this regulation, that regulation, some support 
for that, and information regarding this and that’. And then it is up 
to the government to see whether, given available alternatives in the 
market, they find it an interesting market and if they want to support 
and facilitate it. And that makes it possible to create the framework 
together. […] This happens quite often in the port of Rotterdam, 
and it’s nice because otherwise these developments are impossible 
to launch.”272
This quote is not only a good example of public and private parties can cooperate at the 
local level and blur the boundaries between state and society, but it also nicely illustrates 
how Type II, bottom-up, networked forms of MLG eventually need Type I — a governmental 
authority — to make decisions, change regulations and support developments (Smith, 
2007:6278). 
The PoR itself has been a major driver in small-scale LNG development. One respondent from 
the private sector indicated that their company could have had a much harder time within 
the port without the support of the port authority. If small-scale LNG had not been one 
of the PoR’s top priorities, the authority could have thrown up many obstacles preventing 
investment. On the other hand, this power implies that the PoR can also make things 
happen faster if an initiative is in their line of thinking. To that end the PoR employs many 
resources to find out what the businesses in the port want, which is valuable information 
for governmental authorities. The PoR’s ability to act in the general interest and cooperate 
with companies is a good example of blurring of state and society. Yet a single port authority 
can only do so much. If small-scale LNG development is not on the list of priorities of other 
ports, transport companies or governmental authorities, its power to develop small-scale 
272  Interview 3.
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LNG into successful business will be very limited273. So even though the PoR may be a 
powerful supporter, if its network does not cooperate it will have to change its goals. As 
one respondent from the energy business put it:
“The Port of Rotterdam Authority does not determine everything. 
Nobody can, in this case. This market can only flourish if everyone 
does it together.”274
What the PoR can do, then, is act as a facilitator and catalyst. To support business activities 
on its land, the PoR can organise its public affairs such that it can gain political support for 
policies stimulating small-scale LNG development. It can also make sure that the infrastructure 
is there when private parties need it. As a semi-governmental organisation it can liaise 
with governments and it has the capacity to coordinate a large project such as the LNG 
Masterplan, thereby benefiting all other parties participating in the project. The PoR is a 
powerful initiator provided there is a secured following.
Furthermore, according to the six interviewees, contractors — i.e., the companies that want 
goods to be shipped, by law called ‘consignors’ — have to step up. They can request their 
transport loads to be fulfilled using LNG as fuel. According to some respondents this would 
be the best way to ensure more investments into LNG ships. If nobody cares which type 
of fuel is used or how clean a ship is, there is little reason to invest heavily in a clean, but 
expensive, ship. Consignors are thus expected to act in the interest of the many instead of 
the few, yet this actual championship of public goals by consignors is hardly happening. 
An expert from a knowledge institute put it as follows:
“The role of the private sector lies with those who stand to benefit 
from further development of LNG: engine manufacturers, suppliers 
of cryogenic technologies, and the LNG-suppliers themselves. They 
can all benefit from cleaner inland shipping because it increases their 
market share potential. They can therefore do something to stimulate 
this. The signal from the sector itself is that they, in general, want to 
be greener, but something needs to be done about their risk coverage. 
[…]. There may be other parties who find a green image important. 
[…]. Most likely are the LNG suppliers themselves: they can stimulate 
their market share at the same time and can thus create a win/win 
situation.” 
273  Based on interviews 3, 5, 11 and field work reports C and F.
274  Interview 3.
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The example of Albert Heijn’s LNG trucks has been discussed earlier, and it shows how a 
potential win/win situation can get both private and public authorities to cooperate together. 
Obviously Albert Heijn stood to gain from this fuel switch, but the company did have to 
increase its investments into its logistical operations275.
The other way around, governments at times act more like private actors when they attempt 
to lobby other governments. While Dutch ministries used to give subsidies and other 
financial incentives to the private sector, the preferred course of action is now to try to 
secure EU funding first276. To that end, private parties are required to obtain support from 
ministries in their European applications. Effectively, this development places the national 
government more in the shoes of a private party than of a public authority. The Dutch 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment helped secure funding for several TEN-T projects 
by drawing attention to them at the European level277. Since the Dutch national govern-
ment is withdrawing from funding activities, it is expected that lobbying for money by the 
government will only increase in the near future. Experience with the LNG case shows that 
it is likely that such lobbying will be the result of a national public-private coalition bridging 
the divide between state and society. 
To conclude, in response to Tortola’s (2017:241-242) challenge to show that there is a 
natural connection between state and society, the small-scale LNG case depicts a situation 
in which regulation is lacking and much of the needed expertise lies with ports and busi-
nesses, rendering their inclusion in policy processes natural to provide good policies. There 
is a shift from state-oriented, top-down steering to heavy involvement of societal actors in 
policy-making in “more horizontally organized, relatively fragmented systems of governance” 
(Eikenberry, 2007:193 [italics in original]). However, also befitting MLG’s claims, the nation 
state remains important, especially to spur an essentially technical development along. A 
high-level employee at the Rotterdam Port Authority formulated this as follows:
“Less is done from the viewpoint of the government trying to make 
changes and devising the needed regulations for that. Instead, the 
developments are bottom-up and the government then participates 
275  Example based on interview 9. The call for contractors to request LNG shipping is based on interviews 1, 5, 9, 13 
and 16. One respondent also stated that the PoR could switch over to LNG for its own ships, thereby sending a 
strong message to others. According to an employee of the Port Authority, some ships would be eligible to make 
the switch to LNG fuel, but most of the PoR’s fleet is too small to accommodate the necessary machinery. Still, the 
‘walk the talk’ argument is convincing.
276  Part of this development is caused by the European state aid rules, which place restrictions on funding of projects 
that are not part of pre-commercial activities such as R&D.
277  Based on interviews 6, 12 and 13.
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to facilitate these developments, sometimes through regulations. 
This is significantly different from the model that was used before. 
There still are departments with a top-down way of doing things, but 
changes are happening.”
Participation of both the public and private sector is crucial to develop small-scale LNG, 
though Piattoni’s far-reaching blurring of state and society is barely present.
6.3.5. Discussion of the Three Theoretical Dimensions
The three shifts identified in MLG theory are a domestic - international shift, a centre - 
periphery shift and a state - society shift. These shifts are also connected to each other 
through the dynamics that occur within them. MLG focuses on contestation along these 
three dimensions, since it does not assume that there is complete coherence between them 
(Piattoni, 2010:87-88). The three shifts, along with areas where they clash, will be discussed 
now (see also table 6.6).
The importance of the EU as a level of policy-making is especially clear in the small-scale LNG 
case due to the international nature of transport, emissions, and energy flows. Regulation 
at the EU level278 (or higher) is deemed necessary not just by the EU but also by national 
authorities and the private sector, albeit for different reasons. The EU wants to legislate in 
order to expand its competencies while national authorities and the private sector — il-
lustrating the domestic - international shift — create interdependencies to ensure a level 
playing-field. Private sector and societal actors do not only cooperate with the national 
government, but are also connected to these higher levels of governance. The resource 
flows are crucial here. Because the EU has become the main funder of projects related to 
small-scale LNG, it is connected to local and regional businesses and also gets to lay down 
demands. Still, contrary to the MLG framework, widespread influence of NGOs or business 
actors was not found in this case, largely due to the low priority attributed to greening 
the inland shipping sector. However, there is definitely a shift from the domestic to the 
278  The EU itself, however, is internally divided concerning the answer to the climate change mitigation question. 
For the EU, LNG is just one of potential possibilities to make transport more sustainable. DG CLIMA and DG 
ENV are strong proponents of fully electric transport, although that future still seems far away. Furthermore, 
DG CLIMA’s focus on CO2 is getting a lot more attention at the domestic, EU and international level than DG 
ENV’s (and cities’!) focus on the environment and air quality. Polluting ships in a large port such as the Port of 
Rotterdam have a significant impact on the local air quality in the city of Rotterdam. It would stand to reason 
that initiatives focused on improving this situation — such as the use of LNG as a fuel for inland (and maritime) 
shipping — would garner much support from DG ENV. Strangely enough, there are hardly any connections 
between PoR officials and DG ENV.
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international, albeit mainly through different factors than identified by Piattoni. EU member 
states themselves willingly maintain existing international interdependencies, and global 
market dynamics create new interdependencies. The Dutch government is even compelled 
to push for international regulation by actors such as the Port of Rotterdam Authority. The 
insistence on a level playing-field necessitates international action, yet at the same time 
ensures slow progress towards sustainability. It is therefore also an excuse for the national 
government to not have to coordinate (or fund) at all, which probably meets the preferences 
of a department with a low budget to spare, such as the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment. Even if driven by a different set of factors than identified by Piattoni, the result 
of the domestic - international shift remains the same; the high-impact strategic decisions 
seem to be taken at EU (or higher) level, while practical decisions (such as levying taxes per 
fuel type) are made nationally. A local voice in policy-making is missing.
At the same time, this shift clashes with the state - society shift due to the centrality of gov-
ernments in international decision-making. The nation state remains important — hierarchy 
persists — but decentralised levels of government do have powers of their own and their 
Table 6.6. Results of LNG case per key concept of MLG
Dimension of MLG Key concepts Results of LNG case
Domestic - international 
dimension
Interdependencies at 
international level
1. Hardly new cross-border networks created 
(examples are ESSF and CESNI)
2. Representation in international organisation 
or associations mostly along traditional lines
Policy coordination at the X 
level of government
1. EU attempts to coordinate policy and offers 
soft coordination through funding
2. National policy documents do refer to 
the necessity for EU decisions due to 
international nature of IWT
Centre - periphery 
dimension
Coordination of activities Local projects across the EU are coupled into 
EU-funded projects, Rotterdam facilitates LNG 
uptake where it can
Local empowerment 1. Many attempts at local coordination
2. PoR perceived as important locally and is 
empowered alongside other local actors but 
interdependencies are high
State - society dimension
Cross-linkages between 
public and private actors
1. Many resource flows between public and 
private actors, capital and policy-making 
capacity are crucial
2. Joint goal/target setting present
Blurring of state and 
society
1. PoR can spur blurring and the LNG 
Masterplan provides input for policy-makers
2. Dutch government supports Dutch projects 
at EU-level. Otherwise not much blurring
Source: author’s own composition based on case study. 
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preferences do not always line up with those of the national government. In fact, one could 
argue that the distinctiveness of local governments is another feature of the persistence 
of hierarchy, driven by the political belief that representative democracy is important and 
that accountability is better organised in a rule-based hierarchy (Lynn Jr., 2011:231-233). 
When taking the other two shifts into consideration, an interesting picture appears in the 
centre-periphery shift. One important peripheral actor, the PoR, is not part of representative 
democracy but can efficiently act as the linking-pin between governmental authorities and 
the private sector. As discussed above, the inclusion of society (in a broad sense) in state 
affairs speeds the governance process along, and much of the policy output stems from 
the EU and international level. The coordination of activities is mostly organised locally. 
Whilst the city of Rotterdam is not being heard in LNG policy-making, the absence of strong 
central steering — a lot of the transition to cleaner fuels is done through soft coordination 
— empowers local coalitions; the periphery. The interconnections and interdependencies 
necessitate high-level international coordination (often top-down) coupled with domestic 
practical implementation, testing and experimentation in a more networked fashion279. The 
national government is seemingly undergoing a change from setting the long-term visionary 
goals to taking care of practical issues based on EU policy. It therefore more and more acts 
like a decentralised authority than a national government.
6.3.6. Secondary Findings; the Role of Power and Uncertainty
Even though no interview question explicitly probed the issue of power, respondents often 
touched upon it in their answers. In fact, power relations seem of much higher importance in 
this case than initially assumed in the conceptual framework. When it comes to distribution 
of power, the international dependencies created by national governments also have their 
downside for governmental authorities. One such example is the revision of NRMM. As 
discussed previously, the methane slip of LNG engines is harmful to the climate. Without 
going too much into the technical details here, it is important to note that NRMM does not 
include a specific methane emissions norm, but implicitly covers it through a more general 
hydrocarbons emissions (HC emissions)280 norm. The proposed norm by the EC was 6 gr/
kWh. While fairly strict, during negotiations it appeared that this norm would be supported 
by member states and large parts of the private sector affected by the regulation. The Dutch 
government, however, proposed to change the norm to 3 gr/kWh281, claiming the necessity 
279  Based on interviews 3, 5, 9, 11 and 13.
280  Methane (CH4) is a hydrocarbon.
281  This norm would only apply to new ships and thus not to retrofits. Existing and upcoming retrofits would therefore 
be safe not complying to the 3 gr/kWh norm.
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for such a strong norm if LNG as fuel is to be used without a negative impact on the climate. 
The environmental department of the Ministry of I&M submitted the amendment, but 
insiders have claimed this went without support from the transport department. Support 
was also lacking at EU level282. Member states were hesitant to adopt a more stringent norm, 
probably due to the resistance from the private sector283. DG MOVE could not support the 
amendment without convincing proof that 3 gr/kWh was actually possible for ship engines. 
The Dutch proposal was outvoted284. While the Dutch government definitely has a say in 
the negotiations, in the end it is dependent on the greater consensus within the EP and 
the Council285.
On the other hand, the national government maintains a powerful position as well. There 
are several reasons. First, energy policy is still an area in which EU member states retain 
competency, especially where their national energy mix is considered286. Even though the EU 
is trying to insert a measure of coordination between the national energy policies, bilateral 
activity remains prevalent. Second, it was mentioned earlier that the national government 
must lend political support to TEN-T projects. Without the signature of the national govern-
ment, a project cannot be submitted to the Commission for funding. While it is in the interest 
of a national government to support as many projects as possible (otherwise the funds 
will go to another country), this competency disables the possibility to completely defy the 
existing hierarchy. Third, even though EU decision-making is based on consensus between 
28 countries, this still means that the Dutch government has a vote in the policy-making 
process. Its policy priorities are therefore one of the determinants of the policies resulting 
from negotiations. Fourth, even in an area where the EU does have clearer competence, 
such as transport, MS retain some autonomy. Clean fuels for transport, to name an example, 
are governed by an EU Directive. Directives give MS leeway in the way they are transposed. 
The EU imposes the final goals, not the way in which these goals are reached. National 
governments can still be powerful in the implementation process. Multi-level governance 
282  Although nobody stated it explicitly during the interviews, the prevailing feeling (which was quite clear during 
participant observation) that was communicated indicated a lack of trust in the national government, especially 
the Ministry of I&M. This lack of trust lives both in local authorities and in the private sector and is mainly due to 
the formal and distanced attitude of I&M and its internal conflict between the environmental department and the 
transport department. After openly supporting LNG as fuel for transport, the Dutch proposal to amend methane 
emissions in the NRMM regulation took both the PoR and the private sector off guard. Some actors took the 
government’s action as an affront and saw it as an attempt to block further small-scale LNG development. 
283  PoR was strongly against the 3 gr/kWh norm, so were other port authorities.
284  Example based on interviews 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 16 and field work reports A and J.
285  The same applies within the CCNR, IMO, CESNI, and the ADN Safety Committee. 
286  Art. 4 TFEU. Officially energy policy is a shared competence. See chapter 4, section 4.2.2.2. for more information.
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does not disable the nation state; its governance capacity is stretched out over multiple 
levels of government and between multiple actors.
Power (im)balance is important within EU institutions as well. The Dutch 3 gr/kWh proposal 
was not adopted due to the lack of political support in other countries. Internal conflict 
within the Ministry of I&M287 most likely also did not help the government in backing the 
proposal unilaterally. At the EU level, DGs often are at odds with each other (Aspinwall, 
1999:127) and when push comes to shove, oftentimes energy policy (and economic gain) 
wins out on environmental and climate considerations. Even with the apparent fusion of 
DG ENER and DG CLIMA under one Commissioner it is not a given that both policy fields 
will be given equal importance. Energy security is of strategic and economic importance 
and is likely to continue to be treated with privilege. While both the 2011 White Paper on 
Transport (European Commission, 2011c:5) and the White Paper on Governance (European 
Commission, 2001b:28-32) mention policy integration as important, one insider in European 
diplomacy described reality as follows:
“At the end of the day, energy policy determines what will hap-
pen, and climate ambitions — if necessary — will be wiped from the 
table”.288
The integration of environmental issues into other areas of European policy-making thus 
still has a long way to go. The top-down way in which the Commission operates leaves little 
room for DGs such as CLIMA and ENV to upload their agendas effectively289.
Between DG CLIMA and DG ENV there are power imbalances as well. DG CLIMA’s focus on 
CO2 is getting a lot more attention at the domestic, EU and international level than DG ENV’s 
focus on the environment and air quality. Emissions other than CO2 are usually translated 
into CO2-equivalents. International climate negotiations also often focus on CO2, placing 
this greenhouse gas in the area of high politics, i.e., the Hobbesian elements in politics that 
touch upon matters which are very contentious and deemed essential to the survival of the 
state. This contrasts with low politics, referring to more technical responses to concerns 
that do not endanger the nation state (Hix, 2006). As stated before, GHG emissions have 
287  Interviews 3 and 9.
288  Field work report K.
289  With the advent of the Juncker Commission the DGs have handed in part of their power and have to fold to the 
political priorities established by Juncker and his VPs. In addition, the inter-service consultation is led by officials 
from the Secretariat-General, which places the real administrative power in their hands and not in the hands of 
individual DG officials. Still, the new VP structure introduced by Juncker could lead to more policy integration at 
the high, political level within the Commission. Based on field work reports J and K.
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a global effect whereas air quality has a highly local impact. Reducing the local emissions 
impacting air quality therefore remains in the area of low politics. It is an area in which 
the local level is potentially empowered, most apparently through its regulating powers as 
attributed by DG ENV’s Air Quality Directive290.
While not part of the MLG framework, uncertainty drives much of what happens between 
the public and private sector. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002:115) claim that “uncertainty 
is the single most important attribute of climate change as a public problem”. Cooperation 
between the state and society in a broad sense may be needed to break through this 
uncertainty. From a private sector perspective, investing into sustainable initiatives does 
not help short-term gain. From a public sector perspective, investing into sustainability is 
too expensive without support from the private sector. Parties involved in the development 
of LNG as fuel are fully aware that the real gain will come after several years, and that this 
market needs full support to develop first. This is also the reason why governments and 
companies want more stringent emission norms; the incentives created by firm emission caps 
should cause a further push toward cleaner transport. Paradoxically, these emission caps 
are very difficult to establish due to resistance from the shipping sector, mainly at the IMO. 
Table 6.7 summarises the most important uncertainties for small-scale LNG development, 
which often came up as shining examples in the narrative boxes.
The public sector is cautious to formulate specific targets for sustainability because the 
rate at which cleaner technology becomes available is unpredictable. On the other hand, 
business seems to have trouble understanding the nature of governmental planning. While 
governments usually make financial plans of up to four years, a viable business case in this 
sector requires a certain financial stability of between five to ten years. When governments 
cannot give the private sector such assurances, the private sector becomes cautious to 
290  Based on interviews 1, 3 and 10.
Table 6.7. What prevents small-scale LNG development?
Politics/policy Finance Technology
Unclear long-term policy priorities, 
also regarding emission norms
Small-scale LNG (and retrofit) is 
expensive
Long lifespan of ships, slow 
turnaround
Geopolitical situation (energy 
independence?)
Inland shipping sector under heavy 
weather
Methane slip and actual emissions 
of LNG engines still unclear
Mindsets of shippers and 
consignors
Unclear LNG price development (in 
relation to other fuels)
Infrastructure lacking (also for 
large-scale LNG)
Intra-governmental competition Financial tools do not always 
match the needs of the market
Source: interviews, each hurdle has been mentioned by at least four people and is commonly found in evaluative 
documents. Hurdles range from most to least mentioned. 
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invest in expensive technologies. The public and private sector thus at times have difficulty 
understanding each other’s language. Forcedly incentivising the market to provide a product 
can become very expensive, as became blatantly obvious when the Dutch government tried 
to stimulate the acquisition of electric vehicles through subsidies (Rengers & Schoorl, 2014)291. 
Coupled with the inherent uncertainty surrounding climate change as a public problem 
(McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002:115), the uncertainty of future policy choices in this domain 
(also mediated by power relations) and the uncertainty of the rate at which technological 
progress will occur are very important factors in the governance of small-scale LNG. 
6.4. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM
Ports can play an instrumental role in the transition towards sustainable transport and 
energy. Not only are they the obvious place for large concentrations of transport activities, 
they are also very important in global energy flows (Meyer, Nillesen & Zonneveld, 2012:80). 
Therefore, they are the prime suspect, so to speak, to watch when assuring the sustainability, 
competitiveness and security of European energy (and therefore also transport). Growing 
strategic importance of LNG as a large-scale energy carrier may push other LNG develop-
ments forward, although that is not certain because EU LNG import terminals already have 
overcapacity. Therefore an increase in LNG imports would not necessarily impact — positively 
or negatively — small-scale LNG developments. A promising possibility would be to tie 
small-scale LNG into the larger LNG strategy of the EU. Doing so would require cooperation 
between DGs and a more comprehensive policy framework than is currently available. Not 
only is it uncertain whether member states would allow that, but it is equally uncertain 
whether the individual DGs are willing to encroach on each other’s territories. The efforts of 
the current Juncker Commission to mainstream Energy Union plans and climate plans into 
all of the EU’s policy-making could mark the change needed to get to this comprehensive 
framework. The recent Energy Union plans look promising; transport, energy and climate 
are explicitly considered together in the Commission document and it is acknowledged that 
the climate objectives regarding decarbonisation of the economy will have to be expressed 
in concrete actions targeted at the transport and energy sectors (European Commission, 
2015b). A link to ports, however, is still missing.
The potential importance of ports is especially relevant when the largest European port is 
considered. The Port of Rotterdam houses some of the world’s largest energy companies 
and is a major transport hub through which many different transport companies traverse on 
a daily basis. A third of all energy brought into the port is processed within the port area, 
291  Interview 9.
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fuelling the cluster and producing energy carriers. Two thirds of the energy is transported 
further inland or exported292. A major consequence for the PoR is therefore that political 
choices made by governments impact its operations due to the direct impact of these choices 
on the private sector present in or making use of the port. Of course, this is not news to the 
port. But, as discussed in the three shifts in multi-level governance, governance is dynamic 
and relationships change. Especially before corporatisation of the PoR, the local and national 
governmental authorities were of paramount importance to the Rotterdam Port Authority. 
Now, the EU (especially DG ENER, DG MOVE and DG CLIMA) is becoming more and more 
important, even if there is no formal ports policy (yet). As an entity devising its own long-term 
strategies and goals, the PoR will have to deal with the shift from domestic longer term 
visions to strategies formulated at the European level. At the same time, the distance to 
that level is larger than the distance to the national level, even physically. The PoR also has 
to contend with many other players for EU attention. It remains to be seen whether the Port 
Authority is fully equipped to deal with this new reality. Its potential strength as a regional 
aggregator of interests may be an important catalyst for its public affairs management.
There is another reason why the EU is of increasing importance to the PoR. The Port of 
Rotterdam can afford to have a long-term strategy including investments that are potentially 
risky, or that will pay off five, ten, or even twenty years from now. This ability fits its role as 
infrastructure provider facilitating necessary provisions for companies. However, many of the 
businesses in the port cannot afford to invest in long-term payoffs due to them simply being 
too small to have sufficient financial stability for the future. Since strategic decisions of the 
PoR also rely on the information they receive from the private sector, it is difficult for the PoR 
to devise strategies based on the uncertainty of long-term private sector investment. With 
the uncertainty surrounding the national government’s real (and realistic) priorities added 
to the mix, strategic planning for the PoR may become very difficult. One thing the PoR 
could, but will not, do is make a clear choice against another type of fuel (oil, for example) 
since that would harm its business. If other actors from the public or private sector make 
these choices, the port will follow to accommodate their wishes. The Port Authority is in 
danger of supporting everything (and therefore choosing nothing) in fear of missing out 
on an opportunity. Lastly, global uncertainty due to economic crises does not help either. 
While the above affects the EU as well, it is better able to provide more longer term financial 
stability and security than the national government, if only by virtue of EU decision-making 
being slow. The EU may therefore be better able to provide a guiding light for the port.
292  Port of Rotterdam Authority, internal presentation (2017). Total energy flowing in to the port on a yearly basis is 
7620PJ.
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The somewhat ambiguous status of the Port of Rotterdam Authority may prove challenging 
in the EU. Many European ports are still in the hands of governmental authorities, which 
makes it easy for the EU to know who to address if ports are considered. In its actions towards 
governmental authorities the PoR can either be advocating its own interests (mostly focused 
on ensuring a level-playing field) or as the aggregator of port-related company interests. It 
should be clear which position the authority is taking in each situation. Furthermore, in the 
LNG case both the local and international network seem quite small; PoR officials know 
people in certain positions at the EC and vice versa. Still, the Commission often prefers to 
speak with governmental authorities instead of actors such as the PoR. The corporatisation 
of the PoR means that they can operate relatively independently from the Dutch national 
government, although they are obliged to report to the Dutch government and the city of 
Rotterdam due to their status as shareholders. However, with the port authority being in 
charge of its own port policy and being able to define its own future, there is not much 
standing in its way when moving towards the EC rather than the Dutch ministries. In 
doing so, it can behave both as a public and as a private party. During a conversation with 
an employee of the PoR, it was stated that depending on the subject, the PoR alternates 
their statement whether they are a public or private sector actor in EU questionnaires. This 
ambiguity may therefore not work in their favour at the EU level where there is no full 
understanding of the exact status of the PoR. The implications are that if the Commission 
continues to prefer contact with a governmental authority over direct contact with a port 
authority, maintaining good relations with the Dutch government will be a must for the PoR.
During the interviews a question was asked regarding respondents’ opinions on what the 
role of a port authority is in stimulating the transition towards more sustainable energy and 
transport. The overall opinion of what PoR is doing is favourable, though respondents do 
indicate that it could be more open in its goals and information sharing with other parties 
such as other ports. The leadership role PoR has taken up, however, is judged very positively. 
It is clear that the EC watches Rotterdam closely and that there are informal ties between 
the two actors. However, the bureaucratised way in which the EC operates does not make 
it easy for the PoR to pursue its goals at the EU level. As policy officers often are responsible 
for only a small part of an issue, the PoR inevitably has to deal with multiple officials. The 
PoR will also have to contend with the fact that outside The Netherlands there are more 
big players vying for access to the European Commission.
6.5. CONCLUSIONS
The application of MLG to this case addressed Jordan’s (2001:201-204) criticism that MLG 
ignores the external level of the EU. Piattoni’s factors covering the domestic - international 
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shift were supplemented with two other factors: nation states willingly maintaining interna-
tional dependencies, and the influence of global market dynamics. Coupled with Piattoni’s 
factors, this case study is able to add to the continuously evolving MLG framework. The shift 
from centre to periphery actually revealed the formation of a new centre at the EU level, 
with an enlarged periphery consisting of domestic actors. It also partly confirmed earlier 
criticism of MLG regarding its overstatement of the influence of sub-national authorities. 
Even though the preferences and actions of decentralised authorities matter, and regions 
are potentially empowered, they do not overshadow the national government but rather 
build up to intergovernmental coordination in international institutions and the EU. Power 
relations were found to be more important than previously expected, which reflects a 
shortcoming of MLG as described by Jachtenfuchs (2001:258). This shortcoming will be 
addressed more fully in the last two chapters of this dissertation.
Multi-level governance as a theory is able to identify the dynamics occurring between actors 
and the challenges related to EU policy-making. It does, however, not predict what will 
happen, only that changes will occur (see table 6.8). The shift from state to society shows 
that the inclusion of business and civil society helps governments govern more effectively 
Table 6.8. Small-scale LNG conclusions per theoretical expectation
Theoretical expectation Conclusions for small-scale LNG case
Actors create interdependencies between 
business, civil society, and government on an 
international level, which necessitates policy 
coordination at not only the national level but 
also the supranational level
-> The PoR is one of many actors active at 
international level because the policy solutions 
the PoR needs cannot be provided at national 
level alone
Shift from the domestic to the international, 
with governmental authorities retaining their 
decision-making competencies and voting 
powers in international bodies (strengthening 
vertical governance). At the same time, mutual 
interdependencies are created by actors such as the 
PoR, and by societal actors in a broad sense, but 
mostly due to nation state actions and global market 
developments (exogenous effects).
Regional coordination in territorial matters 
is more efficient than national coordination, 
which leads to the strengthening of local policy 
actors
-> PoR is empowered due to being able 
to employ its resources effectively when 
stimulating activities in Rotterdam
Boundaries of centre and periphery are being 
stretched through the empowered activity of 
peripheral actors such as the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority, acting in coordination with the local 
private sector and implicitly backed by the passivity 
of the Dutch national government.
Cross-linkages between private and public 
actors lead to private parties assuming public 
responsibilities and public parties acting like 
private groups
-> PoR develops economic activity in 
cooperation with the private sector and 
advocates its interests at EU level alongside 
Dutch governmental actors to obtain favourable 
policy conditions
Shift from the state to society due to the critical 
nature of resource flows, resulting in more horizontal 
governance, where the public and private sector 
jointly agree on sustainable goals and organise 
their implementation. The PoR moves between the 
public and private in an effort to maximise regional 
benefits.
Source: author’s own composition based on case study.
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through mutual resource dependencies. In turn, the private sector is heavily dependent 
on policy initiatives such as Clean Power for Transport. The shift from the domestic to the 
international illustrates how interdependencies are created at the international level, which 
necessitates international coordination. Yet supranational governance is not necessarily the 
most effective form of governance. When appropriate regulation at the international level is 
lacking, as for example with the legality of sailing down the Rhine in an LNG fuelled vessel, 
action from national governments is necessary. Or, in other words, the domestic level steps 
in when the international level fails — a stark contrast to the CCS case — provided that 
such action is within the interests of the nation state. The growing patchwork of EU policies 
regarding emission ceilings, transport policy, energy policy and climate policy suggests that EU 
policy output will continue to expand in the future. However, lingering uncertainties impede 
governance when actors do not know what the future will bring. These uncertainties go 
past practical regulation and are especially prevalent in the governance of climate change, 
as technologies and insights evolve and much is dependent on the mindset of policy-makers 
and entrepreneurs alike. Multi-level governance can help uncover these uncertainties.
The nation state remains at the heart of the governance of small-scale LNG, although its 
position is not one of an autonomous, directive authority. The national government retains 
competence in the area of energy policy and has room for manoeuvring when implementing 
EU transport Directives. However, the cross-border nature of IWT and required system 
changes for LNG implementation necessitate EU-wide coordination and provide powerful 
incentives for regional authorities to step into the arena. Crucial, then, is the fit between 
domestic initiatives and long-term European goals. Ensuring this fit will require cooperation 
at multiple governmental levels, with a strong role for the private sector due to the expertise 
and investment capacity of the sector. The value of MLG as a theory therefore is in showing 
that the authority of a national government can be stretched across multiple levels, yet 
paradoxically remain intact as well. The complex dynamics between the actors in multi-level 
governance strengthen mutual dependencies.
What is the ‘engine’ that seems to be at work in this case? EU member states requested the 
EU to formulate an alternative fuels strategy due to the cross-border nature of transport. 
Supranational coordination was desired. The Commission took up this task and defined the 
Clean Power for Transport Directive. Alongside the Directive came EU funding for alternative 
fuels infrastructure, pilot ships and efforts to standardise training and safety procedures. As 
national governments began transposing the CPfT, their own uncertainty regarding desirable 
alternative fuels for the future and discussions regarding lock-ins delayed implementation. 
Still, the Dutch government enabled small-scale LNG demonstration through a Green Deal 
which stimulated local activity in the Port of Rotterdam and the municipality. Especially 
the PoR can incentivise the use of LNG through discounts and infrastructure adjustments. 
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Large companies such as Shell and Engie can afford to invest in LNG (bunker) ships and 
infrastructure, but smaller shipping companies face larger financial insecurities. Explosive 
growth in the usage of LNG as fuel is therefore unlikely in the current situation. The lessons 
learned in the demonstration projects and infrastructure adjustments can be used in the 
revision of the alternative fuels strategy at EU level. The LNG ‘engine’ is running slowly, but 
whether it achieves further harmonisation and large-scale implementation is yet to be seen. 
However, the first results are promising.
The importance of power is a secondary finding of this case study. The European Commis-
sion can only do so much until it hits the wall of national interests and political pressures. 
Whichever (geo-)political direction the EU and its members choose with respect to energy 
policy will impact transport. Especially in countries where large-scale LNG infrastructure is 
lacking, EU emphasis on the importance of LNG for environmental purposes may help in 
its introduction as a fuel (Arteconi & Polonara, 2013:511). Due to the connection between 
transport and energy policy, changes in the transport regime will, in turn, also change 
European energy policy. This case study has shown multiple examples of power relations 
impacting the outcomes of governance, not in the least because of the tensions between 
climate considerations and economic gain. The next chapter will discuss whether the multi-
level governance framework adequately considers the role of power in governance.
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The Governance of Rotterdam Energy Port
7.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters dealt with two nested case studies illustrating EU climate and 
energy policies with relevant impact on the Port of Rotterdam: CCS and small-scale LNG. 
The case chapters uncovered the multi-level governance mechanisms present in these two 
cases, with differing results. While the mechanisms were discussed in the concluding parts 
of those chapters, they need further theoretical elaboration. This chapter will compare and 
contrast the two nested cases in an effort to give an answer to the second sub-question of this 
dissertation: which (multi-level) governance mechanisms are present in the implementation of 
these policies? The LNG and CCS cases will be compared at several intersecting themes (the 
origin, scale and impact, and problem ownership) and aspects of multi-level governance. The 
key concepts discussed in the methodological chapter (chapter three) will be linked to the 
results of the embedded case studies. Doing so will allow a critical review of the expectations 
formulated in the theoretical part of this dissertation. First, §7.1 and §7.2 discuss general 
observations and conclusions regarding the policy aspects of LNG and CCS, which aids in the 
explanation of these cases. Then, §7.3 reviews the theoretical expectations along the lines 
of the state - society, domestic - international, and centre - periphery dimensions of MLG. 
However, the case studies also showed two secondary findings that seemed important in 
both CCS and LNG: the role of power and uncertainty. In operationalising Piattoni’s theory 
of multi-level governance, I have not very explicitly probed for either power and uncertainty. 
These concepts came up inductively during the expert interviews. This retroductive approach 
allows for a revision of initial theoretical expectations, though it is worth reflecting (§7.4) 
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on whether Piattoni’s MLG has enough explicit attention for power and uncertainty, or 
whether this framework can be improved upon. In itself, the MLG framework is generic 
yet attractive, which is why I have chosen to apply it to my empirical study of Rotterdam 
Energy Port. The goal is to understand the governance puzzle and give the theory of MLG 
another boost. This chapter ends with conclusions which will pave the way for this exercise 
in the final chapter.
7.1.1. Comparing LNG and CCS: the Contrasts
A face-value comparison of LNG and CCS reveals some contrasts: CCS is, by many, seen 
and advocated as something we ‘simply must do’, yet it is not happening in Europe right 
now. Small-scale LNG, on the other hand, is not advocated as a must do, yet it is happening 
(at the very least in West-Europe). Related to this observation is the concept of problem 
ownership. CCS is generally linked to solving the ‘climate change’ problem, which is often 
upscaled to the highest level possible: the global scale. However, arguing that a problem 
needs to be solved globally can also be used as an excuse to do nothing. After all, the whole 
world needs to participate actively to solve the problem of climate change. If nobody else 
moves, why should the EU move? Or a small country such as The Netherlands? Downscaling 
problem ownership by formulating the problem at a localised scale, which is visible in the air 
quality and noise arguments in the small-scale LNG case, might be more effective. Air and 
noise pollution have a decidedly local impact, which legitimises local activity. Incentivising 
cleaner shipping down the Rhine river is a very concrete measure that solves the smaller 
problems of noise and air pollution within the larger problem of global climate change. 
Effectively, using LNG as fuel becomes the ‘must do’ at the local level, which makes activity 
much easier than having to do something at the global level. 
Another contrast is found in the actual scale and impact of LNG shipping and CCS activities. 
While LNG comprises international projects (for example inland shipping down the Rhine or 
the Danube) which have a local impact (improving local air quality), CCS is a matter of local 
projects (localised application at, for example, coal-fired power plants or the steel industry) 
with international impact (reducing CO2 emissions). This global impact is exactly why CCS 
suffers from problems in its execution. CCS has a higher long-term potential impact on the 
climate than LNG since the latter does not have the potential to reduce emissions to zero, 
yet CCS is not profitable. Conversely, LNG as fuel is advocated as one of the routes to take to 
make heavy transport more sustainable and small-scale LNG activities are said to potentially 
add 8000 FTE in The Netherlands alone by 2030 (PwC, 2013:56). The positive economic 
impact is strong. On the other hand, the IEA calls CCS the ‘game changer’ in climate change. 
The question remains whether that label counts for something for a technology without 
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end users. At present, it does not seem that way. Perhaps the prospect of CCU — using the 
carbon instead of storing it — will prove catalytic to CCS development.
While both cases hinge on the availability and the price of fossil fuels, they started in 
completely different environments. In The Netherlands, CCS has been a topic of research 
since the early ‘90s, yet it drags on without results. LNG started after the turn of the century, 
came up through the private sector, and is expanding. Both cases present developments that 
were ongoing in The Netherlands prior to their upscaling to the EU level. National processes 
were therefore already running before the EU commenced its harmonisation attempts, which 
seem to be driven by the price of CO2 (in the CCS case) and the prices of oil and gas (in the 
case of LNG)293. The problem with CCS was that it was already presented with significant 
public resistance prior to the adoption of the CCS Directive. CCS, as will be discussed in the 
next section, is in a more advanced policy cycle than LNG, which is still in pre-review phase. 
It is therefore impossible to fully compare both cases in terms of effectiveness. However, 
the Clean Power for Transport does constitute a different approach from earlier (failed) 
attempts to reduce fuel emissions from transport activities. Furthermore, small-scale LNG is 
definitely not without its own hiccups. Of necessity, using new types of fuel constitutes a 
system change whereas applying CCS does not. While we can safely say that the governance 
of CCS thus far has largely been unsuccessful, the success of LNG seems more likely but 
cannot yet be ascertained. Table 7.1 summarises the thematic comparison of LNG and CCS.
Whereas governments were not at the initial drawing table when it came to CCS and 
small-scale LNG developments, they have hooked into the process early on. The short-term 
293  See also the timelines in chapters 5 and 6, which show how EU policies and implementation projects come up 
after a significant price change.
Table 7.1. Contextual differences between CCS and LNG
Theme CCS LNG
Origin Academia (long-term view) Private sector (short-term view)
Policy field of origin Climate policy Transport policy
Scale & impact - Local projects, global impact on 
climate
- ‘Game changer’ in fight against 
climate change
- International projects, local 
impact on air quality
- 8000fte in NL by 2030
Problem ownership Global (GHGs impact everyone on 
the planet)
Local (air quality, noise pollution)
Problem solution owner Heavy emitters (energy, industry) 
-> reluctant
Shipping companies -> reluctant, 
energy companies and port 
authorities -> willing
Source: author’s own composition.
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view associated with LNG is easier for governments to address than the long-term vision 
necessary for CCS, not in the least because of the democratic election cycle and the public 
accountability that goes with it294. To put it differently, of the ‘three Ps’ of sustainability 
— people, planet, profit — CCS is missing the aspect of profit. A discussion regarding the 
meaning of the origin is outside of the scope of this dissertation, but the struggle between 
short-term and long-term benefits definitely impacts governance mechanisms in both cases 
and is reviewed later in this chapter. For now, let’s zoom in on the impact of policy on both 
cases, as there are observed differences that require elaborating.
7.2. POLICY OBSERVATIONS
For the Port of Rotterdam Authority, LNG and CCS are an integral part of the ongoing 
development of Rotterdam Energy Port. Yet political steering is not in the hands of the 
port authority, and the private sector leans heavily on policy when planning investments. 
CCS originally came out of the Commission’s climate department (back then still part of 
DG ENV), which was small and lacked strength. Small-scale LNG came from the transport 
department, which has more stature and power through its TEN-T and CEF budgets. Even 
though both the development of CCS and small-scale LNG is in line with EU and national 
policy objectives, there is no ‘CCS policy’ or ‘LNG policy’ because governmental authorities 
want to be technology neutral and because developments happen at policy intersections 
with a different division of competences between governmental authorities: LNG moves 
in the intersection between energy, climate and transport policy while CCS operates at 
the intersection between energy, climate and industry. Within the European Commission 
these policy areas are part of different DGs (ENER, MOVE and ENTR) and it is no secret that 
bureaucratic dividing lines make holistic approaches difficult (Bache et al., 2015:12; Toke & 
Vezirgiannidou, 2013:544; Vogler, 2013:629). Therefore, even though both cases originated 
in one DG, they become trapped between the EC’s many silos with each pursuing their 
own interests and goals. Another factor is at play in the area of energy policy; the European 
Commission is ambitious, but largely powerless. Member states are driven by short-term 
considerations rather than by long-term strategic planning (Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 
2016:4), which implies that small-scale LNG may potentially be much more successful than 
CCS. The Netherlands, a country used to having gas fuel its economic motor, is especially 
294  It is difficult to ‘score’ politically with a CCS project when its impact is long-term and no citizen can observe it. 
Conversely, cleaner ships have already made the areas around the Rhine much cleaner, less noisy, and greener, 
which is something citizens can sense.
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interested in further developing LNG295. The EC’s entrepreneurship may slowly be pushing 
the EU towards a common energy policy, but we are not there yet. 
Current efforts can be reviewed in light of CCS and LNG. In both cases government represen-
tatives have stated that governments prefer to set targets, for example emission standards, 
and then let the market decide which technology to use to meet these standards. The 
question is whether this attitude is conducive to successfully combating climate change and 
developing Rotterdam Energy Port. At the very least, it could be helpful if governments make 
it clear which technologies will be supported for a certain amount of time. Imagine you run 
a business and it is unclear if your coal-fired power plant will still be allowed to operate ten 
years from now, are you likely to invest in expensive abatement technologies for it? Probably 
not. Clear policy regarding which goals the private sector should meet by 2030 is missing, 
but such timelines do drive investment decisions. Technology neutrality thus far therefore 
seems an argument devoid of consistent action. Setting vague, long-term CO2 reduction 
standards is not enough, especially not when experience shows that nothing happens when 
these standards are not met. Table 7.2 roughly summarises the EU’s current energy policy.
These broadly defined actions, coupled with directives such as the CCS Directive and Clean 
Power for Transport, are not necessarily in harmony with each other — for example, coal and 
gas are cheap and help diversify the EU’s energy mix but are not sustainable — and leave 
national authorities a lot of discretion. The European Commission is trying to harmonise 
policies across the EU in different ways. The CCS Directive was incorporated into the larger 
2020 Energy and Climate package and was a smart attempt by the EU to make its member 
states consider CCS in their national policy framework. This attempt did not fully succeed, 
however. Member states delayed the implementation of the CCS Directive — only one 
country had implemented it in time — and some made provisions barring CCS from their 
territory. The countries that did allow CCS, such as The Netherlands, have legal frameworks 
295  Germany, in contrast, is not convinced by the benefits of LNG and prefers to look at other alternative fuels such 
as hydrogen.
Table 7.2. EU energy policy is vague and sometimes contradictory
Goals Actions
Sustainable energy - Reducing CO2 
- Increasing energy efficiency
Affordable energy - Building an internal energy market
Secure energy - Building infrastructure 
- Diversifying energy supply
-  Reducing negative consequences of import dependency
Source: Schubert, Pollak & Kreutler, 2016:12-13.
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in place but no actual CCS projects that are running. The EU is now satisfied with the overall 
implementation of the CCS Directive, but it has not actually led to CCS being developed 
in the EU296. One does not build a kitchen to not cook in it. Deploying CCS was a clear 
ambition the Commission had and it can therefore be concluded that the governance of 
CCS has not been successful thus far. In the case of small-scale LNG, the Clean Power for 
Transport Directive is a loose-standing Directive, but it is aimed at policy harmonisation across 
the EU. Most notably, core ports in the TEN-T network are required to have LNG bunker 
points installed by 2030. Member states have to consider whether and how they want LNG 
to be part of their future fuels mix. Since the Directive is not past its due implementation 
date yet, it is too early to say whether this harmonisation attempt by the EU is successful or 
not. However, at least in The Netherlands LNG-fuelled ships are being built and retrofitted, 
and the CCNR and ADN Safety Committee have changed their regulations to allow for the 
transport of and sailing on LNG. The question remains whether this development will spread 
throughout the EU as per the ambition of DG MOVE, but its governance has thus far been 
more successful than the governance of CCS.
7.2.1. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Hard and Soft Coordination
The CCS case is a clear example of failure of soft coordination. Even substantive EU subsidy 
possibilities and the linking of CCS deployment to the ETS have not worked due to the 
low CO2 price. In fact, linking CCS and the ETS appears to have been detrimental to the 
deployment of carbon capture and storage, overshadowing the potential impact of the 
fairly operational CCS Directive. The use of CCS requires the establishment of a regulatory 
framework clearly depicting the roles and responsibilities of public and private authorities. 
Typically, the private sector would be responsible for the field in which carbon dioxide is 
stored, but a company will not want to maintain that responsibility for a long time after 
storage operations have ended. The transfer of the field to the stewardship of public authori-
ties brings with it legal risks and issues of risk sharing297. These processes are regulated by 
the CCS Directive and its national implementation, but as yet it is unclear what the actual 
ramifications are. As chapter 5 shows, the Directive is barely used in practice. Now, it appears 
that CCS may only develop through heavier investment from governments or through 
hard coordination: setting very strict standards such as emission performance standards or 
296  A subsequent review of the CCS Directive did bring to light articles which could be made stronger, but the EC 
chose not to do so and fight the battles worth fighting (interview 28).
297  See also box 5.6 in chapter 5.
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simply outlawing certain carbon-intensive activities without CCS298. The situation becomes 
extra problematic when low-carbon processes for currently carbon intensive industries, 
such as steel and cement production, are considered. These industries will, at least in the 
medium term299, likely have to implement CCS if we are to meet our climate ambitions. The 
chance of the EU being able to do so is slim due to the resistance of many member states 
which are coal-heavy, fear high implementation costs, want a level playing-field, or feel 
the need to protect their industries. The CCS Directive will only be useful if the domestic 
levels of governance adopt CCS. The Netherlands might be a promising adopter because 
of the potentially high contribution of CCS to the national CO2 reduction requirements. 
The Netherlands could be a test case for CCS; if it does not work there, it will not work 
elsewhere in the EU.
Another policy failure in the CCS case, thus far, was linking it to the carbon price under the 
ETS system300. Without going into the debate on whether the ETS actually works, it is clear 
that it does not currently incentivise CCS301. Changing the way the ETS works is difficult 
because of the way the European decision-making process works. It is also an example of 
how policy choices can be locked into a path from which it becomes difficult to stray. Path 
dependency may play a role in the potential future of CCS, since an expensive abatement 
technology may not further be developed in a situation with a low carbon price. This 
low carbon price is not necessarily a problem unless governments decide they want CCS 
to develop in their country. While the Dutch government could be criticised for vocally 
advocating CCS without employing all available means (such as a carbon tax) to make it 
happen, one could argue CCS might not be such a good idea if it will only happen through 
extreme governmental investment. Even so, for The Netherlands the mechanics of the ETS 
system have definitely presented problems for the Dutch ROAD CCS demonstration project. 
Small-scale LNG does not suffer from being locked into a European system of emissions 
trading. Rather, its price is linked to (global) gas prices. When natural gas is cheap, the private 
298  Another promising venue is to develop CCS through CCU applications to garner support and create a better 
business case.
299  A lot of research is being done into full electrification of industrial processes, but full implementation of such 
technologies is still very far away (timeline: 2050).
300  In short: the low carbon price under the EU ETS has a negative effect on business cases hinging on the price of 
carbon. Additionally, the NER 300 fund which was based on allowances taken out of the ETS drastically dropped 
in value when the CO2 price fell, leading to lower subsidies than previously anticipated. See chapter 5 section 
5.3.3.1 for more detailed information.
301  I am not claiming it should, but ETS currently thwarts the achievement of the EU’s ambitions regarding CCS 
demonstration projects.
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sector is more likely to invest in LNG. Here, however, we see that LNG has suffered from 
the low price of gasoline, making it unattractive to switch to expensive alternative fuels302. 
The LNG case thus far shows a very different picture; mere domestic coordination is simply 
impossible due to the international nature of transport. Small-scale LNG of necessity needs 
to be upscaled to the EU level, which is what has happened when DG MOVE launched its 
directive. The promise of domestic and EU funding for LNG projects has attracted multiple 
interested private parties, and LNG ships have started to be delivered to the market, albeit in 
low volumes. Steering of LNG infrastructure development through Clean Power for Transport 
is quite concrete even though the targets have yet to be implemented. The international 
nature of transport also makes coordination risky as multiple countries will depend on 
each other to build the required infrastructure for ships to refuel. Laggards can therefore 
thwart a large part of the process, which makes effective governance highly important. 
Whilst targeted LNG coordination is of a soft nature — the Directive leaves ample room for 
national authorities to do what they want — overall engine emissions have become hard 
targets through the NRMM Regulation. Any newly built engine will have to meet the NRMM 
standards by January 2017303, which could, slowly, further harmonise the way the inland 
shipping sector operates in the EU. With the requirement of complete adoption by national 
authorities, the Regulation harmonises the processes in the private sector by regulating 
engine manufacturing. Furthermore, stricter international sulphur regulations for maritime 
shipping are causing a move toward alternative fuels in the maritime sector as well. As the 
engine manufacturing of maritime and inland shipping is similar, a push in one sector also 
makes change in the other sector easier. Currently, the most promising outlook is to use 
LNG as fuel, but a lot of research is being done into the use of, for example, hydrogen and 
ammonia, as well. LNG is one of many options to make transport more sustainable whereas 
CCS seems to be one of few options to truly decarbonise energy and industry304. Yet when 
faced with a choice between being sustainable and being competitive and secure, govern-
ments may be prone to choose the latter (Skovgaard, 2014:2-5; Vogler, 2013:631-640).
Clearly, both soft and hard coordination have their own strengths and weaknesses, as 
outlined in table 7.3. Both types of coordination can be found in multi-level governance. 
Hard coordination illustrates the potentially tense interaction at domestic level, resulting in 
national governments preferring hard coordination to get their private and peripheral actors 
302  Market mechanisms are a natural part of business and therefore perhaps not as limiting as the ETS, which is partly 
imbalanced due to high subsidies given to renewable energy by governments.
303  Regulation (EU) 2016/1628.
304  Industry more so than energy, since the energy sector could theoretically rely fully on renewables if ways to store 
electricity efficiently are found so that the market can deal with the volatility of renewable energy.
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moving. Soft coordination illustrates the potentially tense interaction between the national 
and supranational level, granting opportunities to societal actors and subnational authorities 
in an effort to bypass their national government305. The coordination measures the EU is 
able to decide on relies heavily on the opinion of its member states and their readiness to 
give up (part of) their sovereignty to increase harmonisation of policies across the EU. These 
decisions are of a political nature and their consequences are that the implications of these 
decisions affect their implementation at the domestic level. In other words, power drives 
multi-level governance. Before delving into a discussion of how exactly power fits within the 
MLG framework, let us compare and contrast the conclusions of the CCS and LNG cases 
and review the theoretical expectations.
7.3. THE MULTI-LEVEL AND MULTI-ACTOR CONTEXT OF ROTTERDAM 
ENERGY PORT
What can be said about multi-level governance in a situation where policies are of a general 
nature and consensus regarding policy choices is lacking? The next three sections will address 
the theoretical expectations formulated earlier in this dissertation. A summary of the results 
per expectation is provided in table 7.4.
Looking at the CO2 and LNG hubs, the picture that arises is one where hierarchical relation-
ships between governmental authorities shift whilst horizontal governance reaffirms the 
authoritative position of the government. Multi-level governance of these climate-related 
305  More discussion on the link between soft/hard coordination and Piattoni’s MLG follows in 7.3.
Table 7.3. EU soft and hard coordination has pros and cons
Strengths Weaknesses
Soft EU coordination - Potential harmonisation through 
benchmarking and peer pressure
- Leaves room for flexibility in 
implementation, potentially 
increasing national legitimacy
- Can provide powerful incentives to 
private sector if the context is right
- Non-binding and non-enforceable
- Can lead to large differences in 
implementation across EU countries, 
making cross-border operations for 
businesses challenging
- Uncertain outcomes if tied to 
economics and market developments
Hard EU coordination - Binding
- Hard coordination in one sector can 
catalyse developments in another
- Clear choices made by government 
which the private sector can base 
decisions on
- Very difficult to achieve in climate 
and energy policies
- Often little room for flexibility in 
implementation (prone to high 
resistance) and can be rigid
- Often perceived as grandfathering by 
private sector (last resort)
Source: author’s own composition based on analysis of CCS and LNG cases.
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issues thus leads to a call for governments to perform their classic duty of directive policy-
making in addition to more horizontal governance. In order to be able to do so, governments 
need to cooperate with non-governmental actors due to information imbalances and for 
implementation purposes. Both horizontal and vertical aspects of governing remain strong. 
We have also seen that the far-reaching blurring of state and society, as Piattoni defines it306, 
does not resonate strongly in both cases even though linkages and cooperations between 
public and private partners are flowering due to their interdependence. For the CCS case, 
the centre - periphery shift caused no real empowerment of local actors when policy choices 
at the EU level led to unintended effects. For LNG the effect is the other way around: 
supranational activity has enabled regional empowerment and efficiency. The axis with the 
highest impact, then, seems to be the domestic - international shift. As the EU increasingly 
tries to harmonise climate and energy policies across its member states, domestic actors 
invariably turn towards the EU for funding. Legitimising EU activity in this way leads to the 
creation of directives and project initiatives such as ROAD and the LNG Masterplan. The EU 
component is engrained in these projects — and therefore developments as a whole — by 
virtue of its participation in formulation and funding phases, bringing peripheral actors in 
direct contact with EU officials.
National governments, while still quite autonomous with respect to their energy policies, 
place themselves in the situation where they seem to accept EU harmonisation attempts in 
return for the funding of projects carried out domestically. In the Dutch case, these projects 
feed into the formulation of national policy but the government does not seem to formulate 
a strong vision of its own. For example, the Dutch CCS vision hinges on the completion 
of the ROAD project, which is a relatively meagre policy vision. When the EU is not able 
to further developments through soft coordination and member states block far-reaching 
coordination, peripheral actors quickly lose their potential efficiency. The next three sections 
discuss the results for both CCS and LNG per theoretical expectation.
7.3.1. Policy Coordination Across Multiple Levels of Government?
Whereas both cases are developments that started within The Netherlands prior to being 
adopted by the EU, now it is clear that the EU acts as the main regulator in an effort to 
harmonise policy across the EU-28. Sustainable development is more than technology alone; 
the element of how it is organised is extremely important307. Since both small-scale LNG 
306  Blurring of state and society is, according to Piattoni (2010), a situation in which private parties assume public 
responsibilities and public parties act like private groups.
307  The orgware versus techware discussion as discussed in chapter 1 (section 1.3.2).
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and CCS are intertwined with other policy fields it is easier for the European Commission 
to grasp these developments due to established competence in, for example, climate policy. 
For transport (and thus small-scale LNG) Commission activity is more logical than for CCS 
due to the cross-border nature of transport. The small-scale LNG case has shown on multiple 
occasions that international coordination is necessary and that national governments have no 
choice but to aggregate at a higher level of governance. Even the global level of governance 
is involved due to regulations surrounding the transport and trade of waste products (fe. 
CO2), or the carriage of dangerous goods on ships (LNG). The CCS Directive was smartly 
incorporated into the larger Climate and Energy 2020 package by the European Commission, 
allowing for its relatively easy adoption in 2009. National authorities were most likely perfectly 
capable of legislating CCS-related issues on their own, so making the directive part of a 
package everyone wanted allowed for an expansion of competences for the Commission. 
The opinion DG CLIMA is now allowed to give on storage permits is one such example, 
though it has not been used much due to the unforeseen lack of CCS projects. The same 
goes for the Clean Power for Transport Directive, which allows for the Commission to dabble 
in its member states’ national energy mix by virtue of its attempt to make transport more 
sustainable. The EU’s harmonisation efforts in both cases have hinged on soft coordination 
by getting directives adopted and providing funding for projects; the first bastions the 
Commission turns to when formal competences are lacking. The LNG case again shows that 
such an approach makes more sense there than for CCS; investing in infrastructure to better 
connect parts of Europe provides a more convincing story than investing in highly contested 
CCS demonstration projects, where local support is paramount. Still, the Commission and 
Dutch government were able to find interested partners to provide additional funding for 
ROAD, which could be seen as a step towards harmonisation of goals308.
The domestic level supports policy and regulation made internationally by incorporating 
both developments in domestic energy policy, most notably the Energieakkoord. However, 
no real CCS or LNG targets are set in the Energieakkoord, which leads to the conclusion 
that the government is supporting the developments but not actively steering towards their 
completion. The ROAD case may be the exception because it could play a prominent role in 
Dutch national CO2 reduction ambitions up to 2020. Using LNG as fuel fits within the Dutch 
aspirations of continuing to be a gas hub, which was initially enabled by Slochteren gas and 
has been a source of revenue for many years. However, a measure of enforcement is lacking, 
even in the CCS case where the coal fired power plants initially were built with the private 
sector promising to capture and store CO2. The municipal government was most avid in 
attempting to force the companies to make good on their promise, but was not supported 
308  Also ‘excuses’ countries such as Germany from investing into CCS in their own territory, making it a highly political 
move.
The Governance of Rotterdam Energy Port 225
by the province. The city of Rotterdam is also hardly involved in policy-making surrounding 
LNG and CCS and its efforts to get CCS going in the port area have essentially failed.
While the LNG case does not show great NGO activity, the CCS case does. CCS is seen as 
a ‘game changer’ in humanity’s combat against climate change, with bodies such as IEA 
and IPCC advocating serious consideration of CCS in countries with feasible storage sites. 
Overall, there does not seem to be a spreading out of policy coordination over several 
governmental tiers, but rather a concentration of policy-making efforts at EU-level, which 
goes through already established channels, is supported by the national government in the 
interest of a level playing-field and at the same time slowed down in the interest of national 
sovereignty. For small-scale LNG it appears EU coordination might work, but for CCS it is 
clear that European coordination has actually led to a crippling of domestic efforts. The 
domestic - international shift therefore impacts both cases differently. Currently it looks 
like more European harmonisation on CCS will be unlikely, unless a convincing argument 
regarding the level playing-field can be made. While the EU can regulate ship engine 
emissions through the NRMM — and thereby impact the business case for LNG — it does 
not seem likely that a CCS requirement will get past the EU’s decision-making process.
7.3.2. The Potential of Local Clusters Versus Centralised Authority
Peripheral activity has — so far — not been effective in the CCS case. The municipality of 
Rotterdam was not empowered enough309 to carry out its ambitions regarding CCS and CO2 
reduction even though, politically, it was important for the city to succeed. Between the local 
government and the national government (including the province) there have been tensions 
regarding political views on whether coal-fired power plants can be forced to employ CCS. 
These tensions between domestic governmental authorities provide a confusing picture 
for business, which can be used to further their own interests by, for example, adopting 
a reactive attitude. However, the national government has also been lobbying other EU 
member states to help fund the ROAD project through the European Eranet-ACT fund, 
which is quite unique as a development. 
Absent hard targets for CCS deployment (governments want to be technology neutral), 
centralised steering is visible through EU-wide soft coordination. The EC is trying to get a 
grip on the situation by offering assistance through Eranet-ACT. However, its attempt to 
further refine the CCS Directive has not been taken up by national governments. Linking 
CCS to the carbon price under the ETS curiously makes CCS a market-driven technology that, 
309  Note that this conclusion is mostly based on the perception of interviewed experts, as stated in chapter 3.
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unless other measures are taken, will only work if the EU changes the pricing mechanism 
behind the ETS or adjusts its market reserve. In the CCS case the centre has thus spread out 
towards EU institutions. Domestic actors look at the EU to ‘do something’, creating a new 
centre at the supranational level. Still, national governments remain pivotal yet also limited 
by international agreements. In both cases a domestic push is difficult, yet not impossible, 
to make without EU-wide activity. Mutual interdependencies create the necessity to govern 
across multiple hierarchical levels and with non-governmental actors, yet at the same time 
this is difficult because of differing interests, global pressures, and market mechanisms.
In the LNG case one interesting observation is that once the (European!) centre put in place 
favourable conditions for small-scale LNG to develop, the periphery could take up activities 
and govern from there, which supports Piattoni’s argument regarding the efficiency of 
decentralised authorities yet shows that they need a favourable context to be efficient. The 
port cluster in Rotterdam has a good position to further stimulate LNG due to the availability 
of both supply and demand. The PoR is able to incentivise the switch to this fuel by providing 
discounts on port dues. Yet the difficult financial situation the shipping sector currently is in 
counteracts the ability of the local level to act decisively. Furthermore, the LNG Masterplan 
project was most successful in the Rotterdam region but failed to deliver in the regions 
around the Danube river. Local conditions therefore do matter in the process of governance 
and local authorities definitely have a decisive role to play. In Rotterdam, the central role 
of the EU did not create blocking tensions with the periphery. However, whereas most of 
the actual activities are local due to the local nature of projects, local empowerment is only 
limited. The authority of the centre is often needed to establish rules and provide funding 
instruments (cf. Smith 2007). In short, the periphery can be efficient, but it is dependent 
on other levels of governance.
7.3.3. Horizontal Public and Private Governance
The many cross-linkages observed between the public and private sector appear to be 
crucial in both the LNG and CO2 hub. This finding corresponds with authors who claim that, 
especially in the area of sustainability and the combat against climate change, the state 
needs society to govern effectively (cf. Piattoni, 2010, but also Tortola’s (2017) challenge). 
Governmental authorities cannot manage the transition towards a more sustainable society 
on their own because they are hardly the ones emitting polluting gases. The same goes for 
the PoR which owns the land upon which companies are vested; the actual emitters. It is 
therefore heavily dependent on those emitters to reach climate goals. This situation places 
the PoR in a facilitating role with its power mainly centred on its ability to bring parties 
together. The mutual interdependencies are perhaps clearer in the case of small-scale LNG 
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due to the nature of transport. For CCS, interdependencies appear to be of a more political 
nature with actors questioning the logic of paying for an expensive technology that lets 
others free-ride (making it a classic collective action problem). Especially the municipality 
of Rotterdam, leaning on its agreement with Engie and Uniper to use CCS in their new 
coal-fired power plants, was unable to pressure the companies to invest more because it 
lacked support from the province and national government. The financial resources spent 
on realising municipal CCS goals has made its realisation a political priority, although many 
negative opinions regarding CCS were also voiced in the Council. Power — and its limita-
tions — is an important factor when looking at the slow progress towards the CO2 hub.
In terms of the other key concept in this part, the blurring of state and society, very few 
examples were found. Since both cases exemplify a highly technological development, 
governments need to be informed by the private sector in their policy-making process. They 
need to know what is feasible and what is not. The other way around there is quite heavy 
involvement of the Dutch national government (and the PoR) at European level, lobbying to 
get favourable conditions to further develop both LNG and CCS. Remember that both cases 
were already ‘going on’ in The Netherlands prior to EU involvement, which cannot be said for 
many other countries. The Netherlands is therefore trying to be a front-runner (or, in Börzel’s 
terms: a ‘pace-setter’) and exert influence through its experience with developing CCS and 
small-scale LNG. The cross-linkages between the public and private sectors only partly lead 
to the blurring of state and society as defined by Piattoni. The mutual interdependencies 
appear to be key drivers in developing the Energy Port, but the sectors mostly perform their 
traditional tasks. Interestingly, in the problematic CCS case there may be a breakthrough only 
because the national government lobbied other governments to close the funding gap of 
the ROAD project; an example of public actor behaving like a private one. Both cases show 
clear influences from non-governmental actors and a shift from governing as a state to 
governing with society, yet for LNG the regulatory part has been so important that its shift 
is somewhat more limited. The state does need society to govern effectively, if only because 
governments are not where the practical solution to the climate change problem lies and 
because they are economically and socially dependent on the private sector. The reverse 
is also true. Multi-level governance theorists should therefore not ignore this dimension.
7.3.4. Shifts in Multi-level Governance; an Explanation
Based on the above, a conclusion can be drawn regarding the three theoretical expectations 
formulated earlier (summarised in table 7.5). Very clear is that the analysis has not confirmed 
the initial expectations entirely. Most notably the second expectation (taking place in the 
centre - periphery dimension of MLG) was found to be impacted by the domestic - interna-
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tional dimension in such a way that the periphery could only use its potential effectiveness 
with the right domestic and international context in place. However, the EU context had a 
different impact across both cases. Whereas in the CCS case EU coordination crippled the 
effectiveness of the PoR and the city of Rotterdam, in the small-scale LNG case it empowered 
them. A regional project such as the LNG Masterplan benefited greatly from the support of 
local authorities. In that sense Piattoni’s claim that regional authorities potentially are more 
efficient than national authorities holds merit but needs to be analysed in the wider context 
of MLG; the three dimensions influence one another. The first expectation found additional 
factors that stimulate international interdependencies: nation states willingly maintaining and 
creating the need for supranational coordination and global market developments. Especially 
in the area of energy, where markets are of a global nature, the market developments are 
of paramount importance on the political possibilities at domestic and EU level. Lastly, the 
third theoretical expectation did not resonate strongly due to Piattoni’s very far-reaching 
definition of blurring of state and society, however the cross-linkages between public and 
private actors were found to be crucial elements of the governance of CCS and LNG due 
Table 7.5. Case study conclusions per theoretical expectation
Theoretical expectation Conclusions
Actors create interdependencies between 
business, civil society, and government on an 
international level, which necessitates policy 
coordination at not only the national level but 
also the supranational level
-> The PoR is one of many actors active at 
international level because the policy solutions 
the PoR needs cannot be provided at national 
level alone
Interdependencies are ample but coordination mostly 
goes through already established channels, and 
the analyses identified two other factors leading to 
policy coordination: nation states willingly doing so 
and global market developments
-> Due to level playing-field concerns and the 
international nature of transport, the PoR needs not 
just Dutch policy but also EU policy and is therefore 
active at international level
Regional coordination in territorial matters 
is more efficient than national coordination, 
which leads to the strengthening of local policy 
actors
-> PoR is empowered due to being able 
to employ its resources effectively when 
stimulating activities in Rotterdam
Regional coordination is potentially efficient yet 
impacted by the conditions laid down by higher 
levels of government, so it is partially dependent on 
the impact of the domestic - international shift
-> PoR is a powerful local actor but heavily 
dependent on others to make change happen, can 
function as catalyst for the region
Cross-linkages between private and public 
actors lead to private parties assuming public 
responsibilities and public parties acting like 
private groups
-> PoR develops economic activity in 
cooperation with the private sector and 
advocates its interests at EU level alongside 
Dutch governmental actors to obtain favourable 
policy conditions
Partly (no far-reaching blurring), but the connection 
between the public and private sector is crucial
-> PoR is heavily linked to both governmental and 
private sector actors and is active at EU level as well 
to obtain funding for projects and influence EU 
policies. However, it is mainly heard on port-specific 
topics (and not energy topics)
Source: author’s own composition.
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to resource interdependencies. These cross-linkages are not necessarily caused by MLG: 
they are an intrinsic part of it.
Actors are present in multiple — if not all — dimensions of MLG. It therefore makes sense 
to look at the interplay between the dimensions to see whether agency in one dimension 
impacts another. In Piattoni’s (2010:85) terms, three mechanisms that could be observed are: 
1) Mobilisation of civil society at the international level (interplay of domestic - international 
and state - society); 
2) Mobilisation of subnational authorities at the international level (interplay of domestic 
- international and centre - periphery); 
3) Mobilisation of civil society at the subnational level (interplay of state - society and 
centre - periphery).
The empirical chapters have discussed mobilisation of subnational authorities and civil 
society as part of the theoretical framework. Based on the findings, a conclusion (see table 
7.6) can be drawn regarding how the intersections between the three dimensions can 
either be mutually reinforcing, neutral, or counterproductive.
Multi-level governance enlarges each actor’s arena stretching it from the local level to the 
supranational level. In doing so, it creates both opportunities for goal-attainment and ten-
sions. These tensions between the multiple dimensions of governance are intrinsic to MLG. 
Agendas do not always line up across the EU-28, between the EC and national governments, 
within nation states, and between private actors and the public sector. For example, the EU 
is pushing member states (domestic - international) to reach the Europe 2020 climate goals 
and trying to get domestic governments to consider the role of CCS and alternative fuels as 
means to reach these goals. The Dutch government sees opportunities to continue its position 
as gas-exporting country and acknowledges the Dutch potential for underground CO2 
storage. Yet public opinion (state - society) is not on its side regarding CCS, which politicians 
are keen to take into account. Stimulating CCS through extensive financing may therefore 
not be politically viable at national or local level, so a European lobby is set up (invisible to 
the regular citizen) to generate more funding (centre - periphery). In short, governance is 
organised at specific levels in order to deal with the tensions between governance levels most 
effectively, yet its results are not necessarily effective. The mechanism that can be observed 
here is that actors are present in more than one dimension of governance, and therefore 
their agency impacts what happens across the governance spectrum. This interdependency 
between levels of governance lies at the core of MLG. 
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Figure 7.1 shows the difference between the observed shifts in governance in the CCS and 
LNG case. Implicitly the figure also shows the tensions engrained in multi-level governance. 
Most significant are the differences between the domestic - international and centre - periph-
ery dimensions. LNG was concluded to be Europeanised by virtue of its transnational nature. 
CCS, on the other hand, merely shows a symbolic shift with the relatively inconsequential CCS 
Directive. Whereas small-scale LNG benefits greatly from the Rotterdam region mobilising 
to adopt the fuel, mobilisation for CCS was crippled by international agreements and other 
external factors. Apparently the centre - periphery shift strongly influences governance 
outcomes, though as discussed earlier, it is influenced heavily by its supranational context. 
The state - society dimension has similar results for both cases, however in the CCS case a 
negative public opinion counteracts the mobilisation efforts of other parts of civil society. 
Table 7.6. Dimensions of MLG can reinforce or block developments 
Interplay between 
intersection MLG dimensions
CCS LNG
Mobilisation of civil society 
at international level 
(domestic - international & 
state - society)
Neutral
- Mobilisation mostly in research 
and discussion platforms (fe., 
ZEP)
- Diverse civil society advocacy 
(both positive and negative)
- EU funding for demonstration 
attracts private sector and 
subnational authorities
- PoR can partially influence 
processes (good support for 
projects)
Neutral
- Low focus on IWT within 
civil society, but their overall 
mobilisation benefits the case
- MS sovereign to choose fuel 
mix, so national level remains an 
important focus
- EU funding for cross-border 
projects attracts private sector 
and subnational authorities
- PoR can partially influence 
processes (good for projects)
Mobilisation of subnational 
authorities at the 
international level (domestic 
- international & centre - 
periphery)
Counterproductive
- EU ETS disables decentralised 
governments and peripheral 
activity
- Solution seen as a matter for 
national governments & EU
- PoR no influence on processes 
(cannot change EU ETS)
Mutually reinforcing
- Complementary competencies 
between EU and regional level
- Periphery can be efficient, foster 
regional projects down the Rhine 
with EU support
- PoR good influence on processes 
(good for projects)
Mobilisation of civil society 
at subnational level (state - 
society & centre - periphery)
Counterproductive
- Regional cooperation started off 
well but suffered from infighting 
later (uncertainty!)
- Low financial means at city level, 
so private sector also negotiates 
with other authorities
- PoR can partially influence 
processes (infrastructure 
development)
Mutually reinforcing
- Good cooperation in Rotterdam 
region
- Rotterdam as small-scale LNG 
showcase
- Temporary exemptions stimulate 
first adopters
- PoR good influence on processes 
(infrastructure adjustments)
Source: author’s own composition based on empirical cases (chapters 5 and 6).
The Governance of Rotterdam Energy Port 231
The exact way in which the dimensions of MLG would be expressed in both cases could 
not be predicted using the MLG framework310. The predictive value of MLG appears to be 
limited to predicting that shifts in governance happen through participation of supranational 
institutions, but their exact size, strength and consequences can vary. MLG can identify 
differences between outcomes of governance and provide tentative explanations, especially 
since CCS is an example of failed governance and LNG is not (or not yet). In-depth case 
studies are therefore very valuable in uncovering what truly happens, and why it happens, 
in EU governance. The theoretical expectations have been useful searchlights for empirical 
analysis, though they work differently in both cases. The logic of retroductive research begs 
for a reflection on their ability to find what the ‘real’ mechanisms driving a case are. To do 
so, the secondary findings regarding power and uncertainty need to be reviewed in light of 
MLG since they provide the means to understand multi-level governance.
310  I did not expect it to be, since it is my belief that theories within social sciences cannot predict human behaviour.
O
Domestic - international dimension
Centre - periphery dimension
State - society dimension
CCS
LNG
Figure 7.1. Governance shifts in the CCS and LNG cases along dimensions of MLG
Source: author’s own composition based on empirical work (chapters 5 and 6).
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7.4. POWER AND UNCERTAINTY IN MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
Piattoni’s treatise on MLG is infused with power, though much of it is implicit. The importance 
of power and uncertainty for the explanation given in this dissertation begs for a review of 
the role of these concepts within the theoretical framework. For CCS, which has already 
gone through a policy-making process, the implementation phase showed unsuccessful 
peripheral governance, effectively undercutting one of MLG’s claims. Furthermore, the 
impact of the domestic - international shift is different for both analysed cases. For LNG 
supranational coordination is needed, whereas CCS does not necessarily benefit from it. 
The multi-level governance of small-scale LNG has shown that, when the supranational level 
provides enabling incentives, local conditions matter for policy implementation. The private 
sector is both waiting for supranational governments to provide a long-term vision upon 
which investment decisions can be based and simultaneously thwarted or enabled by the 
results of this very same supranational coordination. The explanatory value of the role of 
uncertainty and power in these processes is discussed next. Both concepts warrant special 
attention due to their importance for the explanation given in this dissertation whilst not 
having been explicitly included in the theoretical framework established in chapter two.
7.4.1. Uncertainty Guides Decision-making in a Volatile Energy and Climate 
Context
Climate change is often mentioned as the prime example of a (super) wicked problem (cf. 
Lazarus, 2009; Levin et al., 2012; Maréchal & Lazaric, 2010; Webster, 2008). Lacking an easy 
test for a potential solution and a way of knowing precisely how our society will be affected 
by climate change, decision-makers are constrained by the choice they have to make between 
short-term gain (for example, economic gain) and the long-term gain of preventing climate 
change (Levin et al., 2012:126-128). In other words, affordable and secure energy (two 
of the pillars of European energy policy) currently are more rewarding than the uncertain 
benefits of sustainable energy and therefore easier to reach on the short term. Since it is 
uncertain how (quickly) sustainable technologies will develop, governments are hard-pressed 
to make policies for a future they cannot predict. Both the CCS and LNG cases have seen 
policy-makers reluctant to make a choice, fearing that these transition technologies will lock 
in future developments and thereby thwart more sustainable technologies. Various authors 
have written about regulatory risk, uncertain climate policies and technological uncertainty. 
Important findings are that regulatory risk is taken into account by the private sector when 
making decisions (cf. Barbose et al., 2008), that unproven technologies, such as CCS, 
substantially increase the price tags of CO2 mitigation, making it an issue for governments 
to consider (cf. Hoffman & Szklo, 2011), and that a price floor in the EU ETS would spur 
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low-carbon investments (cf. Brauneis et al., 2013). These findings show how society, in a 
broad sense, needs to be incorporated into state activities.
Rather than accepting that technological progress is inherently uncertain and that policy-
makers can therefore not make good long-term choices, Levin et al. (2012:128) actually 
make a plea for policy-makers to lock-in future preferences promoting sustainability which 
can steer subsequent action as society tries to reach them. For example, developing LNG-
powered ships is beneficial on the short term and could be made more sustainable in the 
future through the use of bio-LNG. Likewise, CCS could develop into CCU (using the carbon 
instead of storing it) in the future, which contributes to a greener chemistry sector. Having 
sustainability as one of three pillars of EU energy policy is not necessarily enough to lock in 
future preferences. Agreements based on emission limits linked to target time periods, such 
as the EU’s 2050 Roadmap and COP-21, fit within such an approach but the main challenge 
is how to plot the path that will help reach those targets in time.
The analysis of CCS and LNG shows that both cases are embedded in a context of high 
uncertainty, though these uncertainties seem to be addressed much more (effectively) in 
the LNG case than in the CCS case. Policies are unclear, the financial aspects are worrying 
at best, and technological development is unpredictable. Without arguing that ‘everything 
is governance’, the uncertainties that were identified in both cases311 are issues for and 
of governance (at multiple levels) (cf. Moser, 2009:31) but also because of governance 
(Levin et al., 2012). Actors expect something of each other and are also uncertain about 
outcomes. Mutual gain can lead to breakthroughs and cooperation, such as what happened 
with the LNG trucks of Albert Heijn. Yet uncertainty also blocks major changes by virtue of 
being unpredictable; governance is bounded by previous paths chosen by policy-makers 
and private parties alike. Path dependency is an interesting and much debated concept 
in political science and public administration literature (cf. Kay, 2005; Levin et al., 2012; 
Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Pierson, 2000). Its narrow conception of the effect of increasing 
returns argues that the benefits of an intervention, once introduced, can increase over 
time (Levin et al., 2012:135). Policy-makers have a tendency to choose the pathway that 
provides the most apparent benefits on the short term, which potentially undermines future 
efforts to devise clean energy policies and benefit from increasing returns. However, as 
the previous paragraph argued, this argument can be turned around by locking in future 
preferences312. Current obstacles for desirable developments can be used as input for policy. 
As chapters five and six show, these obstacles often exist in conditions of high uncertainty. 
311  Tables 5.6 and 6.7.
312  One would need to know what the ‘no regret’ options are; options that do not lock in undesirable technologies in 
the future or that appear in multiple desirable scenarios.
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Table 7.7 discusses the relationship between uncertainty and governance for both cases and 
is based on desk research and how interviewed experts responded to the question what 
CCS and LNG, respectively, need to develop further. In effect, it extends tables 5.6 and 6.7 
by formulating requirements to solve each hurdle mentioned in the empirical chapters and 
discussing the origin of each potential solution. The conclusion that can be drawn from 
this table is that uncertainty impacts all levels of governance. Especially in the CCS case 
uncertainty is not being taken away by those in power. Delayed activity in one dimension 
of MLG can thwart activity in the other two dimensions as well. In other words, the EU’s 
harmonisation efforts can be stalled when other actors in multi-level governance do not 
act in the interest of removing uncertainties.
Both cases show that underlying uncertainties have to be solved in close cooperation between 
public and private actors at multiple hierarchical levels. Especially the horizontal dimension 
of MLG — the network-based interactions between state and society — benefits from a 
closer look at the influence of uncertainty. However, the concept of (policy) uncertainty 
itself is not part of the traditional MLG framework. This chapter has discussed how the 
lack of a long-term vision causes private parties to delay investment, preferring to wait for 
clear signs from governments. Taking away such uncertainties is extremely important when 
considering the longevity of the investments involved in CCS and small-scale LNG; they are 
not technologies to be installed for 2-3 years. The PoR’s vision of a CO2 hub implies the 
creation of appropriate infrastructure to facilitate CO2 flows, and even though pipelines can 
often be repurposed, the PoR likely will not invest in the infrastructure if projects are lacking. 
However, both CCS and LNG projects are also lacking due to the absence of infrastructure, 
creating a chicken-egg problem. For example, linking the installation of carbon capture 
systems to the building of infrastructure is what the demonstration phase is about (besides 
showing that the technology works and improving its cost-effectiveness), and companies 
expect public (financial) support for demonstration projects. That, in turn, requires a long-
term vision with regards to a country’s future energy mix. Careful deliberation between the 
public and private sector can go a long way to remove uncertainties and, in turn, lock in 
desirable preferences for the future.
Multi-level governance, in practical terms, can be a good answer to uncertainty due to its 
inclusiveness; the hybridity observed in European governance has the potential to include 
relevant actors at the right time and for the right reasons (the path dependent logic of 
increasing returns). It can ensure initial support for developments upon which other initia-
tives can build. In this sense, the European Commission’s focus on harmonising preferred 
policy options is a step towards ensuring that domestic developments occur according to 
a predefined logic. Assuming that governmental decision-making regarding energy and 
climate policy is not of a radical nature, the EU can theoretically build the foundation of a 
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Table 7.7. Solving CCS and LNG problems requires multiple governance levels
CCS
Requirement Origin of solution Uncertainty solved
(Long-term) vision on climate and 
energy and its implementation, with 
consideration of CCS
National and 
supranational level
Lack of political will, lack of long-term 
vision, fossil fuel lock-in fears, funding 
problems
Higher carbon price and ETS reform Supranational level 
(backed by national 
level)
Low carbon price, cost of CCS, 
funding problems
CCS demonstration All levels (private + 
public sector)
Unclear benefits due to 
underdeveloped technology, safety 
concerns
Global agreements and a level playing 
field
Supranational and 
global level
Level playing field lacking, CCS cost
Deliberation between public and 
private sector
All levels (private + 
public sector)
Lack of long-term vision, lobby against 
CCS
Government acting as coordinator and 
mediator
Local and national 
level
Lack of long-term vision, lobby against 
CCS
CCS in the industry All levels (private + 
public sector)
Unclear benefits
LNG
Requirement Origin of solution Uncertainty solved
(Long-term) vision on climate and 
energy and its implementation, with 
clear emission norms
Supranational and 
national level
Mindsets, intra-governmental 
competition, unclear long-term policy 
priorities
Re-evaluation of financial mechanisms 
facilitating small-scale LNG uptake, 
subsidies
Local, national 
supranational level 
(and banks)
LNG is expensive, problems in inland 
shipping sector, long lifespan of ships, 
meeting market needs
More R&D for LNG engines 
(standardisation*)
All levels (private + 
public sector)
Methane slip, actual emissions, LNG is 
expensive
Deliberation between public and 
private sector
All levels (private + 
public sector)
Infrastructure lacking, meeting needs 
of market, unclear long-term policy 
priorities
Facilitation of small-scale LNG 
development through law
Supranational and 
national level
Unclear long-term policy priorities
International small-scale LNG uptake All levels (private + 
public sector)
Infrastructure lacking, LNG 
is expensive, mindsets, price 
development and geopolitics
Private sector needs to be willing to 
pay
Private sector LNG is expensive, mindsets
Source: interviews, each requirement has been mentioned by at least five people interviewed for both cases, also found 
in consulted documents. *Currently, every LNG installation is uniquely tailor-made to fit the LNG ship. Standardisation of 
LNG systems could help reduce costs associated with retrofitting ships, although it is difficult to achieve. Standardisation 
of newly built LNG ships is probably easier and will be available in the (near) future. 
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European sustainable energy policy which will incrementally harmonise the policies of its 
members (path dependency) and reduce uncertainty. The link with power is discussed next.
7.4.2. EU Governance: Zero Sum Versus Non-zero Sum
Chapter two discussed scholarly critique on multi-level governance, one argument being 
that MLG lacks an adequate conceptualisation of power. Piattoni claims MLG has attention 
for the contested nature of power by virtue of being sensitive to power shifts between 
actors engaging in governance (ie., actors do not necessarily pool their resources to work 
towards a shared goal), and due to its focus on the importance of non-governmental actors 
rebalancing the power of the state due to their inclusion in the formulation of solutions to 
societal problems. Curry also states that power and multi-level governance are “inextricably 
linked” (Curry, 2015). This section looks at the role of power within MLG more closely and 
uses the empirical cases and policy context as input for a review of how power fits within 
Piattoni’s MLG framework. Does Piattoni adequately take it on board — and does power 
indeed fit intrinsically within MLG — or is further conceptualisation necessary?
Weber’s notion of A having power over B if A can make B do something they otherwise would 
not have done is one of the most classic conceptualisations of power. Such power is relative 
and presents a zero sum game where one actor’s power gain means another actor’s power 
has decreased (Fuchs et al., 2016:4). However, the EU’s celebration of multi-level governance 
(cf. the White Paper on European Governance313) exemplifies its belief that collaborative 
action leads to win-win situations (a non-zero sum game). Applying this thought to energy 
and climate policies, one could argue that the Commission believes that harmonising energy 
and climate policy by ensuring affordable, competitive and sustainable energy, will benefit 
all member states. Aside from remarking that these three goals are mutually conflicting at 
times, why are member states so protective of their own energy policies? And why is local 
empowerment not more prominent, as expected by MLG? The European Commission can 
only do so much until it hits the wall of national interests and political pressures. These 
national interests are two-faced: national governments have a national EU interest, but also 
a domestic interest guided by domestic opinion and the election cycle. These two types 
of national interest are not necessarily the same. What works well to say in the EU (fe., 
Dutch pace-setting in climate talks) does not always work well at home (The Netherlands as 
gas country has economic dynamics preventing dogged investment into renewables). The 
ever-changing willingness of national governments to harmonise policies across the EU and 
the differing impact of EU-level agreements on potential local efficiency is not sufficiently 
313  COM(2001) 428 final. Mentioned in bibliography as 2001b.
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covered by non-zero sum logic. We have to consider power in a zero sum way to understand 
the full picture of the effects of EU climate and energy policies on governance in the Port 
of Rotterdam. 
7.4.3. Power as an Intrinsic Part of Multi-level Governance
Both the LNG and CO2 hub have shown that, unsurprisingly, power matters. The CCS case 
has been severely impacted by the polarisation of the debate surrounding not just the 
technology, but the status of coal-fired power plants in general. It is therefore not viewed as 
a neutral technology but often described as the last straw available to coal-fired power plant 
owners to keep their plants open. On the other side of the debate there are proponents who 
argue for the urgency of CCS for both the energy and industry sectors. Its corresponding 
directive was part of trade-offs at the EU level, with funding for CCS projects only being an 
option through NER 300 and EEPR with the addition of funding for renewables as well. The 
EC reasoned that collaborative action throughout the EU would net multiple CCS projects 
and decrease overall EU CO2 emissions. Eventually, renewable projects were funded and 
carried out whereas CCS has not happened. Considering the consensus needed to change 
EU mechanisms already in place, CCS is now stuck in a European level system (ETS) that is 
difficult to change. Furthermore, CCS is not in the political interest of every EU member. A 
consideration of how power works in governance is therefore even more important when 
comparing countries. 
There is one argument often mentioned by national governments which could spur a new 
round of EU coordination in the CCS case: the level playing-field. Especially now that CCS is 
being considered for industrial purposes rather than as a hot prospect for the power sector, 
the private sector and governments alike are worried about potential carbon leakage314. 
This dissertation will not delve into actual carbon leakage risks, but the level playing-field 
argument does discourage national governments from being overly strict with their climate 
demands. An argument is therefore often made to at least coordinate such issues at the EU 
level, or preferably even at the global level through international conferences such as COP-21. 
A legal CCS requirement at the EU level is not unthinkable. Yet any move into the direction of 
energy policy harmonisation touches upon MS competency, so the EU would need a politically 
favourable situation like the one it enjoyed during the negotiations of the 2020 package. 
Back then the EU was supported by organisations such as IPCC and IEA, who painted dark 
314  If countries or the EU increase production prices for heavy industries by requiring CCS or increasing the carbon 
price, these industries might pack their bags and go elsewhere where climate policies are lax and they can produce 
more cheaply.
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pictures of the world’s future and giving EU coordination momentum. Furthermore, the EU 
can frame decarbonisation strategies, such as CCS, under the environmental banner where 
it has a more established competence. It is quite likely that such an initiative would only be 
viable through extensive cooperation and coordination in a multi-level governance setting, 
but power relations will play a major role in the deliberations.
Intra-EC tensions regarding the importance of clean power for transport, such as LNG, show 
that sustainability is not necessarily seen as a non-zero sum game, hindering the EC’s win-win 
approach based on collaboration. Tensions also arise when national governments feel that 
the EU is encroaching on their right to decide on their energy mix for themselves. Their 
quest for autonomy often leads to level playing-field arguments. Having a regulation such 
as NRMM (non-road mobile machinery) in place makes it clear to all engine manufacturers 
what the acceptable parameters for their engines are. Still, the LNG case showed how the 
Dutch government used its position to advocate for a more stringent norm, which hurt its 
relationship with the PoR and ultimately was defeated when other member states would 
not go along with the Dutch proposal. This example shows how Dutch agency has led to 
domestic and supranational tensions, which could be viewed as a logical occurrence in 
multi-level governance. Inherent to multi-level systems are tensions caused by the contested 
nature of power and responsibility (cf. Piattoni, 2010). Tensions arise at the supranational 
level — even within one and the same institution such as the European Commission —, 
between the domestic and supranational level, and within (decentralised) national systems.
These tensions that are inherent in EU governance are based on power, which is not only 
relative but temporal as well. Recall that climate change is a wicked problem, which essentially 
means that finding potential solutions for it happens under high uncertainty. Decision-
making is therefore often guided by conflicts between short-term gain and long-term gain. 
The national government is an interesting actor to consider in this regard. At EU level its 
‘responsibility’ in climate issues may be perceived as having to be supportive of climate 
measures and gaining much, also for its citizens, in the longer term. Otherwise, the Dutch 
would politically be seen as anti-climate. However, the responsibility of the government at 
domestic level includes ensuring societal legitimacy as well. When the domestic responsibility 
is counter to its EU standpoint, the government is likely to pursue domestic goals to ensure 
(short-term) re-election. The fact that the government’s power is contested by the electorate 
influences the multi-level governance of CCS and LNG, most notably vis-à-vis the private 
sector and the EC. While the private sector appears to share the government’s opinion that 
CCS should happen, it uses its power to not invest knowing that the Dutch government is 
not likely to impose it. Again, short-term gain trumps the longer term. 
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The domestic - international dimension was found to be a high impact dimension for centre 
- periphery relations. As this shift covers regime building at EU level, power is an inherent 
part of this shift as the EU polity takes shape as a reflection on and outcome of power 
relations (Piattoni, 2010:56-64). The concept of power is woven into Piattoni’s multi-level 
governance by virtue of identifying shifts in governance and accepting that tensions exist 
between the domestic and the international, centre and periphery, and between state and 
society. Power is not explicitly conceptualised, but is that a problem given that power could 
be reinterpreted as governance when considering its institutional (as opposed to human) 
side (Guzzini, 1993:475)? Following the multi-level governance framework through in-depth 
case study research has enabled finding and analysing how power works within both 
cases, so an explicit identification of the importance of power appears to be sufficient to 
make Piattoni’s theoretical framework carry explanatory weight. In addition, uncertainty is 
a feature of climate change governance, which is a problem requiring solutions with long 
time horizons characterised by slow system change315. Uncertainty causes decision-making 
tensions and therefore also tensions between the public and private sector, as both nested 
cases have shown. Identifying these tensions allows three conclusions to be drawn:
1) Multi-level governance of climate and energy happens under high economic, technologi-
cal and regulatory uncertainty;
2) Multi-level governance of climate and energy is highly dependent on many (varied) 
interests of many (varied) key players, therefore power matters;
3) Due to the nature of the EU system, the role of power and of uncertainty, the multi-
level governance of climate and energy is constrained by pressures that make change 
difficult as power and uncertainty can block progress in one level of governance, thereby 
impacting all other levels as well316.
Effectively governing climate issues may be difficult exactly because of the interdependent 
nature of EU governance and the fact that member states have different interests, hence 
the attractiveness of the argument made by Levin et al. (2012:128) to lock-in future prefer-
ences promoting sustainability. The next chapter will reflect on this argument further.
315  It is not a coincidence that everyone now speaks of the ‘energy transition’, in acknowledgment of its long 
timeframe.
316  Interesting venues of research to uncover these dynamics further involve Schmitter’s (2004) ‘great events’ or 
Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) punctuated equilibrium.
7
240 Chapter 7
7.5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter set out to compare both the CCS and LNG case and answer the question 
which (multi-level) governance mechanisms are present in the implementation of EU climate 
and energy policies. The CCS and LNG cases were compared to one another across the 
three dimensions of MLG. This analysis was complemented by the secondary findings: the 
importance of power and uncertainty. Since probing for these two concepts was not part 
of my operationalisation of MLG, this chapter discussed whether power and uncertainty 
have been adequately accounted for in Piattoni’s MLG framework. The main conclusions 
will be discussed now.
The governance of Rotterdam Energy Port317, which I have linked to the governance of 
the EU’s energy and climate policies, is indeed an excellent example of MLG in practice. 
Relationships are perhaps not so much reconfigured as reaffirmed; the private sector calls 
upon governmental authorities to do what they are supposed to do, and governmental 
authorities lean on their traditional creation of frameworks within which the private sector 
is to operate. It is difficult because consensus on the right way is lacking. The hybrid form of 
governance shows itself both in the reaffirmation of relationships and the need for inclusion 
of non-governmental actors in the process of governing for it to be effective. The EU is 
increasingly able to influence member states’ energy mix by linking climate targets to energy 
policy. European energy policy therefore becomes an area in which the EU cooperates with 
national governments on a hierarchical basis, whilst cooperation between governmental 
authorities and the private sector is also necessary due to resource interdependencies and 
the fact that emissions primarily stem from the private sector. Governments are expecting 
more and more that businesses will act in the interest of the climate, yet the high degree 
of uncertainty involved in carrying out expensive projects — such as CCS and small-scale 
LNG — needs to be met by adequate government policy, at the right level, to assure the 
private sector that investments are not wasted. 
The engines that drive multi-level governance can be derived from the policy analysis done 
in chapter four and the empirical chapters and the MLG analysis carried out in the empirical 
chapters, continued in this chapter. EU coordination attempts begin with EU member states 
being open towards coordination attempts by the European Commission because they are 
unable to solve a problem on their own. In the CCS case the reasoning behind this support 
was the wish to show the world that the EU is a global climate leader, and the knowledge 
that global effort is required to solve the climate change problem. The Commission deftly 
317  Not all aspects of Rotterdam Energy Port (see chapter 3) have decidedly supranational components, so the 
generalisation of the CO2 and LNG hubs to Energy Port as a whole has its limitations.
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added the CCS Directive to the climate goals for 2020. In the small-scale LNG case the 
reasoning was the need for supranational coordination of a cross-border phenomenon: inland 
waterway transport. The next step consists of efforts by the EC to coordinate legislation, 
be it through hard coordination (by means of regulations) or soft coordination (by means 
of directives). Contentious issues become directives to ensure enough freedom for national 
governments to implement measures as they please. Both the CCS and LNG case have 
directives governing their most important aspects. In order to incentivise movement in the 
private sector, the Commission then sets financial resources aside to finance demonstration 
projects. Member states do not want to miss out on this opportunity because it is their 
own money that flows back to their peers, giving them an incentive to want to reap the 
benefits of EU funding. The purpose of demonstration projects is to learn from them for 
further rollout of technologies, adjust needed legislation and get the proper infrastructure 
in place for large-scale adoption. One would expect successful demonstration projects to 
support, and be supported by, the domestic transposition of EU directives. Lessons learned 
from demonstration can then be used by the EC to revise earlier directives and formulate 
next steps forward, thus continuing the cycle of policy-making, funding, implementation 
and revision (see figure 7.2). 
Where does this cycle go wrong? Power and uncertainty circulate through this cycle and 
can either keep the gears spinning or block them. Cooperation of all levels of governance is 
MS open to EU coordination
EC begins policy formulation
EU adopts Regulation
or Directive
EC provides funding
for demonstration 
and implementation
National & sub-national 
governments implement 
Regulation or Directive
Industrial demonstration 
projects supported 
by national governments
Private sector reports
back to national 
government & EC on 
results of demonstration
Lessons learned spur new 
round of coordination for 
large-scale implementation
Power
Uncertainty
Figure 7.2. Elements of CCS and LNG policy coordination
Source: author’s own composition based on this dissertation.
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necessary to keep the engine running, which strengthens Piattoni’s reasons for including the 
private sector and subnational authorities. Lack of participation from any of the stakeholders 
will negatively impact all three dimensions of governance, effectively freezing the process 
in a certain phase or pushing it backward. When industry does not want to cooperate 
and hard coordination is politically unacceptable, the engine grinds to a halt. If a national 
government decides to implement a directive in such a way as to de-incentivise a specific 
development, sub-national authorities and other peripheral actors lose their influence. 
Aside from the agency of actors, the consequences of policy choices can also put a spoke 
in the wheel. The EU ETS has cast a long shadow on low carbon investments through its 
continuously low carbon price which makes investing in cleaner technologies less attractive. 
The Commission’s egalitarian nature counteracts the Dutch tendency to specifically support 
its so-called mainports. In fact, much of the EC’s effort goes to regions that are less well-off 
than The Netherlands, sluicing funding to those regions instead of to the Port of Rotterdam. 
Geopolitical factors have an effect as well. The declining oil price hurts the small-scale LNG 
business case and delays deployment across the EU. A global push for more stringent climate 
norms might reverse some trends.
All the examples above point towards the existence of trade-offs which hamper investment 
decisions and determine how actors ultimately behave. The EU’s system of multi-level 
governance works well in theory, but there can be reasons for an actor to support EU 
coordination efforts while at the same time trying to keep things as they are at national level. 
In the small-scale LNG case there are many promising developments, though for shipping 
companies there is a significant trade-off between owning a cleaner ship and the costs 
associated with it. Wider scale adoption of LNG as fuel is slowed down by this trade-off. In 
the CCS case there is a showstopper: the EU ETS and the general unwillingness of the private 
sector to invest in a technology with highly concentrated costs, but very diffuse benefits 
(cf. Wilson, 1980:367-370). Small-scale LNG could soon suffer from the same cost-benefit 
distribution unless owners of ‘dirtier’ engines will be made to pay for the societal costs of 
their emissions.
Multi-level governance allows the researcher to dive deeply into cases and explore the 
mechanisms that drive governance processes. The three dimensions (domestic - international, 
centre - periphery, state - society) outlined by Piattoni were applied in this dissertation to 
test their practical applicability. These dimensions are mutually interdependent: they must 
work in tandem to keep the gears in figure 7.2 running. Both the CCS and LNG — which 
in hindsight can be termed contrasting cases (see also table 7.1) — case showed different 
impacts of EU governance on Rotterdam and it became very clear that the three dimen-
sions of governance are interconnected. The dynamic, yet difficult to change, nature of 
governance was also captured well by the theoretical framework, shedding light on how 
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uncertainty and power influence governance outcomes. The three theoretical expectations 
formulated in chapter two were further fleshed out by the case studies, showing that they 
can serve as theoretical searchlights for retroductive research and therefore have explanatory 
value. In the case of the domestic - international shift, the cases added nuancing to the 
MLG framework by showing that international interdependencies are not just created by 
sub-national authorities, civil society and business, but also by nation states themselves 
(cf. Majone, 1996:68) and through the operation of (global) market mechanisms. For the 
centre - periphery shift a nuance was added acknowledging that regions are potentially 
effective, yet that this effectiveness depends on contextual factors (such as (un)wanted 
outcomes of EU-level agreements) beyond their direct control. In the state - society shift 
we have seen a clear need for governance with society, though no ‘Piattonian’ far-reaching 
blurring of state and society. 
The strength of MLG as a theoretical framework lies in uncovering the challenges of complex 
governance processes such as climate and energy governance. Its weakness lies in its 
extremely general and overarching nature which makes it difficult to speak in terms of 
causality: extensive qualitative research is needed to untangle the dynamics underlying the 
three dimensions of governance. The next chapter suggests ways to move forward with 
this type of research.
7
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Conclusions — Bounded Multi-level Governance
8.1. INTRODUCTION
The time has come to look ahead. What do we now know about EU governance based on 
the experiences described in this dissertation? How can the EU move forward with energy and 
climate policy and which recommendations can be given to the Port of Rotterdam Authority? 
This dissertation started with outlining the ‘problem’ at hand: the EU’s quest to mitigate 
climate change by substantially reforming energy policies with attention for greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets. The largest port in Europe, the Port of Rotterdam, was shown to 
contribute to a large amount of emissions through its transport and industrial operations. 
Rotterdam Energy Port was introduced as the Port Authority’s vision on the future role of 
energy in the port along the lines of LNG, coal and biomass, CO2, energy efficiency, and 
(sustainable) electricity. The LNG and CO2 hubs were chosen in chapter three as illustrative 
cases within Energy Port. The main research question this chapter will answer is as follows: 
How do the European Union’s efforts to address climate and energy issues affect the 
Rotterdam port community, and what role can the Port of Rotterdam Authority play in its 
governance in order to reach climate and energy policy goals?
Chapter two outlines the onset of research on EU governance and discusses the core elements 
of multi-level governance as a theory, contrasting it to network governance and dealing 
with earlier criticisms directed at MLG. Theoretical expectations are drawn from Piattoni’s 
MLG framework based on three shifts in governance, which are further operationalised in 
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chapter three. The third chapter also discusses the retroductive approach followed in this 
dissertation and introduces the in-depth case study performed in chapters five and six.
Chapter four explores the EU’s policies and initiatives in the field of energy and climate 
governance and discusses how these policies feed back into member states. The EU’s 
policy-making efforts up to 2020 are shown to be guided by the overarching Climate and 
Energy Package adopted in 2009. The CCS Directive is a direct part of this package, whereas 
legislation on small-scale LNG flows from one of the flagship programs under the package. 
Both are mainly governed through EU efforts at soft coordination, particularly because of 
member state sensitivity regarding their sovereign right to govern their own territory and 
energy mix choices. The chapter also shows that the EU and Dutch goals regarding energy 
and climate change, at face value, seem to be aligned. One would not expect coordination 
issues to arise based on these goals. Yet they do.
Chapters five and six, and to some extent chapter seven, dive into the empirical part of the 
dissertation, each opening the black box of the governance of CCS and small-scale LNG 
respectively. Both chapters discuss the key elements of MLG: the necessity of supranational 
governance which cannot be ignored by national governments (the domestic - interna-
tional shift), the quest for empowerment of local actors (the centre - periphery shift), and 
governance through and with non-governmental actors (the state - society shift). The PoR 
is found to be active at all levels of governance, bringing actors together making use of 
its position as regionally bound intermediary between the public and private sector. The 
empirical chapters also discuss secondary findings, paying much attention to the role of 
power and uncertainty. Chapter seven discusses the aggregated results of both cases in an 
effort to review the theoretical expectations formulated in chapter three and reflects on their 
consequences for the governance of Rotterdam Energy Port. Whereas the state - society 
shift in a broad sense is concluded to be instrumental to EU governance, chapter seven 
argues that the domestic - international shift has the highest impact on the cases. The 
development of CCS is locked into a EU-level system (ETS) that is hard to change, making 
it dependent on national efforts to stimulate carbon capture and storage, which are absent. 
This shift also has implications for the empowerment of local actors, which are able to have 
significant agency in the implementation of small-scale LNG but are left largely powerless 
in CCS. Reflecting on the secondary findings of the nested case studies, chapter seven also 
discusses how power and uncertainty fit in MLG and argues that they are an intrinsic part 
of the framework. In other words, power and uncertainty are an important part of the 
explanation of shifts in multi-level governance.
This final chapter will summarise the answers to the sub questions formulated in chapter 
one, culminating in the answer to the main research question. The chapter starts (§8.2) 
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with a reflection on the empirical applicability of Piattoni’s conceptualisation of multi-level 
governance, arguing that employing MLG showed how important governmental decision-
making is in the area of climate and energy policies. Section §8.3 moves on with the 
introduction of a bounded notion of MLG to improve how Energy Port is governed. The 
chapter concludes (§8.4) with recommendations for the Port of Rotterdam Authority and 
governments, a methodological reflection, and suggestions for future research.
8.2. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Piattoni’s conceptualisation of multi-level governance provided the theoretical framework 
applied in this dissertation. The purpose was to see how Piattoni’s framework behaves in 
practice and try to build on it further. The analyses of small-scale LNG and CCS have shed 
light on how EU governance works in the context of climate and energy policies. Power and 
uncertainty came up as crucial parts of the explanation of how governance works in these 
cases. In essence, they are part of the agency of actors, which complements the structural 
part of MLG. This finding leads to a further nuancing of figure 3.1 from chapter three.
As shown in figure 8.1, the base of Piattoni’s model provides a useful tool with which to 
investigate EU governance. The interaction between the EU-level, the domestic level and 
third parties leads to identifiable shifts in governance along three dimensions: the domestic - 
international dimension, the state - society dimension, and the centre - periphery dimension. 
Zooming in on each dimension shows the most important elements of the shift. Multi-level 
governance is very helpful in identifying governance mechanisms and outcomes, as shown in 
this dissertation for the unsuccessful governance of CCS and the more successful governance 
of small-scale LNG. Both these cases, and climate and energy policies more generally, are 
nested in a context characterised by high uncertainty. Knowledge on the extent to which 
acting leads to benefits (financial, political, climate-related, and so on) is constrained by 
uncertainty. Power ultimately dictates whether actors move (‘act’) or remain where they are, 
and what the effects of their decisions are on the whole. Power, and thus agency, moves 
along the dimensions of MLG and impacts all aspects of governance. Conflicting interests 
and values are at the heart of the governance of climate and energy policies. Trade-offs 
are abundant and inform any actor’s (also the PoR’s) choices. It is therefore important to 
consider these factors when studying the governance of climate change. I recommend 
incorporating these factors more explicitly in Piattoni’s multi-level governance framework 
as I have attempted to do in this dissertation and summarised in figure 8.1. Chapter seven 
has discussed how these concepts are interrelated and explained the differences found 
between both nested cases. Especially the need for a long-term vision on cleaner energy 
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appears to clash with the short term effects of power and politics. The next sections discuss 
these effects in more detail while answering the sub questions posed in this dissertation.
8.2.1. Tackling Uncertainty: the Importance of Clear Policy Decisions
The first sub question asked in this dissertation is: which EU climate and energy policies 
are relevant for Rotterdam Energy Port? Furthermore, it is imperative to know how these 
policies affect the domestic level and whether national and supranational goals are aligned 
(the underlying two questions). For a full overview of relevant policies I refer to chapter 
four, which introduced the pillared structure of the EU’s Europe 2020 strategy for smart, 
sustainable and innovative growth, partly summarised in figure 4.1. Most of the identified 
policies are Directives requiring the domestic level to translate them to their own national 
policies within a certain timeframe. At face value, EU and Dutch goals are aligned. The next 
part of this section provides more nuance to the answer to the first sub question. 
The 2009 Climate & Energy package, including the CCS Directive, is part of the Europe 
2020 strategy. The Clean Power for Transport Directive flows from the Flagship program 
‘A resource-efficient Europe’ formulated under Europe 2020. The EU has identified several 
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Figure 8.1. Agency and structure in multi-level governance
Source: author’s own composition. Structure is based on Piattoni, 2010.
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coordination goals within these initiatives318. Domestic and EU coordination goals are quite 
aligned (see table 8.1), especially as both the Commission and the Dutch government 
want CCS to happen (CCS could play a large role in Dutch CO2-reduction efforts) and are 
in favour of a modal split towards inland waterway transport including the greening of the 
fleet. A misfit between these grand targets therefore cannot provide an explanation why 
CCS has not lifted off in The Netherlands and small-scale LNG has. As discussed in chapter 
seven, applying the multi-level governance framework to both cases does provide a plausible 
explanation. Still, a reflection from the policy analysis is in order.
The three pillars of European energy policy — security of supply, competitiveness, sustain-
ability — are mutually conflicting and lead to trade-offs319. Sustainability often loses to the 
more immediately pressing goals of actually having energy and being able to pay for it. 
If it is the role of governments to guide proper policy implementation, they will need to 
be clear about what they want in terms of sustainability and provide pathways for society 
to reach those goals. In practice, that amounts to funding R&D and pilots so that initially 
expensive technologies can be further developed and become less costly, which explains 
why the ROAD CCS demonstration project is so important to the Dutch government and 
318  See chapter 4 for a full overview.
319  See also section 4.2.5.
Table 8.1. Alignment of EU and domestic coordination goals for CCS and LNG-related policies
Level Climate and Energy package A resource efficient Europe
EU-level - Ensure safety of CCS (for public 
and environment)
- Drop of total emissions (43% in 
2030) of ETS sectors
- 20% CO2 reduction (80% by 
2050)
- 20% energy efficiency
- 20% renewable energy
- revise ETS
- -1% yearly reduction (average) of 
transport-related GHG emissions 
beginning in 2012
- Development of alternative fuels for 
(commercial) transport
- Use potential of water transport 
to reduce emissions and reduce 
pollution from water transport
- Revise TEN-T
EU + domestic level - CCS permits given by national 
authorities but EC can give its 
opinion first
- Fully integrate the European 
energy market
- Integration of resource efficiency 
into European Semester
- Definition of right indicators and 
targets with stakeholders
Domestic level - 20% CO2 reduction (80-95% by 
2050)
- 16% renewable energy in 2023
- CCS demonstration
- Only use CCS if no other options 
are available
- Periodically report on resource 
efficiency
- 60% GHG emissions reduction from 
transport by 2050
- Level playing field for ports and 
supporting sustainable initiatives
External sources: COM(2011) 571 final (2011d in bibliography) and COM(2010) 2020 final.
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the European Commission. However, their commitment should go even further. The IEA 
estimates that global coal supply will last another 3050 years at current rates (Schubert, Pollak 
& Kreutler, 2016:4). Lacking clear decisions on the future of coal usage, it is likely that coal 
will continue to be burnt unabated. Governments should therefore either decide to phase 
out coal entirely, or develop CCS to mitigate carbon emissions. They have to realise that in 
the current situation technology neutrality implicitly means they have chosen not to develop 
CCS. As discussed in the previous chapter, climate change is often seen as a (super) wicked 
problem (Levin et al., 2012) and as a classic collective action problem requiring “carefully 
managed policy coordination and multi-level governance” (Esty & Moffa, 2012:777). A 
strong role for governmental authorities could be what is needed to solve this problem. 
Especially the expert interviews revealed that both governmental authorities and the private 
sector want a long-term policy vision with clear goals. Technology neutrality does not work, 
and is even illogical, when a clear vision is lacking and just one part of the energy sector 
(renewables) is subsidised heavily. The trade-off, as shown in chapter five, is a dysfunctional 
ETS. Furthermore, business risks to fundamentally change the energy system are too high 
when long-term policy is lacking. The Dutch Energieagenda 2016 seems to contain steps 
in the right direction, but its effect is yet to be seen. The question we need to ask ourselves 
is whether we, as a society, consider it part of our national government’s duties to provide 
a clear climate and energy vision.
Here is also when power comes up as an issue; some member states have different concep-
tions of the climate change problem, making it unlikely that an EU-level approach with 
sanctions could follow. For Eastern European countries that are heavily dependent on coal or 
Russian gas, it may be difficult to phase out coal, mitigate emissions from coal-fired power 
plants, or diversify their gas supply. Their short term interests are to secure their energy supply 
and make it affordable for their citizens. Large-scale LNG can suit their interests whereas 
CCS may not. Yet some countries hardly have an inland waterway transport sector, making 
investments into LNG as fuel unlikely unless it is used in road transport. The Netherlands, 
however, has a relatively high contribution of inland shipping to its overall transport and 
could potentially market CCS technology if CCS pilots can be used as a learning vehicle to 
make the technology (especially the capture process) cheaper. The Dutch have something 
to gain whereas other member states may not. EU coordination efforts in both these cases 
therefore appear to have a higher chance of success in The Netherlands than in most other 
member states, effectively making the Dutch a test case. Yet the Dutch government has 
chosen not to specifically incentivise CCS or small-scale LNG deployment, instead referring to 
agreements made at EU level. It appears that the Dutch government does not want to seek 
solutions at the national level. How can the 2020 targets be reached if national governments 
choose to hide behind only partially effective supranational agreements?
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8.2.2. Successful Governance or Government?
The second sub-question asked in this dissertation was: which (multi-level) governance 
mechanisms are present in the implementation of these policies? Underlying questions 
dealt with the role and position of the Port of Rotterdam Authority, how non-governmental 
actors are involved in the process and to what extent governance is successful. The first 
three mechanisms that were analysed were the three theoretical expectations. First, civil 
society is active at international level, though the cases found more supranational coordina-
tion due to global market developments and nation states willingly creating international 
interdependencies. Especially around COP negotiations it seems that EU members are more 
likely to join the EU’s climate policy harmonisation efforts. Second, subnational authorities 
and other local actors were active at EU level — especially the PoR — but not necessarily 
efficient, as Piattoni expects. This mechanism seems heavily influenced by the context created 
in the domestic - international dimension. Third, non-state actors were found to be very 
active at national level, especially since their expertise appears to be crucial for national 
governments to devise fitting climate and energy policies. Furthermore, national governments 
depend on private sector activity to meet the goals of the policies, strengthening mutual 
interdependencies. However, contrary to Piattoni’s expectation of a far-reaching blurring 
of state and society, the public and private sector mostly remain in their traditional roles 
furthering their own traditional interests. These three mechanisms will be further elaborated 
on below, ending with an additional mechanism that was found.
One of MLG’s most common criticisms is its assumption that the inclusion of decentralised 
governments in the EU governance process is abundant and effective. The cases studied in 
this dissertation show that subnational authorities are hardly involved in the policy-making 
phase, but definitely have a role to play in the implementation phase. That last phase is 
also where the Port of Rotterdam Authority is able to add to the success of governance; 
as a semi-public authority it is a natural partner for both governmental authorities and 
the private sector. The PoR can function as a spider-in-the-web and bring actors together, 
which was seen in the small-scale LNG case. The municipality of Rotterdam has a similar 
function but, in the CCS case, is hampered by internal disagreements on the usefulness of 
CCS and by national political debates regarding the status of coal-fired power plants. The 
municipality has been largely powerless in the story of CCS, which is a painful conclusion 
considering the fact that it was mainly the city that counted on CCS deployment to reach 
its highly ambitious CO2 reduction targets formulated under RCI auspices. Yet as soon 
as the centre — now basically polycentric with the EU at the head and leaving a dual 
role for the national government —establishes workable frameworks, peripheral actors 
can take strides in the implementation of policies. Decentralised coordination of efforts 
should therefore not be discounted, but it needs conditions set by the other governance 
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layers in order to be a driving force behind successful governance. An inductive theoretical 
expectation following from this dissertation therefore is that local actors lack empowerment 
when supranational coordination works differently than intended. The criticism of MLG is 
therefore partly founded.
Both cases have shown quite extensive involvement of non-governmental actors: from 
businesses at multiple scales and in multiple sectors, to NGOs, and to academia. Still, the 
CCS case was shown to be an example of failed multi-level governance, mostly because of 
choices made by governmental authorities. It has become difficult to incentivise CCS with 
policy tools because of its ‘lock-in’ the ETS system that is now hard to change. That being said, 
this does not mean CCS has now become impossible. Financial participation of a few member 
states now seems sufficient to start ROAD, after which other CCS projects might follow 
in the EU. Extensive advocacy from the Dutch government and the European Commission 
was needed to get this far. Public authorities can therefore block progress but also enable 
it. When exogenous factors (such as COP-15) are at play, national authorities sometimes 
willingly spur supranational coordination. A second inductive theoretical expectation flowing 
from this dissertation therefore is that supranational coordination can be necessitated by 
nation states willingly creating or maintaining international interdependencies. As such, 
MLG does not always provide the strongest explanation.
At the same time it is important to note that technological development moves at a higher 
pace than governmental regulation. While clear policy goals and frameworks are needed, 
it is difficult for governments to keep up with their regulatory processes. Here is where 
non-hierarchical governance — including non-state actors — shows its strength. Flexible 
governance arrangements such as the Green Deals have enabled small-scale LNG deploy-
ment in The Netherlands, even while proper regulation was still lacking. This area is also 
where decentralised governments become crucial; much of the success of small-scale LNG 
deployment hinged on the willingness of municipalities to let it happen on their territory, 
for example by ensuring safety through proper instruction of their fire departments. The 
commitment of the Dutch government was also instrumental in speeding market develop-
ment along. For such practical purposes singular governmental action can be successful 
when collective action in European context is not. The binding factor in this mechanism 
appears to be connected to (global) market developments, as investments (and EU policy 
coordination!) follow the ebb and flow of prices. The third inductive theoretical expectation 
is that global market developments can create international interdependencies which 
necessitates supranational coordination.
Aside from the theoretical framework, another mechanism was found. The CCS case shows 
that a governance mechanism at EU level is to answer unsuccessful attempts at harmonisation 
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(where the engine of figure 7.2 grinds to a halt) with subsequent attempts to harmonise to 
restart the engine. For the Commission as an actor, such a strategy makes sense to increase 
influence. When regulations are out of the question, a directive will be proposed. The CCS 
Directive was even accompanied by the goal to have twelve CCS demonstration projects 
and supported by two funding mechanisms at EU level. If the directive fails to deliver, the 
Commission will try to revise it. When there is no interest to do that, and earlier funding 
attempts have borne no fruit, the Commission will propose different funding options and, a 
novelty for CCS, stimulate intergovernmental funding efforts so that the CCS Directive will 
not be a complete failure. In the small-scale LNG case the Commission could rely on past 
experiences with attempts to harmonise the composition of fuels, which were problematic. 
However, the Clean Power for Transport Directive could benefit from its infrastructural 
component, especially coupled with TEN-T funding and the harmonisation goal geared at 
TEN-T core ports. Member states that build the LNG infrastructure are likely to want to use 
LNG as fuel. The international component of transport has also made policy harmonisation 
for small-scale LNG easier at EU level.
8.3. BOUNDED MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
The third sub-question asked in this dissertation was: how can the governance of climate 
and energy in the Rotterdam port area be improved? As figure 8.1 shows, the governance 
of Rotterdam Energy Port can neatly be placed into the MLG framework identified earlier in 
this dissertation, with the addition of serious consideration of the importance of concepts 
such as power and uncertainty. Uncertainty was translated in chapter seven to be comprised 
of the continuous tension between short term interests and long term interests. In the 
longer term, political power loses its power in democracies due to the very nature of the 
electoral process. Presenting society with very concrete long term visions, especially including 
budgetary frameworks, can therefore be challenging for governmental authorities. I pose 
that these concepts are an intrinsic part of the MLG framework, though its bounded nature 
should be recognised explicitly: current EU governance is characterised by the inability to 
radically change direction due to previous governance arrangements resonating through 
all layers of governance (which are mutually interdependent), creating a type of path 
dependency and making change difficult. 
Path dependency is an interesting and much debated concept in political science and public 
administration literature (cf. Kay, 2005; Levin et al., 2012; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Pierson, 
2000). Its narrow conception of the effect of increasing returns was discussed in chapter 
seven and linked to the aspect of uncertainty that was identified in the empirical part of 
this dissertation: policy-makers have a tendency to choose the pathway that provides the 
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most apparent benefits on the short term, which potentially undermines future efforts to 
devise clean energy policies. The increasing returns can lock-in policy options and technology 
choices by virtue of having high start up costs but subsequent learning and coordination 
effects. However, this is not necessarily a cause for great concern. As Levin et al. argue, 
path dependency can also be turned around to lock-in desirable options for the future so 
that they are more likely to be achieved. In that respect, governance can be improved by 
creating an even deeper link between climate and energy policies: sustainability should be a 
core assumption, not a goal. CCS has been unsuccessful because not implementing it only 
endangers the sustainability aspect in energy policy goals. In contrast, large-scale LNG is 
in the interest of the EU’s and Dutch diversification strategies, so small-scale LNG can ride 
on that success. Treating sustainability as a core assumption could ‘lock-in’ policy choices 
that will positively affect climate change governance. In effect, the EU and its member 
states could bind themselves to a policy pathway that will aid in climate change mitigation. 
Needless to say, doing so at EU level ensures further harmonisation of policies in a creeping 
fashion, but it remains to be seen whether member states will allow this to happen. Within 
the European Commission this thinking is already visible with the merger of DG ENER and 
DG CLIMA under one Commissioner in the most recent Juncker Commission. Perhaps the 
departments will fully merge into one in the next iteration. In essence, the bureaucratic 
(or, non-political) nature of the Commission appears to be perfectly suitable for the initial 
proposal of long-term goals, which can then feed into domestic governance.
8.3.1. The Port of Rotterdam Authority as Policy Actor
If governance entails “the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce 
and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods” (Börzel & Risse, 
2010:114), making solutions work makes governance effective. Drawing on table 7.7, the 
solutions it contains to deal with the uncertainties hampering CCS and small-scale LNG 
development are all geared towards making governance work better. In fact, these solutions 
have a decidedly multi-level nature: long-term climate and energy policies, demonstration 
projects, global agreements, new financial mechanisms, regulatory changes, standardisation; 
all these options require collaboration between governmental authorities at multiple levels 
and often also with the private sector. They potentially reduce regulatory and economic 
uncertainty, allowing solving technological uncertainties in cooperative fashion. What role 
does the Port of Rotterdam Authority play in this multi-layered governance? 
The PoR is a publicly owned landlord with a system overview of the port area, extensive 
connections with companies vested in the port, a deep understanding of global logistics 
and innovative developments and of the effects of contiguous markets. This position makes 
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the PoR an excellent candidate to act as a spider-in-the-web bringing actors together and 
helping them build coalitions. The PoR has the capacity to understand companies, provide 
infrastructure, and liaise with governments. Its status as the largest port of Europe makes 
it an interesting partner for the European Commission as well: a true Port of Europe. That 
said, the PoR is heavily dependent on all these actors to implement sustainable changes. In 
and of itself, it is not a large emitter nor is it a provider of overarching policy. The CCS and 
LNG case show that the PoR needs to take into account that the EU is becoming a more 
and more important provider of policies relevant to the port area. Likewise, the funding 
instruments provided at EU level make it imperative for the PoR to keep its EU knowledge 
up to date and remain close to the national government to secure support for EU projects. 
The cases also show that the PoR can help companies legitimise their projects by throwing 
in their own support and forge coalitions. In that sense, the PoR is not so much a policy 
actor but could rather be a catalyst. The PoR therefore has the potential to be a strong 
actor in the multi-level governance of climate and energy in Rotterdam. It can improve 
current governance processes by ensuring that the right actors work on the right things 
at the right time. To give two practical examples: in the case of small-scale LNG the PoR 
can improve the regulatory process by providing responsible governmental authorities with 
technical expertise gathered from within its own ranks and those of its private partners. In 
the CCS case the PoR can support adoption of the technology in the port’s industry and 
electricity sectors by providing adequate CO2 infrastructure in cooperation with the Dutch 
government. In short, the PoR can potentially glue together the various actors involved in the 
multi-level governance of climate and energy. This insight is especially important in light of 
how interdependent actors in multi-level governance are; every blockade in one dimension 
can potentially block other processes as well. In the area of policy-making, the PoR can lobby 
for a lock-in of preferences that will make use of the port’s strengths (good infrastructure, 
good logistics, interwoven industrial cluster), thereby enabling the private sector to adopt 
sustainable solutions that also improve our energy security and competitiveness.
8.3.2. The Importance of Strategy: Shared Vision
Systemic changes, such as the energy transition, take a lot of time and are very difficult to 
accomplish. Governments and the private sector cannot realistically be expected to solve the 
climate change problem in the next few years. With the addition of the notion of bounded 
multi-level governance, we can ultimately answer the main research question: How do the 
European Union’s efforts to address climate and energy issues affect the Rotterdam port 
community, and what role can the Port of Rotterdam Authority play in its governance in 
order to reach climate and energy policy goals? I conclude that the multi-level governance 
of the EU’s efforts to address climate change is:
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1) inevitably supranational and polycentric but, precisely because of that, leading to inter-
dependencies across levels of governance which can facilitate coordination but block it 
as well;
2) of necessity a public - private affair because of resource interdependencies and the 
required systemic changes;
3) impacted by global economic, (geo)political and technological developments which 
further complicate decision making processes by virtue of adding more uncertainty to 
already highly uncertain visions of the future;
4) limited by short term considerations of those in power, often favouring economic benefit 
over the more long term benefits of sustainability;
5) bounded, so we cannot and should not expect radical changes to happen, but it does 
stress the importance of a clear framework of policies and goals with clear pathways to 
reach them.
The port community needs to be included in climate and energy governance by virtue 
of having the expertise policy-makers need, but is also dependent on governmental au-
thorities for the provision of enabling policies. The Port of Rotterdam Authority should 
try to be a catalyst for sustainable development in the port area, bringing together actors 
across multiple levels of government and making sure that the aggregated interest of the 
port is heard by governmental authorities. The PoR also needs to be aware of its tenuous 
dependence on all these actors to achieve its own goals.
The above also means that, if governments are to realistically expect the actors present in 
the Port of Rotterdam to make investments based on profit and sustainability, it does not 
suffice to simply stress the importance of sustainability in policy documents and to add 
strict CO2 reduction goals. Steering mechanisms, based on realistic pathways to reach the 
goals that ensure widespread support of these frameworks, are necessary. The necessity 
to govern with societal actors does not excuse governments from their traditional task 
as policy-makers. In addition, even though local governments have a limited role in the 
policy-making process, they are able to provide crucial practical conditions to implement 
policies. Decentralised governments are important for EU governance as implementers and 
facilitators, and can gain traction with the Commission through their experience with policy 
implementation and technology deployment. However, the CCS case explicitly shows that 
a subnational authority can be left powerless when agreements at EU level do not work as 
intended. This insight adds nuance to Piattoni’s claim that local governments exist because 
of the benefits territorialised governance brings with it. It also shows that the influence of 
sub-national authorities should indeed not be over-exaggerated (cf. Jordan, 2001). For a port 
authority this conclusion implies continued dependence on the national government and 
the necessity of an additionally strong focus on the EU as a source of fundamental policies 
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and guidelines. If the governance of EU climate and energy policies is to run smoothly, all 
levels of governance (including the private sector) need to cooperate. Such cooperation 
will only work if actors know what they can reasonable expect from one another. In short, 
a strong, broadly shared vision on climate and energy is needed. The Port of Rotterdam 
Authority can contribute to this vision.
8.4. LOOKING FORWARD
8.4.1. Recommendations for the Port of Rotterdam Authority
The time has come to answer the last, very practical, sub-question: what are lessons the 
Port of Rotterdam Authority can learn for its public affairs management of future rounds 
of climate and energy policy-making? Or, to put it differently, what can the PoR learn from 
these cases for its management of the energy transition?
First, a reflection on the concept of Energy Port is in order. While Rotterdam Energy Port 
provides an interesting and marketable catchphrase, its components — the various hubs 
and the PoR’s energy efficiency goals — are advocated loosely. Energy Port is therefore not 
a ‘whole’. It does, however, serve as a way for the PoR to show that there is more to a port 
than logistics. The emissions associated with port activities are not merely comprised of 
logistical activities, especially not in a landlord port such as Rotterdam. The large (petro-)
chemical cluster is a source of considerable emissions as a consequence of considerable 
energy use. Any policies geared towards making energy cleaner thus impact the day-to-day 
operations within the port. Raising awareness for this fact with policy-makers can help the 
PoR in their access to EU institutions. Their status as a semi-public authority should work 
to their benefit in this case. Furthermore, the PoR could use the Energy Port as a visionary 
instrument towards the companies in the port, giving them insight in the direction in which 
the port authority wants to go in the future. Such insight is given in the Havenvisie 2030 
document, which also provides a clear overview of which authorities are in the lead for 
which action. The same exercise could be performed with Energy Port-specific topics, by, 
for example, adding visionary targets for small-scale LNG and actively steering towards their 
completion in the PoR’s business development activities. Keeping in mind how a lock-in 
of preferential sustainable developments could help the area edge towards lessening their 
emissions, the PoR could adopt sustainability as a core assumption of their operations rather 
than as a separate goal, and advocate doing the same at national and European level.
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Second, the PoR also needs to have a clear strategy and vision on its role in the future. 
Currently it seems to be struggling with who it will be in 2050 and what it will do. It is not 
unthinkable that the PoR will take up activities not traditionally associated with it, such as 
stimulating energy efficiency by acting like a broker on the electricity market. The energy 
transition team the PoR set up in 2016 is tackling questions pertaining to its future role 
and visionary development. In parallel the PoR should discuss these issues with the city of 
Rotterdam, the Dutch government, and perhaps even the European Commission. It should 
be clear for all parties what the PoR’s core business is and will be in the future. In the 
absence of clear guidance from governmental authorities, the PoR can provide some of the 
necessary leadership. In the end, however, it is also entrenched in the national context. Many 
companies will look at governments or at their international headquarters for guidance and 
vision. The Port of Rotterdam Authority can be a catalyst and should maintain its position as 
a good partner for both governments and businesses. It should capitalise on its ability to be 
a facilitating party leading coalitions of the willing. To do so effectively, the PoR’s antennas 
need to be honed in all possible directions.
Third, stimulating a CCS project is not really part of the PoR’s core business because it is a 
purely energetic business case. Stimulating small-scale LNG makes more sense because it 
makes port operations cleaner, especially if LNG is also used to power cold ironing facilities 
until they can be reliably powered by renewables. Yet, from a strategic point of view, an 
argument can be made for PoR involvement in CCS. The potential for the Port of Rotterdam 
lies in large-scale application of CCS, in which case Rotterdam could become the CO2 hub it 
aspires to be. While supporting a single project such as ROAD is risky, stimulating (or even 
laying down) CO2 infrastructure could help get CCS going for the whole area. It could end 
up providing a unique selling point for the Port of Rotterdam, enabling heavy industry to 
settle in the port and plug into a CO2 pipeline. Providing the necessary infrastructure for 
companies to be able to settle into the port while meeting sustainable goals is considered 
part of the PoR’s core business, so this approach would fit320. One important hurdle for 
the international hub function is the ban on CO2 trade for purposes of storage under the 
London Protocol. As the amendment to this ban has not yet been ratified by the required 
number of parties, the PoR could urge the Dutch government to lobby other governments 
for ratification as soon as the outlook for CCS becomes more promising.
Fourth, the PoR needs to be aware of which underlying trade-offs keep actors in place or 
get them moving, and know how to use these trade-offs to keep desired policy coordination 
engines running. Recall that figure 7.2 in chapter seven shows that when a stakeholder 
decides not to participate, all dimensions of MLG are impacted. While the PoR cannot 
320  This argument also goes for other types of infrastructure, such as steam and hydrogen pipelines.
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singlehandedly motivate everyone to take action, it needs to be aware of this mechanism 
and use its power to either keep the engine running, or, when desirable, block it. The PoR’s 
position in the multi-level governance of climate and energy policies is such that it can bring 
parties together and facilitate cooperation. Much of the PoR’s efforts in this dossier should 
go towards capitalising on this position. There is no point fighting lost battles, so the PoR 
needs knowledge on how governance levels interact and what causes blockages. The many 
uncertainties and interdependencies guiding global climate efforts and business decisions 
require monitoring and analysis. The PoR’s Corporate Strategy department should therefore 
work closely with the Business Intelligence and External Affairs departments to keep track 
of trends and actions of other stakeholders. This knowledge is crucial for its management 
of the energy transition, and that is not even mentioning other pressing challenges such 
as digitalisation, automation, and the recent silk road developments. Unfortunately, the 
Corporate Strategy department has been reduced drastically since 2013, though its participa-
tion in the recently established energy transition team is promising.
Finally, there seems to be no real strategy the PoR has with respect to Europe. The manpower 
covering European affairs is small and they focus too much on individual dossiers rather than 
the larger picture. As such, a comprehensive vision concerning the EU and what to do with 
it seems to be lacking. There is little coordination between projects in the same domain. An 
example is the LNG hub, where there were three projects running with EU subsidy in 2014, 
but there was no uniform communication toward the EC about them. What happened was 
that multiple people spoke with the Commission about their own project, amounting to 
delivering bad news three times in a row in September and October 2014. The leaders of 
one project did not know they were speaking with the Commission around the same time 
as the leaders of another project. Needless to say, the EC was less inclined to be lenient 
towards these projects after having been disappointed three times in quick succession. The 
internal coordination  within the PoR could therefore be set up in a better way, perhaps by 
ensuring participation of the external affairs department in meetings discussing projects 
funded by the EU. Another solution might be to always include an external affairs employee 
in the project lead. The disconnect between departments goes even further. For example, 
people outside of Corporate Strategy often do not know that developing LNG has been 
identified as ‘no regret action’ in the PoR’s energy scenarios. In short, multiple processes 
that are more than just tangentially related to one another run parallel in the PoR, whereas 
they should at least have bridges between them to ensure communication and a more 
coherent vision and strategy. In that respect, the PoR still very much looks like a public 
authority rather than a corporation.
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8.4.2. Recommendations for Governmental Authorities
If Europe is to achieve the three pillars upon which European energy ambitions rest — 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy — it will have to look beyond just the energy 
sector, beyond dependency on Russian gas and oil and towards other options. Hypothetically 
speaking, if the availability of oil would drastically decline, the whole transport sector (and 
the chemical sector as well, for that matter) would need to change fundamentally. As long 
as that does not happen and oil-based fuels remain affordable and within emission norm 
limits, the incentive to change the transport system is limited. Whichever (geo-)political 
direction the EU and its members choose with respect to energy policy will impact transport. 
Especially in countries where large-scale LNG infrastructure is lacking, EU emphasis on 
the importance of LNG for environmental purposes may help in its introduction as a fuel 
(Arteconi & Polonara, 2013:511). CCS may be revitalised if fossil fuels continue to be the 
main resource in the electricity and chemical sectors. Guided by a more streamlined EU ETS, 
investments into CCS may be more fruitful in the future.
Due to the connection between multiple policy areas, changes in, for example, the transport 
regime will also change European energy policy. Furthermore, exactly because transport is 
based on energy, more attention for sustainability in transport policy will impact energy policy 
as well. If proponents of competitive energy policy remain in the lead in the battle between 
energy ambitions and climate protection, an attention shift from energy to transport policy 
may prove more fruitful for climate and environment enthusiasts. On the other hand, the 
largest push is coming from the energy sector, as companies such as Shell try to cement 
their market share in the LNG business. They find themselves in a safer position than 
shipping companies due to the other potential uses for LNG besides as fuel for shipping. 
For transport companies, investing into LNG propulsion remains risky. Likewise, should a 
cluster of companies find a business case for shared CCS infrastructure to smooth their 
path toward fewer emissions, they might not need stricter climate norms to move green 
investments forward. Yet an incentive to look for such business cases is probably necessary. 
The heavy reliance on public funding in the initial phases does indicate that governmental 
steering is effective; however, it is a result of a cooperation between the EU and national 
governments. The EU’s coordination attempts will yet have to prove their effectiveness.
The EU has not become an all-powerful agent of policy harmonisation and national govern-
ments do still matter. Especially in the area of climate policies these power (im)balances can 
lead to ineffective governance because of the EU’s tendency to rely on compromises. The 
natural environment, however, does not compromise (Levin et al., 2012:127). The urgency 
to act effectively will only become more pressing. A proactive attitude at the national level 
is vital. Even more vital is the reshaping of long-term goals into short-term targets and 
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providing clear frameworks at the appropriate level of governance to reach those targets. 
Involving society in governance does not excuse governments from their job as policy-maker. 
According to the majority of people interviewed, this adequate policy is lacking in both 
CCS and small-scale LNG. With hard targets lacking altogether, a patchwork of loosely 
coupled policies and soft coordination is what governs Rotterdam Energy Port. Governmental 
authorities seem to want to ensure societal transition towards more environmentally friendly 
energy, but at the same time they seem incapable (or unwilling) of governing this transition. 
The strongest recommendation this dissertation can give to governmental authorities is to 
work together on a comprehensive climate and energy vision, including realistic pathways 
and appropriate policy tools to reach it. In doing so, governments should consult actors such 
as the Port of Rotterdam Authorities, the private sector, knowledge institutes and NGOs for 
the needed knowledge regarding feasible decarbonisation options and which institutional 
frameworks need to be in place to develop them. In a situation where everyone is vying 
for vision, governmental authorities need to aggregate interests and formulate this vision 
on a sustainable future.
8.4.3. Methodological Reflection
This dissertation started with a comprehensive discussion of multi-level governance, identify-
ing its theoretical premises and deriving tentative theoretical expectations from it whilst 
acknowledging that there is much academic debate surrounding whether MLG actually 
constitutes a theory. A retroductive approach was chosen in an effort not to ignore the 
criticism directed at MLG while testing its practical applicability, which led to a strengthening 
of Piattoni’s structural MLG model with very explicit attention for agency driven by uncertainty 
and power. The three theoretical expectations proved to provide useful conceptual lenses 
through which data was collected in an in-depth nested case study. This approach had several 
limitations. First, it drew heavily on expert interviews which provided a richness of data yet 
made looking for patterns difficult. Each expert was questioned according to a general list 
of questions and a tailor-made list of questions, so some questions were only answered 
once. This limitation was handled as much as possible through extensive coding using a 
coding mechanism. A second limitation is that the results of this dissertation are highly 
specific to the CCS and small-scale LNG developments — even though they are contrasting 
cases — in the Port of Rotterdam. Generalising them is difficult due to how far the nested 
cases have zoomed in and the relatively low amount of studied cases. However, for these 
two developments the findings seem able to describe and explain the real mechanisms 
guiding them. For the Port of Rotterdam Authority the findings provide an opportunity to 
learn from past outcomes. It is likely that the results of this dissertation can be used for 
future cases as well, for example when the hydrogen economy will be developed and the 
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first ships sailing on hydrogen are planned. Many of the challenges in the small-scale LNG 
case will be applicable for that situation as well. Likewise, future CCS (and perhaps CCU) 
projects will likely encounter the same problems as ROAD did thus far, underlining the 
importance of what we can learn from this case. A third limitation was the choice for cases 
that are still ongoing, making it difficult to draw conclusions in a continuously changing 
landscape. The benefit of this choice is that this dissertation remains very close to current 
issues relevant for the PoR, hopefully increasing its practical value. A strong benefit of the 
chosen methodological approach was its richness of detail and ability to flesh out how 
governance has affected the Rotterdam area. It is my hope that this dissertation was able 
to tell a compelling story because of its thick descriptions.
8.4.4. Reflection on Recent Developments
Data collection for the empirical cases ended in 2016, one year after the adoption of COP-21. 
Since then, much has happened. The adoption of LNG engines for inland shipping slowed 
down, and the ROAD CCS project was cancelled. In its place, the Port of Rotterdam and 
its public and private partners are developing Porthos: a CO2 pipeline to facilitate CCS in 
the port area. The pipeline will only be useful if industrial partners capture their CO2, but 
the mere existence of a pipeline increases the value proposition of settling in Rotterdam 
in an era where climate issues are being taken more and more seriously. In MLG terms 
this pipeline could provide an impetus to restart the CCS engine by virtue of removing a 
blockade at the local level. 
The Dutch government has begun its own climate talks in spring 2018, which should lead 
to an agreement and action plans to reduce CO2 emissions by 49% in 2030. This agreement 
could also lead to removing blockades to further CCS and small-scale LNG deployment. 
The Dutch ambition goes beyond EU ambition, and it remains to be seen what the effects 
will be. Thus far, the Dutch track record is not great in this respect. In response to citizen 
protest caused by earthquakes, the Dutch government decided to turn down Slochteren 
gas production, increasing the prospects of LNG import. If governments double down on 
the emissions of shipping, LNG ships may become more interesting again, although without 
the transition to bio-LNG their emissions will be too substantial to reach the climate goals 
formulated in the EU’s roadmap to 2050. The Port of Rotterdam can stimulate regional action 
through the active climate and energy vision it has been formulating since 2017, supported 
by a strong energy transition team. Still, the PoR remains dependent on all its partners to 
achieve its goals, and that is not likely to change in the future.
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Dutch efforts to mitigate climate change have picked up rather than slowed down, adding 
much potential new data ripe for analysis. While I would have gladly included all these recent 
developments in my analysis, my data collection had to stop at some point. Yet there is still 
much to do, and this dissertation can help shed light on when coordination works (and at 
what level) and when it does not. The last section of this chapter focuses on suggestions 
for future research.
8.4.5. Suggestions for Future Research
This dissertation attempted to apply Piattoni’s MLG framework to empirical cases to understand 
how governance works. The framework lends itself well to such an application, however, in 
itself it does not provide explicit ways to look at the role of power and uncertainty, which 
came up organically during the research process. In hindsight it can be argued that power and 
uncertainty are an intrinsic part of MLG by virtue of adding agency to structure and explaining 
how the various layers of governance are mutually interdependent. It became very clear that 
power and uncertainty affect how the three dimensions of governance play out on a case by 
case basis. In wicked problems such as climate change, oftentimes short-term considerations 
(mostly economical, more certainty) win against long-term considerations (mostly sustainable, 
more uncertainty). Power and uncertainty are therefore crucial for the governance of climate 
and energy policies and should be considered integrally when approaching a problem from a 
multi-level governance point of view. I have argued that, acknowledging that EU governance 
has a bounded nature, sustainability should be made a core assumption of energy policy 
instead of a goal. Future research could explore the effect of doing so in more detail, fol-
lowing the research started by Levin et al., with special concern for how governments will 
act and whether the private sector will be able to bear the burdens that will inevitably be 
placed on it. In short, the structural analysis MLG is known for can be further improved on 
through specific recognition of the interplay between structure and agency, especially since 
the analysed contrasting cases both found these concepts to be crucial for their explanation.
A second issue for future research is concerned with generalisation based on my case work. 
Whilst the conclusions are not easily generalised, theoretical generalisation has potential. 
Drawing back to the theoretical expectations that were found inductively — the role of nation 
states willingly creating or maintaining international interdependencies necessitating supra-
national coordination, the role of global market developments necessitating supranational 
coordination, and the lack of empowerment of local actors when supranational coordination 
works differently than intended — it would be interesting to study these mechanisms in other 
cases to test their validity and applicability. These mechanisms can potentially strengthen the 
MLG framework and are therefore academically interesting to explore further.
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A third potentially fruitful research endeavour considers further exploring the slow to change 
nature of climate and energy policy-making and compare it with the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium (cf. Benson & Russel, 2015) to gain more insight in how climate and energy 
policies have evolved over time and which strings can be pulled (and by whom) to increase 
the chances of further preferential evolution. Since many conflicts surround the climate 
change debate, framing theory could help understand why change happens. Framing 
theory highlights the variety of attributes present in each and every policy issue. Based 
on their own perception of the issue and on their preferences, actors engage in framing; 
they select and emphasise certain attributes over others (Daviter, 2009:1118; Scholten 
& Timmermans, 2010:529). Frames, then, are not necessarily the same as preferences: 
“interests are shaped by frames, and frames may be used to promote interests (Schön & 
Rein, 1994:29). Such frames, when they clash with one another, can lead to conflict (Schön 
& Rein, 1994; Daviter, 2009:1120; Dewulf et al., 2009:156; Scholten & Timmermans, 
2010:529). Change is slow, and certainly difficult in (super) wicked problems — such as 
climate change — where a multitude of actors and a multitude of competing frames exists 
(Post, Raile & Raile, 2010:663). New ideas can be perceived as threats, unless “they emanate 
from the community itself or can be adapted to suit the existing needs of the community” 
(Richardson, 2000:1018). Frame analysis is useful in uncovering frames, their meanings, 
and effects, and can help explain (mis)matches between actors in governance processes. 
This dissertation has discussed two often-mentioned frames in practice: the green growth 
(win-win) frame and the economic trade-off frame. Supplementing this analysis with a more 
extensive frame analysis could lead to interesting insights that would help public and private 
actors alike formulate their public affairs strategies better.
My last, very personal, recommendation for future research concerns ways to plot pathways 
to reach a goal that is still far away. How do we, as a national and European society, plan 
our road towards a sustainable future given high technological, political and economic 
uncertainty? This dissertation shows the importance of clear long-term goals upon which 
private actors can base their investment decisions. Especially in the energy and industry 
sectors such goals are important given the long lifespan of investments. We know that we 
can engineer the needed technology to make industry, energy and transport cleaner, but 
we need the right institutional framework to get developments going. Social sciences can 
add tremendous value to these developments through furthering our understanding of how 
legislation and governance can ensure that technological progress is made in an economically 
sustainable way. Without the right institutional framework in place — without vision — it 
will be very difficult to pull our society through the energy transition. More research has to 
be done into finding ways to make (multi-level) governance act as a catalyst for reaching 
climate and energy goals.
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
One of humanity’s gravest problems in the 21st century is climate change and the threat 
it poses to the state of our planet and humankind. Governments, businesses, NGOs and 
experts across the globe are considering the problem and trying to find solutions to limit 
the earth’s temperature rise by finding and implementing ways to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (most notably CO2). The limited progress that has been made has been 
subject of much scholarly study. The severity of the problem and the difficulty of reaching 
a solution make it a prime example of a (super) wicked problem. Lacking an easy test for 
a potential solution and a way of knowing precisely how our society will be affected by 
climate change, decision-makers are constrained by the choice they have to make between 
short-term gain (for example, economic gain) and the long-term gain of preventing climate 
change. The search for a logical solution begins with addressing emission sources: most 
notably the energy sector, industry, transport, and housing. The energy sector alone was 
responsible for more than two-thirds of GHG emissions in 2010. It makes sense to seek 
concerted action by addressing climate change and energy (production and use) as two 
sides of the same coin. Yet in practice it appears not to be so easy to coordinate climate and 
energy policies. This dissertation applies multi-level governance (MLG) theory to gain insight 
in how the EU’s efforts to address climate and energy policies affect all layers of governance, 
including societal and private sector actors. One expectation is that non-state actors create 
interdependencies on an international level, necessitating coordination above the state level 
because solutions cannot be provided by the national level alone. Another expectation is 
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that local actors are strengthened in their position due to their efficiency relative to national 
coordination. The third expectation is that cross-linkages between private and public actors 
lead to a far-reaching blurring of state and society.
CASE
The Port of Rotterdam Authority is one among many actors seeking to mitigate climate 
change. The EU and its member state governments need ports and industry to realise 
their energy and climate objectives. Possibilities for GHG reductions in the Rotterdam port 
area are vast and, due to the region’s large contribution to Dutch emissions, efforts to 
decarbonise in the port play an important role in overall Dutch climate change mitigation 
efforts. Rotterdam Energy Port was chosen as the main case study, within which two nested 
cases were identified: CCS and small-scale LNG. This dissertation follows a retroductive 
approach, taking the theoretical expectations as guiding lights and refining them using 
empirical data. The research approach is characterised by an in-depth qualitative analysis 
of governance mechanisms using thick descriptions, drawing heavily on expert interviews.
RESEARCH QUESTION AND FOCUS
This dissertation asks the following question: 
How do the European Union’s efforts to address climate and energy issues affect 
the Rotterdam port community, and what role can the Port of Rotterdam Authority 
play in its governance in order to reach climate and energy policy goals?
The aim of this dissertation is to explain how decisions made at EU level can impact the port 
area in Rotterdam, and how actors in the port can organise their public affairs to influence 
future policies to their benefit. Understanding the impact of EU policies can help improve 
governance in order to deal with policies more effectively. Governance is a game of stakes 
and priorities, and developing an understanding of which buttons to press, or which tools 
to use, to get certain outcomes is of great value for public affairs. The dissertation is divided 
into a section that includes a policy analysis (chapter four), a section with the two nested 
cases (chapters five and six), and a section with a comparison between the cases (chapter 
seven) and conclusions (chapter eight).
285Summary
FINDINGS
The CCS case shows a situation in which supranational coordination has provided a catch-22: 
it is deemed necessary by all parties involved, but it creates problems which persist because 
the necessary level of agreement to solve them is now absent. Initially effective regional 
coordination can be nullified by unforeseen effects of international coordination. The EU 
has succeeded in delivering a CCS Directive, though its implementation and exploitation 
lies squarely in the hands of national governments. An important finding was that national 
governments themselves spurred supranational coordination rather than other actors. While 
public-private cooperation is necessary, the predicted far-reaching blurring of state and 
society has not occurred. However, increasing (soft-)coordination attempts by the European 
Commission do enable more public-private cooperation at domestic level in order to get 
favourable arrangements at EU level. The Port of Rotterdam Authority acted as a facilitator 
in an attempt to stitch actors across layers of governance together, which befits its role. 
A secondary finding was the importance of power and uncertainty, which show how a 
technology such as CCS can become deeply political (and thus not ‘neutral’) and give insight 
into how multi-level governance helps tackle uncertainties surrounding the role of CCS in 
European climate and energy policy.
The small-scale LNG case shows that the nation state remains at the heart of governance, 
although its position is not one of an autonomous, directive authority. The cross-border 
nature of IWT and required system changes for LNG implementation necessitate EU-wide 
coordination and provide powerful incentives for regional authorities to step into the arena. 
This case also showed that market developments can spur supranational coordination and 
that peripheral actors can be empowered provided the right institutional context is in place. 
The complex dynamics between the actors in multi-level governance therefore strengthen 
mutual dependencies, further underlining the shift from state to society though without 
a far-reaching blurring of boundaries. This case had similar secondary findings to the CCS 
case, showing multiple examples of power relations impacting the outcomes of governance. 
Added uncertainty surrounding regulatory risk, economic benefits and technological progress 
lead to difficult decision-making.
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation concludes that the multi-level governance of the EU’s efforts to address 
climate change is supranational, polycentric, bounded and characterised by interdependen-
cies across all levels of governance. It is of necessity a public - private affair and impacted by 
global economic, (geo)political and technological developments which further complicate 
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decision making processes by virtue of adding more uncertainty to already highly uncertain 
visions of the future. Governance is also limited by short term considerations of those in 
power, often favouring economic benefit over the more long term benefits of sustainability. 
The conclusions stress the importance of a clear framework of policies and goals with clear 
pathways to reach them. Power and uncertainty circulate through MLG and can either keep 
the gears spinning or block them. Cooperation of all levels of governance is necessary to keep 
the engine running. Lack of participation from any of the stakeholders will negatively impact 
all layers of governance. The port community needs to be included in climate and energy 
governance by virtue of having the expertise policy-makers need, but is also dependent 
on governmental authorities for the provision of enabling policies. The Port of Rotterdam 
Authority should try to be a catalyst for sustainable development in the port area.
The value of MLG as a theory lies in showing that the authority of a national government 
can be stretched across multiple levels, yet paradoxically remain intact as well. The strength 
of MLG as a theoretical framework lies in uncovering the challenges of complex governance 
processes such as climate and energy governance. Its weakness lies in its extremely general 
and overarching nature which makes it difficult to speak in terms of causality.
RELEVANCE
This dissertation shows that MLG is well-applicable to practical cases. In wicked problems such 
as climate change, oftentimes short-term considerations win from long-term considerations. 
Power and uncertainty are therefore crucial for the governance of climate and energy 
policies. The structural analysis MLG is known for can be further improved on through 
specific recognition of the interplay between structure and agency. I have argued that, 
acknowledging that EU governance has a bounded nature, sustainability should be made 
a core assumption of energy policy instead of a goal.
The cases paint a clear picture of what EU governance means for the port authority’s posi-
tion vis-à-vis other actors, most notably governmental authorities. The Port of Rotterdam 
Authority has also been provided with recommendations based on the case study analysis. 
These recommendations will hopefully contribute to the orgware of the port — and not so 
much to the techware — and will seek to advance the Port of Rotterdam Authority’s efforts 
to achieve its goals at the EU level.
Samenvatting
INTRODUCTIE
Een van de ernstigste problemen van de mensheid in de 21ste eeuw is de klimaatverandering 
en de bedreiging die deze vormt voor de toestand van onze planeet en de mensheid. Over-
heden, bedrijven, NGO’s en experts over de hele wereld proberen oplossingen te vinden om 
de temperatuurstijging op aarde te beperken door manieren te vinden en te implementeren 
om broeikasgasemissies (met name CO2) te verminderen. De beperkte vooruitgang die is 
geboekt is onderwerp van veel wetenschappelijk onderzoek. De ernst van het probleem en 
de complexiteit maken het tot een schoolvoorbeeld van een (super) wicked problem. Bij 
gebrek aan een eenvoudig te testen oplossing en kennis over hoe onze samenleving door 
klimaatverandering zal worden beïnvloed, worden beleidsmakers beperkt door de keuze 
die ze moeten maken tussen kortetermijnwinst (bijvoorbeeld economisch gewin) en de 
langetermijnwinst om klimaatverandering te voorkomen. De zoektocht naar een logische 
oplossing begint met het aanpakken van emissiebronnen: met name de energiesector, 
industrie, transport en huisvesting. De energiesector alleen al was verantwoordelijk voor 
meer dan tweederde van de broeikasgasemissies in 2010. Het is logisch om gecoördineerde 
actie te zoeken door klimaatverandering en energie (productie en gebruik) als twee zijden 
van dezelfde medaille aan te pakken. Maar in de praktijk blijkt het niet zo eenvoudig om 
het klimaat- en energiebeleid te coördineren. Dit proefschrift past de multi-level gover-
nance (MLG) theorie toe om inzicht te krijgen in hoe de inspanningen van de EU om het 
klimaat- en energiebeleid aan te pakken van invloed zijn op alle lagen van bestuur, inclusief 
maatschappelijke actoren en de private sector. De verwachting is dat actoren buiten de 
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staat om afhankelijkheden op internationaal niveau creëren, waardoor coördinatie boven 
het niveau van de staat noodzakelijk is omdat oplossingen niet alleen op nationaal niveau 
geboden kunnen worden. Een andere verwachting is dat lokale actoren worden versterkt 
in hun positie vanwege hun efficiëntie ten opzichte van nationale coördinatie. De derde 
verwachting is dat connecties tussen private en publieke actoren leiden tot een vergaande 
vervaging van de grenzen tussen staat en samenleving.
CASUS
Het Havenbedrijf Rotterdam is een van de vele actoren die klimaatverandering tegen willen 
gaan. De EU en haar lidstaten hebben havens en industrie nodig om hun energie- en 
klimaatdoelstellingen te realiseren. De mogelijkheden voor broeikasgasreducties in het 
Rotterdamse havengebied zijn enorm en vanwege de grote bijdrage van de regio aan de 
Nederlandse uitstoot, spelen inspanningen om CO2-reductie te behalen in de haven een 
belangrijke rol in het algehele Nederlandse klimaatbeleid. Rotterdam Energy Port werd 
gekozen als de te onderzoeken casus, waarin twee subcasussen werden geïdentificeerd: CCS 
en small-scale LNG. Dit proefschrift volgt een retroductieve aanpak, waarbij de theoretische 
verwachtingen als leidraad gelden en worden verfijnd met behulp van de empirische analyse. 
De onderzoeksbenadering wordt gekenmerkt door een diepgaande kwalitatieve analyse 
van de governance mechanismen met behulp van thick descriptions, die zwaar leunen op 
interviews met experts.
ONDERZOEKSVRAAG EN FOCUS
Dit proefschrift stelt de volgende vraag:
Hoe beïnvloeden de inspanningen van de Europese Unie om klimaat- en ener-
gievraagstukken aan te pakken de Rotterdamse havengemeenschap en welke rol 
kan Havenbedrijf Rotterdam spelen in haar governance om de doelstellingen van 
klimaat- en energiebeleid te bereiken?
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om te verklaren hoe beslissingen die op EU-niveau zijn 
genomen van invloed kunnen zijn op het havengebied in Rotterdam en hoe actoren in 
de haven hun public affairs management kunnen organiseren om het toekomstige beleid 
in hun voordeel te beïnvloeden. Governance is een spel van belangen en prioriteiten en 
goed begrip van de knoppen waaraan gedraaid kan worden om bepaalde resultaten te 
bereiken is van grote waarde voor public affairs. Het proefschrift is onderverdeeld in een 
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gedeelte met een beleidsanalyse (hoofdstuk vier), een gedeelte met de twee subcasussen 
(hoofdstukken vijf en zes) en een gedeelte met de vergelijking tussen de cases (hoofdstuk 
zeven) en conclusies (hoofdstuk acht).
BEVINDINGEN
De CCS-casus toont een situatie waarin supranationale coördinatie een catch-22 heeft 
opgeleverd: CCS wordt noodzakelijk geacht door alle betrokken partijen, maar het creëert 
problemen die blijven bestaan  omdat het noodzakelijke niveau van overeenstemming om 
ze op te lossen reeds afwezig is. Aanvankelijk effectieve regionale coördinatie is teniet 
gedaan door onvoorziene effecten van internationale coördinatie. De EU is erin geslaagd een 
CCS-richtlijn te leveren, hoewel de uitvoering en exploitatie ervan volledig in handen is van 
nationale overheden. Een belangrijke vondst was dat nationale regeringen zelf supranationale 
coördinatie aanspoorden in plaats van andere actoren. Hoewel publiek-private samenwerking 
noodzakelijk is, is de voorspelde vergaande vervaging van de grenzen tussen staat en 
samenleving niet opgetreden. Door de toenemende (soft-)coördinatiepogingen van de 
Europese Commissie wel publiek-private samenwerking op binnenlands niveau opgetreden 
om gunstige regelingen op EU-niveau te ontsluiten. Het Havenbedrijf Rotterdam, passend bij 
haar rol, fungeerde als een facilitator in een poging om actoren in verschillende bestuurslagen 
samen te brengen. Een secundaire vondst was het belang van macht en onzekerheid, die 
aantonen hoe een technologie zoals CCS zeer politiek (en dus niet ‘neutraal’) kan worden 
en inzicht geven in hoe multi-level governance helpt onzekerheden rond de rol van CCS in 
Europees klimaat- en energiebeleid aan te pakken.
De small-scale LNG-casus laat zien dat de nationale overheid de kern blijft van governance, 
hoewel haar positie niet een van een volledig autonome, gezaghebbende autoriteit is. Het 
grensoverschrijdende karakter van de binnenvaart en de vereiste systeemwijzigingen voor 
LNG-implementatie vereisen coördinatie op EU-niveau en bieden krachtige stimulansen 
voor regionale autoriteiten om de arena in te stappen. Deze casus toonde ook aan dat 
marktontwikkelingen supranationale coördinatie kunnen stimuleren en dat actoren in de 
periferie effectief kunnen opereren, mits de juiste institutionele context aanwezig is. De 
complexe dynamiek tussen de actoren in multi-level governance versterkt de onderlinge 
afhankelijkheden, waardoor de verschuiving van staat naar samenleving verder wordt 
onderstreept, echter zonder een vergaande vervaging van grenzen. Deze casus had 
vergelijkbare secundaire vondsten als de CCS-casus, en liet meerdere voorbeelden zien van 
machtsverhoudingen die van invloed zijn op de resultaten van governance. Onzekerheid 
over beleidsrisico’s, economische voordelen en technologische vooruitgang leidt tot moeilijke 
besluitvorming.
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CONCLUSIES
Dit proefschrift concludeert dat de multi-level governance van de inspanningen van de EU 
om klimaatverandering aan te pakken supranationaal, polycentrisch en beperkt (bounded) 
is en gekarakteriseerd wordt door onderlinge afhankelijkheden op alle bestuursniveaus. 
Het is bij noodzaak een publiek-private aangelegenheid die wordt beïnvloed door mondiale 
economische, (geo)politieke en technologische ontwikkelingen die besluitvormings-processen 
verder bemoeilijken door meer onzekerheid toe te voegen aan reeds zeer onzekere toekom-
stvisies. Governance wordt ook beperkt door kortetermijnoverwegingen van degenen 
die aan de macht zijn, waarbij vaak de economie wint van de langetermijnvoordelen van 
duurzaamheid. De conclusies benadrukken het belang van een duidelijke beleidsvisie en 
doelstellingen met heldere paden om ze te bereiken. Macht en onzekerheid circuleren door 
MLG en kunnen de motor laten draaien of blokkeren. Samenwerking van alle bestuursniveaus 
is noodzakelijk om de motor draaiende te houden. Gebrek aan participatie van een van 
de belanghebbenden zal een negatief effect hebben op alle lagen van het bestuur. De 
havengemeenschap moet worden opgenomen in klimaat- en energiegovernance op grond 
van de daar beschikbare expertise die beleidsmakers nodig hebben, maar de haven is ook 
afhankelijk van overheden voor het bieden van beleid. Het Havenbedrijf Rotterdam moet 
proberen een katalysator te zijn voor duurzame ontwikkelingen in het havengebied.
De waarde van MLG als theorie ligt in het aantonen dat de autoriteit van een nationale 
overheid over meerdere niveaus kan worden uitgerekt, maar paradoxaal genoeg ook intact 
blijft. De kracht van MLG als theoretisch kader ligt in het blootleggen van de uitdagingen 
van complexe bestuursprocessen zoals klimaat- en energiegovernance. Haar zwakte ligt in 
de buitengewoon algemene en overkoepelende aard ervan, die het moeilijk maakt om te 
spreken in termen van causaliteit.
RELEVANTIE
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat MLG goed toepasbaar is in de praktijk. Bij wicked problems zoals 
klimaatverandering wint de korte termijn het vaak van langetermijnoverwegingen. Macht 
en onzekerheid zijn daarom cruciaal voor de governance van klimaat- en energiebeleid. De 
structurele analyse waarom MLG bekend staat, kan verder worden verbeterd door specifieke 
(h)erkenning van het samenspel tussen structuur en agency. Ik heb betoogd dat, gezien 
EU-governance bounded is, duurzaamheid een centrale aanname moet zijn van energiebeleid 
in plaats van een doel.
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De casussen geven een duidelijk beeld van wat EU-governance betekent voor de positie 
van de havenautoriteit tegenover andere actoren, met name overheden. Het Havenbedrijf 
Rotterdam heeft ook aanbevelingen ontvangen op basis van de case study-analyse. Deze 
aanbevelingen zullen hopelijk bijdragen aan de orgware van de haven - en niet zozeer aan 
de techware - om de inspanningen van het Havenbedrijf Rotterdam om haar doelen op 
EU-niveau te bereiken bevorderen.

Podsumowanie
WPROWADZENIE
Jednym z najpoważniejszych problemów ludzkości w XXI wieku jest zmiana klimatu i 
zagrożenie, jakie stanowi ona dla stanu naszej planety i całej ludzkości. Rządy, przedsiębiorstwa, 
organizacje pozarządowe i eksperci na całym świecie rozważają problem i próbują znaleźć 
rozwiązania, które ograniczą wzrost temperatury Ziemi poprzez znalezienie i wdrożenie 
sposobów ograniczenia emisji gazów cieplarnianych (przede wszystkim CO2). Ograniczony 
do tej pory postęp był przedmiotem wielu badań naukowych. Nasilenie problemu i trudność 
w znalezieniu rozwiązania sprawiają, że jest to doskonały przykład problemów o dużej skali 
skomplikowania, tak zwany (super) wicked problem. Brak łatwego testu na potencjalne 
rozwiązanie i sposób dokładnego poznania wpływu zmian klimatu na społeczeństwo sprawia, 
że  decydenci są ograniczani wyborem, jakiego muszą dokonać między krótkoterminowym 
zyskiem (na przykład zyskiem gospodarczym) a długofalowymi korzyściami zapobiega-
nia zmianom klimatycznym (tzw. rozwój ‘zielonej ekonomii’). Poszukiwanie logicznego 
rozwiązania zaczyna się od adresowania źródeł emisji: w szczególności sektora energety-
cznego, przemysłu, transportu i mieszkalnictwa. Sektor energetyczny był odpowiedzialny 
za ponad dwie trzecie emisji gazów cieplarnianych w 2010 r. Sensowne jest poszukiwanie 
wspólnych działań, zajmujących się zmianą klimatu i energią (produkcja i wykorzystanie) jako 
różnymi obliczami tego samego zagadnienia. W praktyce wydaje się jednak, że koordynacja 
polityk klimatycznych i energetycznych nie jest tak łatwa. W tej rozprawie wykorzystano teorię 
zarządzania wielopoziomowego (Multi-level Governance — MLG), aby uzyskać wgląd w to, w 
jaki sposób starania UE dotyczące polityki klimatycznej i energetycznej wpływają na wszystkie 
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poziomy zarządzania, w tym na podmioty z sektora społecznego i prywatnego. Oczekuje 
się, że podmioty niepaństwowe tworzą współzależności na poziomie międzynarodowym, 
co wymaga koordynacji ponad poziomem krajowym. Bo wiadomo, że rozwiązań nie można 
zapewnić wyłącznie na poziomie krajowym. Innym oczekiwaniem jest wzmocnienie pozycji 
lokalnych podmiotów ze względu na ich skuteczność w ramach koordynacji krajowej. Trzecie 
oczekiwanie polega na tym, że wzajemne powiązania między podmiotami prywatnymi i 
publicznymi prowadzą do daleko idącej niwelacji różnic pomiędzy kompetencjami państwa 
i społeczeństwa.
STUDIUM PRZYPADKU
Zarząd Portu w Rotterdamie jest jednym z wielu podmiotów, które usiłują złagodzić zmiany 
klimatyczne. UE i rządy jej państw członkowskich potrzebują portów i przemysłu, aby 
zrealizować cele energetyczne i klimatyczne. Możliwości redukcji gazów cieplarnianych na 
obszarze portu w Rotterdamie są ogromne, a ze względu na duży udział tego regionu w 
całości holenderskiej emisji, wysiłki zmierzające właśnie do obniżenia emisji gazów w porcie 
odgrywają ważną rolę w holenderskich usiłowaniach łagodzenia zmiany klimatu. Jako 
główne studium zagadnienia wybrano Rotterdam Energy Port, w ramach którego zidenty-
fikowano dwie niezależne od siebie, choć uzupełniające się, przypadki: CCS (wychwytywanie 
i składowanie dwutlenku węgla) i LNG (ciekły gaz ziemny na małą skalę). Zastosowane w 
tym doktoracie rozważania opierają się na retrodukcyjnym podejściu, przyjmując teoretyczne 
założenia badawcze i udoskonalając je za pomocą danych empirycznych. Podejście badawcze 
charakteryzuje się głęboką analizą jakościową mechanizmów zarządzania z wykorzystaniem 
szczegółowych opisów, w dużej mierze opartych na wywiadach eksperckich.
PYTANIE BADAWCZE
Doktorat ten stawia następujące pytanie:
W jaki sposób starania Unii Europejskiej dotyczące kwestii klimatycznych i ener-
getycznych wpływają na autonomię społeczności portowej w Rotterdamie i jaką 
rolę władze portowe odgrywają w zarządzaniu tą społecznością, w celu osiągnięcia 
pożądanej przez siebie polityki klimatycznej i energetycznej?
Celem niniejszego doktoratu jest wyjaśnienie, w jaki sposób decyzje podejmowane na 
poziomie UE mogą wpłynąć na politykę wewnętrzną portu w Rotterdamie a zatem w jaki 
sposób podmioty funkcjonujące w porcie mogłyby zorganizować swój ‘lobbying’ mający 
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zapewnić im pożądane działania polityczne na ich korzyść. Zrozumienie wpływu realnej 
polityki UE może pomóc w usprawnieniu zarządzania i ułatwić efektywność wyborów 
strategicznych. Ponieważ zarządzanie jest grą interesów i priorytetów, to właśnie użycie 
odpowiednich narzędzi perswazji może mieć ogromny wpływ na stworzenie właściwego 
wizerunku pomagającego w realizacji tychże wyborów. Rozprawa podzielona jest na 
osiem rozdziałów, z których najważniejsze to: rozdział czwarty zawierający analizę polityki 
zarządzania klimatem i energią w Unii i w Holandii, rozdział piąty i szósty skupiający się na 
analizie wybranych przykładów CCS i LNG, rozdział siódmy dokonuje ich porównania, a 
rozdział ósmy jest podsumowaniem całości rozprawy.
EFEKTY BADAŃ
Sprawa CCS pokazuje sytuację, w której koordynacja na poziomie UE ujawniła jasność 
problemu wszystkim zainteresowanym stronom. Mianowicie, niezależnie od faktu że strony 
zgadzają się co do niezbędności CCS, okazuje się że niezbędny poziom porozumienia w celu 
rozwiązania związanego z CCS problemem jest niewystarczający. Początkowo skutecznej 
koordynacji regionalnej grozi jednak unieważnienie przez nieprzewidziane skutki koordynacji 
międzynarodowej. UE udało się wprowadzic´ dyrektywę w sprawie CCS, chociaż jej wdrożenie 
leży w rękach rządów krajowych. Ważnym odkryciem było to, że same rządy krajowe 
pobudzały koordynację ponadnarodową, w przeciwieństwie do innych podmiotów. Podczas 
gdy współpraca publiczno-prywatna jest konieczna, to jednak nie nastąpiła przewidywana 
daleko idąca niwelacja kompetencji publicznych i prywatnych. Jednak zwiększenie przez 
Komisję Europejską delikatnych prób koordynacji CCS pozwala na większą publiczno-
prywatną współpracę na poziomie krajowym po to, aby podnieśc´ skutecznośc´ korzystnych 
rozwiązań na poziomie europejskim. Zarząd Portu w Rotterdamie zadziałał jako pośrednik 
według sobie przynależnej roli, próbując zjednoczyc´ podmioty na różnych poziomach 
zarządzania. Drugim odkryciem było jak bardzo dążenie do władzy i jednoczesne zagubienie 
pozbawiają to zagadnienie niezbędnej neutralności, poprzez jej upolitycznienie. To prowadzi 
do wniosku, że wielopoziomowe sprawowanie rządów pomaga rozwiązywac´ problemy 
związane z rolą CCS w europejskiej polityce klimatycznej i energetycznej.
Sprawa LNG pokazuje, w sposób jeszcze bardziej jednoznaczny, że państwo narodowe 
pozostaje w centrum sprawowania rządów, chociaż jego pozycja nie jest autonomicznym 
organem decyzyjnym. Transgraniczny charakter transportu śródlądowego i wymagane 
zmiany systemowe w zakresie wdrażania LNG wymagają koordynacji na szczeblu UE. To jest 
gwarantem zapewnienia potężnej zachęty dla władz regionalnych do podjęcia wyzwania. 
Sprawa ta pokazała również, że mechanizmy rynkowe ukierunkowane na rozwój stymulują 
koordynację ponadnarodową, a podmioty peryferyjne zostaną przez to wzmocnione, pod 
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warunkiem że zaistnieję odpowiedni kontekst instytucjonalny. Kompleksowa dynamika 
dotycząca podmiotów wielopoziomowego sprawowania rządów wzmacnia wzajemne 
zależności, dodatkowo podkreślając płynnośc´ granic między państwem a społeczeństwem. 
Przy czym nie konstatuję się niwelacji różnic pomiędzy ich kompetencjami. Ten przypadek 
wykazał podobne wtórne ustalenia w sprawie CCS, i pokazał wpływ jaki władza w znac-
zeniu obiektywnym może miec´ na wyniki zarządzania. Niepewnośc´ związana z ryzykiem 
regulacyjnym, korzyściami ekonomicznymi i postępem technicznym utrudnia dodatkowo 
proces podejmowania decyzji.
KONKLUZJE
W mojej pracy doktorskiej próbowałam udowodnic´, że wielopoziomowe sprawowanie 
rządów UE w zakresie przeciwdziałania zmianom klimatycznym ma charakter ponadnarodowy, 
policentryczny, ograniczony (bounded) i charakteryzuje się współzależnością na wszystkich 
szczeblach zarządzania. Zachodzi zatem konieczność aby traktować to zagadnienie jako 
sprawę publiczno-prywatną. Chociaż wpływ globalnego rozwoju ekonomicznego, (geo)
politycznego i technologicznego, poprzez swoją złożoność, dodatkowo komplikuje procesy 
decyzyjne i nie prowadzi w linii prostej do jednoznacznej wizji przyszłości. Zarządzanie 
tym aspektem jest silnie ograniczone krótkoterminowymi planami sprawującymi władzę, 
często wybierającymi korzyści ekonomiczne w przeciwieństwie do długoterminowych 
korzyści płynących z rozwoju ‘zielonej ekonomii’. W konkluzjach podkreślono duże znac-
zenie jednoznaczności wizji rozwojowej, w tym jednoznaczności celów i metod osiągania 
założonych zamierzeń. Wspomniana już władza, w sensie obiektywnym, i związana z nią 
niepewność wyborów na różnych poziomach mają zatem największy wpływ na zarządzanie. 
Współpraca na wszystkich poziomach jest niezbędna dla utrzymania pożądanego rozwoju 
‘zielonej ekonomii’. Brak uczestnictwa ze strony któregokolwiek z filarów rozwoju wpływa 
niewątpliwie negatywnie na wszystkie poziomy zarządzania. Społeczność portowa musi być 
systematycznie włączana do zarządzania klimatem i energią ze względu na posiadaną wiedzę 
specjalistyczną, której brakuje często decydentom politycznym. Strategia portu pozostaje 
jednak mimo wszystko w dużej mierze zależna od polityki krajowej i międzynarodowej. 
Zarząd portu w Rotterdamie powinien starać się być katalizatorem rozwoju ‘zielonej eko-
nomii’ na terenie portu.
Wartość teorii MLG polega na wykazaniu, że autorytet rządu narodowego operuje na 
wielu poziomach, pozostając paradoksalnie koncentryczny. Siła MLG jako teorii polega na 
odkryciu wyzwań złożonych procesów zarządzania, takich jak zarządzanie klimatem i energią. 
Słabość natomiast jest niezwykle ogólnej naturze tejże teorii, co sprawia, że  trudno jest w 
niej operować kategorią przyczynowości.
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ZASTOSOWANIE
W moim doktoracie wykazałam, że teoria MLG ma wysokie zastosowanie do analizy prakty-
cznych przypadków. W problemach o dużej skali skomplikowania (wicked problems), takich 
jak zmiany klimatyczne, często zwyciężają względy krótkoterminowe. Dążenie do władzy i 
jednoczesne zagubienie mają zatem kluczowe znaczenie dla zarządzania polityką klimatyczną 
i energetyczną. MLG, sprzyjająco się analizą struktury zarządzania, może być ulepszona dzięki 
specyficznemu rozpoznaniu wzajemnej zależności pomiędzy własną strukturą a sposobem 
zarządzania nią (agency). Przekonywałam, iż uznając, że zarządzanie UE ma charakter 
ograniczony, rozwój ‘zielonej ekonomii’ powinien stać się podstawowym aksjomatem 
strategii polityki energetycznej, a nie jej celem.
Przytoczone przeze mnie w studium przypadku zagadnienia, dają jasny obraz konsekwencji 
wpływu jakie zarządzanie w ramach UE ma na pozycję portu w Rotterdamie i jego stosunku 
do innych podmiotów. Moje studium zagadnienia zawiera wiele praktycznych porad dla 
portu w Rotterdamie. Pozostaje mi zatem mieć nadzieję, że porady te przyczynią się do 
stworzenia lepszej strategii organizacji portu w celu zwiększenia efektywności wysiłków 
zmierzających do zadawalającego dialogu w ramach Unii Europejskiej.
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